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Religion and Philosophy
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His cheeks are as a bed of spices, as sweet flowers: his lips like lilies, dropping sweet smelling myrrh.	His cheeks are like beds of spices, exhaling perfumes. His lips are hyacinths, dropping flowing myrrh.
His hands are as gold rings set with beryl: his belly is as bright ivory overlaid with sapphires.	His hands are rods of gold, studded with Tarshish-stones. His body is a column of ivory, adorned with sapphires.
His legs are as pillars of marble, set upon sockets of fine gold: his countenance is as Lebanon, excellent as the cedars.	His legs are pillars of marble, set on bases of gold. His form is like Lebanon, as choice as cedars.
His mouth is most sweet: yea, he is altogether lovely. This is my beloved and this is my friend, O daughters of Jerusalem."	His mouth is sweet, and he is altogether lovely. Such is my beloved, and such my lover, O maidens of Jerusalem."

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THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

Volume VIII JANUARY 1928 Number 1

DEGREES OF AGGRESSIVENESS IN RELIGION

DANIEL J. FLEMING
Union Theological Seminary, New York

In the rethinking now going on with reference to almost every phase of the missionary movement, methods in evangelism must come up for consideration. Attitudes and objectives in our missionary endeavor are increasingly questioned even by liberal-minded adherents of other faiths. They often challenge us by our own standards, saying that a given method is un-Christian or not in accord with the spirit of Christ. Especially in India in recent years has this challenge been recurrent and searching. It may help us to reappraise our positions if we consider several scales of choice indicating the range of possibilities in aggressiveness. Actual missionary procedure for any given person is very likely a combination of factors from several such groups.

I

The factor in proselytization most often assailed has to do with inducements. The most aggressive type under this head is the use of physical force, persecution, threats of loss, veiled coercion, or undue pressure. Few would defend these methods now; but it is well to remember that the conversion of most of Europe, with the exception of Great Britain and Ireland, was hastened by the use of physical force. We are told that "From the days of Constantine down to a period well within the nineteenth century comparatively few Christians would have rejected the proposition that it was lawful, and in many cases advisable, that missionaries should avail themselves of political influences in order to facilitate the prosecution of their work."[1] The connection of missions with the gunboat policy in China comes the nearest to this type in modern times.

Less aggressive than coercion is the use of political, social, educational, and economic inducements in such a way as to be the determining motive in baptism. A reliable historian of missions tells us that "cases are to be found in all parts of the mission field in which converts have been induced to make a profession of their Christian faith in the hope that they might secure for themselves material advantages, and in some instances the responsibility for arousing this hope lies with the missionaries."[2] Our critics claim that methods amounting practically to bribery are still used. This form of recruiting non-Christians to Christianity has recently been compared by a leading non-Christian[3] to the way laborers are recruited to colonies or soldiers to regiments by prospects of social and economic amelioration, better food, better clothing, better housing, and a more protected life. Instances (rare, no doubt) are pointed out where remedies have been given free to Christians while a small sum was charged to non-Christians, or where in a boarding school less consideration and no presents were given to those who remained non-Christian. Even with the best of intentions it is hard to prevent irreligious conversion, for in many areas becoming a Christian does lead to social advancement of one sort or another, so that it is very difficult to exclude arguments appealing to desire for such advancement.

This type of evangelism, where practiced, is usually defended by claiming that while no great inner change has taken place before baptism, even the nominal identification with Christianity gives the opportunity for definite and constructive Christian nurture, or that at least the second and third generations become Christian. Many missionaries following this plan realize that the conditions which they set for entrance into the church are low. But their object may not be to swell the statistics of conversions (as some of their critics suppose), but to bring as many "inquirers" as possible into social relationship where definitely Christian influence may be brought to bear upon them.

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[1] C. H. Robinson, *History of Christian Missions*, p. 18.

[2] C. H. Robinson, *History of Christian Missions*.

[3] *Indian Social Reformer*, XXXVI, 686.

There is a third position, less aggressive than what tends toward bribery, viz., the use of material, medical, educational, and economic means, not to secure converts, but as advantages which can be obtained only on condition that the people in question listen to the Christian message. As illustrations one may cite the dispensing of medicine in hospitals only after listening to an evangelist; equipping a bath-house to which poor Chinese women may come from their unheated houses, and where a Bible woman talks to them about Christianity while they wait their turn; having half a movie on Friday, half at Sunday school; giving buns to hungry men at the close of an evangelistic service; giving brightly colored cards to Buddhist children to get them to attend Sunday school; having an evening class in English providing the pupils attend a Bible period following it; *zenana* visiting consisting largely of giving advice, teaching a bit of fancy work, and, if the way opens, a Bible story.

Even less aggressive than offering advantages conditional on hearing the message is the use of material, medical, educational, and economic means in such association with the Christian message as to act as attractions, but so as to leave listening to the message absolutely optional. For example, a missionary wanted to take advantage of the great desire on the part of the Japanese to learn English. He started evening classes. Between the first English period and the second he put a Bible period, which was made optional. In a certain mission hospital there is a lecture room leading off from the place where patients wait their turn. In this room instruction concerning Christianity and the development of spiritual life is given. Patients are invited in to hear this teaching, and they know that the doctor in charge considers this the most valuable element in what he has to offer. But they also know that they will receive impartial medical attention even if they do not attend this teaching. A reading-room is opened in a certain station with newspapers and other popular reading material provided in the hope that the patrons will read the religious literature which is also conveniently displayed.

There are those, however, who would reject all allurements for securing a hearing. They would depend on the example of disinterested relief of human sorrow, suffering, and need, and of all noble, joyous, and unselfish living, with the definite concern that others seeing this as the natural expression of their religious life would be drawn to their source of life and power. They would attempt to demonstrate a superior life and thus draw people to seek that power which gives dynamic for such a life.

Sixthly, and least aggressive from the standpoint of the non-Christian, are those who believe in meeting the human needs of folk and in noble, joyous, unselfish living for no other reason than that such a kind of life is highest. They believe that ministry to human need should be the response spontaneously made by ability to meet that need. Such service, such life, should be the natural expression of a Christian, and not self-consciously used as means to something else. Many medical missionaries would repudiate in theory and in practice the idea that what they do is merely to secure an audience for a spoken or an acted message. They would hold that the ministry of healing is an essential part of the work of God through the church, and that the service thus rendered is a natural and vital expression of the spirit of Christ, who served men because he loved them. Advocates of this position want individuals to be inquirers on their own initiative.

II

Another group of decisions centers about one's conception of the best immediate religious path for a person to take. Among these the most aggressive type aims to bring into existing churches by the process of baptism people who accept Jesus as their Lord and Savior, even though this takes them away from one or more of the groups to which they belong (family, caste, clan, tribe, village, religious body). Advocates of this position, while not saying, with Rome, that membership in the church is essential to salvation, yet stress its unique importance as a means of grace. They believe profoundly in the church as a Christian institution and protest the futility and waste of individualism. They hold that continued membership in the old group is incompatible with being a Christian, or at least with satisfactory Christian growth. Many non-Christians (Hindus, in particular) would not object if members of their family changed their ideal, faith, or religious loyalty so long as they continued in the family connection. That to which they object is not change in belief, but change in social and communal life. Where (as to a very great extent in India) baptism has become the occasion for an inevitable change in group relationships, critics of missions say that improper emphasis has been put on changed community affiliation.

Unfortunately it seems easy to depart from the high ideals which justify this objective in missions. It is so easy to become partisan and want our religion to triumph because it is ours. One's dominating thought may become the advancement of the number under one's own religious label, with no interest or insight to see results which do not bring credit and glory to this particular group.

This emphasis on mere numbers is usually, when present at all, more or less unconscious. And yet missionaries have undoubtedly given the impression to some observers that this is their actual program, even though theoretically they could give a much worthier motivation. Tagore warns a young missionary against being "like a coolie-recruiter trying to bring coolies to his master's tea garden." Others call such a program "soul-snatching." Jewish leaders who have spoken frankly say that we give the impression of being either coolly indifferent, or as anxious to approach them only with the express object of subverting their faith and making proselytes. This type of missionary creates the impression that his interest is merely in finding more sheep for the fold, not in the sheep themselves. The result is making people Christians rather than Christian.

The sending agencies have sometimes unwittingly stimulated this degradation of evangelization to a campaign for numbers. Missionaries not infrequently testify that they feel an undue pressure upon them to produce numerical results that can be passed on to the giving constituency. The response given to success-stories has tempted some to press unduly for results that can be tabulated.

A second position does not insist on baptism into an existing church, but attempts to lead men to loyalty to Jesus as teacher, Savior, and highest revelation of God to man without emphasizing the necessity of any particular organization or label. Advocates of this position may witness to the need of spiritual fellowship, but they are willing to leave it to the people concerned to decide how they shall group themselves. This position is well illustrated in the following quotation:

> The missionary's chief hope is concerned with a still smaller group, whose size is unknown to him, but for whose enlargement he daily strives and daily prays—the company of those who have made a decision, intelligent, deliberate, whole-hearted, a decision to live their lives as sons of the Great Father in the spirit of Jesus Christ. "Conversion," "Regeneration," "surrender," "consecration" were the old words, and they were, and they are, good words. But the thing back of them is better than the words and than the particular way in which this thing is brought about; the dedication of body, mind, and soul to the will of God is interpreted by Jesus Christ. For when a man so commits himself, with or without a resulting change in his ecclesiastical affiliation, the missionary is assured that a force has been started which will work miracles in that man's world

—his world of personal, domestic, community, political relationships. This is leaven hid in three measures of meal; the whole will be leavened.[4]

There are various reasons which lead missionaries to take this position. Some come to it because they feel that thousands have never seen the meaning of the Gospel in life inasmuch as it has been made synonymous with baptism or an organization. Christianity has appeared as a membership rather than as a way. Some are influenced by a deep desire for an indigenous church, and they feel this can never be realized until the people are not only left free, but also encouraged to interpret Jesus for themselves and to determine in what sort of an organization, if any, they will embody their new faith. Still others, from an apologetic standpoint, have seen that the person of Christ is the one priceless treasure they have to give. They want to convert people to Jesus, not to the church or even to Christianity. They are willing to leave as quite secondary or to resent as actual obstacles all other considerations, however helpful as stepping-stones these may have proved to be in other places and at other times.

A third position attempts to forward better relations and understandings between adherents of different religions, so that all religions may have the fullest freedom to develop the best that is in them on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. The committee of the Federal Council of Churches in America on good will between Jews and Christians has definitely stated that its aim is not proselytization, although this does not mean that the various federated churches have given up evangelism. A work in China that has received wide approval by Christian leaders is described by its missionary head as "a place where there is no propaganda for any special religion, a place where religious people can meet and talk over religious matters and be together in worship and meditation."

This position is further illustrated by the committee on missions to Jews, of the English Presbyterian church, which concludes a restatement of policy as follows:

---

[4] Howard S. Bliss, *The Modern Missionary*, p. 28.

> We are aware how novel may seem this general idea of creating by gentle means a new atmosphere in place of the old one of isolation or worse. Let us have the courage simply to get closer to one another, content that our respective creeds should shine through character and conduct, and be revealed in the measure of love one to another. We ought to realize that Truth eventually makes its own supreme appeal to the human mind. It is best to be self-convinced. Jews feel that their religion, rightly understood, has an invaluable contribution to Christian theology. We believe that in the facts regarding Jesus as they appear to us, we have truth of inestimable significance regarding the self-revelation of God to man. May it not be that the light will be made manifest to both of us, not by treading the paths of controversy, but when we endeavor to co-operate in the things that are pure and holy and of good report?

The advocates of this position would say that if mutual understanding and respect exists with reference to the various religions, each person would be willing to hear and to examine the good news of the other's religion. Some would acknowledge that this might well be a part of the aim of every missionary, and yet be convinced that it is a quite inadequate main aim in missionary work.

Farthest removed from aggressive evangelism as commonly understood is a fourth position, viz., the revival of the best in the old faiths. Professor G. Stanley Hall, doubtless more under the influence of his recapitulation theory than of any direct touch with the non-Christian faiths, summarized his advice as follows:

> Hence the missionary's first care should be to revive the best of all the old beliefs and rites and restore them to their highest estate, and to make the best possible Mussulmans, Confucianists, and Buddhists; and then and on this basis educate, evolve to the next higher stage, and then the next, always mindful of the peril of great ideas in small souls, of radical novelties and innovations in rutty and rusty brains. We should be ever mindful of the greater good and of future conditions, and not allow these to be eclipsed by immediate individual needs. Toleration should be stretched to its uttermost if need be. We should be first of all sure to thoroughly understand the native view and custom, giving it the benefit of every doubt, should conserve everything and attack nothing so far as it is

possible, ignore, overlook, wait long before antagonizing, think much as well as pray, be sure that the natives respect everything in their traditions and life that can be made worthy of respect, and think as highly of it all as possible, trust to growth as well as to sudden conquest; in a word, fulfil rather than destroy.[5]

III

A third group of decisions involves one's educational theory, especially from the standpoint of respect for personality. Most objectionable from this standpoint is the expressed contempt for another religion, or the abuse and misrepresentation of it. Dr. Farquhar tells us that "down to some ten or twelve years ago a considerable number of Christian books published in India contained harsh judgments, denunciatory language, and, here and there, statements that were seriously inaccurate. But that is now almost altogether a thing of the past."[6] More generally he has pointed out that in many fields there has been something hard and forbidding in the traditional attitude of the missionary body to things native, and that the mode of missionary life and the forms and channels of mission effort took shape in an age of contempt.[7] In early Protestant efforts in South America popular interest could be aroused by diatribes against the unpopular clergy and the church they represented, and there were evangelicals who did not fail to make the most of the opportunity. But most missionaries have long since learned that a critical denunciatory attitude of mind, or even the mere appearance of such an attitude, insures defeat in evangelistic work, however zealous and devoted the evangelist may be.

Only less objectionable is conversion by contrast—acquiescence in an environment of misery and degradation as being that in which converts may be most successfully attracted to Christianity. Evidently a Jewish leader has to take this state of mind into consideration. The President of the London University Zionist Society had been describing how, under Turkish rule, Palestine has been a stagnant country, burying within itself the resources with which nature has endowed it, sunk in mental lethargy, disfigured by poverty and disease, and incapable of giving to the world any message. The Zionists hope to change these conditions. It was assumed that the Palestine thus changed will afford a less favorable field for winning converts to Christianity. "But Jews cannot believe," he writes,[8] "that that consideration will weigh against Zionism with the great body of enlightened Christians."

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[5] G. Stanley Hall, *Journal of Race Development*, I, 141–42.

[6] J. N. Farquhar, *The Crown of Hinduism*, p. 35.

[7] J. N. Farquhar, *International Review of Missions*, III, 421.

Very nearly this position must have been held, possibly unconsciously, by a leader in missionary effort who, after describing various reform movements in non-Christian religions, added, "These efforts are, unfortunately, succeeding to a great degree, and many are thus being kept away from Christianity who were open to receive it." Would not a Ceylon missionary also come under this head who regretted that the writings of certain Hindu saints are so good that they make it difficult to get people to adopt Christianity? Instead of welcoming all that is best in what one finds, and thanking God for such good material with which to build, the existence of such material is half resented.

Thirdly, one could attempt to undermine the faith of the uneducated or of those unskilled in argument. Intelligent non-Christians often resent what to them seems like taking an unfair advantage when argument or discussion is carried on between persons of relatively unequal standing and education. It is possible for a person possessing superior knowledge and a better understanding of how experience may be controlled to withhold material aspects of the situation so that an inquirer may respond only to manipulated and loaded situations and may make his choice in the light of facts which are only partial and selected. Western science may be used in this way to break down confidence in sacred books, or to show how religious beliefs are merest superstition. For example, a missionary "took great care not to let the opportunity slip to impress upon them the reasonableness of doubt about the religious teachings of books that manifestly err in matters of science of which they treat."[9] To do this and not to show at the same time that the Christian Scriptures have to meet the same difficulty would be considered by some partisan and unfair.

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[8] *Bible Lands* (July, 1919), pp. 355–56.

Less objectionable, but still unsatisfactory to many, would be the attempt to fix a person's choice, without helping or encouraging him to make a choice, so as to prevent his making a free choice when he has grown older or more experienced. It is not difficult to take advantage of an immature inquirer by fixing upon him rigid habits of thought or action that have not received the extent of approval possible at that time. By the use of authority as a representative of Western Christianity, or by the sanctions of social pressure or tradition, persons may be so emotionally conditioned with reference to certain habits or beliefs that they are never thereafter really free. In many an area in India the use of the common communion cup was introduced in such a way as practically to fix for life the choice of the people concerned, so that emotionally they are incapable of opening the question as to whether individual cups might not be better. There are those who have no shadow of doubt about the supreme value of what they have to give, and yet who would, from the standpoint of respect for personality, shrink from imposing or fixing even these values through indoctrination in the limited sense used in this paragraph.

A fifth position is frank propagandism in its good sense. This is an ambiguous word, so that for the purpose of this article let us define propagandism as systematic work at propagating any opinion, creed, or practice. Under this head would come the familiar aggressive proclamation of the Christian message, including street preaching and newspaper evangelism. This is a standard missionary method, and many of us, earnestly convinced as we are that salvation is in Him who is at once the Way, the Truth, and the Life, will not be disposed to question its validity. And yet it may be well to note that certain educators doubt the efficiency of mere preaching or mere ideas to change life. They would say that knowledge is functional, that it is best received and organized in relation to the enlargement and control of actual present life and experience. Their concern would be, not how to bring about the acceptance of an idea, but how to get that into the experience of people which will mean the construction of new habits and attitudes. From their standpoint behavior must be changed through experience; it cannot be changed through the mere impact of ideas.[10]

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[9] Joseph Warren, *A Glance Backward*, p. 134.

Others point out that from an educational standpoint the essential aspect of the propagandist's method is that he fixes the end in advance; he settles ahead where he wishes the people to come out. While acknowledging that this may be wise or necessary in emergencies, they do not approve of it as a general educational method.

From educational reasons, therefore, and not necessarily from any less conviction or any less keenness in having people share the inestimable values in Jesus Christ, there are those who take a sixth position. They aim for the development of alert, critically minded, creative men and women, appreciative in an intelligent way of the best and finest in all life, even though they may not come to agree with the missionaries. They would enter with others into a co-operative search for the good life through facing actual life-situations without unduly weighting the Christian message, but with a sincere sharing of testimony as to what each has found and drawing help from any likely source including Christianity.

A missionary of this type would want each man to discover the best for himself in his own way, and to criticize in his own way his own actions and the institutions about him. His function as a missionary would be to open up horizons for men, to bring them in contact with ranges of life that they have not touched before, and in particular with Jesus. He would give his own beliefs and convictions as part of the data, but he would want to help people to learn how to solve their own problems.

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[10] Cf. M. P. Follett, *Creative Experience*, pp. 200–205.

IV.

There are certain tests that may help us to appraise the various positions that have been thus briefly sketched. In each group one should select that position which seems most in accord with the spirit, practice, and teachings of Christ. Which shows most respect for personality? Which would intelligent and liberal non-Christians most approve? Which would pass the test of the Golden Rule that we should do to others as we would wish others to do to us? With which would you be willing to have a Buddhist or Moslem or Hindu approach your child or your coreligionist? Which will achieve the best results in the long run? What is the testimony of history as to the ways which have been used with the most success and approval? Which method is the most effective in winning inner conviction and autonomous loyalty? What would comparative case studies, i.e., the subsequent careers of individuals dealt with by the various methods, indicate as to what is best?

In the three scales of aggressiveness that have been outlined the writer certainly does not assume that either the most aggressive or the least aggressive is the position most to be approved. Other considerations manifestly will be determinative. Furthermore, it is impractical to use the same approach to every situation. To relieve the sufferings of a starving coolie may be a commendable way to attract him to one's Christ, but it could not be applied to the winning of a wealthy merchant. Similarly, only some merchants, only some students, would be influenced by the method of sharing life's experiences. It should be possible, however, in rereading these positions to mark with a zero those positions which you regard as utterly unworthy of a Christian; with an asterisk those that you would use under some conditions but not in others; and with a plus those that you consider valid in all circumstances. May all the rethinking of our evangelistic attitudes bring us closer to the quality of touch our Master had with men.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

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The nature of religion is revealed by comparison with other interests and activities which arise in the history of culture. For example, there is at all stages some ideational experience involved for human beings, but in religion it is kept subject to the fulfilment of practical interests. In primitive cults thinking goes on in a kind of reverie which gives rise to mythologies. This associative thinking is the oldest and the most natural kind of mental activity. It is subject to chance impressions and generates the most grotesque fancies. The folk-lore of all peoples abounds in stories of the strangest imaginings, mingled with the events of daily life. The world is peopled with spirits of undefined powers and caprice. Legendary beings throng through nature and take possession of man. There are no bounds between the real and the imagined. The strangest marvels happen. Inanimate things come alive. Animals speak with more than human wisdom. Men are transformed into lower forms and invisible shapes. The dead are alive and the living pass out of the body in their dreams. Words and signs have magic power. Omens are given in cloud and star, by the entrails of birds, and by the dew and hail. The sun is stayed by the word of a prophet. The serpent tempts a woman and the race bears the heavy burden of her sin, generation after generation. An axe head floats in water, a man lives in the body of a whale, a cruse of oil is miraculously replenished, city walls fall at the blast of trumpets, seas divide their waters for tribes to pass and then overwhelm pursuing armies, manna falls from heaven for the hungry, water bursts out of the rock for the famished.

Such are the groping efforts of man's infant thought endeavoring to explain the events of life and the relation of the mysteries which surround him. Nor does he leave of a sudden that fanciful, mythical world for one more clearly defined and ordered. By the side of a more rational conception these old fancies still persist. Wise men, to this day, live next door to dark superstition, and in some corner of their being are likely to harbor some old irrationality of myth or magic. But this mythology was not the main stream of man's life in any age. All the time he was carrying on a life of action, loving and fighting, sowing and reaping, building and migrating, dancing and singing. He built cities and sailed the seas; he invented tools and developed the arts. Clumsily and haltingly but persistently he extended his power and increased the volume of his deeds. By restless energy and chance achievement he pushed on into new adventures and new mastery. His thinking was in terms of his experience and habits. It was "practical," just as at the present time, people elaborate in their leisure and reverie dream pictures which review and extend the patterns of their daily tasks or build compensatory castles in the air. The world of ideas was molded by the things the hands worked in and by the processes of nature and man's interaction with them. The mythologies were often grotesque, the efflorescence of unchecked imagery, but they were in the character of the symbolism afforded by the habitat and by the enterprises of securing the means of existence.

Another tendency of thought in connection with religion is the rationalization of prevailing customs. Swine were taboo to the Hebrews. The reason usually given was that swine were not healthful food for them in their climate and circumstances. But an authority on such matters now says that the taboo may have been due to the fact that the swine were too sacred, the term "unclean" not having the meaning which we ordinarily attach to it. Likewise the observance of the Sabbath as a day of rest may have arisen from some superstition connected with the changing phases of the moon rather than from the recognition of the desirability of having a day's vacation each week. We rationalize the use of clothing as the expression of modesty, whereas it is now known that modesty springs from the use of clothing, and that clothing began to be worn as ornamentation. In our society marriage seems to be the basis of the family but in the history of the race the family was the occasion of marriage, and remains so in some lands today.

Theology may be regarded as the systematic rationalization of customs and of the fragmentary, uncriticized ideas carried along in the practice of religion. Thus Christian theology has undertaken to organize and interpret the biblical system of religion. The doctrines discussed and formulated deal with creation, the fall of man, the nature of sin, the scheme of redemption, atonement, the trinity and each person of the trinity, revelation, rewards and punishment, immortality and the destiny of the world. Some theologians have proceeded upon the theory that the Bible furnished answers to all such questions and that it was only necessary to make a systematic exposition of the scriptures. The diversity of conclusions is obvious even to the casual reader of their works. Others have held that theology required enlightenment with reference to the original languages and institutions of the people whose records are given in the Bible. Still others, under the influence of modern critical methods have concluded that no theology can be written simply as an exposition of scriptures but that it always requires a process of interpretation. This process is of course subject to constant revision, not only from the side of discoveries with reference to biblical texts but on account of the growing knowledge of human nature and social institutions and other religions. To some extent each religious body has its characteristic theology. The Calvinistic, Lutheran, and Wesleyan theologies start with different presuppositions and arrive at different results. Or theologians who undertake to divest themselves of all partisan points of view are still influenced by the prevailing spirit of their times. Just now all advanced scholars work with the concepts of evolution, of genetic theories, of social justice, and of scientific methods. They incline to the moral theory of the atonement rather than to the judicial, the commercial, the legal or any other of the older historic types. They are also more or less motivated by the attitude of the apologist, interested in the truth and value of the religion he expounds. Their thinking, usually with confessed awareness, is concerned with making religion more intelligible and useful.

In the philosophy of religion another stage is reached in the function of thought. Philosophy endeavors to proceed in an objective and independent manner. It is more detached, more of a spectator or observer than of a participant or apologist. Here reflective thinking develops the attitude of searching for the Truth freed from the practical, emotional experience. Only a few philosophers have realized that their thought, however they strive for this objectivity, is yet influenced by motivations and evaluations which are deeper than their thought. Occasionally thinkers like William James appreciate the extent to which temperament, personal history, environment, occupation, and other phases of concrete living enter into the structure and color of the stream of thought. Fewer yet seem to see that thought may still have value and very useful functions within such limits.

The full realization of this fact has appeared only with the development of recent psychology which has discovered the realm of the "unconscious" and has given new importance to habit and impulse, and to custom within the group life. The school of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl in France, with Gilbert Murray and others in England, has shown to what extent the structures of society, religion, morals, and philosophy itself are elaborated under the practical pressures of life, and with far less "objectivity" than thinkers have usually supposed. The remark of Sumner that there are "fashions in thought" as well as in dress is a reminder that ideas bud on the branches of the tree of action and that a whole "tree of knowledge" is mythical. Whatever exaggeration there may be of this view in certain schools of thought it has carried conviction in varying degree to all types of thinkers. Very few, if any, at the present time escape this fashion of our thought. We are pretty generally convinced that our thinking is bound up with our habits of action and operates within the field of our "complexes" and our *milieu.*

It is interesting to note to what an extent the philosophers have dealt with the problems of religion. From Plato to Royce and James it has been a dominant interest. Descartes labored over the "proofs" for the being of God, Spinoza was finally dominated by "the intellectual love of God," Locke wrote more essays on religion and commentaries on the scriptures than on any other one subject. Even Hume evinced a central interest in the history of religion and in miracles. Kant felt called upon "to remove knowledge [from undue claims to settle the metaphysical problems of religion] in order to make room for faith." Hegel put his philosophy of religion at the apex of his system. The English idealists—Green, Caird, Bradley—were philosophers of religion. Comte, Mill, and Spencer are known as much by their discussions of religion as by any other interests. Bertrand Russell, with his *Free Man's Worship,* and Santayana with his *Winds of Doctrine,* and Whitehead with his *Religion in the Making* express in the titles of important works the inescapable subject of man's sincerest reflective thought. In writers like Bergson and Dewey, occasional references to the subject indicate that these questions are not foreign to their thinking though they may be, with effort, left on one side or deferred for later consideration. And even in those who do not use the terms of religious phraseology, only a slight change in their nomenclature is needed to make it fully apparent that they are not uninfluenced by the problems which arise in this field.

It is not difficult to understand why philosophy moves so constantly within this sphere. Thinking centers upon the points of stress and strain in human experience. Religion deals with inclusive and pervasive ideals of life, with the tragedies of a fortuitous existence and the fact of death. The emotional tensions which pertain to these universal experiences center attention upon them with unavaidable pressure. Probably the great majority of professional thinkers have devoted their lives to philosophy because at some time or in some way these problems became vital and inevitable for them.

But when one enters upon the task of philosophizing about so live and urgent a matter as religion he finds himself involved in the opposition of two profoundly significant attitudes. On the one side is the living, practical interest in the ends or consequences to be obtained. He wants his faith justified, his hopes assured, his wishes fulfilled. But satisfactory reflective thinking requires detachment. It must be disinterested, cool, impersonal. How, then, is it possible for a warm, practical being such as the natural person is to go over to the attitude which thought requires? How can he be expected to absolve himself from all interest in the outcome of thought in order to be able to think impartially and truly? Or, if he succeeds in abstracting himself from his emotional life, how can he be certain that in his detachment he still is in possession of the "facts" of experience upon which he wishes to reflect? This is, of course, a kind of paradox which is involved in all scientific, disciplined thinking. For some thinkers it has developed the conviction that we live in two realms, one of appreciation and one of description. Actual living experience is permeated with appreciations. "Pure thought" moves in the unemotional field of description. Experience is on the plane of action toward ends which are colorful with desired satisfaction. Thought lies on the plane of observation, analysis, and logical relation. In the first, desires rule; in the second, "truth" is found. Thinking, in the form of associated imagery or of practical solving of specific problems, occurs in the former, but "pure thought" belongs only to the latter. The one is known in the history of philosophy as "empiricism," and the other as "rationalism." The effort to see things as they *are,* independent of all feeling, leads to the Truth, capitalized and hypostatized. The treatment of concrete, motivated experience allows only of relative truth, spelled with small letters and conscious of its modest function and power. It is an instrument for action, for use under the demands of the practical will.

From this predicament flow decisive influences, particularly in the study of religion and therefore it deserves careful consideration. Those who hold to reality as it is for pure thought cannot identify that reality with the emotionalized world of religious experience. They must, therefore, either take refuge in a paradox such as "intellectual love," or relegate religion to the world of symbols and metaphors as Kant did. They may become mystics, holding on to religion in spite of their philosophy, or they may discard religion as an affair of the simple-minded and unenlightened. In all such positions there is a cleavage between the sphere of emotionalized action and conceptual thought and no adequate or legitimate interaction is recognized.

Another view of this difficulty is that thinking is only relatively detached, and for intervals of time. Thought does indeed for the time being ascend or withdraw to one side from the practical activity. But it remains in sight of the situation and is cognizant more or less closely of the fact that its problem arose from that field of living experience and that its answers must soon or late be referred back to it again for verification and use. The functions which thought performs are those of criticism and direction of activity. Both aspects are accomplished by affording a wider perspective for the survey of the situation in which conduct occurs. Just as an aviator may survey the field of battle more comprehensively than a soldier on the ground, and may also have more quiet and safety in which to make observations, so the thinker in his withdrawn position relates the narrower scene of the moment to the past and the future, and thus gets it in a perspective which brings out its purport and meaning. If the aviator loses all relation to the earth he has no bearings from which to make estimates of distance or danger or any other meaningful observations. It is impossible to imagine what kind of thoughts a disembodied spirit could have and yet the effort of some "pure scientists" seems to be to attain precisely this complete release from any meaningful problems of human interest or value.

Under the sway of scientific thought there is a strong disposition to regard the world as described by science as more objective and real than the world as seen through social interests. Science seems to give us "Nature" as she is. In that view man and his human affairs appear as transient and momentary and subject to the processes and fate which the natural order imposes. But it may be answered that these physical sciences describe the world *from their point of view*. And there are other points of view, probably indefinite in number. There is the conception of the world as an object of consciousness, or as a stage for the drama of conscious life, or as a scene in which spiritual forces are gradually transforming lower into higher orders of reality. Any given object may be viewed from indefinitely numerous and various points of observation. What I call my pencil is also a piece of metal; it is of so much money value; it is "beyond price" in its meaning to me because it was presented by a friend one Christmas time; it would be, on occasion, a weapon to stab with; it is a reflector of light; it is a means of identification; it is an ornament; it is the subject of discourse. In each relation it is just as real as in any other. The scientist cannot say what it really is any more than a poet or a salesman or a thief. The sciences have their points of view which are just as much determined by "interests" as are those of the religionist or the artist. If we consent to let the scientific view play the rôle of the really real, we may consistently do so.

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But to suppose that it is really the real in any ultimate and objective sense, other than this, is to ignore what all the sophisticated people know and admit. Every judgment is weighted and anchored by interests and specific situations. This, indeed, gives limitation to the judgment, but it also is the basis of any meaning or significance for judgment. "Limits" have positive, as well as negative, functions. The boundaries of a field reveal the area of the owner's freedom and may invite to certain kinds of friendly relations beyond. They show him the way out at the same time that they establish his place within.

An objection frequently made to such an interpretation of the function of knowledge is that it is subjective and solipcistic. The answer may be made that of course all thinking goes on in minds or persons and is unquestionably conditioned by their experience and character. But it is just this fact that they are in the world and part of it which makes their knowledge of it real. It is obviously quite impossible for the mind to deal with objects or entities entirely outside its experience. We get at past events through their relation to present events, and imagined future occurrences are projected upon the screen of the known. It is a favorite puzzle to assume the geological ages of the past and then ask whether they came into being with the birth of man or other sentient creatures. They are so obviously antecedent to mankind. But is not this "antecedence" a relation to the knower of the present? The very arrangement of before and after, of here and there, is undefinable except in relation to some posited point of reference. So much is this a feature of thought about the world that the attempt to think it independenly is impossible. The attempt to assume objectivity of this kind is like trying to get an up without a down, or an in which has no out. But on this account to deny meaning to these relations is to dismiss all possibilities of description or thought. To assume that there is some particular kind of knowledge, such as that of geology or of mathematics, which escapes this condition is to set up certain relations of thinking as if they were independent of thought. It is no different with religious objects than with any others. These also appear within the forms, and subject to the conditions, of thought. Like all other conceptions of reality they are related to the experiences within which they are conceived.

But this is quite a different matter from the assumption that the individual thinker imposes relations and conditions which are his alone. Thought is not a subjective process within the head of an individual organism. Thought is bound up with language and language is a social fact. It is a shared experience. Minds, so to speak, are more fluid than human bodies. They interact and participate in ideas and emotions when the physical organisms are at a distance. Meanings are transmitable and simultaneous for the parties to a conversation or a correspondence. It is of the very nature of ideas to be communicable and to be group possessions. They are events in time but they are not isolated like stones and stars. Any idea is continuous with other ideas and is a partial definition of a continuum of experience. There are no individual life-histories sundered from all other such histories. Each is an aspect of a flowing stream and can be singled out and described only within a social process.

This fact is the basis of a certain type of objectivity which is of importance in dealing with the truth and reality of the world. When an idea is true it is capable of appropriation by other persons, and it is this possibility of appropriation which makes it more than subjective, individual fact. The truth of an idea is its meaning for many persons in similar circumstances so that it is a cue for similar acts for them all. The true idea about a route of travel is one which represents the experience of persons in the past and of possible experience for others coming after them. The objectivity goes beyond the personal feeling of a single organism, is capable of being used by others, and guides action for all into overt deeds. In fact, the reality and validity of an idea becomes convincing and authoritative only when it is so recognized and used by others. In the field of social action the truth is finally established.

This is a form of objectivity very different from the entire detachment from human concerns which is sometimes demanded. This is the type of objectivity which Plato describes when he speaks of the state as the individual "writ large." The pattern is more intelligible and available when projected on the larger scale. But the pattern is still cast within the human, social experience, and yet it takes on universal and demonstrable reality. Such reality has concreteness and definition. It does not belong to the order of essences, pure being, and absolutes without attributes. It is not pure, nor infinite, nor absolute in the meaning of these terms as fixed by familiar doctrines of ideal Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

As has often been pointed out, the difficulty springs from the attempt to establish knowledge by itself, in a vacuum, as it were. But every such attempt must end in a kind of mysticism where the very processes of demonstration and argument are carried out beyond the only sphere in which they are capable of having meaning. They can have meaning only in reference to action or within a system which finally rests upon the solid realm of practical action. Knowledge thus shows itself to be a means of dealing with action and the objects which are generated or brought to attention within action. In the simpler forms of life this action is of a sufficiently obvious kind and this continues to be the fundamental type for all men. Living organisms are inherently active. They are constantly in motion, seeking and appropriating food, mating, playing, fighting, in the endless struggle for existence and for the goods of life. The processes of perception, memory, anticipatory imagination, are ceaselessly operative. The function of percepts, memories, and imagination is to guide and select. They are the ever restless "antennae" of the organism in relation to the environment, circling about, feeling for favorable experiences, withdrawing from objects which signify danger. On the higher levels of conduct the same process continues with varying degrees of refinement. The "antennae" of human beings are vastly developed by the accumulation of traditions, of techniques, of capacities for assessing novel situations. But in principle it is the same process. The inventions of man are often characterized as the extensions of the organs of the body and we now have man with telescopic and microscopic vision, with marvelous powers of locomotion, of discriminative ability to the millionth of an inch and the distances of light years. With these refinements of the senses, go enlargment of sympathy, deepening insight into social processes, and corresponding creativity in intelligence and art. This extension and refinement of goals, or ideals, is of the essence of the spiritualization of life. The assumption that the spiritual is of another order than the practical and the intelligible introduces into the conception of life a cleavage which obscures and confuses all important problems. It reduces everyday experience to the routine and commonplace, and removes spiritual values out of reach of the natural man. Whoever accepts that dualism thereby creates the impossibility of regarding religion as something to be understood and developed by reasonable methods, and leaves the simple and fundamental life-processes outside the pale. Then there appears the irreligious natural man, and the unnatural religious man. In such a view, no development of science could be of any help or enlightenment to religion, and religion would be incapable of suggesting any ends capable of enlisting or utilizing the services of science.

Wherever knowledge has been applied to concrete experience the result has been marked development. Many spheres of interest were once withheld from criticism and rational suggestion. It was so with custom, with law, with marriage, with what seemed the decrees of fate. "The king can do no wrong" meant that he was not within the province of criticism. Gradually various realms have been conceded to rational treatment. The one still most insistent on the claim of exemption is religion. But wherever it has been subjected to the light of knowledge significant consequences have followed. The Bible has been given a new place of importance for educated persons through its critical interpretations. The life of Christ as described by Renan and the long line of scholars since his time has generated a new appeal. A religion of social idealism has gained adherents in all creeds and is gradually remaking the conception and the symbols of the churches. Whenever religion turns to practical tasks such as healing the sick, educating the ignorant, organizing the broken and wavering units of the family and neighborhood, scientific knowledge is able to prove its serviceableness to spiritual ends.

Religion does not foreshorten the perspectives in which these practical tasks lie, but is interested (more than any other treatment of them) in the extension of their perspectives upon the largest possible scale. A cup of cold water may be given in the name of deity; an obscure soul is a brother of the most divine. But it is the brother whom we have seen who affords the starting-point. Any satisfactory idealization begins with the concrete and the empirical. It cannot end there. Religion performs one of its greatest services in the extension of the frame of thought and feeling from the immediate and the given to the most sublime proportions. This recognition of the far-reaching relations of the humblest events involves one of the most important functions of knowledge. Here all the sciences, including mathematical measurements and imaginative constructions, lend form and magnitude to religious conceptions. It follows that religious ideas, in their refinement and scope reflect the level of the general culture. At every stage religion seeks the most inclusive and comprehensive "frame of thought" in which to set the lowliest experiences. But the attempts of knowledge to build conceptions of reality independent of such experienced realities lead it into mere fog and mist. While the efforts of religious feeling to assert other realities than those of actual experience end in the same unverifiable and indescribable nonentities. Religion needs, therefore, the factual elements and relations of scientific thought, and science needs the evalutions of religious attitudes. Neither one is complete or adequate in itself.

These attitudes, as we have indicated, are social attitudes, in the true sense of that term. It is from this common base of social life that all knowledge extends and to this it returns. The dining-table may be taken as a symbol of this center of social life and as a medium in which is generated the essentially human world of feeling and thought. Take, for example, the "round table" of a university faculty club. There may be seen gathered at luncheon several men, specialists in various fields, sciences, languages, law, religion, art, medicine, business. They order from the same menu, use the same kind of utensils, and employ the same speech. There is a limited range of conversation in which they are all equally at home—the weather, the news of the day, certain general features of the university life. But two men of the same department may engage in conversation concerning some problem in their special field of research and quickly absorb themselves in technical concepts and discussions which are quite outside the interest or understanding of their neighbors. In order to make their conversation intelligible to their friends they would have to go back to the beginnings of their problems in the field of common experience and gradually show the steps by which they were carried out to their special sphere of discourse. In similar manner each one about the table is at home in the simple, common processes of eating, drinking, and chatting about the items of the narrower circle of living. But from that base of shared action and feeling radiate lines of selected interests with their own technique, terms, and values. The chemist, physiologist, historian, and linguist are well enough served by the same menu and understand one another sufficiently with reference to hunger and satiety. Yet each one moves out from that fundamental process and follows certain facts and relations into the great distances of academic expertness. At the farthest points of their investigations they are remote from the common experiences of the table group but are occupied all the time, it may be, with questions connected with food. However diversified or technical their knowledge, it is nevertheless engaged upon the facts of that encompassing life-process and for its ultimate validation must justify itself with reference to that process. Now and then some discovery occurs on the frontier of a specialty which throws such light upon the elementary activities as to be universally appreciated. Such is the discovery of a new anaesthetic or the excavation of an Egyptian tomb, or Lindbergh's non-stop flight across the Atlantic Ocean. But the processes and achievements of knowledge move out from and return to the world of common experience symbolized by the table. The highest and the subtlest reaches of knowledge have this setting and relation. There is no material for knowledge outside this cycle nor any means of proof or verification of alleged facts or truth apart from a loop line ascending from this starting-point and returning to it again. This does not mean that the basic field of human action and emotion remains unchanged by accumulating knowledge. It is constantly illuminated and modified by enlarging knowledge but it continues to be a life-process stimulated by the native springs of appetite, of curiosity, and satisfaction. Knowledge does not come first. Action, impulse, sentiency, and habit in their diversity and conflict are the sources of reflection and the test of its value. Philosophy cannot go on without the social life of man but the life of man generated philosophy and constantly summons philosophy to an accounting as to its results and value. Like all knowledge, philosophy is, in a sense, derived and secondary, instrumental and subservient.

Yet this very knowledge is the means to the greatest enrichment and development of the life of mankind. The attainment of the methods of accumulating knowledge, of making scientific discoveries, and of extending experimentation are the great agencies of progress and the enlargement of life. They have transformed the face of nature and the manner of man's life to an astonishing degree. Here lies his hope for further control in the future. But at the very height of this scientific era the wisest men are beginning to see that no amount of knowledge is adequate to the demands of human life in its deepest needs. Bertrand Russell and other observers of our civilization see that the development of scientific technique affords no guaranty of any significant use of that technique. The great question of their later thought is as to where and how there are to be found means for relating knowledge to the great values and ends of life. These values are the qualities which belong to the natural social bonds of the fundamental social units, the face to face groups of mutually sympathetic and helpful individuals. These values are the concomitants of social attitudes and these attitudes at their highest are the religious verities.

JUDAISM IN NEW TESTAMENT TIMES

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Students of Judaism and of Christian beginnings, and of these two in their historical relation to each other, have recently had the excitement and satisfaction of welcoming two truly great works in this field, works which can at once with confidence be regarded as of classical quality and of indispensable value to every student of Judaism or Christianity, whether he be Jew or Christian. Strack-Billerbeck's *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch* is thus far—in three large volumes—complete as a commentary on all the books of the New Testament (1922–26). And now follows George Foot Moore's *Judaism*.[1] Each of these works is to be supplemented by a volume of notes and excursuses, and these volumes will add greatly to the value of both works. It is to be earnestly hoped that nothing will long delay their appearance. We could also wish that the similar work on Hellenistic Judaism, which was originally planned by Professor Moore, might still prove possible, though no promise of it is given.

The two works are by the two men of whom it can probably be said that of all Christian scholars of their generation they have made themselves most fully masters in the difficult regions of rabbinical literature. Professor Hermann Strack, of Berlin, though a productive scholar in other lines, especially in Old Testament subjects, gave his attention chiefly to the Jewish literature of the first Christian centuries. He is the author of a standard introduction to Talmud and Midrash.

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[1] *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era: The Age of the Tannaim.* 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927. 552 and 487 pages.

The present work is to be regarded as carrying forward the work of John Lightfoot, and others before and after him, to what must long remain a concluding stage. It is an immense collection from the rabbinical literature of materials which in any way help the student to read the New Testament in the light of contemporary Jewish ways of thought and of life. Though meant primarily for the New Testament student, who certainly cannot do without it, it is of value also to the student of Judaism because of its elaborate treatment, even in the volumes already before us, of many topics which are as important in Judaism as in Christianity. This work, though the publication of it had to be done by his collaborator, Billerbeck, after Strack's death, can certainly be called the culmination of his long life's work. The same can be said of Professor Moore's work, and, in both cases, in a sense and measure in which such a thing can only rarely be said. The two books are widely different in character. Strack collects and discusses his material directly for the student of the New Testament. Moore writes on Judaism as such, and for its own sake, and is concerned to keep all special Christian interests and presumptions out of the way. Over against the apologetic and polemic aim and temper of most Christian writers on Judaism, Moore reacts strongly in the opposite direction. He will understand the Judaism of the Tannaim from within, as they themselves understood it. He gives therefore, in effect, a defense of rabbinical Judaism, Judaism's own self-defense, let us say, since his ideal is to select the recognized and authoritative leaders and teachers of "normative" Judaism, and to let them speak for themselves.

His standpoint and purpose can best be understood in the light of his article, "Christian Writers on Judaism," in the *Harvard Theological Review* (July, 1921, pp. 197–254), a treatment of his predecessors which those who have the "Judaism" will do well to insert within its covers. Here Moore reviews with learning and severity the efforts of Christians from the first to prove the truth of Christianity either by showing that Judaism is itself essentially Christian, and that Jews ought, in view of their own Scriptures and traditions, to accept Christianity as the fulfilment of their own faiths and hopes, or, on the contrary, by showing that Judaism is at all essential points the opposite of Christianity and inferior to it. In one case the Jewish literature is searched for likenesses to Christianity; in the other, for differences; but in both cases the aim is equally dogmatic and unhistorical. "Christian interest in Jewish literature has always been apologetic or polemical rather than historical." Occasionally, indeed, through the centuries we meet with "the scholar's love of learning for its own sake"; and there is a gain when rabbinical learning is used to elucidate the New Testament. The modern period, in which the aim is to understand the Christian religion in the light of its origins, began only with Gfrörer (1831–38); but his followers have seldom freed themselves from the long tradition of prejudice.

It is especially worth while to take account of Moore's criticism of the works of Weber, Schürer, and Bousset, with which it is most natural to compare his own book. Weber's *System der altsynagogalen palästinischen Theologie* (1880) is criticized because it is a system, whereas the Jews made no system of their religious and moral teachings, but only (in the Mishnah, etc.) of law and observance; because its system is modern and Lutheran; because the author ascribes to Judaism the conception of a transcendent and remote God, and an un-Jewish (Pauline) conception of legalism; because of an uncritical and often second-hand use of the sources; and because his aim was not historical, but missionary: so to present Judaism as to prove to Jews the superiority of Christianity. With these criticisms we must on the whole agree, and will certainly give to Moore's book the right to displace Weber's as an exposition of the religion and morals of the early rabbis.

The chief Christian authority in the general field of Jewish history in New Testament times is, of course, Schürer. Harnack once remarked that there is scarcely any other branch of theological study in which there is so unquestionably one chief textbook as in that of the *History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ.* Moore agrees that Schürer's volumes are "an indispensable repertory for all sorts of things about the Jews—history, archaeology, geography, chronology, institutions, cultus, sects and parties, literature, etc.—treated as distinct subjects of investigation and presentation." "Schürer did what he set out to do, and made an immeasurably useful handbook." But he did not intend to write a history of religion during the three centuries which his work covers. Two chapters only deal directly with religion; one, with the messianic hope; and the other, with life under the law. These two subjects, Moore says, were chosen because the relation of Christianity to Judaism was positively the belief that Jesus was the Messiah of Jewish hopes, and negatively the rejection of the legalism of the scribes and Pharisees which Jesus and Paul denounced. It therefore served the apologetic interests of Christianity to show that the Jewish hopes justified the acceptance of Jesus as their fulfilment, and that the life under the law justified his condemnation. Moore regards Schürer as of eminent merits in everything external, but misled by his apologetic interest in these two chapters, and especially in that concerning legalism. Moore's book does not aim to take the place of Schürer in any way except in its exposition of "life under the law." He does, to be sure, begin his book with a sketch of "the history of the centuries with which we are concerned so far as religion was affected by it" (I, 3–121). It is ably done and essential for the understanding of what follows, for it traces the lines which lead by a direct progress from Ezra the Scribe and his law to the Judaism of the Tannaim. The title of this section of the book, in the form in which it was published in the *Harvard Theological Review* (October, 1924–January, 1925) is "The Rise of Normative Judaism." This title shows the determining interest of the historical sketch and the meaning of the defining phrase, "so far as religion was affected by it." In this history of the rise of normative Judaism the doings of Antiochus IV and Judas Maccabaeus are but briefly told (pp. 48–55). There is no mention of the Book of Daniel here, which is surely of the greatest importance for our understanding of the religious significance of this crisis. The chapter that covers the century from Judas to Herod is called "The Rise of the Pharisees." Herod's reign is the time of Hillel and Shammai, with whom the age of the Tannaim begins; and the Roman war and the destruction of Jerusalem are barely mentioned in order to introduce the "Reorganization at Jamnia." Of course Professor Moore does what he intends to do; but the history he tells shows clearly that the religion whose rise he is tracing was not affected by the stirring political events of the two centuries. The line from Ezra to Hillel, and then to Johanan ben Zakkai and Akiba and Judah I, seems to move straight on without being diverted by the part that the Jews suddenly found themselves playing in the history of the world. Moore's history therefore is not in any way intended as a substitute for what Schürer's first volume (in English. Vols. I–II) gives in full detail. Nor does the following introductory part on the sources at all intend to make less necessary the elaborate introductions to the extant Jewish literature of the period with which Schürer's work begins and ends. As the History carries us through the centuries from the religion of the Old Testament to the normative Judaism which resulted from it, so the Sources to which we are introduced are chiefly the work of the Tannaim themselves, especially the Midrashim on the Pentateuch (Mechilta, Sifra, Sifre, and some related writings), upon which Moore puts the highest value for his purposes. We may perhaps say that Moore's purpose is to do exactly what Schürer did not—or did only in one or two chapters—attempt to do, that is, to give a history and exposition of Judaism as a religion.

But this is what Bousset undertook in his *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter* (1903; 2d ed., 1906; 3d ed., Gressmann, 1926). Bousset's book aims to cover Hellenistic as well as Palestinian Judaism, as Moore's does not; but for the Palestinian part they have the same purpose and mean to fill the same lack in Schürer's work. Of Bousset's work, Moore's judgment is on the whole adverse. He criticizes chiefly his almost exclusive use as sources of the books called Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, with special preference for the Apocalypses, and his "almost casual" use of "the writings which represent the acknowledged and authoritative teachings" of school and synagogue. Bousset's defense was that the Apocalypses represented the popular religion, while the work of the rabbis was that of the learned few. Moore rejects this choice, and describes the book that results from it as based on sources to which Judaism never conceded any authority, while largely ignoring those which it has always regarded as normative. Such use as Bousset makes of the rabbinical sources is unscholarly, as Jewish critics have pointed out. Yet, "taken for what it is, it is a serviceable handbook"; taken, that is, as an exposition of the religion of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, and "as a piece of apparatus for the student of the New Testament." So, though Moore's estimation of Bousset's work is by no means so high as of Schürer's, yet in Bousset's case, as well as in Schürer's, he does not propose to do again what he accepts as done well. His own task is one that was done badly by Weber, whose work his own would displace; but it is one that neither Schürer nor Bousset seriously undertook; for which, moreover, they had not the necessary equipment.

We may infer from his criticisms of others that his own work will have two characteristics: He will write with complete impartiality, and especially will avoid every prejudice from the Christian side. It is not his purpose to give an account of the beginnings of Christianity, or to provide students of the New Testament with all the knowledge they need concerning its background and environment. He will not even be influenced by the denunciations of the scribes and Pharisees by Jesus, or of legalism by Paul; nor will he try to decide whether they were justified. He inclines, it would seem, to think that they were not, certainly not altogether. He will not write of Judaism with any intention, however veiled, of proving the truth of Christianity or making Christians of Jews. Paul wrote: "To the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain Jews; to them that are under the law, as under the law, not being myself under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law." This aim, which was Weber's, Moore renounces; but if we substitute the word "understand" for "gain," Paul's words become an exact expression of Professor Moore's spirit and method. He does attempt, and urges his readers to attempt, to become as under the law, though we are not, in order that we may understand those that were under the law. He prefers not to use the word "legalism," but he says with repeated emphasis that the foundation of Judaism is the belief that religion is revealed. Judaism conceived of itself as revealed religion. God had given to Israel in his twofold law, Scripture and tradition, a revelation of his will. "The religion thus revealed was the religion of Israel and of no other nation"; though, as the one true religion, it was destined to be that of all mankind. "The idea of historical development in religion . . . . so dominates us that it is hard to understand a religion to which it is a contradiction in terms. But it is idle to try to comprehend Judaism at all unless we are prepared to accept its own assumptions as principles of interpretation, and not substitute ours for them" (I, 112). This is Moore's parallel to Paul's becoming as a Jew to Jews.

The second characteristic of Moore's book which can be inferred from his criticism of others is the principal, though not quite exclusive, use, as sources of the rabbinical writings rather than the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. "The aim of these volumes is to represent Judaism in the centuries in which it assumed definitive form, as it presents itself in the tradition which it has always regarded as authentic." The representatives of authoritative tradition are the "Tannaim," the rabbis of the period from the time of Herod (Hillel and Shammai) to that of the Patriarch Judah, under whose authority, about 200 A.D., the Mishnah was put forth in what proved to be its authoritative form. This means that the sources with which Moore chiefly operates are this Mishnah, in which the traditional law (Halakah) is formulated and systematized, together with the Tosefta and other related compilations of early halakic discussions; then the halakic and haggadic commentaries on the Pentateuch, of which Mekilta (on Exodus), Sifra (on Leviticus), and Sifre (on Numbers and Deuteronomy) are most important, but are now supplemented by recently recovered parts of other Midrashim of like age. In the later parts of the Talmud and in later Midrashim reliable traditions are still to be found of the teachings of the tannaite rabbis; so that the readings which are involved in the study even of the Tannaim are extensive and difficult.

Let us now survey briefly the subjects chosen and the range and quality of the main substance of the book. Professor Moore criticized Weber for making a "system" of the rabbinical religion, to which systematic treatment is foreign. Perles had already pointed out this fundamental fault in Weber. No system, he says, can be distilled out of the Haggada. In regard to religion, morals, eschatology, the rabbinical writings only register the varying and often contradictory opinions of different teachers. There are, indeed, in the discussions of these matters, certain principles and general prescriptions, but these are never worked out into a closed system. Moore seeks to avoid this criticism and to arrange his material under a few general divisions, without sharp boundaries.

After the introductory sections: "I. Historical," and "II. The Sources," we have seven parts in which the religion of the Tannaim is described. "I. Revealed Religion": Here the fundamental principle of Judaism, already referred to, is unfolded. Israel is the nation to which the revelation is given. The Scriptures are throughout and in every place equally the revelation of God. The unwritten law has the same source and authority as the written. By it tradition was brought into accord with Scripture. This chapter contains a defense of the halakic material of the Talmud in the sense that, upon the premise that religion is revealed, such interpretations are necessary, and the juristic casuistry "cannot be too exact or too minute."

The "name for this divine revelation, written and oral, in which the Jews possessed the sole standard and norm of their religion is *Torah*," of which "Law" is a misleading translation. It is identified with wisdom, and is eternal and unchangeable. This revealed religion is not so much a doctrine of God, even of his oneness, as a rule of life. A consequence of the idea of revealed religion was the effort to educate the whole people in its religion, and in this the synagogue and the school had their unique place and importance in Judaism. They are described in detail. Another unique consequence of the belief in Torah, revealed religion, was belief in its destiny to become universal. A long and important chapter on "The Conversion of the Gentiles" closes Part I. Part II treats "The Idea of God." This is not, in our sense of the word, a theology; but Judaism drew from the Old Testament teaching on the whole its highest and best. Jewish monotheism was the belief that "*one* will ruled the world to *one* end—the world as it ought to be." The idea of God is discussed in a way that corrects many current misconceptions and removes many supposed contrasts between Jewish and Christian ideas. Part III, "Man, Sin, Atonement," discusses these topics with great fulness (I, 445–552). Attention should be given especially to the treatment of repentance, which is of central significance in the Jewish religion and is often misjudged in Christian representations. Volume II begins with a relatively short Part IV, on "Observances" (pp. 3–78). This is the only considerable part of the book which deals chiefly with Halakah. It begins with a discussion of religious principles which argues in effect that in a revealed religion ritual is not ritual, but morals, because the rites and interdictions of the law are observed, not because they have any magical effect, but because they are the will of God. At the end, in regard to laws of purity, especially food laws, it is again emphasized that the Jews needed and attempted no explanation of the reason or value of things to be done or avoided. That "it is a statute of the King of kings" is a sufficient reason. This is the logic of a revealed religion. If the Pharisees were more scrupulous in such things than others it was because they saw more clearly what was involved in the possession of a revealed religion. If this is "legalism," then the name cannot be denied to them, although "loyalty" better expresses their attitude. This conception of conformity to the will of God is the essence of a religion of revelation. It "was the only conception possible in Judaism, with the Bible in its hands" (II, 78). Let us leave this apology for what we have been accustomed to call ritualism and externality for later comment.

Part V treats of "Morals." Here the ways are traced in which moral teaching was developed by a religion in which morality also was the revealed will of God, and had therefore a legal character. Dr. Moore prefers to say, "They are the morals of a religion," of the God-given rule of life, and their obligation lies not in reason and conscience, but in the sovereignty of the Lawgiver. On the authority of divine revelation, not on general principles and deductions from them, the ethics of Judaism were founded. The motives, the duties in various relationships, and the quality of an ethic of this nature are elaborately discussed. It is an important and most illuminating section, to which more than a quarter of the second volume is devoted. The New Testament student will note a number of comparisons with the ethics of Jesus, in which likeness, not difference, is chiefly indicated. Part VI, "Piety," discusses love to God, the Father in Heaven, prayer, faith, study, the meaning of suffering, fasting (there is no proper asceticism in Jewish piety), purity of mind, humility. In piety, as in ethics, Judaism is a safe and sane teacher and guide. The Christian church followed it; or when it departed, as in the direction of asceticism or other-worldliness, it was not for the better.

Part VII is on "The Hereafter." Here, although rabbinical sources are given the precedence, the Apocalypses are also drawn upon, and there is a brief introduction to these books, which were referred to in the introductory section on "Sources" (I, 127–130) only in order to exclude them as sources for the first six parts of the book. "Inasmuch as these writings have never been recognized by Judaism, it is a fallacy of method for the historian to make them a primary source for the eschatology of Judaism, much more to contaminate its theology with them." This last part of the book deals with "Retribution after Death," "Messianic Expectations," and "Eschatology."

Such is the field chosen and cultivated by this master-workman. He himself describes the field thus: "The aim of the present work is to exhibit the religious conceptions and moral principles of Judaism, its modes of worship and observance, and its distinctive piety, in the form in which, by the end of the second century of the Christian Era, they attained general acceptance and authority." Looking at the work, as we should, in the light of this precise definition of it, we can only judge that the task is splendidly performed. What Dr. Moore set out to do he has done, as those who know him would expect, with painstaking and unsparing devotion to accurate and complete knowledge, and with fair, unprejudiced interpretation and judgment. It is the product of thirty years of a great scholar's researches in a literature of which the difficulties of first-hand mastery and understanding cannot be imagined by those who have not met them in some measure face to face. The immense labor of which these volumes are the product is evident enough, though the third volume will make it more so; but the skill with which the material is handled conceals the labor and makes what was hard to write easy to read.

If attention is now called to some points at which difference of judgment is possible, or to certain limitations involved in the author's choice and definition of his field, it will be with the special purpose of guarding against possible misunderstanding or misuse of a book of the highest quality and greatest value in its chosen place.

The Judaism which Professor Moore describes with such wealth of learning is that of the end of the second century of our era, and the sources which he uses are those that embody the interpretations and formulations of the law by the rabbis, chiefly from the fall of Jerusalem, 70 A.D., to the promulgation of the Mishnah of the Patriarch Judah, about 200 A.D. When Moore speaks of the sources which Judaism has always regarded as authentic, he means "always" from the third century A.D. onward. It is a proper and needed task to exhibit the religious conceptions and moral principles, the observances, and the piety of the Judaism of the Tannaim. Perhaps it is the thing that most needed to be done of all the many labors that must contribute to our knowledge of that age. But Professor Moore calls this Judaism "normative"; and means by this, not only authoritative for Jews after the work of the Tannaim had reached its completion in the Mishnah, but normal or authentic in the sense that it is the only direct and natural outcome of the Old Testament religion. It seems, therefore, that the task here undertaken is not only, as it certainly is, a definite, single, and necessary one, but that other things hardly need doing, and do not signify much for the Judaism of the age of Christian beginnings. The book is not called, as it might have been, "The Judaism of the Tannaim," but *Judaism in the*

First Centuries of the Christian Era: The Age of the Tannaim. Was there then no other type of Judaism in the time of Christ that may claim such names as "normative," "normal," "orthodox"? The time of Deuteronomy was also the time of Jeremiah. The religion of revelation in a divinely given written law stood over against the religion of revelation in the heart and living words of a prophet. The conviction was current after Ezra that the age of prophecy had ended; the Spirit of God had withdrawn itself from Israel (I, 237). But if prophecy should live again, could it not claim to be normal in Judaism? Where, in the centuries after Ezra, are we to look for the lines of development that go back, not to Ezra and Deuteronomy, but to Jeremiah and Isaiah? R. H. Charles claims the genuine succession for his loved Apocalypses. The Pharisees at least had the prophets in their canon, and it is claimed by many, and by Moore, that the rabbis were not less familiar with the prophets than with the Pentateuch, and even that they had "fully assimilated" the teaching of the prophets as to the value of the cultus (II, 14), and that their conception of revealed religion "resulted no less from the teaching of the prophets than from the possession of the Law" (I, 235). Christians see prophecy coming back to Judaism in John the Baptist and in Jesus, and find in Paul the new experience that revelation is given in a person, not in a book, and inwardly to each one through the indwelling Spirit of God, as Jeremiah had hoped (31:31–34). And now, finally, liberal Judaism claims to be authentic and normal Judaism because it takes up the lines that Jeremiah laid down.

It would require more proof than Professor Moore has given in his section on "History" to justify his claim that the only movements that need to be traced *as affecting religion* are those that lead from Ezra to Hillel and Johanan ben Zakkai and Akiba and Judah the Prince. Great events happened during the three centuries from Antiochus IV to Hadrian, events which deeply affected Judaism as a religion. But of these events and their influence Moore has little to say. It is of course in connection with these events that the Apocalypses were written. In regard to these writings it would be possible to call in question the entire consistency of Moore's position. They were ignored by the Tannaim, "without countenance from the exponents of normal Judaism." The common Christian use of them, especially in support of the criticism of the Jewish conception of God as transcendent and unapproachable, is a contamination of Jewish theology. But when Moore writes (I, 128) that in Judaism "the eschatological apocalypse, which from the days of Antiochus IV to those of Domitian had apparently revived in every crisis of the history, disappears completely," he makes its disappearance, after the Apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch, date from the beginning of the second century A.D., and yields an importance to such writings in the last two pre-Christian and the first Christian centuries which would seem largely to justify the use of them by Schürer and Bousset. When he speaks of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha in general as giving "glimpses of the religion of the times, *outside the schools*," he seems to warrant Bousset's contrast between the piety of the common people and that of the learned few, and to give some ground for Bousset's preference for the literature of the popular religion. The Book of Daniel stands near the beginning, and the Apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch near the end, of the period with which we are concerned. The canonization of Daniel attests and perpetuated its influence; and the support of Bar Cocheba's revolt under Hadrian by leading Tannaim would seem to put the importance of apocalyptic literature—certainly of the nationalist movements that called it forth—beyond question, even if the New Testament did not bear additional witness to its currency. Dr. Moore does not doubt that these books "in their time were very popular" (II, 281). But more than this, he finds that the eschatological scheme of the Apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch "is the same which through the Tannaim became the standard conception of Judaism"; and even goes so far as to say that in some other matters also "these apocalypses are closely related to. . . . the rabbinical sources. The authors had the learning of the schools" (II, 285). They evidently stood in some relation to the rabbis of their time, and "*there is no sectarian eccentricity to be discovered in them*" (II, 344). In fact, these two books are freely used, by the side of the rabbinical sources, in the treatment of the origin of sin, Adam, and the evil heart (I, 474–80). Should there have been either less or more use made of these and other Apocalypses? There need be no criticism of Moore's choice of the age of the Tannaim and of the literature that comes from them and is recognized as theirs by their successors; but if this is his choice, would it not have been as well to have excluded the Apocalypses altogether, and to have given purely tannaite doctrine about the hereafter, as well as about theology and ethics? As it is we are left wondering why these books should be valid evidence as to eschatology, and even as to the origin of sin, but misleading, contaminating, as to dualism and asceticism and the transcendence of God. The Apocalypses are one expression of the self-consciousness and self-defense of the Jewish spirit in its opposition to foreign influence, and the Talmud is another and very different expression of the same spirit. The Apocalypse begins with the first assault of the Greek Empire upon the Jewish religion; and the rabbinical writings follow after the failure of the last revolt of the Jews against the Roman Empire; though this of course is by no means a sufficient answer to the question of the relation to each other of these two self-assertions of the Jewish religion over against heathenism. Moore's book seems to leave us in need of something more about that conflict of Judaism against foreign cultures and religions which was surely the most distinguishing and critical fact about Jewish religious history during the two centuries before, and the two centuries after, Christ.

The late Dr. Hugo Gressmann, one of whose last works was the editing of the third edition of Bousset, published also an essay on *Die Aufgaben der Wissenschaft des nachbiblischen Judentums* (1925), which indicates what he would have undertaken to do if he had rewritten instead of merely edited the work of Bousset. He gives a page to the work that needs to be done in the rabbinical field, and names Dalman, Moore, and Billerbeck as the Christian scholars who are most capable of doing it. But this is not one of the seven tasks with which he specifically deals. Gressmann substitutes "in the late Hellenistic Age" for Bousset's "in the New Testament Age," in the title of his *Religion of Judaism.* The influence of Hellenism is, in his opinion, the chief factor with which the historian has to deal. Synagogue, Torah, canon, scribe, resurrection, apocalyptic, supernaturalism, suggest the ways in which Judaism transformed itself in order to resist the danger of Hellenization. The chief task of the historian of the origin, not only of the Gospel, but also of the Talmud, is to trace the gradual rise, through the influence of Hellenism and through opposition to it, of this other-worldly type of Judaism of which the Apocalypses are the first and clearest expression. The specific tasks which Gressmann discusses are: (1) Hellenistic Judaism before Christ; (2) Jao and the religion of magic; (3) the parallelism between Yahweh and Dionysos-Sabazios; (4) astral Judaism; (5) the Mandaic religion; (6) the Odes of Solomon; (7) Manichaeism and Islam.

Now we are not to forget that Moore has not given us his projected book on Hellenistic Judaism, in which perhaps the various oriental as well as the proper Greek religious movements in the world into which Christ came would be duly described. But it is certain that Gressmann represents an interest and a method which Moore distrusts. Gressmann prefers to search among the obscurities of half-Jewish, half-heathen, half-Christian heresies for light on the sources and character and influence of that other-worldly Judaism which seems to him most significant. Moore is concerned with the orthodox

Judaism of the rabbis, which is, like the Old Testament, essentially healthy minded and of this world, and to show that it is the direct and consistent outcome of the history of religion from the Old Testament through the intervening centuries. We are not to expect from Moore a discussion of the different types and sects in the Judaism of the time, of the effects of varying political fortunes, of the influence of foreign religions, nor even of the changes that followed the fall of the temple and the end of Judaism as a nation in the two wars against Rome. Moore chooses to give us one thing: the Jewish religion in its final, stable form, as it defined itself at the end of the second century. Gressmann regards the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha as intermediary not only between prophecy and the Gospels, but also between the Judaism of the last two centuries before Christ and that which began in violent reaction against everything foreign after the fall of the Jewish state. Moore carries the Judaism of the Tannaim back into the time of Christ and the century before. Gressmann thinks we have no right to draw conclusions, without careful reservations, from the time after Hadrian to the period in which Judaism had its share in the religious syncretism that was characteristic of the world when Christianity began.

Let us return to Moore's book, in its main contents and purpose, as a book which uses rabbinical sources for the exhibition of the Judaism of the age of the Tannaim, the Judaism which attained general acceptance and authority by the beginning of the third century of our era. This is a book on "normative Judaism as we know it in the literature which it has always esteemed authentic." For its great qualities as a work on the religious conceptions and moral principles and piety of the Tannaim I have already expressed the admiration and gratitude which everyone must feel. With due reserve I would now propose certain queries about two principal matters, one concerning the work in its own proper field, the other its bearing on New Testament interpretation and on the problem of the relation between Judaism and Christianity in its beginnings.

The first queries concern the use which Professor Moore makes of the Halakah in his exposition of the religion of the Tannaim. Halakah is law. The word means "a rule to go by." It is "the precisely formulated rule itself." Whatever in rabbinic tradition is not law is Haggada. Of this the chief aim is religious and moral instruction. Only Halakah possesses authority. Only in the field of legal definition is it proper to speak of Jewish orthodoxy. "There was no such thing as an orthodox Haggada" (I, 162). The unity that held Judaism together was not based upon orthodoxy in theology, but upon uniformity of observance (I, 110 f.). "When the Jews thought of revealed religion it was religion as a rule of life rather than as the recognition of the one true God" (I, 276). It was the rule of life about which the schools discussed and sects divided. This means that Halakah, not Haggada, was the chief concern of the Tannaim. Even Hillel, with whom the tannaite school tradition begins, is significant in the history of Judaism, not because of his genial temper and fine religious and moral sayings, but because he gave new impulse and direction to the study of the law (I, 81). He began the movement that ended in the Mishnah. One of the two main parts of the work of Johanan ben Zakkai and his successors was the formulation and classification of the rules of the unwritten law; and the other was the minute study of the written law; and in both lines the primary interest was in the Halakah. The Mishnah, shaped especially by R. Akiba and R. Meir, and finished by the Patriarch Judah, was the result of the first of these lines of study; and the halakic Midrashim, Mechilta, Sifra, Sifre, of the second. The Mishnah is distinctly the great final work of the Tannaim, and the rabbis who followed them were therefore called by another name, "Amoraim." With the Mishnah the age of the Tannaim ends. It is the crown and completion of their labors. One would think therefore that normative Judaism of the age of the Tannaim would be defined essentially as the Judaism of the Mishnah, just as the Judaism of the Amoraim is that of their distinctive work, the Talmud as a whole. Judaism "may properly claim to be represented by the teachers and the writings which it has always regarded as in the line of its catholic tradition, all the more because the resulting consensus is authoritative and is embodied in a corpus of tradition possessing not only universal authority, but in some sense finality" (I, 126). This sentence describes the Mishnah and the later completed Talmud, but not the Midrashim. The Mishnah is almost entirely Halakah. Only one of its sixty-three books is haggadic throughout: the famous Chapters of the Fathers (Pirke Abot).

These facts and definitions I have given much in Professor Moore's own words; yet in his actual exposition of the normative, orthodox Judaism of the age of the Tannaim comparatively little place is given to Halakah. One of the seven parts of his exposition is on observances; and here cultus, circumcision, Sabbath, festivals, fasts, taxation, and interdictions are summarily dealt with; but the other six parts deal in detail with the religion and ethics, the piety and hopes, of Judaism, matters about which the Haggada supplies most of the material, and for which authority and finality are not claimed. The tannaite (halakic) Midrash (Mechilta, etc.) contains a good deal of Haggada together with its halakic exegesis, and these books Moore values as the most important of his sources (I, 135 ff.; II, 80). The principles of religion and morals do indeed control the interpretation of certain laws, so that Halakah is sometimes a source for such teachings, and "is in many instances of the highest value as evidence of the way and measure in which great ethical principles have been tacitly impressed on whole fields of the traditional law" (I, 134). This sounds as if the ethical implications constituted the chief value of the Mishnah for Moore's purposes. But these are not its chief contents. It is made up, as a whole, of opinions or decisions about the minutiae of law observance. It constructs a hedge of definitions and restrictions meant to protect the letter of the law from violation, to make its observance possible and practicable under all circumstances, and to bring all of life under its rule.

The Jewish scholar, Perles, in a pamphlet with which Moore is in sympathy, criticized Bousset, in *Die Religion des Judentums,* for using only books such as Bacher's, on the Haggada, and for expressing a preference for haggadic sources; whereas the Halakah in its unity, in its definitive and systematic form, and its deeper grasp upon life is much better fitted to supply the basis of the structure of a history of the Jewish religion. Moore agrees with Perles' criticism of Bousset's preference for the later, haggadic, Midrashim; but it is not because they are halakic that he gives the first place to the early Midrash. "It is this religious and moral element by the side of the interpretation of the laws, and pervading it as a principle, that gives these works [Mechilta, etc.] their chief value to us" (I, 135). Perles insists on the primary importance of the Halakah, not only because it shows here and there the influence of prophetic ethics, but because throughout, as it stands, it is the principal work of the rabbis, and the work which alone has the character of authority, and because, concerned as it is with ritual, cultus, and law (*Recht*), it has decisive influence upon the whole of life. This applies peculiarly to the religion of the Tannaim. The Haggada neither begins nor ends with them, so that Bousset ought not, Perles thinks, to have used exclusively Bacher's work on the Haggada of the Tannaim, but also his volumes on the Haggada of the Amoraim, as well as the anonymous Haggada which Bacher did not live to publish. It is only in the region of the Halakah that the Tannaim have a distinctive place and epoch-making significance, since the Mishnah, the fundamental text of the Talmud, was their creation.

Would Perles be satisfied, then, with Moore's procedure? Would he think it enough that Halakah proper, observances, should occupy one part in seven in an exposition of the Judaism of the Tannaim, considering that in their classical and distinctive work Halakah practically fills sixty-two out of sixty-three parts? Moore agrees with Perles that there is no essential distinction between earlier and later Haggada (I, 163), and that the teachings of the Tannaim about God and man, morals and piety, sin, repentance, and forgiveness are not only also the teachings of the later Amoraim, but run backward, too, without essential change into the Old Testament itself. There is no point at which freedom and variety of opinion and belief, within the bounds, to be sure, of certain fundamental principles, came to an end, and a proper orthodoxy of dogma was set up. But orthodoxy of conduct, of observance, did reach this stage of finality and authority in the Mishnah; and the tannaite rabbis were those who brought this about. It is in accordance with Moore's chief interest in haggadic teachings that he does not in fact confine himself to sayings of the Tannaim, but quotes freely from the Amoraim also; how freely may be seen by the list that ends Index IV.

Professor Moore's emphasis upon his purpose to present normative Judaism, definitive, authoritative, orthodox, would lead one to expect that he would give the chief place to those "juristic definitions and decisions of the Halakah" to which alone, as he himself sometimes says, these adjectives strictly apply. We should look for more about the Mishnah itself, about its systematic arrangement of the laws, its methods of argument and of bringing custom and tradition into connection with the written law, and more of its actual contents and total character, of those actual rules of life, that "uniformity of observance" which constituted the distinction of the Judaism of the rabbis. Dr. Moore knows the Mishnah thoroughly well; few know it better. He knows, therefore, what he is doing, and does what he intends. Our question, therefore, concerns the justification of his choice, the validity of the reasons he gives for it.

Let us quote (with italics of our own, here as elsewhere) some of Moore's most striking sayings about the minute juristic casuistry which makes up most of the Mishnah, and note the sense in which he justifies the rabbis in their devotion to it, and also explains the relatively small place which he gives to it in his own exposition of Judaism. The justification is summed up by saying that it is the logic of a revealed religion. At the end of a very brief discussion of the laws about things unclean—"interdictions"—Dr. Moore says that a multitude of things that are in the religious definition "unclean" "have an extensive and minute development which fills a large space in the Mishnah and cognate works." These distinctions had no meaning to Judaism except that they were divine commands. Observance of them was not superstition, but only obedience. "To repeat what has been emphasized more than once before in this volume, this is the logic of a revealed religion. Upon its premises any other attitude is *ipso facto* a rejection of the religion and of God who is its author." Observances so undertaken are not the "externals" of religion; as conformity to the revealed will of God, they are the essence of religion. *"This conception, being given in revelation itself, was the only one possible in Judaism with the Bible in its hands"* (II, 78). In a discussion of questions about sins of ignorance or forgetfulness, and the efficacy of sacrifices in such cases, Moore says, *"The details of the casuistry are nothing to our purpose." "Only those will regard this casuistry as futile who do not know the religion of the Old Testament"* (I, 461 and n. 1). It is the Old Testament itself that puts all sins, moral and non-moral alike, under the purely religious category of violations of the revealed will of God. It is also the Old Testament which gives its legalistic definition to the Jewish religion throughout. We have said enough, then, about the casuistry of the Talmud when we have said that it is the logic of revealed religion, or, what means the same thing, that the rabbis found it, and the necessity for more and more of it, in the Old Testament. Having recognized in it the unescapable effect of belief in revelation, Moore thinks that we can see that it was not futile, and yet that its details are nothing for our purpose.

But it must, I think, be acknowledged that Professor Moore is not fully consistent, and does not in reality tie the Jewish religion up in quite so hard and fast a way as his language sometimes suggests to an impossible doctrine of Scripture. He ends his treatment of the Sabbath by saying that the use of the day for the worship of God and the study of the law gave it a positive religious value in comparison with which its negative aspects became wholly subsidiary, and that *"it is a stupendous error to concentrate attention on the micrologic casuistry of external restrictions or relaxations, ignoring the real significance of the day for religion itself"* (II, 39). But has not Moore insistently taught us that reasons and values have no right of way in a religion of revelation, and that laws, even those that are distinctly moral, are obeyed in such a religion because they are revealed as the will of God, and not for any consideration of their inherent excellence or useful effects? The laws about Sabbath in the Old Testament are almost entirely negative; and certainly the tracts "Shabbat" and "Erubin" in the Mishnah have nothing to say of positive religious values in Sabbath observance, but are occupied with "the micrologic casuistry of external restrictions or relaxations." And if this was the principal concern of the Tannaim, whose principal work was the Mishnah, how, if we would understand their religion, can it be a stupendous error to give our attention to that which chiefly absorbed theirs? In an earlier chapter Moore himself says of the Sabbath that "the regulations which we find in the Mishnah are in part the formulation of custom, in part of exegetical study of the Scriptures, in part of juristic casuistry; *but upon the premises of revealed religion such things cannot be too exact or too minute*" (I, 251 f.).

Moore's justification, both of the rabbis' procedure and of his own, seems in effect to mean that we should recognize the necessity and inevitableness, from their point of view, of the preponderance of legal casuistry in the Talmud, but that we do not need to follow them in the endless and dreary details into which this necessity forced them, but only to understand once for all the nature of the necessity. It would no doubt be difficult in a book like this to give to the actual contents of the Mishnah the place which would seem to be its due in an account of the religion of the Tannaim. It would be hard to make so favorable an impression of this religion, and to call forth so much appreciation and sympathy; hard to avoid the impression which Schürer makes in his treatment, based on the Mishnah, of life under the law.

I shall not propose a different order and proportion of treatment in which Halakah and Haggada might have each its rightful place, but would rather suggest that those who read Moore should also read some consecutive parts of the Mishnah itself. A few of its "tractates" are available in English editions. Berakot, Sukkah, Sanhedrin, Shabbat are published in the useful series of "Translations of Early Documents" (London). In these volumes both Mishnah and Tosefta are given. The Mishnah on Idolatry (Aboda Zara), and the entire Talmudic tractates Berakot and Chagigah, are published by the Cambridge University Press. So that it is entirely possible for the English reader to get some immediate impression of the rabbis as they appear when engaged in their chief task.[2]

But those who read the Mishnah should also turn back again to Moore. Religions are seldom so far wrong as the strict logic of some of their ideas would make them. The rabbis were not tied quite so hard and fast to a mistaken conception of what the Old Testament is as some of Dr. Moore's sentences seem to affirm. His own exposition of Judaism corrects such an impression. The Bible that was in the hands of the rabbis was the Old Testament as a whole; and much the largest—and of course, to any rational and moral judgment, much the greatest—parts of it are not laws at all, and cannot be twisted into any likeness to laws. Moore's book in its main contents presents the Judaism which resulted from this greater Old Testament. This means that it is the haggadic material of which his book is chiefly composed, the Haggada, to which the impressive but dangerous words, "normative," "authoritative," "orthodox," do not properly apply, and which was not produced by the inevitable logic of the conception of revealed religion.

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[2] It should be noted also that the halakic Midrash on which Moore puts such value can in part be read in translations, *Mechilta* (on Exodus), by Wünsche, and *Sifrè* (on Deuteronomy), by Kittel (Part I), in German, and *Selections from Sifrè* (on Numbers), in English, by Levertof (London, 1926).

Moore's book has in some measure the character of a defense of the Judaism of New Testament times against misunderstandings and misrepresentations of it by Christian writers. But one wonders just how Jewish readers will regard it. It will certainly be appreciated and welcomed by them for its author's tone, his evident desire to be fair and to understand the religion he is studying from within, and according to the testimony of its recognized authorities. They will appreciate, as all readers must, the great learning and—better perhaps than others—the enormous labor by which this outsider has made himself at home in their classical literature. What will they think of the use of the conception of revealed religion, which is made so completely the foundation of Judaism that everything else results from it and is justified as its necessary and logical consequence? Revelation, revealed religion, are only translations of the word *Torah*. The word "legalism" is avoided because of its unfavorable implications; but legalism it is, none the less, in Moore's own definition of it which characterizes and explains this religion and justifies the Mishnah and Talmud. Judaism "conceived itself as revealed religion, and drew all the consequences of this conception." Liberal Jews will certainly not want a defense of Judaism to rest on an unsubstantial foundation. They will wish to find valuable elements in the teaching of the Tannaim and their successors, which remain valid because they appeal to reason and conscience, because they have the prophetic quality, even after their conception of Scripture as Torah has proved mistaken. They will not be willing to say that the Old Testament has its only natural and authentic outcome in the Talmud. Professor Moore has become as under the law to them that were under the law, that he may understand them that were under the law; but he is not himself under the law. His defense of Judaism, so far as it consists in an appeal to the logic of revealed religion, is not really a defense for those who believe in Judaism but accept the fact of development in religion as in other things and in the Old Testament as in other literatures. Moore's defense of Judaism as the logical consequence of its premise is made by one who does not accept the premise as true. But if the premise is not true now, it was not true then. The Old Testament is not and was not such a book as the rabbis believed it to be; and the Mishnah is the logical consequence of their belief, but it is not the natural and necessary consequence of the Old Testament itself. Unless, indeed, we are prepared to let the scribes from Ezra's time determine for us the meaning of the Old Testament. If we do that—and Moore seems at times to demand this of us—then we shall be reinstating the priestly legislation in the place from which historical science has removed it.

It should, however, be said again that great parts—the greater parts—of the Jewish religion and ethics which Moore expounds are not the logical consequence of revealed religion, and do not depend on a fundamentally wrong view of what the Bible is. The Mishnah, on the whole, does depend upon that wrong view, and the Mishnah was the chief product of the religion of the Tannaim, and should, it would seem, in some way have a larger place in the exposition of their Judaism than it has in this work. But religious experience and ethical idealism, as Moore's book abundantly shows, had not lost all their freedom and vitality, even though, as Montefiore puts it, the rabbis did labor under "the burden of the Old Testament," and because of this "sometimes seem lacking in capacity to distinguish between the solemn and the trivial," so that "much of their teaching seems childish and absurd." Liberal Jews would rather say, what Moore hardly confesses, that the rabbis made a wrong choice in shutting themselves off from the culture and philosophy of Greece, and made a wrong use of their own great Scriptures.

It is then the relation between Halakah and Haggada about which we wish that Moore had gone farther and more deeply in the way of comparison and inference. Judaism is the religion of revelation. In Part I this principle of revealed religion is expounded, and in Part IV the observances are described which are drawn from the principle. But in Parts II, III, V, VI, VII we have expositions of the Jewish conceptions of God, of sin and atonement, of morals, piety, and hope which are the result of a very different use of the Old Testament. Moore himself describes this use in a significant passage (I, 357–59) as selection by affinity. The principle that the Bible is as a whole one divine revelation might lead us, he says, to expect that on such a topic as the doctrine of God the rabbis would draw from all parts of Scripture "comprehensively or indiscriminately," from early naïve anthropomorphisms up to passages of the greatest elevation. But in fact there is a selective process. "The unconscious principle in this selection was affinity with their own highest conceptions." On the whole they appropriated the best that is in the Bible, and in some directions advanced beyond it. But this principle of selection by affinity would seem to be the opposite and denial of the principle of revelation, which is the definition of Judaism. There is a logic in this procedure, but it is a very different logic from that which justifies the halakic casuistry. This is the circular logic, common to Jewish and Christian theology, which begins by unconsciously choosing from the Bible what is in agreement with one's beliefs, and goes on to prove the truth of one's beliefs by the passages chosen. This is a use of Scripture which is fundamentally different from that which Moore's chapter on the Scriptures, for example, permits. Much the larger part of this exposition of Judaism—say five-sevenths—has to do with the sort of material which involves this free selective use of Scripture. Just what, then, does the difference between these two ways of using Scripture with their two widely different results signify? It is the problem of the relation between the particular and the universal, which meets us everywhere in the study of religions; but in Judaism the particular elements—the Torah, Israel the elect people to whom the Torah was given—seem very particular, and, we may add, the universal elements are very universal; and these two seem to stand in a relation to each other of fundamental inconsistency.

The importance of clearness as to the relation between these two—the Torah, and "their own highest conceptions"—in the religion of the Tannaim becomes especially evident when we turn, as we must, in spite of the fact that Professor Moore does not propose to help us here, to the question of the relation between this Judaism and the religion of Jesus and of Paul, or Christianity in its beginnings. In the region of the particular these are two very different religions. Over against Torah and Israel, the distinguishing, objective fact of Christianity is Jesus himself. Christ is the end of the Law; and there is no distinction between Jew and Greek. In the region of the universal, Moore warns us at various points that we Christians are not to look in Judaism for teachings fundamentally different from our own. The title of Bousset's early essay, *The Preaching of Jesus in Its Contrast to Judaism*, is, he tells us, a fateful initial error which vitiates not only this youthful essay but the larger work on Judaism as well. Moore's exposition of the beliefs and ideals of Judaism sets them forth as essentially like those of Christianity, except for its particular feature, its beliefs about Christ.

It is Moore's purpose, in his *Judaism*, to exclude all Christian interests such as have prejudiced the treatment of Judaism by Christians hitherto; and it would therefore be inappropriate, even if space allowed, for the reviewer to enter here into so large and difficult a field. Yet the New Testament student can no more neglect Moore than he can Strack's commentary, though he must largely make his own way in his use of this study of Judaism as it bears on his own problems. Moore uses the New Testament as containing sources for our knowledge of Judaism, and so includes the Synoptic Gospels, especially Matthew and the first chapters of Acts, among "Extraneous Sources." He agrees with the usual Jewish judgment that the rest of the New Testament, except the essentially Jewish Book of Revelation, signifies little for Judaism then, or for our knowledge of it now, but that Jewish literature signifies much for our knowledge of the New Testament. For this, however, Moore leaves us for the most part with Dalman and Strack. He does not discuss in any detail the criticisms of pharisaism by Jesus, nor the Pharisees' hatred and fear of him, which was intense enough to demand his death. He says that the attitude of Jesus and of his immediate followers toward the so-called "ceremonial law" was "entirely orthodox," citing for this judgment especially Matt. 5:18–19; 23:2–3, 23 (II, 9; cf. I, 269 f.). Now it is surely evident that his conduct and his defense of it as to Sabbath and as to rules of purity mean that he did not value the letter of the law, and did not put importance on the least of the commandments, and did not himself do what the scribes and Pharisees prescribed, nor condemn them only because "they say, and do not." The verses cited are, in fact, not of such a character as to support the inference drawn from them. Moore himself, comparing the sayings of Jesus about divorce with those of Hillel and Shammai, says that we should remember that these were "jurisconsults called upon to pronounce authoritatively what the law was; whereas Jesus, having no such authority or responsibility, undertook to say *what, on ideal principles, the* *law ought to be, Moses to the contrary notwithstanding*" (II, 125). This is not orthodox, but the direct contradiction of revealed religion; and Jesus' own "for your hardness of heart Moses wrote you this commandment" goes far by implication toward the recognition of the "eminently modern" conception of historical development in religion. Jesus' refusal to lay down rules of conduct seems to be due, not to lack of authority or responsibility, but to the choice of the way of inwardness and freedom in contrast to the way of authority. Abrahams puts the two ways well when he asks: "Is morality expressible in terms of law? Can a community be made moral and spiritual by being made law abiding?" and adds that an affirmative answer justifies pharisaism as a theory; and "if the answer is negative, pharisaism is inherently false." This is a formulation of the alternative which Paul would have accepted.

But what about Paul? He is not included even among the extraneous sources; yet though a Jew of the dispersion, he studied in Jerusalem under Gamaliel I. He confidently claims to have been an exceedingly conscientious and zealous Pharisee, surpassing his fellows in his devotion to law and tradition, blameless as to legal righteousness (Gal. 1:13–14; Phil. 3:4–6). He gave great powers of mind and soul to the task of understanding the Jewish religion and the difference in it which he found that Jesus had made. Should not this pupil of the leading tanna of his day, the man whom we know more intimately than any other Jew of his time, have something to teach us about Judaism and about what was old and what new, what Jewish and what contrary to Judaism, in the teaching and work of Jesus and in the religion of his followers? We may make full allowance for the passion and prejudice of a vehement partisan of the new religion, and yet find it incredible that such a man as Paul did not know what normative Judaism was. Paul must be reckoned with as a witness on the question whether "Abba" meant anything new as Jesus used it. Even his attitude toward the law must be taken into the historian's reckoning. In fact, a writer whom Moore values highly and accepts as an orthodox Jew, though his book is an apocalypse, expresses much the same feeling against which Paul struggled: the feeling that the law was not adequate as a way of salvation because the evil heart makes the keeping of it impossible. A comparison of Romans 7 with 4 Ezra 3:17–22; 7:45–48, 116–26; 9:30–37 is certainly in place in a book on Judaism. Moore cites 4 Ezra on Adam and the evil heart, but not, I think, on the law. It is to be noted that Ezra, no more than Paul, finds relief in the doctrine of salvation by repentance. If "conformity to the revealed will of God is the essence of religion" (II, 78), how could one like Paul, whose aim was perfection, fail to experience anxiety and despair, which Moore thinks un-Jewish. And if repentance, "the Jewish doctrine of salvation," meant what Ezek. 18; 33:10–20 and Isa. 1:16–17 suggest, "the abandonment of evil deeds and evil intentions, a radical change of conduct and motive" (I, 509), that is, as Kohler puts it, if repentance "is nothing else than man's self-redemption from the thralldom of sin" (*Jewish Encyclopedia,* "Repentance"), then it would certainly have seemed to Paul and to the Ezra apocalyptist only the hardest of the laws, or the sum and substance of the laws, which man's evil nature made it impossible for him to fulfil.

The Christian religion in the end added the New Testament to the Old. It is entirely appropriate, and indeed necessary, that the historian should read the New Testament and the Mishnah side by side. They are almost contemporary authoritative products of the two religions. They are exceedingly different. Both are outcomes of the Old Testament. Moore, indeed, says that "the interpretation of the Scripture in the New Testament is of precisely the same kind" as that of the rabbis and that of Philo (I, 249), Christianity using it of course as a book about Christ. But we cannot but recognize that a radical difference separates the Mishnah from the New Testament, which goes back to a difference as to the fundamental principle of revelation. The Mishnah is the result of the belief that the age of prophecy, of inspiration, was long past, and that the Old Testament was its final product. The New Testament is the product of the conviction, the experience, that the age of prophets had returned, that the Spirit of God was again present, bringing new revelations to light and new religious and moral energies to life. The Mishnah is the classical expression of a religion of a book, a religion of authority. The New Testament is the classic of a religion of a person, a religion of inwardness and freedom. I may be permitted to express my own conviction—it may seem just now a historical heresy—that this difference goes back to Jesus and was made by him, and that Paul is fundamentally right in his understanding of what the difference was and of what it signifies. In these statements I have gone outside of the region in which a discussion of Moore's *Judaism* should move. It is not, however, beyond the range of this discussion to express the two opinions that Jesus was not orthodox, and that Paul was not ignorant of Judaism.

I could wish, then, that Professor Moore had made a fuller comparison of the various sects and tendencies in Palestinian Judaism during the late Hellenistic period with the fixed type that took final shape after 70 A.D. And I wish there had been a deeper-going comparison of the two sides or aspects of this later Judaism which are represented by the Halakah and the Haggada, or are suggested by the words "particular" and "universal." It is a distinction found in all historic religions, but perhaps in none is it more sharply drawn than in Judaism, and more in need of thorough understanding. It is upon such an understanding that every fair effort to compare Judaism and Christianity and interpret their historical relations to each other must rest. We shall not get far in this effort if we compare only the particular features in one with the universal in the other, or if we fail to get some real understanding of the relation in each religion between the particular and the universal. For this inevitable comparison it is perhaps the most distinguishing value of Professor Moore's book that it sets forth with fulness of learning and with fairness and sympathy of judgment the universal features of the final religion of the rabbis. The book leaves one with a wholesome respect for that "best" which the rabbis, with a real, even if it seems to us inconsistent or unconscious, freedom, selected from the Old Testament, and that "better still" which in certain directions they attained. We cannot but get a new impression of the large measure and the importance of the elements which Judaism and Christianity had and have in common, even though the concrete particulars on which the two religions built this superstructure are so different. From this point of view it is natural to compare Moore's book, from the Christian side, with Montefiore's from the Jewish. *The Old Testament and After* is written, not from a standpoint "above the facts," which seems to its author to be that of Professor Moore, but very much from within his own kind of liberal Judaism, and in order to strengthen and advance it. But though a book of entirely different purpose and nature, it is a good book to read by the side of Moore's. It looks for "the advance" beyond the Old Testament that is to be found in the New Testament as well as in the rabbinic literature, and even in Paul as well as in Jesus. It shows what achievements in generous fairness and genuine insight are possible for one who sets out everywhere to find what is good, one who is looking for values, not for defects, and for new values, not for old. Moore may not help Jews to find "the advance of the New Testament." That is not his aim. But he will certainly help Christians to appreciate the religious and ethical values of Judaism; and his book will remain a classic in scholarship, a warning against many long-current errors, a rebuke to prejudice and superficiality, and an inspiration to caution and thoroughness for all historical students of religion.

THE PROFESSOR OF RELIGION

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In the days of our grandfathers a "professor of religion" was a "professing Christian," one who had experienced conversion and made a public profession of faith. In that sense the term is now almost obsolete, but that is not the sense in which I am here using it. I am thinking of college professors. On many a campus now you will not only find students extracting the rich juice of culture from the roots of dead languages, or distilling the clear spirit of science from the bodies of newts and scorpions; you may also perchance drop into a classroom where a puzzled student is saying, "Professor, I don't quite get the difference between the *ka* and the *bai*. Did the Egyptians believe a man had two souls?" Or you may hear another exclaim, "This Zoroastrianism is pretty good! I didn't know there was such a common-sense religion." Evidently the subject of instruction in this class is religion; but if that is so, what can you call the teacher but a professor of religion? In the college catalogue, of course, he appears as professor of Biblical literature, of religious education, or of the history, psychology, or philosophy of religion. The old expression, however, does very well as a general designation for all those who teach religion as a college subject.

But how can religion be taught as a college subject? Can it be taught at all? And if it can, is the college classroom a proper place to teach it? As a matter of fact, is the man I am calling the professor of religion—whatever may be his particular field—really trying to teach religion, or is he simply teaching certain facts about religion? Does he treat religion as just one more object of intellectual curiosity, or does he seek to make his students more religious? What do the students think of his work? What effect does it actually have upon their beliefs and attitudes? Such questions as these arise in many minds regarding the teaching of religion in our colleges, and it is the purpose of this article to suggest answers to some of them.

I

As regards the attitude of the students toward courses in religion, sure and significant generalizations are impossible: the facts are not available. Surveys have been made of the courses in religion offered by various groups of colleges and universities, but they yield no information on this point. Indeed, statistics could hardly answer such a question. A comparison of the enrolment in religion and in other subjects, for example, would not show how the students regard these courses, because the factors which determine the size of a class are so many and so complex that a clear and certain interpretation of the statistics would be out of the question.

Colleges having ecclesiastical affiliations often require all students to take courses in the Bible. Obviously figures prove nothing here. Some students, indeed, resent the requirement, though they do not object to required courses in English or history. During three years in a college where every student had to take my courses I found a few who evidently felt that they had been imposed upon in being compelled to study the Bible. Others may have cherished a secret resentment, but I have no reason to think that such an attitude is at all common. Where it does exist it has much the same basis as the more frequent opposition to compulsory chapel. In one university, by the way, the students asked not long ago that they be given a required course in religion instead of being compelled to attend chapel. But whether a subject is popular or unpopular, the students' attitude cannot be deduced from their registration when the course is required.

Even in elective courses little can be inferred from the enrolment. Interesting lectures, easy assignments, lenient grading, or convenient hours may account for a large registration in any subject. The personality of the professor also has much to do with the number of his students. On the other hand, the fact that a class is small does not necessarily demonstrate a lack of interest in the subject. Students have said to me: "I'm sorry, but I'll have to give up your course; it comes at the same hours as biology, and I have to take that, because I'm preparing to study medicine." During the first two years of college there is generally little room for elective courses, and during the last two years there are requirements of concentration and specialization which fill up the greater part of the student's schedule. Most men who have any interest at all in their studies find that they must pass by many courses which they would like to take.

Sometimes the most religious men on the campus deliberately avoid courses in religion. Some of them probably feel that they have received sufficient instruction in such matters through the church. Men looking forward to the ministry often take the perfectly reasonable position that they will get these things in the theological seminary and must use their college years to lay a more general cultural foundation. Other students are not in sympathy with the modern point of view of the professor of religion. Sometimes, doubtless, and not without reason, they fear that their faith might suffer from exposure to the merciless light of scientific investigation and comparison; but of this I shall speak again in another connection.

Clearly, we cannot tell anything about student attitudes from the statistics of enrolment. It is neither surprising nor especially significant that in some colleges we find large classes in Biblical literature or the philosophy of religion, while in others the classes in such subjects are comparatively small. We do not need statistics, however, to prove that there is a deep and widespread interest in religion among college men and women. In fact, religion seems to be a favorite topic of conversation among young people nowadays. An undergraduate once said to me, "There are three subjects that we are always discussing: athletics, sex, and religion. Generally we go through all three of them and then turn around and come back through all three." Consider also this bit of confession from a Senior: "Since I've been in college I've not attended church at all. Of course I've talked a great deal about religion, but doesn't everyone?" A cynic might say, "What of it? The serious business of pleasure-seeking is exhausting. Heated arguments provide relaxation, and what subject could be more fitting for this purpose than religion?" But there is more than that to be said. Many students are genuinely interested in religion and are thinking about it seriously. Whether they are thinking clearly and soundly is another question, but it is something to know that they are thinking.

II

As a sample of what college students are thinking today about religion let me quote from some papers which were submitted at the beginning of my course in the history of religions last year. Having in mind the statement of a prominent scholar that the first step in a scientific study of religion is to recognize your own prejudices and list them among your facts, I had asked the students to put into writing their ideas of religion—what it is and what it ought to be. Naturally, since there was no previous announcement or opportunity for preparation, you will find some awkwardness of expression in the statements; on the other hand they have at least the virtue of spontaneity. Youth's sometimes irresistible temptation to flippancy may have colored some of them, but on the whole there is very little evidence of the self-consciousness that so often produces a protective coloring of irreverence and cynicism. I ought to add that this was an elective course, and the students represented not only the Protestant, but also the Roman Catholic and Jewish faiths. They were not, of course, representative of the student body as a whole, even in this one university. They were sufficiently interested in religion to elect the course in the first place, and sufficiently open-minded to be willing to study it from a scientific point of view. At the same time their ideas must be typical of a large body of undergraduate opinion.

On the whole they are decidedly unorthodox. One day in class we were discussing belief in God and comparing the different historical forms of belief or unbelief when a student raised his hand and said, "The highest form is atheism, isn't it?" In the same class the doctrine of the Trinity occasioned some perplexity, and I endeavored to clarify it by outlining the historical circumstances under which it was formulated and the issues involved, only to have a student say, "In other words, they knew that they were really polytheists but wouldn't admit it." The same unconventionality characterizes the papers which I wish to quote.

Naturally the importance and validity of belief in God plays a large part in the statements. "The religious attitude," says one man, "emphasizes a belief in a god or in gods who can be appealed to for certain acts and favors." "Religion should be belief in a beneficent personal God," says another. "A religion to be successful should have a personal God," writes a third; and a fourth says, "My religion is a positive thing, a belief in God and his goodness and the divinity of Christ." Others are more vague. Belief in "some superhuman, supernatural psychic power" is specified by one student. Another writes, "Religion is man's expression of the fact that there must be some superhuman power somewhere." Still another, after defining religion in somewhat similar terms, adds, "Often it seems to be the recognition of a supreme power that is not personal, but regards mankind as a phase of natural evolution." One thoughtful statement shows what is doubtless going on in the minds of many undergraduates:

> When I came to college my mind was centered upon orthodox Baptist belief inculcated by orthodox parents. Various courses in college and various speakers have greatly changed my ideas. I would now almost go as far as to cast aside all forms of religion, and as a beginning simply say, "There is a God." With this basis I would attempt to build up a kind of

theology for myself. This God of mine would hardly be the God of the New Testament; rather would It be Power or Ultimate Force. I cannot conceive of God the Father, the very name of which hints at earthly limitations. To me God must be bigger than the God of the Bible—unless I have not properly conceived that God. I mention all of this about deity because to me the belief in God and religion are so closely connected.

Several papers evince a pronounced tendency toward that ethical, atheistic type of religion which used to be called positivism and is now coming to be known as humanism. "Primitive man," says one, "was more concerned with his own benefits, while the modern man insists that his religion be ethical. As such, religion now seems to be an instrument for the promulgation of morality, if we mean by morality the greatest good of the greatest number. Some of the modern conceptions of God as a sort of psychic power or an inexorable law of nature seem to be inconsistent with the idea of worship which seeks favor from God, and consequently become mere codes of ethics." "To be religious," another man writes, "is to hold a constant attitude of love toward things and an open desire to do good, with Christ as the perfect example." Other statements are of similar import. "God should not be put on a high place to be worshipped from afar, but should be one similar to Jesus, who went even among the lepers to teach and heal." "Anyone's religion, or philosophy of life may be a better term, should be an attempt to perfect his body and mind, an attempt to live according to the best ethical standards, an attempt to create harmony within himself and with his fellows. If we do this, the best way, it seems to me, is not to worry about a superhuman power, but to deal openly, honestly, and wholeheartedly with problems of life—with realities—for 'the greatest good of the greatest number' of human beings." "Religion should be auto-communication, a looking into one's own soul or heart, a ubiquitous inventory-taking of yourself, and proper action upon the outcome of this search." "I believe that religion should be made more a matter of natural brotherhood and true friendship for its own practical value, rather than a duty to some abstract being which seems far removed. With the growth of human minds to a point where the masses can reason that far, such an idea of religion may come into being." "A good religion should be developed to scientifically support the ethics of a people. It should not be founded upon emotional experiences and ancient ritualistic superstitions, but should be the best philosophic solution for the behavior of peoples as well as their belief in God. Commandments which are of no utility—the remains of the needs of an older period—should not remain active."

Faith in a life after death apparently has little place in the thinking of these students. "Present-day religion," says one paper, "offers no assurance of after-life that can be logically expected in the face of scientific knowledge." Aside from this the only reference to the other world comes from a student who says that the purpose of religion is to help a person in this life, "and if there is also a belief in immortality, to help him in the after-life."

The Bible is mentioned only in the statement of one man, "I do not accept the Bible as inspired."

One wonders how far this general rejection of traditional beliefs may be a matter of sour grapes, an attempt to make the most of what is left of religion after science has had its say. There is little indication of distress over the loss of earlier faith. Since the class was composed almost entirely of upperclassmen, it may be that they had passed beyond the stage of most acute unrest; at any rate most of the papers show no dissatisfaction with such readjustments as have been achieved. But perhaps the "argument from silence" should not be pressed in a case like this. Certainly the ethical emphasis is wholesome as far as it goes. Insistence upon the close union of religion and morality would have prevented many of the worst historic aberrations of religion. Nevertheless there are still some of us who feel that without God and a hereafter religion is like a bird without wings.

III

The importance which these students attach to religion and their conceptions of what is most essential in religion vary even more widely than their judgment on specific questions of belief. One of them lightly dismisses religion as "a convenient obsession," and the idea of God as "a means of auto-suggestion." He considerately adds, "As man is innately fond of doing this, it is perfectly proper." Most of the men see more than this in religion, yet several are distinctly patronizing in their attitude toward it. "Religion," says one, "is a many-sided mystery. It is man's way of explaining the inexplainable. It is a source of comfort and power to the weak-minded, and a cause for argument for the more learned. A man's religion is something he knows the least about, but which he will defend to the death. Since the beginning of time religion has been the source of terrific wrangle and strife; up to date no Supreme Being has showed any partiality to any side, and yet every faction is sure that it alone is right."

Several students show what they consider important in religion when they attempt to describe it in terms of its psychological origin. Two of them find this in "fear of the supernatural"; a third says, "There seems to be a want for an answer to some psychological necessity, which may be called the religious spirit, something akin perhaps to superstitious fear, an emotion which finds in religion—the worship of superhuman powers—the answer to this need." Other psychological factors suggested are the desire to explain the world, the longing for comfort and inspiration, and the need of moral guidance and control. "Religion seems to me," writes one student, "to be a spirit of humility based largely on man's apparent dependency on something beyond his knowledge. This spirit is not wholly one of fear, but in a great many cases fear plays a large part, more so in religions other than straight Christianity. No one, at least no normal person, can look at the stars on a clear night, watch an autumn sunset, or read about the hypothesis of the earth's origin without realizing the existence of some power or being far superior to anything we now know. This very feeling is the fundamental premise to religion. All the forms, ideas, creeds and dogmas are merely a sort of superstructure which is built on to make it attractive, systematic, and workable." The awe inspired by contemplation of a sunset is mentioned again in another statement: "It is hard to draw the line between everyday life, morality, and religion; but to my mind much in the Bible is not religion. To me religion is a spiritual, worshipful rite, and such a thing as playing baseball on Sunday would not come in that category. On the other hand, joy or admiration derived from the glory of a sunset would be a part of religion. Just what religion has to do with a man's life I cannot yet tell; that is one reason I am taking the course. I want to find out just what religion means to me."

Everything that savors of the supernatural or the mystical is either rejected or ignored by many of the students and distinctly subordinated by others. After defining religion as "belief in some supernatural agent with superhuman power," a student continues, "Religion, in my opinion, should be something more tangible. The whole mysterious atmosphere surrounding it makes it very uncertain in many respects." A somewhat similar attitude appears in this statement: "Religion plays a very important part in the life of today. It is becoming more and more impotent all the time; (if we listen to most ministers) people are losing faith. Personally I think it is rationalization and a commendable tendency toward common sense." An inclination to regard theological questions as insoluble and unimportant appears in another paper: "My idea of religion has always been, as has been stated in this course, the establishment of a personal relationship between the individual and a superhuman power. I used to believe in this Power and now I do not exactly disbelieve. However, I think it is out of the power of the individual to say whether or not this power does exist, and I don't feel that it is worth worrying about."

Two papers state that religion is an essential part of a man's life. Another says, "Religion is very important in a man's life because through its agencies he rids himself of many vague doubts and worries that would undermine his peace of mind." A student who values religion for its help in bearing misfortune says, "Certain philosophies may do this for some persons with a much greater degree of efficiency than a religion. Then, of course, religion is not necessary in everyday life; yet if it is not there something else must usually take its place," Another man writes:

> Personally I have no religion, being more or less atheistic. But I do believe that to the great majority of mankind some sort of religion is necessary, for the simple reason that man needs some source of solace and comfort and may find them, if his faith is strong enough, in the trust and belief in the necessary goodness of some god's works. To myself, however, this faith and trust is unnecessary, as I believe that each person is the captain of his fate and the master of his soul. It seems to me a weakness to assign your sufferings and sorrows to the works of some power which controls your destiny. I believe that every person is himself responsible for everything that happens to him, and that only this realization will bring it about that man will strive to overcome such weaknesses as he may have. When man realizes that his faith is in his own hands, great progress is sure to result. I believe that this conception of life should be the common attitude of man in the future.

Several writers emphasize the function of religion as a source of comfort. One of them waxes very poetic: "Religion is a kindly light, a beacon that lights the way over troubled waters and calm. But, when in calm waters, many feel secure without the aid of a beacon. However, in rough seas, when man's aid is helpless, then is the beacon searched for with straining eyes."

To others, as we have seen, the primary value of religion is ethical. Two papers, however, exhibit a reaction from this ethical emphasis. "One not religious but purely ethical may serve man," says one of them, "but never in the exalted manner of the religious one." The other goes so far as to say, "My religion has no concern with ethics. Those are things to be accepted as the situation requires."

A similar divergence of opinion is evident with regard to the use of ritual, though very few of the men mention this subject at all. A representative of the ethical interest says, "The rise of ritualistic religion has been produced by people whose religious thoughts became expressed in emotional activity. It is true that such teaching is very influential with the masses, but it should be used only to impress one with the obvious truth of a rule." Quite a different point of view is expressed in this statement: "A religion, to be successful, should have an elaborate ritual, because a man goes to church to be inspired, lifted above himself, and nothing accomplishes this so thoroughly as solemn music and elaborate rituals."

The conception of religion as essentially a relationship between man and deity appears in several papers. "Religion seems to be, certainly, a mode of behavior—worship(?)—by means of which man seeks to establish a communion with some sort of superhuman power for the good of himself or his fellow men." Again, "Religion is the establishment of a personal relationship between the individual and a superhuman power." A graduate student in Biblical literature writes, "To give a more philosophical definition we might say that religion is the response of a man which arises from his sense of dependence upon the cosmic force or forces of the universe. But we can put the same thought into more intelligible language if we say that religion is a man's attempt to experience God and to let God control his life and action. After saying this it is easy to say that religion is what gives life meaning."

A summary of the views here presented is out of the question. If any general conclusion is justified, it is that the students' thoughts do not all run into the same mold. One observation, however, is suggested by these papers. Obviously our educational system has thus far been more successful in raising questions than in answering them. It is able to destroy old beliefs, but less effective in supplying anything to take their place. This does not mean that we should formulate a new creed and attempt to impose it upon the students. They must make their own readjustment. And of course that takes time: maturity and experience bring a more settled and a better balanced view of life and religion to many men whose ideas were quite chaotic in their student days. The college, however, might do much more than it does to assist and direct the process of readjustment. Materials for building a new philosophy of life are given in abundance, but training in the methods of building and instruction in the principles of architectural design for such an edifice are almost entirely lacking. We have not yet devised adequate ways of helping the student to do his own thinking.

IV

To this task the professor of religion addresses himself. His aspiration is to train his students in fair, intelligent judgment, based on accurate knowledge and unaffected by authority or prejudice. In other words, he seeks to cultivate a genuinely scientific attitude with regard to religion. Now a scientific attitude involves both an emancipation and a subjugation. It means complete emancipation from tradition, authority, self-interest, and any kind of prejudice, and it means also complete subjugation to facts and to the laws of sound reasoning. The emancipation is relatively easy. Most of the students who come to the professor of religion are already fairly free from ecclesiastical authority and tradition. Occasionally he encounters cases of dogmatic conservatism, but on the whole it is the least of his troubles. As I have already pointed out, men of this type simply do not elect his courses.

Certainly it cannot be said that the men whose papers I have been quoting have blindly and uncritically accepted traditional doctrines. Their tendency is rather toward an uncritical rejection of all tradition. If they are at all typical of their generation, it is quite evident that no appeal based upon authority or upon loyalty to an institution can hope to win the allegiance of young people today. Before they give religion a dominant place in their lives, they want to know why they should. They are both rationalists and individualists. Impatience with the outward forms of organized religion and its corporate manifestations finds expression in several of the students' papers. "A person may be very religious and not appear to be so in the eyes of others. If he feels that he is doing the will of God, has faith in God, then he is quite religious." "It is my belief that religion is a private thing, a thing to be kept out of public life and to be unpreached. Churches often do great ethical good and formulate religion for those who cannot do it for themselves. Other than that I do not approve of them." "I cannot conceive of religion being pounded verbally into the minds of any sane individuals. It must be something that the person or persons look forward to with sincere hope. Too often in our modern day the preacher overemphasizes the importance of his own particular kind of religious belief, oftentimes forgetting that the belief of his neighbor may be just as convincing as his own, or even just as widespread."

But while emancipation from traditional forms of authority presents very little difficulty with the average student, the professor's path is not so smooth when he insists that the scientific attitude involves also freedom from individual prejudices, and in their place a merciless bondage to sound reasoning and facts. Students love to argue and to air their own ideas, but they are often impatient if required to give concrete evidence. Fine, large generalizations have the greatest appeal to them, as to most of their elders. They are also less interested in what actually is and has been than in what may or should be. Facts are mere excess baggage. I once asked a student who wanted to write a paper on the religion of the future, "Do you mean what seems likely, on the basis of past and present tendencies, to be the religion of the future, or do you mean what you think it ought to be?" With a smile he replied, "I didn't realize it, but that's what I had in mind—just what I thought it ought to be." Frequently students ask, "Do you want us to write what we find in the books or to express our own judgment?" The idea of a connection between their own judgments and what they find in the books apparently does not occur to them.

Sometimes the professor is tempted to believe that the last thing students want is to learn anything. What they want, it seems, is only to express themselves. One of my students, a football player, said to me, "I wish we could have more good arguments in class. The fellows could take sides and you could be a sort of referee." I did not say, "Thank you for allowing me to be present at all." I agreed with him. Certainly a good argument is better than a poor lecture. Possibly a poor argument may be better than a good lecture. Even when a class session has been nothing but a battle of conflicting opinions, and the professor feels that the students have learned little if anything, he knows that he has learned a great deal himself. He has discovered what is going on in the minds of his students, and it is more important that he should do this than that he should deliver a great mass of information. He can now much more intelligently determine what needs to be emphasized and can assign reading which is adapted to the requirements and capacities of the students. If the class discussions did no more than this, they would accomplish far more than set lectures and inflexible reading assignments.

Indeed, when he has thought the matter through, the professor of religion is not at all discouraged by the fact that his students show more interest in self-expression than in acquiring knowledge. Remembering the time-honored dictum that there is no impression without expression, he is thankful for every frank utterance of personal opinion. He knows that there is much more actual education going on when students are discussing a question with genuine interest than there is when they are merely repeating what they have read or taking notes on a lecture which does not interest them. They learn something from one another and from the very act of putting ideas into definite form. As a member of one of my classes stated in a paper, a student's views are often determined more by the "bull-sessions" in which he engages with his fellows than by any of the courses he takes. All the facts in the world will not educate a man if they are not worked over in his own mind and made a part of his own thinking. The professor of religion thinks in this connection of Ezekiel, who, before he could speak the divine message, was required to eat it.

And yet argument is not always a good thing from an educational point of view. The debating attitude is not that of scientific research. Too often the interest in argument means nothing more than a keen delight in exerting one's wits to defend positions taken in advance. In such cases the participants not only do not want to learn anything; they are not even interested in candid and unprejudiced discussion. They seek rather to justify themselves, like the man who said that he was taking my course in order to get a foundation for his conviction that religion was unnecessary. Or they may desire only to match themselves against one another (or against the professor) in a kind of verbal athletics. Such an attitude does not make for accurate understanding and judgment.

There are some students, however, who are willing to subject their views to the tests of fact and reason. A Jewish student said to me, "I'd like to study Judaism to see what there is in it. I'm more or less atheistical myself, and I want to know whether I'm right or not." Not infrequently students confess that they do not know what to think about religion and need more knowledge. The presence of such men in a class is a constant challenge to the professor of religion. With them he knows he has an opportunity to accomplish something constructive and lasting.

Sometimes it is evident that facts have made themselves felt. I once had a student who considered Confucianism far superior to Christianity. Knowing that he had no accurate knowledge of Confucianism, I put him to work on the sacred classics, and while he found much that was interesting and admirable, he soon informed me that he was rather disappointed in the religion of Confucius. To have diminished his respect for a great religious system was not in itself a matter for congratulation, but to have corrected a mistaken view of it by letting him discover the truth for himself afforded an encouraging demonstration of the capacity of the undergraduate mind to modify its views in the light of new facts.

After all, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, students' ideas really do change a great deal as a result of what they learn in college. The very fact that scientific training has raised religious problems in their minds is proof sufficient of the effect that new knowledge may have upon their thinking. Even those who express the most dogmatic assurance, evincing no desire whatever for further progress, have often reached their conclusions very recently: their assurance is that of the convert. Nor have they worked out their ideas entirely by themselves. Their confident pronouncements often echo what they have heard in other classrooms. Remembering this, the professor of religion is encouraged to hope that what is learned in his courses also will make a difference in the thoughts and attitudes of his students.

V

But what sort of difference will it make? Is the professor of religion really trying to teach religion? It all depends upon what you mean by that. When we speak of teaching art we may mean teaching to draw and to paint. In that sense religion should not and cannot be taught in the college classroom. Religious education is the task of the church. We may also, however, speak of teaching art in the sense of cultivating appreciation and an understanding of the significance of art as an enterprise of the human spirit. Something like this is what the professor of religion is trying to do. If you ask him, he will tell you quite emphatically that he is not conducting a mission or a Sunday school class. He is interested in an unbiased, objective study of religion as one of the major human interests, one of the decisive factors in the life and history of mankind. "My job," he will say to you, "is simply to see that my students have a fair understanding of what religion actually is, both at its best and at its worst, and that they base their judgments regarding it upon accurate knowledge and sound reasoning. I am not here either to attack or to advocate any particular faith. I stand as a scholar among scholars, and my motto is, 'Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.'"

A course in religion is well worth while if it only cultivates the ability to discuss religious questions without bitterness, to respect the intelligence and character of those whose beliefs we do not share, to understand their point of view and appreciate the values they find in their faith. A student of Jewish extraction said to me, "This course has broadened me. You know you said, when we were talking about the Catholic belief that the bread and wine are the real flesh and blood of Christ, that a thing might look funny from the outside, but it didn't look so funny from the inside. I was thinking about that when I went home for the week-end. My uncle had just died, and my mother had to sit on a box in the kitchen with her shoes off. I asked why she did that, and I thought my father would throw me out of the house. They couldn't tell me why she had to do it. Finally my brother-in-law, who studied to be a rabbi, told me that it was a sign of humiliation before the anger of God. Then I understood it. You see, I'd been looking at it from the outside." Surely that student had learned something from his course in religion. Few things are more needed among us than an increase of sympathetic understanding and tolerance.

It does not follow that the professor of religion has no concern for the spiritual life and faith of his students. In his heart of hearts he may well hope that some of his students will be led on by their study of religion to appreciate and appropriate it for themselves. He is a religious man himself, and he is not ashamed of the Gospel. He does not feel that scholarly open-mindedness and impartiality necessitate an attitude of detachment and indifference in his personal life. The same liberty of opinion and expression which he allows to every member of his classes he claims also for himself. He feels entirely free to engage in any form of religious activity in accord with his own faith. That by so doing he is compromising himself as a scholarly observer he will not for a moment admit; on the contrary, he maintains that only a religious man can understand and so be capable of interpreting religion. His unprejudiced devotion to truth and his capacity for appreciating and evaluating divergent points of view are not in the least diminished by his personal espousal of religion. And as he is not less a scholar for being a religious man, neither is he less religious for being a scholar, or less interested in the religious life of his students. Since religion is to him not merely an interesting subject of investigation, but a most precious possession, he cannot but wish that it might mean as much to others as it does to him. As a teacher he only wishes his students to know *about* religion in all its important manifestations, but as a friend he wishes them to *know* religion at its best.

While these two wishes are quite distinct, there is no necessary conflict between them. What the professor of religion desires for his students as their friend would not be achieved by making his teaching less scientific in character. If he is ever tempted to substitute exhortation for exposition in the classroom, he knows that it would do more harm than good. College students are suspicious of anything which looks like an attempt to drive or seduce them into being religious; witness their revolts against compulsory chapel and required Bible courses. They have been known, even when the professor endeavored to be quite detached and objective, to complain of the "evangelistic flavor" of his courses. I once asked two students how they liked a course given by a certain well-known scholar. They exchanged furtive glances and were silent a moment; then one of them, evidently feeling that the situation called for some remark, said, "He certainly knows his subject." The other, however, scorning such evasion, said, "Well, he seems to think that what we need is preaching." Such classroom preaching does not make for constructive influence.

On the other hand, the most strictly scientific study of religion is not necessarily negative in its effect. It may even have genuine evangelistic value. If God is the God of truth, no harm can come to religion through the discovery of truth. If religion, or any particular form of religion, is not true, the sooner we know it the better. If it is true and worthy of acceptance, it will make its own appeal when it is rightly understood. The professor of religion is sometimes accused of undermining the faith of his students; but in most cases the loss of faith which is laid at his door is merely the abandonment of childish conceptions which never had any vital meaning for the student and would have been given up sooner or later anyway. Such casualties are more than counterbalanced by the cases of men whose respect for religion has been increased by a scientific study of it. An undergraduate in one of the classes of the late Charles Foster Kent said to me, "He makes religion a much bigger thing than it ever was to me before." Of another teacher one of his students said, "I wish we had more men like him on the faculty. He gives you a lot about the subject, and he gives you a lot more besides." This was the professor who found at the end of an examination paper a personal note to this effect: "I was warned not to take this course, because you would force Higher Criticism down my throat and destroy my faith, but I found that you treated all positions fairly, and while I do not accept all your views, I have enjoyed the course and gained a great deal from it." Many of my own students have told me that the objective, critical study of religion has clarified and confirmed their faith, or has made their condemnation of religion less sweeping and less assured.

Nevertheless the distinction between the hope which the professor of religion may cherish as a friend and the purpose which governs his work as a teacher holds good. He is not trying to make converts in the classroom. He does not substitute discussion for direct exhortation merely as a subtler and more effective method of persuasion. He has no desire to make out a case for religion or to maintain that it has always and in all its forms been good for mankind. He does not minimize its darker aspects as a historical and psychological phenomenon; neither does he undervalue other religions in order to exalt his own. As a teacher he has no aim, avowed or secret, but that his students shall know the truth about his subject, drawing their own conclusions and making their own applications. His academic function ends there, and his academic conscience would not allow him to attempt more. He is quite willing to let religion make its own appeal, not only because he is confident that it will do so, but also because he does not want any man to take over from him a ready-made, second-hand religion. In his insistence that the conclusions which the students reach shall be their own he is thoroughly sincere. He is not only willing but glad to have them reach positions other than his own, provided only that they do reach them by their own efforts and without ignoring the facts of life and history.

The greatest difference of all between the modern professor of religion and the evangelist lies in the fact that the professor thinks of himself, not as giving his students something which he has and they do not have, but as leading them in a search for something which he has not found himself. He and they are bound on a quest together. Some of the ground he has traversed before. He has been seeking longer than they have, and so knows better what to look for and where to look for it. But he counts not himself to have apprehended. As spirit and life religion seems to him beyond question supremely good for all men, and he wants his students to know and to have it as such, but he does not believe that this is to be accomplished by instruction, except as instruction removes misconceptions and promotes understanding. Certain beliefs he holds precious for himself, but to impose them by an exercise of authority, by appealing eloquence, or by the most subtle forms of suggestion would seem to him both unjustifiable and undesirable. What he really has at heart is that both he and his students, working together, shall find out more than any of them yet knows about religion and come nearer than any of them has yet come to an adequate understanding of its significance for truth and life.

A POTPOURRI OF CHURCHES

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This is the story of the experiences of a professional engineer with various Protestant churches and of his search for a solution of his religious problems. If the reading of it suggests how the attitude of many such churches may be made more wholesome, then the writing of these autobiographical notes will have been worth while.

My family, having been residents of New England since early colonial days, has been connected with the Baptist church for generations. One of my paternal forefathers for whom I am named was a minister in the Baptist church about the time of Roger Williams. Evidently he had strong ideas of what was right and wrong, for we are told that he wore woolen socks and was never known to smile. Probably, as will be seen, I have something of his make-up in me, although I wear woolen socks only occasionally and enjoy a good laugh. However that may be, the influence of my grandfathers upon me has undoubtedly been more marked. My paternal grandfather was not what is commonly considered a religious man, since he attended church but once a year. That was on Thanksgiving Day. My maternal grandfather was the direct opposite religiously, since he was a deacon in the Baptist church, a sea captain with world-wide experiences, who was never known to swear, and a man who was honored by his fellow church members as a gentleman.

Yet with such a background, I did not like, as a youth, to go to Sunday school in one of the Baptist churches in the town where I was born. Usually the lesson was taken from the standardized pamphlet commonly issued years ago, and consisted of a dozen or so verses which had only a slight connection with the preceding and following lessons. The teaching was almost invariably in the hands of a man or woman who had had limited educational training, who asked questions that were superficial, and who could not be expected to bring out, like a trained teacher, those basic ideas of the lesson which should have been memorable. With such volunteer teachers discipline could not be otherwise than poor, so that the boys in my class usually regarded the Sunday lesson hour as a chance for horseplay and spitballs. The training in my home had been such that I could not enjoy the atmosphere that made such antics possible, and therefore my mother, with rare wisdom, did not insist on my attending Sunday school regularly. She permitted me to go when so inclined.

This and other experiences have convinced me that our churches should make a strenuous effort to place in charge of their Sunday school classes teachers who have been thoroughly trained in educational work. If such teachers cannot be found in the church or denomination, then go outside and get them, paying a reasonable fee for their services. To the average church member such a statement is heresy; but otherwise much of the work done in our Sunday schools is bound to be so much wasted effort. If we insist on training and skill in our day schools, why should we not insist on equally high standards in the more important field of religious education?

Shortly after I entered high school my family moved to a nearby city and I began to attend the Baptist church of our locality. Disciplinary conditions in the Sunday school of that church were much better than I had experienced previously, but teaching methods were open to criticism since they lacked ability to arouse my interest. Again I complained to my mother, but this time with better results. She interviewed the pastor of the church, who put me in the men's Bible class, although I was only fourteen or fifteen. I was glad, for I enjoyed the more serious discussions occurring there.

Now developed another phase of my religious growth, for I found myself rebelling mentally at times at some of the teaching in that class. For example, we were taught that it was wrong to work on Sunday, which led to a long discussion with one of the members as to whether he had committed any sin when during the Civil War he had lost track of the days of the week and had swapped his watch on Sunday with another soldier for some trinket he desired. The fruitlessness of such a discussion, in its bearing on the complicated civilization of today, needs no comment. At the time, although a youth, I was mentally impatient with the lesson taught, although I could not have explained why.

The men in that Bible class were the usual run of decent law-abiding citizens. Very few of them had done any more extensive reading than was possible with newspapers and magazines. They accepted, without serious question, what they were told to believe in religious matters by the minister of the church. They showed little charity for anybody who did not agree unreservedly with the usual creedal statements; and while they did not say so bluntly, nevertheless the impression they gave was that he only was a good Christian who was a member of the Baptist church.

Unfair criticism of that church will do no good. Still the fact remains that I was a high-school student groping around for religious help and not finding it. Very possibly I was a freak. I did not start going to school until I was seven, yet graduated from high school when sixteen—an indication of mental development ahead of my years. Certainly my brain was asking all sorts of questions and I was not able to find anybody who would answer them with understanding. They were such simple questions, too.

I recall one afternoon visiting the pastor of the church and remarking that I could not accept the Old Testament as literally true throughout, mentioning Jonah and the whale as an example. To this day I can see his shocked expression. He argued with me about it a little and said that he regretted my viewpoint, but he insisted that if I were to be a Christian I must accept the truth of the Old Testament. That was about 1900–1902 in an eastern city, and he was a graduate of a school of divinity. He knew enough to have told me that many, many honored men in the Christian church did not accept the Old Testament as literally true, and that whether I accepted it or not had nothing to do with true Christian living.

On another occasion I urged on him my belief that membership in the Baptist church was not particularly important. I pointed out that in my reading I had discovered that many notable men were not only not members of the Baptist or any other church, but that they did not accept many of the supposedly fundamental beliefs of Christianity. I said that I could not bring myself to believe that such men were to be damned forever in spite of their great contributions to the welfare and happiness of their fellows. Again he insisted that the tenets of the Christian church must be accepted, that there was no place in Christianity for those who could not accept them. Needless to say, I disagreed with him then and I still disagree.

These doubts which I had on many religious questions kept me from joining the Baptist church, although at various times I was asked to do so. Finally I was graduated from high school, and under my mother's guidance I went away from home to study engineering in another eastern city. In view of my youth, mother believed that for my first year it would be better if I boarded with a family that would look after me in a general way. Therefore she arranged for me to stay with an excellent Christian family in a suburb of that city. My host was a deacon in the large local Baptist church, and his father, who lived with him, was a retired Baptist clergyman. My hostess had taught classes in, and was superintendent of, the Sunday school of that church. Grace was offered before each meal. I had the privilege of attending prayer meeting with the members of the family once a week, although I did not go to church with them Sundays, since I went home over each week-end. I am glad to admit that I look back with pleasure on the happy and profitable year I spent with the members of that family.

One evening I went with them to a revival meeting in the local Baptist church, during which those who were members of a Christian church were asked to stand. To the surprise of my friends I remained seated. Then ensued a quiet discussion among us for a few moments, with the result that, under the influence of my host's father, the retired Baptist clergyman, I went forward and professed my acceptance of the creed of the Baptist church. However, my spirit of independence asserted itself in a mild way and I insisted that I wished to be baptized in my home church. To this the local ministers demurred, but finally agreed with fairly good grace, although they made it a point to write my pastor and inform him of the new addition to the faith. Perhaps they had an inkling of the fact that I was somewhat of a "hard nut to crack." Nevertheless, I believed then, and I still do, that if I were not to be trusted to go home to join my local church, as I had promised, and to give them full credit for whatever part they had played in my decision, then I was not worth having in the church. Surely religion is of the spirit, and is so elusive that it should not be chained up to a system of bookkeeping.

Thus I became a member of the Baptist church, with all my questions on various religious subjects unanswered. In a moment of deep feeling I had professed my belief in Christianity without having underneath me the sure foundation that only knowledge based on analysis can give. I was in a queer quandary as the days passed, since I was still troubled over much that the Baptist church insisted on as necessary to Christianity. But I did believe in those ideas of right living and love for others of which its creed is a legalistic expression.

So I decided to do what a good many have done before me: ignore all my questions for a time and drift.

During my remaining three years as an undergraduate in engineering I had a room-mate and lived within a few blocks of the school, instead of an hour's ride away in the suburbs, as during my Freshman year. Further, I did not go home over the week-end so often, so that I had an opportunity to hear a number of the ministers of the larger churches in that eastern city. Of a Sunday morning I attended, usually, one of two Baptist churches. One of these was a very famous church; but since the ministry laid emphasis on right living more than anything else, I was able to enjoy the services and the excellent congregational singing with only occasional qualms. The other Baptist church had a minister who was not an interesting speaker and consequently did not often have my attendance. Of a Sunday evening, especially if I had not been to church in the morning, I attended a Congregational church, listening to a famous preacher. Truth to tell, I soon believed that the religion he preached was of a purer form than that in either of the two Baptist churches. The service had a dignity that was lacking in one of the Baptist churches and the oratorical ability of the minister laid an emphasis on right living that was lacking in the other Baptist church. I would have gone more frequently except that in the morning it was practically impossible to get in because of the pew-rental system.

Meanwhile, six days a week, I was learning steadily of the scientific method of attack on many problems. In my Senior year, in particular, I came under the influence of a man who is, in my opinion, one of the noted engineers and one of the foremost teachers of the country. He insisted always on being told, as we demonstrated what we had learned from our textbooks, the reasons for our statement. I have a vivid memory of one recitation hour when he sat in the back of the room pounding the floor in emphasis with a transom-rod and constantly asking "Why?" in comment on every statement I made. My reasons were worthless, but I stuck to my demonstration and bolstered it up the best I could, until between myself and him there was scarcely a man in the class who knew whether I was right. That was exactly what he wanted in order to show us how worthless was the foundation for the knowledge we claimed to have. He strode to the front of the room, informed the class that I was a fool, and then took the sting out of it by adding quickly that he honored me for the way I had stood firm, doing everything I could to meet his verbal onslaught, and suggested that the members of the class copy my stick-to-it-iveness in their recitations.

The preceding is my grateful tribute to the influence of a great teacher. The foundations he laid were continued in practical life. I entered engineering work in a consultant's office, where we sought always for the design that was best for the client, weighing one design against another and debating their good and bad points until we had come to a decision. My later engineering and executive work simply developed the analytical viewpoint further, for I discovered that it was a most valuable tool in solving difficulties of all sorts. My great trouble was that while this was right and proper six days a week, on the seventh some of the churches I was in contact with set up the standard that I must accept on faith, from the say-so of a minister or a creed, the answers to my religious problems. This I could not do.

My first position after graduating, as a professional engineer, was in another eastern city, where I joined, by transfer of letter, a Baptist church with a famous young men's Bible class. I was active in the work of that class, was elected to membership on its committees, and led its singing. Under its influence I found time to spend one evening a week as a leader of a boy's club in a settlement house and another evening a week on the reception committee of a large Y. M. C. A. Without doubt I enjoyed thoroughly my membership in that church. The minister was a speaker with marked ability to bring out the spiritual side of life. He believed in the necessity of a universal meeting ground for all religions. He preached a broad, all-embracing religion of love that was not tagged with denominational ideas. In fact, if I remember rightly he upset the Baptist denomination at one time by stating that so far as he could see it had outlived its usefulness. While a member of his church I was able to ignore my various religious problems, for I found myself in thorough sympathy with his teaching, as I understood it, that the essence of Christianity was right living.

I enjoyed but two years of membership in that church, however, for soon I accepted a better-paying position with a railroad in the Rocky Mountains. Immediately after taking up my new duties I had my letter transferred to the local Baptist church in the city where I was stationed, and joined its activities. I found myself working with the superintendent of a mission school, a man who had not had more than a grammar-school education, and whose religious outlook on life was of a very narrow sort, although he contributed liberally to the support of the church. In addition, I had to see the minister of the parent church become involved in a dispute with his associate ministers at the missions over the natural desire of those ministers, and the members of the missions which they directed, to become independent and self-supporting. He did not want them to separate from the parent church and could not sense that the generous thing to do was to let the missions go ahead and carve out their own future, giving them support when they needed it. Emphasis on adherence to certain statements of creed appeared to be the keynote of the church. Toleration for the divergent views of others was not apparent. In fact, the minister impressed me as a man who was spiritually starved.

Some idea of the viewpoint of those who were active in the management of that church may be gained from the following incident. One week, in the absence of the regular minister, I was asked to take charge of the Sunday evening service at one of the missions. I had never preached a sermon and doubted my ability to do so with any degree of success. Therefore I decided wisely to select a story that appealed to me as worth while and to read it instead to the small congregation. I had read, a few years before, a story in the *Cosmopolitan Magazine,* which made a great impression on me, entitled "Alias Jimmy Valentine." In 1909 or 1910 I had seen an interesting play which had been written around the story. So I read it to the congregation, and to this day I have not been able to understand the viewpoint of those active in the direction of the affairs of that mission, who criticized me severely, claiming that, as a religious observance, my action was most improper.

On another occasion I discussed with the minister of the church my attendance at a play that had been performed in the city by a company from the East. In the first place he was not in accord with my views, since he believed that a Christian had no right to dance, to play cards, or to go to the theater. However, I still do not see anything reprehensible about my attendance, although the play was "The Easiest Way." To me the outstanding memory is of the young woman about whom it revolves, who did not have the courage to take the hard way, but chose the "easiest way." I believe yet that the great majority of those who saw the play caught the same lesson from it, and nothing else.

The great contrast between the conditions in this Baptist church and those which I had just left is apparent. Naturally, I was restive, a condition that was increased by the stories I heard of the minister in a nearby Congregational church, a man who had much of the Unitarian in his views. I was told that he was an eloquent speaker, that the music was good, that the church was crowded each Sunday, and that he drew a very large number of men in his congregation. At the first opportunity, after the end of my year's work in the local Baptist church, I went to hear him. At once I became a steady attendant of the Congregational church.

Within a few months I received a request for a subscription to the support of the Baptist church; but instead of ignoring it, I wrote back with a young man's frankness that I did not care to help, that I was out of sympathy with the work of the church, and that I was very happy in the Congregational church. By return mail I received a letter from the treasurer saying that under the circumstances he would recommend to the church that I be dropped from membership. This did not suit me. I had many associations which made me desire to keep my membership in the church, and recognized that I might some day be in a city where the local Baptist church would be dominated by a liberal ministry. So I called on a friendly deacon of the church and insisted that my name be retained as a member. He supported my plea successfully.

Three years passed. I was active in the work of the Congregational church. On Sundays I listened to a man who had a great love of nature in all its beautiful aspects, and, what was more important, who had the knack of making you join him in that love. The whole spirit of the church was different. On all sides there was a toleration for the viewpoint of others, since even when there was disagreement very little was said. Certainly, so far as I could see, there was no bickering.

My greatest debt to the Congregational church, however, arises from the progressive management in their Sunday school. They tried to teach by modern methods. For those adults who wished to approach the study of religion seriously they had a class under the leadership of a local high-school teacher who was a Greek and Latin scholar of ability and who had studied in special courses at a number of eastern universities. She taught that Sunday school class as stringently as she taught her language classes in high school. The textbook was *Outlines for the Study of Biblical History and Literature*, by

Professors Frank Knight Sanders and Henry Thatcher Fowler. Four hours a week of outside reading at the public library was necessary in order to meet the requirements of that short hour of recitation on Sunday. All that biblical criticism had to offer for the understanding of the Bible she drew upon freely. The analytical viewpoint was encouraged, and that which was base in the Bible was pointed out along with that which was noble. Thus were most of my religious doubts swept away. I found that it was possible for me to approach the study of the Bible with the same viewpoint that I had used in approaching the study of steel structures, and that I did not have to accept as true, just because it was in the Bible, a statement that ran counter to the knowledge I had gained elsewhere. Such a simple solution of my difficulties! Yet it had been only by chance that I had found it. The very men who should have helped me had put obstacles in my way, and it remained for what is probably one church in a thousand to put before me all the wealth of understanding of the Bible that is possible after reading the critical comments of such men as C. F. Kent, W. R. Harper, J. H. Breasted, Morris Jastrow, E. Worcester, and others.

Then came the day that I got an inkling from the East that I was about to receive an offer of a better position than I held. I wrote at once to the pastor of the Baptist church, asking him to dismiss my membership to the Baptist church in my home city in which I had been baptized. I knew that I could store my membership there against the day when I could use it elsewhere. Some time passed, and, not receiving a reply, I telephoned the minister of the church for an explanation. I was informed that I was not in good standing in the Baptist church; that letters were given only to those who were; that I had attended the Congregational church for three years; that I had not contributed to the support of the Baptist church, although a member of it; and that therefore my request could not be granted. I answered at once that if that was his viewpoint he had my consent to canceling my membership in the Baptist church.

A few weeks later I was holding down my new position in a city in the Pittsburgh district. I tried attending the local churches, but found that I was in a strong Presbyterian community, where rigid insistence upon the acceptance of the doctrines of that church was the rule rather than the exception. I did not know which way to turn. I tried a number of other denominations, but nowhere could I find a happy church home. The only ray of light was a small, struggling Unitarian church, but the minister was not an interesting speaker and I missed the organ with the inspiring music of the large church. Perhaps I should have thrown my lot in with that church, but I decided finally to attend it only occasionally and drop religious activities for the time being.

About two years after going to this city I accepted a better-paying engineering position which took me to a large city on the eastern seaboard. At once I sought for a church that I could attend with pleasure. I found on the second Sunday a liberal church where there was no demand that I accept any particular statement of dogma and where my profession of belief in God and my desire to live rightly was sufficient. I joined the church and was active in its affairs, being president of its men's club, for example, for three successive years. One day, without any intimation that such a thing was in store for me, I was called to the office of the chairman of the board of trustees of that church and asked if I would accept, by election by the board, the position of treasurer. I pointed out that I doubted if I could be elected, since I was sure that various members of the board, who were old members of the church, objected to my point of view. For example, I had been among those in the church who had worked for the abandonment of the system of pew-rentals—in favor of free seats—and believed that many of the older, more conservative members disliked me for that reason. However, I was assured that I was mistaken, that a number of the trustees had agreed among themselves that I would make an excellent treasurer; and the chairman was very confident I could be elected. With insistence on my part that my books should be audited and that I should be placed under bond, I agreed, if elected, to carry the duties of treasurer, one of the most arduous positions in the church.

A week or so later the trustee and treasurer whom I was to succeed as treasurer only took me out to lunch and told me that the trustees had fallen out among themselves because some of them believed that the treasurer should be also a trustee. I noted that they had no objection to the clerk of the board, who was not a trustee. The suggestion was made that I take over the duties of treasurer, but with the title of assistant treasurer, thus relieving the present treasurer, who would be able under those conditions to continue as trustee. I refused, partly because it was a much less important offer than had been made me when negotiations were opened. Again, being a young man with comparatively little money, I had some doubts as to whether I was getting the whole story or not. I knew that I had done good work, that in the engineering world I held an important executive position, and that in every way I was capable of carrying the responsibility originally proposed. I could not urge my worth for the position or tell some things complimentary as to my ability that were not generally known. The only thing I could do was to keep silent and to refuse the suggestion made, since it seemed to offer all of the work and none of the honor, if there was any.

Later on a man of moderate wealth and the owner of a prominent store in the city, who was a member of the board of trustees, was elected treasurer.

I am willing to admit that from the standpoint of hard-headed business the trustees of that liberal church showed good judgment in selecting the man they did for treasurer. Yet to this day I have not lost my disappointment that a liberal church should have permitted such a mix-up to occur. The board of trustees was composed of men and women of standing, capable lawyers and keen executives. It was not complimentary to them that such a delicate piece of negotiation should have been so hopelessly messed up. Probably in the heat of their discussion they never thought that it was placing a young man, without wealth, in the position of having been proposed for treasurer and then turned down, even if the reasons had no connection with his character. To say the least, I had been left with the uncomfortable thought at times that I might not have been considered worthy of the position. Consequently, as soon as my engagements in the church were completed, I cancelled my membership. It was my protest against what was not fair treatment, and presumably it was about as effective as puffing my cheeks against an eighty-mile-an-hour gale.

To this day I have a sincere affection for the ministry of that liberal church and a high regard for many of its members, based on a close association of some years, in spite of the fact that I have differed with them. Still, all of us have to make decisions which seem difficult, but, having made them, we find that life has many compensations. Such has been the case with me.

For about four years now I have scarcely entered a church. My life is centered about a home in the suburb of an eastern city where train service is such that it would take me from nine in the morning until two in the afternoon to attend Sunday morning worship at some church in the city. Attendance at the local churches is equally out of the question, since their viewpoint is for the majority instead of the small minority, of which I am one. With this condition I can have no legitimate quarrel, since we are supposed to be living in a democracy in which, if the majority want the type of religion now current in our Protestant churches, they have a right to have it and to set up their own rules to govern its observance. I disagree with them and believe that in many respects these rules are a travesty on true religion and broad tolerance, but such a disagreement time and education alone can cure.

Peace has come to me in my enjoyment of the real hard work I put in about my home of a Sunday, fussing over my shrubbery, planting this and planning that in the development of the scheme for improving its beauty. Many will say that I am not truly religious, but perhaps that is because, even in so frank a narrative as this has been, there are things which "eye hath not seen and ear hath not heard," which cannot be told here. Certainly I have deep religious convictions. If they do not agree with those of my neighbors, I believe that I have as much right to follow them undisturbed as they have to follow theirs without hindrance from me. Perhaps there is as much of prayer in my glancing over a garden magazine just before I drop off to sleep at night as there is in other more usual forms of devotion; only I can say, for these are things of which we do not speak.

SOME FACTORS IN THE EXPANSION OF FRONTIER METHODISM, 1800–1811[1]

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In 1786 James Haw and Benjamin Ogden were assigned as the first Methodist traveling preachers in Kentucky. At the end of their year's labor they reported ninety in society. "This," remarks William Burke in his autobiography, "was the commencement of Methodism in the great west." Ten years after the sending of these first missionaries into Kentucky, there were 7 circuits in Kentucky and Tennessee with about 1,300 members, and the Western Conference was added to the bounds of the Methodist Episcopal church to embrace this territory.

As yet the work of the Methodist itinerants did not reach into the Old Northwest, and not until 1798 was John Kobler sent as the first regular traveling preacher into that vast region, where he formed the Miami circuit. When Kobler administered the sacrament for the first time in the territory northwest of the Ohio, he found but 25 or 30 communicants —"the sum total," he says, "of all that were in the country." He found the population to be sparse and very destitute in religious matters.

From these small beginnings let us briefly note the phenomenal development of Methodism in the West during the first twelve years of the nineteenth century, which is the period covered by the life of the Western Conference. In the year 1800 there was in the West but one district, the Kentucky, embracing 9 circuits. These circuits covered the state of Kentucky and the settled parts of Tennessee and Ohio, which constituted all of the Far West that the Methodists occupied. The circuits were manned by 14 itinerants under the able direction of William McKendree as presiding elder for the district. So large was this district that it took McKendree six months to make the rounds. He regularly traveled from 30 to 50 miles a day and preached at night effectively.[2] A total membership, white and colored, of about 2,800 was reported in the Minutes of 1800 for the entire western country. The Methodists profited greatly from the Great Revival, which reached its culmination in the summer of 1801. The membership more than doubled within a short period, and there was a great increase in both traveling and local preachers. Of the work in Ohio, in 1802 McKendree wrote that where fifty formerly made a respectable congregation at a quarterly meeting, "a thousand is now a tolerable gathering."[3] In 1805, the year taken as marking the close of the general revival movement, nearly 12,000 communicants were reported from the Western Conference.[4] By 1811 this number had more than doubled. During the period covered by the Western Conference, a little over a decade, the number of districts in the West increased from one to eight, the circuits grew from 9 to 69, the number of preachers from 14 to 100, while the membership leaped from about 2,800 to over 30,000.[5] Considering frontier conditions, this was a most remarkable expansion. Entirely apart from the Great Revival, which resulted in a considerable increase in all denominations which it affected, the development during the normal years from 1805 to 1811 was striking indeed, membership doubling in this period.

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[1] Convenient bibliographical information on Western Methodism can be found in F. A. Archibald, *Methodism and Literature* (1883), and Peter G. Mode, *Source Book and Bibliographical Guide for American Church History* (1921). The latter is more recent than Archibald and contains some references to periodical literature, but it by no means displaces the older work, which only lacks bringing to date.

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[2] Cf. Autobiography of William Burke in J. B. Finley, *Sketches of Western Methodism* (1854), p. 74; Jacob Young, *Autobiography of a Pioneer* (1860), p. 61.

[3] Letter of McKendree, October 10, 1802, quoted in John Atkinson, *Centennial History of American Methodism* (1884), p. 456.

[4] *Minutes of the Conferences of the M.E. Church,* 1805.

[5] *Ibid.,* 1812; Sweet, *Rise of Methodism in the West,* p. 35.

It is the purpose of this study to bring together and briefly evaluate what seem to be the principal factors in this growth of the Methodist Episcopal church in the region west of the Alleghenies during the period 1800–1811, when the entire territory was embraced within the confines of a single conference. The selection of this period is purely arbitrary, and the writer believes that these factors will serve to explain the expansion of Methodism in any of the "successive wests" or frontier regions. It goes without saying that not all of these factors continued to have the same relative importance; but, in the main, the period and region under discussion, the writer believes, are typical.

I. THE ITINERANT SYSTEM AND THE CIRCUIT RIDER

Undoubtedly, the greatest factor in the expansion of early frontier Methodism was the itinerant system of spreading the gospel. When the Christmas Conference met at Baltimore in 1784 to organize a Methodist Episcopal church in America, it accepted the itinerancy as an integral part of its organization. The early circuit riders regarded this as the best system in the world and as the only one sanctioned in the New Testament. Like Cartwright they believed that to abandon the itinerancy would be to abandon Methodism itself, so closely was it interwoven in their ecclesiastical system.

Several serious disadvantages confronted the churches in the frontier regions. Population shifted very rapidly; it was widely scattered; and because of the poverty of the people, it was out of question for many communities to support a settled pastor, even if they had been inclined to do so. Unless a minister happened to migrate to a place and was willing to contribute to his own support by manual labor, as many did, the community might go a long time without a regular church organization.[6]

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[6] Cf. Catharine Cleveland, *The Great Revival in the West, 1797–1805* (1916), pp. 22–23.

It appears that no denomination so effectively overcame the foregoing disadvantages as did the Methodists. Under the itinerant system, Methodism enjoyed the advantage of centralization.[7] The power of assigning the preachers to the circuits lay wholly in the hands of the general superintendent or bishop.[8] Under such limitations as he chose to impose upon himself by sharing the power with his presiding elders, the bishop's appointing power was absolute. Notwithstanding the fact that this power had been the cause of much dissent and even secession in the form of O'Kelly's schism of 1792, it is not to be gain-said that for the infant church functioning in a sparsely settled, rapidly developing country, centralization was the best policy. No one realized more than Asbury how essential to the success of the evangelical movement was his authority to send preachers wherever he chose. This system gave to the denomination a missionary character which enabled it, to an astonishing extent, to keep pace with the rapidly growing West. The ministers could be, and were, wisely distributed. It was precisely here that the wisdom of centralization was demonstrated, and Asbury's extensive journeys gave him an intimate knowledge of the entire field, so that he was able to direct his warriors where they were most needed.

If placing the supreme authority in the hands of a single chief subjected the itinerancy to the dangers of favoritism, no such practice developed under the wise leadership of the early bishops. Until 1804, it is true, the superintendent could continue a preacher in one place as long as he wished. In that year a time limit of two years was imposed as the longest a preacher could remain on the same circuit.[9] The rule was probably a good one, as it offered to the bishop an avenue of escape in the few instances where outside influences might be brought to bear in the stationing of popular preachers. At the same time it was a certain guarantee that the latter would not be able to form any local connections that might be a detriment to their influence. A study of the memoirs of the early itinerants along with the Minutes affords sufficient proof that the preachers were changed frequently, usually every year, and sometimes at the end of six months, even before the rule of 1804 was passed.[10]

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[7] See Atkinson, *op. cit.*, chap. vii, for a good discussion of this feature.

[8] See David Sherman, *History of the Revisions of the Discipline of the M.E. Church* (3d ed., 1890), p. 182, on the duties of the bishops.

[9] Sherman, *op. cit.*, p. 183; Atkinson, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

In addition to bringing the church to the people and keeping it in the vanguard of civilization, the itinerancy possessed other advantages. It required a constant activity which developed a most energetic and zealous ministry. Each preacher was compelled to serve a whole group of probably twenty or thirty communities scattered over a wide area, and the short time a man was confined to any one field brought out the best that was in him, for it was necessary to concentrate all efforts upon the work in order to secure results. No man was able to settle down comfortably, nor was he apt to lose his grip upon people whom he visited only about once a month or every six weeks. In constant touch with new people and new situations, with fresh problems confronting him at every turn, there was little likelihood of a preacher's going stale.

The churches, too, profited from this system. The frequent changes of itinerants gave them the benefits of a varied and collective ministry and brought to them men of all talents. The popular revivalist whose preaching struck hundreds to the ground could be followed by men whose talents better fitted them to make permanent the results of the work and to keep the church established in the faith. Moreover, the possibility of friction between preachers and their societies was remote, as no man confined himself to a single group. We likewise see that the unpleasant circumstances of getting rid of a pastor where readjustments were necessary was avoided. Undoubtedly such a system had a healthful reaction upon both the societies and the preachers. Indeed, the latter were not unaware of this, and, as Jesse Lee put it, "saw that it would be best for themselves and for all the people to have frequent changes of gifts and of congregations."[11]

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[10] E.g., Henry Smith, *Recollections and Reflections of an Old Itinerant* (1848), pp. 42, 64.

Still another advantage of the itinerant plan was that it kept every church supplied with a minister, and secured to the latter a place as long as he was able to stand the hardships of traveling. Unemployed itinerants who were physically fit for the work were unknown to early Methodism, nor were the societies compelled to be without preachers for long intervals. There was a place for every circuit rider; and every congregation was sure of a minister, no matter how poor or small it might be. The newly settled regions were provided for as well as the older districts as soon as circuits were formed. It might be but once a month, but the pioneer emigrant and his neighbors were sure to hear the gospel, for the itinerant regarded his appointments as sacred obligations and seldom, if ever, failed to keep them or to send some one in his stead.

It goes without saying that the success of the itinerancy depended above all on the activities of that zealous and devoted army of circuit riders who braved every peril, hardship, suffering, and privation incident to frontier life. On every highway they became familiar figures with their straight-breasted coats, short breeches, and long stockings, the oil-skin covering for the hat, the leather saddle bags, and the hair clipped short in front and allowed to hang down the back of the head to the shoulders.[12] Such was their faithfulness in filling their appointments that on days that were so bitterly cold as to drive most persons indoors it was a proverbial saying, "There is nothing out today but crows and Methodist preachers." The circuits were large, often 400 or 500 miles in circumference and requiring from three to six weeks to travel. They swept over the whole country, touching at neighborhoods that were very remote and distant from one another. In the course of a four weeks' circuit the itinerant would meet from twenty-five to thirty-five appointments and preach on an average of once a day.[13] The number of preaching places was constantly being increased as new societies were collected, and circuits had to be divided. As a rule the itinerant traveled alone, but frequently a younger man would be assigned to a circuit with him. His coming was the occasion of a general turnout of the Methodist families, and the itinerant was always sure of a congregation when he reached his appointment.

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[11] *A Short History of the Methodists in the United States of America* (1809), p. 52.

[12] W. W. Sweet, *Circuit Rider Days in Indiana* (1916), pp. 7, 34.

To enter the itinerancy, as is well known, was almost equivalent to taking the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. From 1800 to 1816 the salary of a traveling preacher was placed at $80 a year and traveling expenses, with the same allowance for a wife and $16 for each child up to seven years and $24 for each child from seven to fourteen years.[14] Small as the amount was, the preacher was forunate if he could collect half of his own allowance, while on provision for the family the *Discipline* was a perfect dead letter.[15] Often the preachers did not get enough in a year to buy a suit of clothes or an overcoat, while it was a most serious misfortune to have to buy a new horse.[16] Had it not been for the fact that now and then the circuit riders were presented with homespun clothing, many a preacher would have been forced to abandon the itinerancy in order to earn enough to clothe himself.[17] As it was, their clothes were often but patch on patch, so that the original cloth could scarcely be detected. In 1806 when Asbury was at the Western Conference he found the brethren "in want, and could not suit [clothe] themselves; so I parted with my watch, my coat and my shirt." Notwithstanding their abject poverty, these men were never too poor to deny themselves for someone who might be worse off. Their lives were indeed examples of the spirit of Christ.

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[13] E.g., W. P. Strickland, *Autobiography of Rev. James B. Finley, or Pioneer Life in the West* (1853), pp. 193, 237; Young, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[14] Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–44.

[15] W. P. Strickland (ed.), *The Backwoods Preacher: An Autobiography of Peter Cartwright* (London, 1858 ed.), pp. 28, 57–58. Much that was collected was paid in kind, in the form of cloth, leather, corn, and shoes.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 48; Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 91; J. M. Barker, *History of Ohio Methodism (1898)*, chap. vi; S. W. Williams, *Pictures of Early Methodism in Ohio* (1909), chap. iii.

[17] Strickland, *Autobiography of Cartwright*, pp. 48, 52–55.

The poverty of the itinerancy made it almost out of the question for the circuit rider to marry and establish a family. Such, indeed, was the prejudice against married preachers that if one of them took a wife it almost inevitably meant cessation from traveling.[18] Otherwise "he might expect to be coldly received, if not frowned upon, almost everywhere. The doctrine was: 'A traveling preacher has no business with a wife: let him locate, and take care of his wife.'"[19] Those few who married and remained in the itinerancy, such as Burke, Finley, and Cartwright, found every form of discouragement placed in their way, for the people had neither the means nor the inclination to pay for the support of a wife. If a married and single preacher traveled together and the amount collected was not sufficient to cover the wife's allowance, it was supposed to be divided into three equal parts, one of which belonged to the wife. However, in order to keep the peace, Burke was compelled to share equally with the single men when they were on the circuit with him.[20] Finley was a married man when he entered the traveling connection in 1809, and he could not find a single place on his whole circuit where his family could live. He was driven to the necessity of building a small cabin to shelter them. They had nothing but a bed and some wearing apparel in the way of worldly goods. Says Finley, "My funds being all exhausted, I sold the boots off my feet to purchase provisions with; and after making all the preparation that I could to render my family comfortable, started out again upon my circuit, to be absent four weeks."[21] As things were, few men had the courage to expose a wife to the hardships and privations of an itinerant's life, when there was no provision for a preacher's family, when he was compelled to be constantly separated from them, and when he was apt to be coldly received on his circuit. Many were the men who were advised to locate, although still young, simply because they took upon themselves the incumbrance of a wife and for that reason were considered as disqualified from traveling.

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[18] Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–50; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

[19] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

[20] Finley, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

2. THE LOCAL PREACHERS OR LAY MINISTRY

A second factor of importance in the development of early Methodism was the lay ministry or system of local preachers. The local preachers were those who followed regular lay vocations during the week but devoted some of their time, particularly the Sabbaths, to preaching and organizing classes in their neighborhoods. The lay ministry was recruited from two sources. In the first place, there were many itinerants who were compelled by broken health, domestic cares, or economic circumstances to cease from traveling. In addition there were many converts who felt that they ought to preach the gospel but were unable to enter the traveling connection and devote themselves exclusively to the work of the ministry. By entering the lay ministry both of the foregoing groups were able to serve the church in a more restricted sphere.[22]

The advantages of the lay ministry to the church are at once apparent. By means of it the denomination retained the services of many gifted men whose talents would have been lost had the church relied wholly on the itinerancy. Without bearing the responsibilities of the regular ministry, and receiving no steady remuneration, the local preachers served the church with diligence and supplemented the work of the itinerants in a most able manner.

[21] Strickland, *Autobiography of Finley*, p. 194; Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–83, for a similar experience.

[22] Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 202 ff., for duties of local preachers.

The local preachers were scattered everywhere over the country and very frequently were the pioneers of the church.[23] Many of them emigrated to the West and organized Methodist classes before the coming of the circuit rider. The presiding elder often sent them to neighborhoods unreached by the regular itinerant, or drafted them to help out on the circuits. They went on extensive preaching tours, and some of them were even induced to enter the itinerancy permanently.[24] At times of revivals the local preachers were a great help in the work and were sometimes called upon by other denominations who saw in them valuable auxiliaries. Wherever the lay ministers were, in fact, their influence was most salutary for the church, and they did much to extend its boundaries.

In the early West the lay ministers were frequently the real pioneers of Methodism. In 1783, three years before Haw and Ogden were sent as the first missionaries to Kentucky, Francis Clark, a local preacher from Virginia, had emigrated to Kentucky, and he formed what is considered the first Methodist class in the Far West.[25] He is regarded as the real founder of Methodism in Kentucky. Shortly after Clark had settled, a number of other local preachers joined him, and together they organized societies and prepared the soil for the itinerants.

The introduction of Methodism in Ohio also was due to the efforts of a lay minister, Francis McCormick.[26] McCormick had been a Universalist who was converted in a Methodist meeting in Virginia about 1790. Joining a society, he became a class leader, exhorter, and finally a local preacher. He removed to the West in 1795 and organized the first regular classes in Ohio. It was through his appeals that Asbury sent John Kobler as first missionary of the church in the Northwest Territory in 1798. In 1799, when Henry Smith came to form the Scioto circuit, he found his old friend McCormick on the banks of the Little Miami doing a good work for the cause.[27] He was ably assisted by Philip Gatch, one of the earliest native itinerants, who removed to the Northwest in 1798 and located in McCormick's neighborhood. Gatch continued in the lay ministry for many years after removing to Ohio, and in 1801 a great revival broke out under his preaching.[28]

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[23] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 49, 321; Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 62 ff., 88; Young, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[24] Robert Paine, *Life and Times of William McKendree*, I, 157–59.

[25] A. H. Redford, *Methodism in Kentucky*, I, 26–27; Finley, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

[26] Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–84.

Henry Smith, although only the second itinerant to be assigned to the Ohio territory, found many Methodists already organized in classes. One of these classes, formed by Colonel Joseph Moore, a local preacher from Kentucky, was so numerous that no private house was large enough to accommodate those who came for worship. When Smith came, a meeting house was built which is considered to be the first one erected by the Methodists in the Old Northwest.[29]

In at least two other states of the early West Methodism was introduced by lay ministers. In 1793 Joseph Lillard, a local preacher of Kentucky who had once been an itinerant, visited Illinois and gathered the few scattered Methodists into a class under the leadership of Captain Joseph Ogle, a pioneer settler.[30] Four or five years after this, Hosea Rigg, a lay minister, settled in Illinois and continued the work begun by Lillard. In 1803 Rigg visited Kentucky in order to secure from the Conference a regular itinerant. As a result, the Illinois mission was formed and Benjamin Young was sent into the territory to push the work.[31]

In Indiana, also, the first Methodist preaching was done by local preachers who had settled there prior to any officially organized society. The first reliable record of such preaching was in 1801, when Samuel Parker and Edward Talbott came from across the Ohio to spread the revival which had started in Kentucky. They conducted a two-days' meeting at a place called Springville, in Clark's grant. In 1802 McKendree formed two classes, the first in Indiana; and in 1803 Benjamin Lakin, traveling Salt River circuit in Kentucky, included these two Indiana classes in his itinerancy.[32] Three years later the first Indiana circuit was formed.

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[27] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 240; Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

[28] Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94, who quotes from Gatch's Memoir.

[29] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

[30] James Leaton, *History of Methodism in Illinois from 1793 to 1832* (1883), p. 29.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–34.

In such ways as have been described, the local preachers most ably supplemented the work of the itinerants and were important factors in extending the influence of Methodism in the early West.

3. THE LOCAL ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH

The local organization of the Methodists was well designed for keeping the church vigorous and militant. The societies were divided into classes and bands. It was the original intention to limit the classes to twelve believers, but, owing to the impossibility of finding a sufficient number of qualified leaders, the group was usually larger. The position of class leader was very important, for upon him the zeal and activity of the members depended to a large extent.[33] It was one of the duties of the circuit rider to appoint the class leaders and change them when it was deemed necessary. At least once a quarter he was to examine the class leaders carefully and to inquire into their faithfulness.[34] The classes were governed by strict rules which the leaders were required to enforce. The rules forbade indulgence in evil of every kind, particularly swearing, drunkenness, fighting, giving or taking of usury, unseemly conversation, as well as the wearing of gold or costly apparel. On the matter of simplicity in dress the Methodists were sticklers, and the *Discipline* ordered that all who indulged in superfluous ornaments should be excluded from the societies. The rules instructed that none were to be admitted to the classes "that wear high heads, or enormous bonnets, ruffles or rings."[35] The class leader was expected to visit the members of his class as often as circumstances would permit. An official roll of every class was kept and periodically was purged of delinquents. Members were enrolled only upon recommendation of the leader and were admitted by ticket, so that strangers could not attend regularly. Serious persons who were not Methodists were permitted to attend classes not more than "twice or thrice" unless they became members, and alternate meetings were closed to all but holders of tickets.[36] Regular attendance at class meetings was insisted upon, and those who violated this rule were invariably dropped. By refusing to continue useless members on the class rolls, the Methodists maintained the vigor and purity of the church.

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[32] Sweet, *Circuit Rider Days in Indiana*, pp. 3-4.

[33] Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-40, 446.

[34] *Discipline of the M.E. Church, 1805*, pp. 25, 50.

The band societies were made up of two, three, or four true believers, all of whom must be men, or all women, all married, or all single. They met once a week for the purpose of rigid inquiry into the spiritual welfare of each member. The rules were very strict and were designed to promote a more spiritual life through the intimacy of a small group, each member of which came into close personal contact with the others. Each member was expected to tell freely his temptations, faults, and shortcomings and to subject himself to the criticism of the others or receive their advice. In this way it was expected that a deeper religious life and Christian fellowship could be promoted than in the larger group.[37]

It will be readily seen that the classes and bands supplied the Methodists with a system of personal oversight into the conduct and lives of the members which the nature of the itinerancy prevented. No doubt, too, this organization provided even a closer supervision than could pastoral care alone. By bringing little groups of Christians close to each other, the band and class meetings constituted a most important unifying agency in the infancy of Methodism and developed in the denomination an *esprit de corps* which discord could interrupt only with great difficulty.[38] Through this mutual association each member watched over every other for good, and each was made responsible for the upright character of his fellow-member. Anything that indicated the slightest departure from Christian conduct became a matter of general concern and apprehension which made it harder for a man to backslide. Thus "the Methodist church maintained a more careful supervision of its members than the other denominations."[39]

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[35] *Ibid.*, chap. ii, sec. 1; Sherman, *op. cit.*, p. 193, "Concerning Dress."

[36] Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 450–51, for explanation of the reason; also Jesse Lee, *A Short History of the Methodists in the United States of America* (1809), p. 48.

[37] Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 445 ff.

In every respect the local organization of the church emphasized the Christian conduct and the activity of each member. There was little or no room for the idler. Everyone was expected to pray, testify, or exhort; and every man who was at all gifted was expected to become a class or band leader or an exhorter or local preacher. In this way the church made use of all the talent in its membership. The social influence of the class meetings should not be overlooked, since by emphasizing the group the Methodists afforded an agency in breaking the monotony of the frontier. No doubt, too, by bringing together men and women from all sections on a plane of exact equality, the class meetings contributed not a little toward sweeping aside prejudices and developing that distinct Western spirit which has become identified with the American national character.[40] In short, the Methodists made religion both active and social, and hence aggressive.

4. THE CAMP MEETING

The camp meeting developed during the period under consideration as a very important special agency in the spread of Methodism. While camp meetings are supposed to have been held by the Methodists in western North Carolina in the last decade of the eighteenth century, certainly they did not come into general use among the denomination until the period of the Great Revival, 1800–1805.[41] The first camp meetings in the West were interdenominational in character. Presbyterians, Methodists, and Baptists, particularly the two first-mentioned, participated in these great meetings in spite of sharp doctrinal differences, which seem to have been forgotten for the time being. However, the extravagances which characterized these first gatherings caused the Presbyterians and Baptists soon to regard them askance, and they did not continue to employ the camp meeting extensively.[42] Among the Methodists some of these strange manifestations were common occurrences; and they were quick to see in the camp meeting, with its great crowds, a means of reaching the people that no other type of meeting afforded. From the time of the Great Revival that denomination adopted it as a regular and widespread feature of their worship. In 1811 Asbury wrote: "Our camp-meetings, I think, amount to between four and five hundred annually, some of which continue for the space of six or eight days."[43]

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[38] See Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 109, 174.

[39] Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[40] Sweet, *Rise of Methodism*, p. 67.

The camp meeting was just the thing for the West in supplying the need of group association to overcome the monotony and isolation of frontier life. It was an occasion which all Methodists looked forward to, and served a social as well as a religious purpose. We may regard it as a great annual picnic eagerly awaited by all on the circuits. Of course, its purpose was primarily a religious one. To these annual gatherings the people came by the thousands, frequently from distances up to a hundred miles. It was not uncommon for ten thousand persons, including all who came during the course of the meeting, to attend, particularly if the season were one of revivals.[44] The problem of entertainment took care of itself, since each family or group came with provisions and supplies prepared to camp for several days under the shelter of wagons or improvised tents. The reason for so coming was that people might be present at all the meetings, especially the night meetings, which seem to have become particularly important.

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[41] Atkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 489–90; Cleveland, *op. cit.*, pp. 52 ff.; Strickland, *Autobiography of Cartwright*, p. 9; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 57; Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 133; Strickland, *Autobiography of Finley*, pp. 363, 365.

[42] Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

[43] Quoted in Atkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 491–92, from *Arminian Magazine*, London, 1812.

The camp-meeting scenes at night were both picturesque and impressive. There were the circles of tents and wagons; the bonfires reflecting their light amidst the waving branches of the towering trees; the candles and lamps illuminating the encampment; the hundreds moving to and fro with torches—and all this amidst confused preaching, praying, singing, and exhorting of the saints, mingled with the groans from the stricken sinners.[45] To the unacquainted spectator, these scenes must have presented nothing but unutterable confusion with no regularity or order to the routine. As religious occasions the camp meetings were extraordinary both in the large crowds present, the number of meetings held, the effectiveness of the preaching, and the number of the awakened. They gave the Methodists access to the people which they could have secured in no other way. The camp meeting was the one place where all who came could be accommodated, for, being outdoors, several ministers could preach at the same time from the different stands. It does much to account for the remarkable increases in the membership of the Western societies in the early years of the nineteenth century.[46]

5. METHODIST HYMNODY

The Methodists were peculiarly fortunate in having the poetical genius of Charles Wesley to supplement the remarkable organizing ability of their great founder. Unquestionably the hymnody of Methodism was no little factor in its early success, particularly in frontier regions where people were more apt to sing than to read.[47] Those who are familiar with modern revival literature well know the profound influence of singing in the great religious gatherings.

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[44] *Ibid.*; cf. Strickland, *Autobiography of Finley*, p. 363; P. G. Mode, "Revivalism as a Phase of Frontier Life," *Journal of Religion*, July, 1921, pp. 349–50.

[45] See also Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 58, and Redford, *op. cit.*, I, 358 ff., for description of the well-developed camp meeting.

[46] Mode, *loc. cit.*, pp. 350, 352.

The fact that the Methodists had a hymnody that was born in their own revival and designed to express the religious beliefs and experiences of that denomination in particular was of no little significance. This statement gains more weight when we consider the fact that early Methodism did not emphasize any fixed creed or set of doctrines or method of worship, but rather regarded Christian experience and conduct as the main test of membership.[48] The doors of the church were open to all sincere believers in the evangelical faith. There were no stringent doctrinal requirements for admission into the societies, and Methodists did disagree on such points as the method of baptism, the Lord's Supper, entire sanctification, back-sliding, and the like.[49] If a man professed the Christian experience and showed it in his daily living, that was sufficient. His creed was a minor consideration. The itinerants sought to win men to Christ rather than to the church.

Because of this catholicity in doctrine, the hymns of the Wesleys were an important factor in supplying something like a platform for the early Methodists.[50] They filled to a great extent the place of liturgy and creed, and certainly were a main instrumentality in indoctrinating the masses in the evangelical principles for which Methodism stood. In fact, the hymnal has been called "a poetic confession of faith,"[51] and a noted Unitarian divine once pronounced it "the greatest instrument of popular religious culture that Christendom ever produced."[52]

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[47] See David Creamer, *Methodist Hymnology* (New York, 1848).

[48] Cf. W. J. Conoly, "The Catholicity of Methodism," *Methodist Quarterly Review* (South), October, 1916, pp. 718–28.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 720; cf. Charles Adams, "Wesley the Catholic," *Methodist Quarterly Review* (New York), XXXII, 177–98.

[50] W. F. Tillett, "Methodist Hymnology," *Methodist Quarterly Review* (South), LII, 333–48, esp. p. 343.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 345.

That the Methodists realized the power of scriptural psalmody is seen in the fact that the *Discipline* contained a section on "The Spirit and Truth of Singing." In this the ministers were told, "In every large Society let them learn to sing, and let them always learn our tunes first." They were warned to guard against formality in singing; close attention must be given to both the words and the parts as written in the Wesleyan hymnal, and above all, dragging the tune was not to be suffered, since this "naturally tends to formality." Ministers were urged to "recommend our tune book," "exhort every person in the congregation to sing, not one in ten only," "introduce no new tune until they are perfect in the old."[53]

The Methodists made a special effort to cultivate their sacred music, and they became noted for their singing. Says Cartwright, "They could nearly every soul of them, sing our hymns and spiritual songs."[54] According to Henry Smith, in the revival of 1800 the Methodists were in demand everywhere because they were noted for praying and singing. He continues, "our hymn book and tunes gained the ascendancy over all others, and were sought after by some as though they had an inspiration attached to them."[55] From these two witnesses we may take it that frontier Methodists loved to sing and learned the songs well. Although hymnbooks were scarce on the frontier, people caught the words from the practice of the preachers' reading them to the congregation prior to singing.

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[52] Dr. J. Martineau, quoted in Bishop E. R. Hendrix, "The Evolution of the Methodist Hymnal," *Methodist Quarterly Review* (South), LV, 3–18.

[53] *Discipline of the M.E. Church*, 1805, chap. i, sec. 24; Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–37.

[54] Strickland, *Autobiography of Cartwright*, p. 35; see Sweet, *Rise of Methodism in West*, p. 56, for improvised "spiritual songs."

[55] *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

It was the aim of John Wesley, as editor, to make the hymnal a practical manual of Christianity; to include in it "all the important truths of our most holy Religion whether speculative or practical"; and to illustrate them and prove them "by Scripture and reason."[56] The hymns are carefully arranged according to the experience of real Christians, making the book, as was intended, a little manual "of experimental and practical divinity." Through its instrumentality Methodist beliefs were spread far and wide. From the hymnal many people learned their theology; many others, no doubt, were kept from falling into strange doctrines.[57] Preachers came with sermons only occasionally; the hymns were always sung, and often they went where preachers could not go. They were a great bond of unity between Methodists everywhere.

In addition to the practical nature of the teachings of the hymnal, it contained a variety of meter which expressed every emotion of the soul, and which thus greatly enhanced its value as a medium for extending the revival. In short, as a means of quickening the spirit of devotion, of confirming the faith of the believer, of enlivening his hope and increasing his zeal for the church, nothing, perhaps, exceeded the songs that resounded with the march of Methodism.

6. METHODIST THEOLOGY

From the standpoint of theology, the Methodist preached the sort of a gospel which, it would seem, made the strongest kind of appeal to the frontiersman. The frontier was a region where environment tended to develop high physical energies due to the hard struggle for existence and constant exposure to dangers. At the same time, owing to isolation and the lack of stimulation in the form of books, libraries, and various mental recreations, life was more or less monotonous and the mental energy of the frontier was low. Under these conditions that sort of religion was preferred which would make a direct and stimulating appeal to the heart rather than a formal and rational appeal to the head.[58] The West needed a gospel that would stir the emotions; one that would overcome the element of danger, which constantly threatened the frontiersman, by emphasizing a direct relation between God and the individual —an omnipresent God always ready to intervene in human affairs to the best interests of his children. Likewise a religion which would lay considerable stress on certain physical and vocal manifestations, or at least would not discountenance them, would seem to be the one best adapted to the frontier environment. Finally a gospel which placed every man on an exactly equal plane in the sight of God, gave everyone an equal opportunity for salvation, and made salvation absolutely free to all who would pay the price, would seem to be most in accord with the Western ideals of democracy, equality of rank and opportunity, and individual worth.

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[56] John Wesley, *A Collection of Hymns for the Use of the People Called Methodists* (7th ed., London, 1791). Preface, pp. iv–v.

[57] Hendrix, *loc. cit.*, pp. 344–45.

The gospel as preached by the Methodist itinerants met most admirably these needs of the frontier. The circuit riders themselves were men of the people, plain and simple in tastes, direct and forceful in their methods. Unlike many of the Presbyterians and Baptists, they placed a good deal of emphasis on the emotional and physical appeal and were often vigorous and noisy themselves.[59] They preached in plain language which could be understood by all, and their style was unfettered by the measured rhetoric of the manuscript. They placed much stress on personal religion and individual responsibility. In contrast to the Calvinistically inclined Presbyterians and Baptists, who preached a limited salvation, the Methodists preached a free grace which gave to every individual the power to choose between salvation and eternal damnation.

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[58] Cf. F. M. Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, chap. i, esp. pp. 8–10.

[59] Cf. Cleveland, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–11.

The catholicity of the denomination was well adapted to reach the great unchurched masses. To be a Baptist or Presbyterian one must adhere to a creed or confession of faith; to gain admittance to a Methodist society he must merely be a true seeker after the Christian experience and possess "a desire to flee from the wrath to come and to be saved from sins." As evidence of this desire, members must observe certain rules of conduct and avoid certain practices which were regarded as un-Christian. The one thing emphasized by the followers of Wesley was a right heart.[60] Methodism "was not a revival of theology, nor a restatement of doctrine, much less was it a revamping of ecclesiasticism. . . . ." It was rather a revival of evangelical religion, and evangelical religion is personal, heart religion. Outside of the few cardinal evangelical doctrines common to all similar sects, the Methodists did not agree on their theology.[61] They did not, however, allow this to become a divisive factor among them. We should expect such a church to make strong headway in a region which possessed the characteristics of a frontier.

Much of the preaching in the early West was of a controversial nature between Baptists, Presbyterians, and Methodists, involving such questions as infant-baptism and predestination. No matter what the subject was, the followers of Wesley consistently proclaimed the great truths of the evangelical faith—the original sin of all men; the possibility of salvation for everybody through repentance and faith; the doctrine of regeneration, which brought to the individual a complete change of heart; the witness of the spirit to conversion, which must be manifested and which became a matter of one's own knowledge. They emphasized also the resurrection, the final judgment, the reward of the righteous, and made terribly real the punishment of the sinner. These were the distinctive Methodist doctrines or beliefs, and the itinerants made them very plain. They preached earnestly and fervently and lost no opportunity to invite sinners to the throne of grace. In every respect it would appear that the Methodist theology fitted in well with the needs of the frontier and made a strong appeal to the Westerners.

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[60] John Wesley's sermon, "On a Catholic Spirit," in *Works* (Emory ed.), I, 346–55, for the classic statement of the Methodist position.

[61] W. P. Lovejoy, "The Influence of Methodism," *Methodist Quarterly Review* (South), LI, 367–82, esp. pp. 371 ff.

7. THE METHODIST PRESS

In conclusion, a word remains to be said as to the influence of the press as a factor of ever increasing importance in the development of Methodism in the West.[62] From its very beginning, the Methodist church has been a printing church. Notwithstanding his constant traveling and preaching, John Wesley found time to be a prolific writer and editor. Archibald says that he wrote 32 volumes which have been published, besides 120 titles which he abridged and edited.[63] Moreover, he began that organized system of book and tract distribution which placed his denomination in the lead in the use of the religious press. In fact, Wesley made the press an institution of Methodism, a close ally of the pulpit. As early as the year 1739 he began the work of publishing religious literature. His object was to reach the masses, and his tracts and pamphlets were printed for millions at astonishingly cheap rates. In 1782 he and Coke organized the Society for the Distribution of Tracts among the Poor. By using the tract as a means of disseminating information, Wesley made Methodism "the pioneer of cheap literature."[64]

The spirit of the founder was carried to America, where, for instance, Robert Williams, pioneer of Methodism in Virginia, combined the profession of printing with his preaching.[65] It is no small tribute to American Methodism that, in 1789, five years after the organization of the church in the

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[62] See esp. Archibald, *op. cit.*

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[64] Archibald, *op. cit.*, Preface, p. 2; see also R. L. Tucker, *The Separation of the Methodists from the Church of England*, pp. 117–23.

[65] Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–49.

New World, the Book Concern was instituted.[66] As the present Abingdon Press, I believe that this publishing house has the longest continuous history of any now existing in the United States.

The significance of the establishment of the Book Concern lies in the fact that the church recognized the value of furnishing its constituency with a religious literature. The Methodists were not only their own publishers but also their own book agents. It was a duty incumbent upon every circuit rider to distribute books and tracts. Many of the latter found their way into frontier homes that otherwise would have remained destitute of any literature. Thus, in the tract, the leaflet, the printed sermons of Wesley, and later the church papers, was left an influence more permanent, perhaps, than that of the pulpit. The itinerants came and went. The book or tract remained to be passed from hand to hand and to be read over and over again.

We can easily see how the press aided in the fixation of the Methodist principles; how it served to bind the members in harmony of spirit; how it inspired them to a greater loyalty to Methodist institutions, to say nothing of its importance in their educational uplift.[67] Something might be said, too, of the social value of a common and extensive literature in the thousands of scattered societies, along with its potency as an evangelistic force.[68] The Methodists did, in fact, develop a literature that was both evangelical and evangelistic. As in its ministry, its hymnody, its polity, the revival and missionary spirit pervaded the press of Methodism. Thus it was made an aggressive force in propagating the doctrines of the denomination and in supplying it with a leaven of spiritual power. At the same time, significantly enough, it freed the church from dependence upon unsympathetic publishers for their reading matter.

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[66] *Ibid.*, p. 129; Archibald, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[67] See Tucker, *op. cit.*, pp. 119 ff.

[68] Archibald, *op. cit.*, chaps. xxii, xxiv.

BOOK REVIEWS

COMPARATIVE RELIGION FOR THE PEOPLE

During the last ten years many books have undertaken the task of guiding the general reader to a knowledge of the religions of the world. Some have been so heavy with knowledge as to lack all light and leading; some have been pure Christian propaganda, arrogant or soft-pedaled; a few were sympathetic but superficial or so obsessed with a special theory of religion as to fail to see clearly the important things in alien cultures; one at least was flippant and vulgar. It is a pity, for the world has grown so small that we are deeply interested to know what dreams and hopes have lighted the wanderings of our far-off fellow-travelers along the highways of time. There is still a need for that lucid and simple story of the religions of the world. *Religions Past and Present,*[1] in spite of its tempting title, is not the book we seek; yet it claims attention, for it represents the way one professor of anthropology instructs a popular audience in the religious history of the race.

The position of the author is clear enough. He does not think it possible to be severely scientific and unbiased in dealing with religion. "A writer must either believe or disbelieve in religion. He cannot be neutral. . . . ." Why it is not possible to be faithful to historical facts and to the facts of experience, to go as far as the facts go and to stop where facts fail, he does not say. That he himself is a believer one is never allowed to forget throughout the book. His belief is in a God who reveals himself to man. He believes in a primitive revelation which makes it easy for him to accept the evidence for "high gods" among primitive peoples and to interpret great areas of the religious materials of his story as degeneration. He believes in a "true religion" which is Christianity, shining as the sun against the background of other religions. Being such a believer, he interprets religion in the traditional Christian way as a relationship with a supreme, supernatural Power, a relationship of faith, dependence, communion. This makes it necessary to exclude Buddhism, Confucianism, Lao-tse's Taoism, Stoicism, ethical societies, and such organizations from the ranks of religions. Believing in a personal, revealing God, he has no difficulty about the origin of religion, though the primitive revelation is

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[1] *Religions, Past and Present*. By Bertram C. A. Windle. New York: Century Company, 1927. x+308 pages. $3.00.

strangely supported by a theory of a primitive philosophy in primitive man. ("Man by the use of his reason brought himself to the knowledge of the existence of God."). The origin of moral codes is simple also to so firm a believer, since naturally God would teach the peoples the ways of moral living. All of which indicates that the work is decidedly biased and unscientific.

The author follows the great Roman Catholic scholars in his ethnological theories, but he lacks all the subtlety of his masters. An argument from the pen of Monsignor Le Roy or Dr. Wilhelm Schmidt is never irritating. The direct apologia for Christianity in the last chapter of the book is peculiarly distressing from the standpoint of history of religions. However convinced a Christian one may be, it is irritating to see an idealized Christianity set over against other religions, misunderstood, misrepresented, and exhibited in their worst light. It is unfortunate that the author should write of other religions without thorough knowledge of them, and especially unfortunate when addressing a popular audience.

A more severe criticism of the book is that it is presented as a treatment of religions. Of its 286 pages, exactly 54 deal with religions proper —Hinduism, 10 pages; Buddhism, Confucianism, Lao-tse and Taoism, Stoicism, called "philosophies," 13 pages; the Mystery religions, 12 pages; Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, Manichaeism, 12 pages; Judaism, 1 paragraph; Christianity, 2½ pages; Islam, 4 pages. The first 211 pages deal with the *disjecta membra* of religions without any attempt to fit the parts into an organic life-process in any historical way. There is the familiar jumble of materials under catchwords—"magic," "fetishism," "animism," "ancestor-worship," "the after-life," "tabus," "totemism," etc. One might classify and describe the stones of a cathedral in some such way, but the plan or the living significance of the whole could never be attained by that method. A religion is a living thing and all the parts have their function in the life-complex. To show them in vital connection in relation to the total life-situation is to write descriptive history of religions. But no one who talks of religions as "true" or "false" will be likely to make such a naturalistic, historical study.

The history of religions deserves the service of consecrated scholarship. It is therefore a great pity that a name highly revered in other branches of learning should be attached to a faulty book in this field. The author is M.A., M.D., Sc.D., Ph.D., LL.D., F.R.S., which should and does indicate that in addition to being a devout Christian gentleman he has a competent grasp of some realm of knowledge; but that realm is assuredly not one which includes religions, past, and present.

A. Eustace Haydon

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A NEW VIEW OF CHRONICLES

The Sellin Commentary on the Old Testament makes rapid strides toward completion.[1] We have before us the latest instalment, a sumptuous treatment of I Chronicles in two volumes, extending over 532 closely packed pages, with 89 pages of Introduction, from the accomplished pen of Professor Rothstein, edited after his death by his colleague, Dr. Johannes Hänel of Münster. No one could have been chosen to deal more adequately with the complicated problems of Chronicles than Professor Rothstein. He had already shed much welcome light on the post-exilic period by his monographs on *The Jews and Samaritans*, *The Genealogy of King Jehoiachin*, and *The Visions of Zechariah*. To the books of Chronicles he gave years of devoted labor, and in the Commentary he shares with us the full fruit of his labor.

The work naturally suffers from the lamented death of the author. Only the first volume, covering the first fifteen chapters of I Chronicles, was passed through the press by Professor Rothstein himself, the remaining volume, though based on his MSS, being subject to thorough revision by the editor. The Introduction, which appears as the Preface to Vol. II, is entirely from the hands of the editor. Conscientious as his work has been, one misses the master's own word.

The style of the Commentary follows that of the series as a whole. The stress is laid on the translation, which seeks to reproduce as accurately as possible the thought of the original. The translation is underscored by voluminous notes, textual and exegetical; and each section is rounded off by an excursus, canvassing the main critical and historical questions involved in it. The treatment throughout is the most comprehensive to be found in any recent Commentary and merits the closest attention on the part of professional scholars. But for the general reader the author's theory of the compilation of Chronicles will be of greatest interest.

Rothstein's distinctive contribution to the subject is his recognition of a double redaction of Chronicles. The nucleus of the book comes from the Chronicler, whom he labels Ch^{P}; the present form of the book is due to a later editor, labeled Ch^{R}. In addition to these, he distinguishes the editor of chapter 15 (Ch^{G}), whom he places earlier than Ch^{P}, and the editor of chapters 22–27 (Ch^{M}), midway between Ch^{P} and Ch^{R}.

The various editors, of course, based their work on earlier sources, mainly from other books of the Bible. In tracing these sources, Rothstein contends that Ch^{P} drew direct from the Priestly Code as a separate unit, as well as from the original documents behind Samuel and Kings; while Ch^R worked on the basis of the Hexateuch as a whole, and the canonical books of Samuel and Kings. This enables him to regard Ch^P as "a kind of continuation of the Priestly Code," and to relate both to the epoch-making activity of Ezra. The chronicler can hardly be identified with Ezra himself; but he is directly influenced by him. Rothstein reverts to the traditional date of Ezra's reforms (458–444 B.C.), and would place Ch^P very soon after 432 B.C., Ch^R following at no distant date (*ca.* 400 B.C.).

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[1] *Kommentar zum ersten Buch der Chronik.* By J. Wilhelm Rothstein. Revised by Johannes Hänel. Leipzig: Deichert, 1927. 2 vols. 272 pages and lxxxix+272–532 pages. M. 16.

It is this early dating of Chronicles that will arouse most opposition to Rothstein's theory. To say nothing of the historical difficulties inherent in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, which have led most modern scholars to antedate Nehemiah to Ezra, the ecclesiastical, liturgical, and theological developments in Chronicles are too marked to permit of so close a *rapprochement* to the Priestly Code. One cannot, however, fail to appreciate the keenness of Rothstein's critical method, his wealth of learning, and his literary, historical, and religious insight—qualities which make the Commentary stimulating and provocative of thought to a high degree.

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A COMMENTARY ON DANIEL

There has long been real need of a commentary on the book of Daniel. We have had many writings about the book, but no adequate treatment from a critical and exegetical point of view. Hence Montgomery's volume is particularly welcome.[1] In it he has put years of painstaking toil and research, and the result is one of which he can well be proud—a lasting credit to American scholarship. It is unquestionably the best commentary on Daniel that we have in any language and will not quickly be superseded.

An outstanding feature of the volume is the attention given to the textual criticism of the book. With the help of his students Professor Montgomery has made a careful study of all the important versions and has made fresh collations of several important manuscripts. In the Introduction there is a particularly good treatment of the different versions bearing on the book of Daniel, and the author is at pains to indicate the relation of the versions to one another and their respective merits. As he well says, "As for the valuation of the testimony of the versions, their real evidence is not obtained by the counting of noses," but by the determination of their authority as witnesses to the text. For every line of Daniel's text careful heed has been given to the witness of the versions, but it is remarkable in how few places the Massoretic Text is found wanting. There was a time when scholars were wont to value the Massoretic Text very lightly and to change it at will, but careful investigation like that of Montgomery goes to show how very trustworthy it is after all.

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[1] *The Book of Daniel* (International Critical Commentary). By James A. Montgomery. New York: Scribner's, 1927. xxxi+488 pages. $4.50.

Not only are the versions of value for the light that they may throw on the text, but also for the interpretation of the book. A translation is of necessity an interpretation, and in the versions we have our earliest interpretation of the biblical text. Montgomery has drawn upon them very largely in his interpretation of Daniel, even though he may not often agree with them.

Another feature of the volume is the attention given to philology, particularly in the Aramaic portion of Daniel. The author was moved to do this because there is so little material available on the Aramaic language and practically nothing that includes the new sources of study. The notes in this field are particularly enlightening; but at the same time, in view of the author's interest in Aramaic, it is disappointing to find such a cursory treatment of the language in the Introduction. One would have liked such a treatment as that by Baumgartner, "Das Aramäische im Buche Daniel," *ZAW*, 1927, pp. 81 ff.—by far the most satisfactory discussion of the subject that has yet appeared.

One is naturally interested in the author's conclusions as to the date and unity of Daniel. The book, he believes, is not a unit, but is composed of at least two parts, chapters 1–6, the Stories, written originally in Aramaic, and chapters 7–12, the Visions, written originally in Hebrew. The Stories, he feels, are earlier than the Visions; and in this he has the independent support of Baumgartner, *loc. cit.;* Noth, *Theol. Stud. und Krit.*, 1926, pp. 143 ff.; and others. Like Baumgartner, he would assign them to the third century B.C.; but differing from Baumgartner, who believes that there are insufficient data to give any definite provenance to the Stories, he believes that it was Babylonia. In partial support of this he lists a goodly number of Persian and Akkadian words. Baumgartner notes the same number of Persian words and twice as many Akkadian, but draws attention to the fact that in the Elephantine Papyri there are roughly 40 Akkadian and 20 Persian words, and in the Aramaic of Ezra 20 Akkadian and 8 Persian words. Hence the linguistic argument is a precarious one; and one cannot assert that the Aramaic of Daniel is East-Aramaic or West-Aramaic, because it is not at all clear what differences, if any, there were between the two dialects at that time. The background of the Stories, however, is Babylonian; and other features in the Stories at least suggest Babylonia as the country of their origin. The second half of the book, chapters 7–12, according to Montgomery "belongs to the first years of the Maccabean uprising, 168–165 B.C., the four Visions to be regarded as composed *seriatim.*" He is much inclined to make the Visions a unit, but at the same time would leave it an open question whether chapter 7 is a distinct composition, a forerunner of the apocalypses in the following chapters. In explanation of the fact that part of chapters 1–6 is now in Hebrew and chapter 7 of the second part in Aramaic, Montgomery follows Dalman and Torrey in the theory that "the redactor must first have turned the preface, chapter 1, into Hebrew, and then translated the Hebrew chapter 7 into Aramaic, and so have bonded the two into one whole." But this smacks too much of the modern editorial office. The part from chapter 1, verse 1, to chapter 2, verse 4*a,* could very well have been translated from an original Aramaic to accord more with its surroundings in the Hebrew canon, but chapter 7 was probably quite independent of chapters 8–12 originally and came to be attached to these by nature of its contents, when these in turn were attached to chapters 1–6. The fact that chapters 1–6 were in Aramaic preserved the Aramaic of chapter 7.

The elaborate Bibliography of twelve pages shows to what degree Montgomery has consulted his predecessors in the preparation of his work. The Bibliography is so nearly exhaustive that it is surprising not to find in the list books like O'Leary, *Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages* (1923); Hooper, *Daniel and the Maccabees* (1918); Welch, *Visions of the End* (1922); Nielsen, *Danielbogens Aelde* (1899) and *Kampen om Danielbogen* (1900); Buhl, *Om Sproget i Daniels Bog* (1899); and Jacobsen, *Daniels Bog og de nyere Sprogundersögelser* (1900).

In a volume so large as this slips are bound to occur, but they are remarkably few. One or two may be noted. The references on page 24 should read "3:33; 4:7*b*–9, 11–14" instead of "3:31; 4:1–2, 7*b*–9, 11–14." On page xxiii "Verzeichnis" is spelled "Verzeichniss" and on page 25 "Verzeichness"; while a letter has accidentally been dropped from "Grundiss," page xvi. A work like this is going to be read by many whose mother-tongue is not English. Hence it would have been better if the author had not resorted so largely to abbreviations. After all abbreviations like "s." for "see" save little space and are at times troublesome even to the English reader. These are minor considerations, however, and detract little from the general excellence of the volume, for it is a truly great work.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT

Professor A. H. McNeile's *An Introduction to the New Testament*[1] is conceived on an individual line. Evidently he defines the function of introduction broadly; for he treats not only the composition of the New Testament books, but in three representative chapters, which are a vital part of the study, he discusses "The Growth of the New Testament Canon," "Textual Criticism," and "Inspiration and Value." Individuality is found also in the distribution of the materials. For example, neither historical consecution nor the topical organization of subject matter is a norm. Rather, the arrangement is as follows: the Synoptic Gospels and the synoptic problem are given exposition, followed by the discussion of Acts, the epistles of Paul, the Pastorals, the general epistles and homilies (with which the Apocalypse is included), and, lastly, the Johannine Gospel and epistles.

The manner of handling the several discussions also exhibits an independent point of view. While important critical literature is frequently cited, Professor McNeile does not attempt to make his volume a compendium of the history of interpretation. There is an inviting freshness about his execution of a methodology which might easily, and, indeed, upon occasion does, become conventional.

It is evident that Professor McNeile regards the relations of the Synoptic Gospels as understood, and the synoptic problem as solved, by the application of the point of view developed by Streeter. Probably the exposition of this point of view is the major characteristic of this Introduction. Acts is succinctly analyzed in a thoroughly up-to-date manner, with adequate attention to the work of Torrey, Jackson-Lake, and Cadbury; it is the reviewer's impression that the study of Acts is the most successful section of the volume. The letters of Paul are treated as in three groups. Both Thessalonian letters are accepted as Paul's; the hypothetical partition of the Corinthian letters, which had begun to seem quite classical, is rejected; the South Galatian hypothesis is followed, with Galatians written after II Corinthians; while the serious problems of the authorship of the prison group are given careful weight, it is concluded that all are Paul's; Philippians is thought to have been the final Pauline letter; sympathetic reflections of recent partitions theories and theories of an Ephesian imprisonment as the place of its writing are given. The Pastorals are thought to contain genuinely Pauline fragments worked up by a disciple. In the generally critical study of the Catholic letters there is a certain flavor of apologetic which expresses itself in the desire to maintain the Petrine authorship of I Peter. The section on the Apocalypse suggests slight liking for this type of literature; the exhibition of the problems of the Fourth Gospel is much more effective. This work is regarded as written by John the Elder in Ephesus toward the close of the first century, but connected with the Apostle through the slight acquaintance of the two Johns; the Elder so revered the Apostle that he pictured him as Jesus' ideal disciple.

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[1] *An Introduction to the New Testament*. By A. H. McNeile. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. 478 pages. $6.50.

While the monograph on the canon is rather conventional (the patristic evidence for the several New Testament books is traced through successive periods), the chapter on "Textual Criticism" possesses the freshness which is evident usually in the book. While great credit is given the work of Hort, more recent studies suggest to the author that advance in the textual field is at hand. The inspiration and value of the New Testament are discussed with engaging frankness in a chapter in which contemporary interests of British scholarship are clearly reflected.

It is obviously difficult for an Introduction to the New Testament to strike out upon new paths. In the nature of the case this is hardly to be expected. It may, however, confidently be affirmed that in Professor McNeile's volume the author's conception of the scope of his field and the definition of his function have resulted in the production of a work which avoids many of the deadly faults and realizes several of the rare virtues of a manual in this discipline. Clearly the work is not designed to displace a compendium of information, such as Moffatt's, nor merely to bring such a formulation up to date. This volume is to a degree the result of an original conception, and it is sufficiently successful that wide use may be predicted for it.

As circulating in America, a notable feature is the place given the achievements of American scholarship. True, in the prepossession with Streeter's four-document theory of synoptic origins the multiple-document hypothesis of the late President Burton, as developed in his *Some Principles of Literary Criticism*, is overlooked (there is merely an incidental reference to what is cited as his *Introduction to the Gospels*). But the work of Bacon is taken with due seriousness, the recent suggestions of Torrey are fully represented, Cadbury's research on the alleged medical terminology of Luke is apparently accepted, and reference is made to Goodspeed, Merrill, McGiffert, Porter, and Ropes. Unlike many British scholars, Professor McNeile does not allow dogmatic considerations to inhibit his use of the recent work of Jackson and Lake.

It is noticeable that while the work of German scholarship is frequently taken into account, the recent work in *Formgeschichte* is given no treatment. Indeed, save for a reference to Schmidt in the section on "Inspiration" (p. 451), this movement in contemporary thought is ignored. This is doubtless due to the author's conviction that Streeter's point of view solves the synoptic problem. It is also striking that while French scholarship is known, the volumes of Goguel's *Introduction* are not mentioned. Another serious omission is the apparently deliberate failure to take into account the religious background of early Christianity in the Graeco-Roman world. Judaism is given some attention in this connection, and there is much dependence upon an assumed Jewish-Christianity, but little use is made of the recent studies of the Oriental syncretistic cults, and none of the literature about the Mandeans.

One of the features of the volume is the identification of the authors of works cited. Undoubtedly this is a useful item of method, but it might fairly be expected that the identifications be correct and up to date, as several are not. In two cases amusement is a by-product of the practice—as, for example, when an appendix to a recent volume of Jackson and Lake is cited with careful identification of the editors, although the article cited is by Professor G. F. Moore (p. 16). Again, it is hardly adequate to refer to Professor Torrey as instructor in Semitic languages at Andover Seminary (p. 35).

To the list of *errata* (Table of Contents) should be added: page 1 of Contents, line 17 *for* Source *read* Sources; page 200, footnote, *for* fifth *read* second; page 429, line 20, *for* J. R. Ropes *read* J. H. Ropes.

On the whole, McNeile's *Introduction* will serve a useful purpose and, doubtless, a widespread public. With the necessary supplement at such points as the history of opinion, literary and social backgrounds, and contemporary religions, it will clearly do for its readers what is intended, i.e., to introduce them to the contents of the New Testament and to the phenomena of Christianity's rise and its production of a literature.

DONALD W. RIDDLE

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THE HISTORIC JESUS

Professor Case's new biography must be welcomed as an honest attempt to recover the facts about Jesus.[1] It is written with clearness, simplicity, and candor. It sincerely aims to follow scientific methods and to ascertain dispassionately the real person underlying the gospel records. The result is a necessarily sketchy portrait and an even more sketchy narrative. Dr. Case's Jesus differs not only from the conventional orthodox Christian Messiah, but also from the so-called liberal portrait of Jesus. The author will of course be anathematized by the orthodox and there is no hope of reconciliation between them. Liberal scholars will scrutinize his volume with some surprise and dislike, but they will have to reckon with this book or with the viewpoint that it represents.

The arrangement of the eight chapters is simple. The first is a description of the character and purpose of the gospels. This is familiar ground and is satisfactorily covered here. The treatment is independent but not novel. Case emphasizes the value of the lost Gospel according to the Hebrews.

In the second chapter he discusses different ways of testing the historical accuracy of the gospel records. He rightly feels that accuracy is not assured for them by their canonicity or early date. Even documentary criticism with its early dating of Mark and Q does not successfully divide all that is true from all that is false. *Formgeschichte*, the later development in Germany of the older technique of synoptic criticism, also appears to Case to help us relatively little. He believes the most effective test of the historicity of items in the gospels is to be found in their relation to social environment.

The chapter on "Jewish Life in Palestine" again covers familiar ground. It deals with the political situation, the complexity and variety of Palestinian society, the parties among the Jews, and their religious institutions.

Chapter iv on "The Home Life of Jesus" is occupied mainly with explaining the birth stories as due to the apologetic interests of later Christianity and with emphasizing the wider contacts and influences that might have come to Jesus at Nazareth from its proximity to large centers of population like Sepphoris and Japha.

Only with chapter v near the middle of the book does the author leave preliminary matter and begin his reconstruction of Jesus' career. Under the rubric "Jesus' Choice of a Task" he discusses at length and with skill the actual character of John the Baptist. He shows how the

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[1] *Jesus: A New Biography*. By Shirley Jackson Case. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. ix+458 pages. $3.00.

Christian gospels have adjusted him to their interests and how the contemporary apocalyptic hope provided the psychological climate for John's preaching of reform. Jesus entered upon a similar task. From the initial experience on, Jesus' career is best classified as that of a prophet.

In chapter vi, "Jesus' Pursuit of His Task" is considered in outline. The discussion or mere paraphrase of each incident in the ministry, in the manner of most lives of Christ, is not undertaken by Case. He contents himself with considering briefly the geographical and chronological scope of the ministry, the disciples and admirers of Jesus, the breach between Jesus and the scribes, and the circumstances of his end.

Chapter vii, "The Religion Jesus Lived," is the most significant in the book, since it deals with the most obscure and delicate and controversial subjects. It attributes to the later imagination rather than to Jesus himself most of the supernatural claims and credentials of Jesus, including both the miracles and the claim to be Messiah. It leaves him with the religious experience of a pious Jew, aware of the presence of God, resting upon a thoroughgoing supernaturalism, dominated by a dedication to God's will, cultivating his own spirit by religious living, and giving himself for the good of his fellowmen.

"The Religion Jesus Taught" (chap. viii) is not much more accurately portrayed in the gospels than the other facts about him. "Not only the content of Jesus' message but the portrait of him as a teacher was fashioned in accordance with Christianity's new needs." Jesus' actual teaching was in terms of his own environment, on subjects derived from his personal contacts and experiences in actual life. Believing in the near advent of the Kingdom of God, Jesus inculcated personal righteousness in his hearers. The elements in his ethical emphasis included indifference to the present world-order and earnest endeavor to live now by the principles of the future kingdom.

> No limit was to be set either to the ideal or to the effort necessary for worthy religious living. . . . . He who would do the will of God acceptably must stand ready to sacrifice all else, even life itself, in his pursuit of the heavenly treasure. And what Jesus demanded of others he himself was ready to perform.

The whole book is evidently written with great care. Professor Case has weighed his words and says what he wants to say. There is no partisan exaggeration, there are none of those pious superlatives with which so many, even of the most radical, critics try to sugar-coat their lives of Christ. Nor when he rejects traditional or favorite viewpoints does the author display any of the usual sophomoric love of shocking his readers. He has, in fact, a most persuasive way of calling the gospel statements pure fiction without jarring in the least. The early Christians simply "relieved Jesus of any stigma attaching to the assumption that the insignificant village of Nazareth had been his birthplace" (p. 173) by inventing a birth in Bethlehem. "The prerogatives of the risen Christ had been generously conferred by the evangelist upon the earthly Jesus" (p. 353). "The Christian writers in the last quarter of the first century were not free from the temptation, or the necessity, of creative description in recounting the story of Jesus' trial" (p. 324). Of course such sentences mean simply that what the gospels tell us is not so. But Professor Case gives reasons for his opinions which the careful reader must consider, while the careless reader will scarcely see how negative the treatment of the records is.

The reason for his rejection of so much of the gospels is his belief that they are affected by the interests of the later church. It is the social environment of the evangelists that determined their presentation of Jesus. They modernized his message, they idealized his character, they interpreted his career, they classified his person, they even imagined his self-consciousness. Professor Case makes social setting the test of historical accuracy in gospel material.

> The decisive consideration in dealing with all gospel tradition is the extent to which the narrative reveals the dominance of interests suitable to the distinctive situation of Jesus, in contrast with conditions characteristic of later stages in the growth of the Christian movement [p. 113].
>
> Every statement in the records is to be judged by the degree of its suitableness to the distinctive environment of Jesus, on the one hand, and to that of the framers of gospel tradition at one or another stage in the history of Christianity, on the other. When consistently applied, this test will prove our safest guide in recovering from the present gospel records dependable information regarding the life and teaching of the earthly Jesus [p. 115].

Evidently this technique is regarded by the author as a new and effective method. "The present volume has been written with more than usual emphasis upon the social point of view, both in handling the early Christian literature and in reproducing the story of Jesus' life and religion" (p. vi.). There has been developing a new school of criticism at Chicago. In this volume we have a chance to hear the technique expounded and to see it at work. How does it commend itself to us? In theory it is of course quite sound, but it is not perhaps so new in biblical study as its advocates fancy. The gospels have long been understood as palimpsests in which the original facts are covered by later interpretation. Founders of schools of criticism often seem newer than they are. Nor is this tool so easily applied to the material as might be wished. For we do not know enough about all the stages of early Christianity to say how each might have influenced the tradition. Some of Case's judgments seem too simple in dividing the true from the false. He implies for example that what suits the Palestinian setting is genuine, but what suits the Hellenistic is false. He believes that supernatural birth would be required by Gentiles more than by Jews. They would exaggerate the heroic rather than the didactic element about Jesus. The miracles attributed to Jesus are to be rejected because the Gentiles demanded miracles, while "among Jews the memory of an ancient worthy's message was thought much more significant for religion than any recollection of his marvelous deeds" (p. 346; cf. p. 102).

This simple classification of Hellenistic and Palestinian is not quite certain enough. After all, according to Paul it was Jews who sought signs and Greeks who wanted wisdom. Because a trait in the gospels suited later Christian needs, we may not at once conclude that it is also unhistorical, nor vice versa. Case himself admits that Aramaic-speaking Christians could supplement or distort reports, and that Palestinian color is no proof of authenticity (pp. 401 ff.). But in general he believes that the teaching of Jesus is better preserved than his deeds, since "a continuous series of marvelous deeds such as are spread upon the pages of the gospels finds no suitable place in the manner of life becoming a preacher of reform in Israel" (p. 357), while "in our present records we find, perhaps in about equal ratio, teachings of Jesus that are appropriate to his own immediate environment along with pronouncements of his upon subjects that first came to light in the latter half of the first century of Christianity's growth" (p. 408). But granting that later Christians exaggerated the miraculous element in Jesus, we may still believe that Jesus, whose religion was, according to Case, a thoroughgoing supernaturalism, could have seemed to himself and to his contemporaries a man endowed with miraculous powers like the holy men of the East today.

The extreme example of emptying out of the gospels what is consonant with later Christian interest is the messianic self-consciousness of Jesus. Professor Case believes Jesus looked for no Messiah but God, never called himself the Son of Man, nor even when confronted by the cross sought to classify himself according to a messianic category. It was the disciples, who after the crucifixion "were, historically and psychologically, far more abundantly supplied with christological stimuli than ever Jesus had been," who read into his mind their own interest in dramatization and officialization.

Such a theory is certainly not impossible. The passage which presents it deserves careful study (pp. 360–78). To those of us who find the christological problems of the gospels linguistically and psychologically insoluble it would come as a relief by cutting the Gordian knot. It provides a simple solution for the silence of Jesus about his messiahship in Mark (see pp. 15 f., 374). It also relieves us of attributing to Jesus a self-classification that historically was most inadequate and that in modern times is most misleading. Probably Jesus was not mainly concerned with self-classification. But was he able entirely to avoid the question of his own identification with the Messiah? Case admits the messianic expectation as part of his social environment. Did he give no ground for later belief that he knew himself in some sense the Messiah?

Freeing Jesus from preoccupation with messiahship certainly gives welcome opportunity to our conceiving of him under other rôles. A most attractive part of Case's book is his altogether reverent attempt to deal with the actual religious life of Jesus. He finds in the term "prophet" the most fruitful analogy for his experiences. He places him in the religion of Judaism and hints at some of the inner characteristics of his life. One wonders whether his picture is reliable. If one rejects with Case so much of the gospel material, is there matter enough left to appraise his inner life? Many moderns will find their ideal of religion beautifully portrayed in Case's description of Jesus' own religion (pp. 378–87) and in the interpretation of his teaching in accord with "Jesus' own sense of the value of creative spiritual living" (p. 441), but is this not merely another stage of modernizing? It has some support in the records, but they may not be accurate. Perhaps it is only its terminology that is too modern (Case himself elsewhere expresses a like fear [pp. 385, 431]). It sounds like William James. For example, Case implies that first-hand mystical experience and immediate awareness of God were primary elements in Jesus' life. How can we know that? He asserts that "the characteristics that had most forcibly impressed the close friends of Jesus had been the dynamic quality of his personality and his prophet-like abandon to the cause of God" (p. 389). Were not the first Christians concerned to emphasize his personal influence and his courageous devotion?

Case also implies by his chapter headings that Jesus was aware of a definite "task." His qualifications of this sense of mission (pp. 247 f., 253, 381) are all well taken, but should not his skepticism and his use of the prophetic analogy make him even less certain about the purposive nature of Jesus' career, about his renunciation of other occupation, and about his deliberate "training" (pp. 14, 43, etc.) of the disciples? In other words, Professor Case's method puts him on surer ground when he shows how the gospels represent later Christian ideas than when he tries to get behind them to the facts of history. This is inevitable, and it was worth while to use the method to show where it leads, but one must be willing to go the whole length of its negative implications. The book's vulnerability is perhaps not where most critics will place it. For that reason, if for no other, it would be really an excellent book. At the risk of some repetition I conclude by setting down some of its distinctive merits:

1. The knowledge of the documents and of the times is based on good scholarship. The author has used Josephus independently and to good advantage and in his use of rabbinical material he is not so second-hand as most Christian biographers of Jesus.

2. Attention is rightly given to the pre-documentary history of the material in the gospels. The independent nature of the units could hardly be better described than is done on pages 98 f. This means that the events of Jesus' life cannot be arranged chronologically. Professor Case simply does not go far enough, for he retains the traditional view that the anecdotes of Mark 11–13 really recall a single final week at Jerusalem (pp. 17, 269, etc.).

3. The economic situation of Judaism is appraised more favorably (pp. 122, 123, 132) than in the recent monograph on the subject by F. C. Grant. Case avoids the modern excess of making the acceptance or rejection of a political program the key toward an understanding of Jesus.

4. The emphasis on the urban character of life in Palestine and on the urban influence upon Jesus constitutes an interesting and original contribution. The rural traits of the gospels are not denied (p. 404) as a primitive and genuine element in the teaching of Jesus, but he cannot be regarded any longer as "a small town man."

5. The Jewishness of Jesus is recognized, and the essential agreement of his position with that of the scribes (p. 305). At the same time there is an adequate and careful presentation of the seemingly minor points of disagreement which led to the extreme mutual hostility between them and Jesus.

6. The apocalyptic element in Jesus' message has full justice done to it (pp. 419–429). It is not, however, overdone. Case points out that its ethical significance rather than its speculative character interested Jesus. I am not sure, however, that Jesus identified the ethics of the future kingdom (p. 439) with the ethics of his teaching of preparation, or indeed that he thought of the former at all.

This book will be a real help to the scholars or intelligent laymen whose desire to see Jesus is matched by the patience necessary for their slowly maturing grasp of obscure historical probabilities. We may safely predict that more sermons will be preached against the book than from it. But the sermon that should be preached to all its critics, who will so confidently defend or reject it, might well be based on the text, "No one knoweth the Son save the Father." There is still much about Jesus of Nazareth that no one knows but God.

HENRY J. CADBURY

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THE CASE FOR PETRINE TRADITION

The impression that Simon Peter was one of the most conspicuous leaders of the Christian movement in its early days is doubtless true to first-century religious developments. Petrine narratives and references in the New Testament are so distributed and of such a character as to give an exceedingly vivid picture of a striking personality and a marked impression of the rôle he played in connection with Christian beginnings. He appears first as a follower of John the Baptist and then as a more ardent disciple of Jesus—ready to hail him as the Messiah even. He was also the first to attain the conviction of Jesus' resurrection, without which nascent Christianity would never have survived the stunning blow of Jesus' death. He preceded James as the leader of the Jewish Christian community in Jerusalem, and he followed Paul in the work of gentile propaganda. In short, Peter was himself an epitome of the beginnings of Christianity in a more inclusive sense than was either Jesus or Paul.

It is not strange, therefore, that an abundant Petrine literature early came into existence. The Petrine strata in the gospels are unmistakable, and early Acts is almost as pronouncedly Petrine as later Acts is Pauline. Two second-century pseudepigraphs under the name of Peter found their way into the New Testament canon. Together with the non-canonical writings bearing the same name, these would make a Petrine New Testament complete in all its parts, with gospel, acts, epistles, apocalypse, and the "Preaching of Peter" in addition. This reckoning, moreover, leaves out of account the romantic Clementine literature which turns mainly on the conflict between Simon Peter and Simon Magus. The early Christian centuries paid ample literary tribute to the memory of Peter.

Not so our century. Modern literature concerning the fisherman apostle is as scanty as ancient literature was abundant. The average theological library will show perhaps half a dozen volumes devoted to Peter in comparison with as many sections full of books concerning Paul. Treatises dealing exclusively with the Galilean apostle are mainly to be sought in dictionaries and encyclopedias. For an inclusive bibliography the student must refer back to C. Guignebert's scholarly work entitled *La Primaute de Pierre et la venue de Pierre á Rome* (Paris, 1909). Nor is the scantiness of modern literature in this field to be wondered at. While Peter's importance for Christian origins cannot be denied, the apostle himself remains very much of a problem. He is the subject of endless legends; but the facts that are actually known about him are few indeed. These circumstances—the ancient greatness of Peter, the little we know about him, the vast mass of Petrine tradition, and the literary neglect of the apostle in modern times—combine to make Professor Foakes-Jackson's book on Peter a doubly interesting and important publication.[1]

The purpose of the volume as announced in the Preface is twofold: "To give the ordinary reader an interest in the first days of Christianity by an endeavor to portray the Apostle who took the lead at its inception"; and further "To appeal to scholars to study . . . . how far tradition is to be respected where direct historical material is scanty." From the author's statement of purpose it is at once evident his objectives are quite distinct and even disparate; the one popularizing and the other scholarly.

In the main the popularizing interest is dominant in the first half of the volume where the author discusses the New Testament data regarding Peter. This section of the book is valuable because of its comprehensive display of source materials and its convenient summary of current opinions on debatable points. On the whole, however, these chapters are disappointing in that they add so little that is really fresh and new to our knowledge of early Christian history. Occasionally the author suggests some ingenious hypothesis without presenting enough evidence to make it convincing. But for the most part he is content to give an exhibit of New Testament materials and summarize the differing judgments of other interpreters without being particular to indicate his own opinion. Throughout this section, moreover, it is apparent that the author is too much concerned with individuals and too little interested in the Christian movement as a whole. We hear much of James and Paul and Barnabas; but we learn little of the Baptists or the primitive Jerusalem community or the Hellenists. It is to be feared that the ordinary reader will not derive an interest in early Christianity as a social movement from this portrayal of the apostle.

The author's appeal to scholarship to attempt the evaluation of tradition fills the last ten chapters of the volume. These deal with such diverse subjects as the non-canonical Petrine literature, the beginnings of the Christian church in Rome, Peter's death and resting place, Roman martyrologies and bishop lists, the validity of papal pretensions, Petrine influence in England and elsewhere both during the Middle Ages and today. Professor F. Gavin of General Theological Seminary, New York, adds to these discursions a chapter on "Peter in Jewish Legend."

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[1] *Peter, Prince of Apostles.* By F. J. Foakes-Jackson. New York: Doran, 1927. 320 pages. $2.50.

On most of the problems treated in this part of the book there is no decisive evidence available for one side or the other. In each instance the author is careful to cite such *testimonia* as are pertinent, but he does not usually assert a greater burden of proof than the facts will bear. On the contrary his final appeal in this section is to tradition and probability; and his main contention seems to be that, in the absence of convincing evidence, tradition may be trusted when it is not obviously improbable. Thus it is freely admitted that I Peter is the only New Testament evidence connecting Peter with Rome and that the Fathers before Irenaeus do not support the view that the Apostle visited the imperial capital. Nevertheless the author thinks it probable that Peter was one of the organizers of the Roman community and perhaps first came to Rome when he left Jerusalem for "another place" during the persecution of Agrippa I. The tradition marking the Vatican as the resting place of Peter dates at the earliest from the end of the second century. During the succeeding centuries many vicissitudes are recorded for the supposed relics themselves and for the Constantinian basilica that enshrined them. Nevertheless the author is inclined to believe that the remains of the apostle are still at rest under the high altar of St. Peter's. At every turn the reader is thus impressed by the "probability" of tradition.

Admittedly it is a difficult task that the author has essayed in attempting to interest ordinary readers and to stimulate scholars by means of one and the same volume. He has done wisely to divide his study into halves by treating first the familiar New Testament materials in a semi-popular vein, and remanding his more specialized discussion of Petrine tradition to the concluding chapters. Even this, however, does not save the book. Both scholars and laymen are likely to be dissatisfied with it, and for opposite reasons. The ordinary reader will be impatient with the suspense of judgment, the nice balancing of critical opinions, and the presentation of problems that are insoluble. The scholar, on the other hand, will desiderate a much more extended, definitive, and technical discussion of moot questions than is to be found here. Moreover, if he be of an historical turn of mind, he will not be impressed by the special pleading for tradition with which the book abounds.

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AN ANCIENT CHRISTIAN HISTORIAN

It is indeed astonishing that so important a work as the *History of the Franks* by Gregory of Tours has never before been completely translated into English.[1] This document is indispensable for a knowledge of Merovingian society in the sixth century. While Gregory himself may be a very poor historian when judged by the severe standards of that craft today, nevertheless he is, perhaps the more so on account of his uncritical methods, an excellent mirror of the beliefs, customs, and tendencies of his age. His credulity, it is true, seems boundless; he thinks all events subject to the crassest sort of supernatural interference; often he is tedious; and he is as much concerned with trivialities as with momentous occurrences. But undoubtedly the great mass of Gregory's contemporaries would have pronounced his work good history because they too saw and felt and thought as he did.

The two volumes under review are far more than a mere translation. In fact, Volume I, although called by the unpretentious title of *Introduction,* is virtually a critical history of the Franks in the time of Gregory. It presents not only a detailed study of introductory matters, such as Gregory as man and author, with a description of the manuscripts and the contents of the document, but it reconstructs the story of the "Merovingian Kingdoms." Also it describes in detail the character, organization, and activities of the "Merovingian Church"; and, finally, gives an account of "Merovingian Life" in terms of the social order, material conditions, knowledge and culture, and pleasures and amusements.

Volume II, the *Text,* contains not only a carefully prepared translation but also over two hundred pages of notes. For the most part these explain unusual allusions or obscurities in the text, yet they also contain numerous references to both ancient and modern literature. Unfortunately, we think, these valuable notes have not been appended to the several pages of text to which they belong but have been printed in a block at the end. In this position they are likely to be neglected, to the serious detriment of the student. An index of proper names, another of "places and peoples," a third on general topics, and a fourth on authorities cited, complete the whole. This is a masterly piece of work for which students of Merovingian history in general and of the Merovingian church in particular should be devoutly grateful.

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[1] *The History of the Franks.* By Gregory of Tours. Translated with an Introduction by O. M. Dalton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. 2 vols. xii+447+660 pages.

MODERNISM IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH[1]

This volume, presenting in slightly expanded form the William Belden Noble Lectures of 1925–26, is the latest representative utterance of the modernist party in the Church of England. The author, as principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford, and editor of the *Modern Churchman* for the sixteen years since its inception, has been recognized as a leading protagonist of the movement, so that anything from his pen is regarded as important. In the book before us the fundamental principles of modernism are stressed at every opportunity, and the conviction is avowed that they are not only true and necessary but in essential harmony with the ethos of the historic Church of Christ, more especially with that of the English Church, which in one place is termed "the ideal seed-bed of Modernism."

The exposition begins with a sketch of the background, which is something more than a bare historical review. It serves the twofold purpose of differentiating the present movement from (*a*) Roman Catholic modernism, (*b*) Protestant liberalism, and (*c*) the Broad Church school of the last century, while showing at the same time its indebtedness to all three. From the complex situation created in England by the aggressive Anglo-Catholic movement and the group of Liberal Churchmen—successors of the Victorian "Broads"—arose the strongly felt need for something which should aim at conserving the religious values of both types. Tyrrell's famous books were having their effect, and at this juncture an American theologian, Newman Smyth, gave strength to the impulse by his *Passing Protestantism and Coming Catholicism,* and this new synthesis of liberalism and Catholicism—henceforth to be known as English modernism—was the result. Those who have allied themselves with the movement are unanimous in disclaiming any desire to create a new sect, still less a new religion. An essential feature of their position is a high valuation of the historic church and its sacraments. And, as our author points out, they are not over pleased with the hybrid word with which they are tagged. Having failed to popularize "modern churchmen" they have formally accepted "modernist" as their designation, hoping, as Percy Gardner puts it, "to rescue the term from ignoble use." Already it has come to be associated almost exclusively in the minds of many with destructive criticism and wanton iconoclasm. Of course, Dr. Major devotes some of his space to the refutation of caluminous statements on this line, but his method is to commend to his readers the positive values of modernist theology and apologetic and to identify these with the essential truth which from the first has characterized the message of Christianity to the world. It would be easy to quote, did space permit, many passages in the book which, even allowing for their qualifications in the context, make an imposing exhibit on the positive side. They reflect the nature of the claim here made for English modernism that it is mediating and cautious. It may be as sure as the English and American Unitarians, or the German Liberal Protestants, or the Roman Catholic modernists that traditional positions are wrong. Even so, it definitely refuses to go to all lengths with men of those schools in rejecting them. It is neither ruthless in its criticisms nor enthusiastic over hasty and ready-made plans for reconstruction—often urged in the interest of immediate and visible results. It pleads for patience and deliberation in the working out of a task which it recognizes as one of extreme delicacy and difficulty.

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[1] *English Modernism, Its Origin, Methods, Aims.* By H. D. A. Major. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1927. 274 pages. $2.50.

The attitude here asserted is one that should commend itself without argument. Many intemperate and ill-considered criticisms have issued from both sides in the present controversy, and our great need today is a spirit of fairness on the part of all the disputants. Dr. Major evidently aims to be fair, but we cannot say that he has always succeeded. To give only an instance or two, he fails to differentiate between the ignorant, or rigidly obscurantist, and the intelligent traditionalist who is far from being impervious to "new truth"—a failure which is hardly pardonable—and his comments on "original guilt" would almost lead one to believe that he is unaware of what perfectly orthodox theologians have to say on that subject. In this connection, readers who desire to know the present attitude of enlightenment on the traditional side are advised to consult *Essays Catholic and Critical*, a volume which had not issued from the press at the time these lectures were prepared for publication.

THEODORE B. FOSTER

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CONGREGATIONALISTS AND QUAKERS

The authors of two little books in the "Faiths Series" (edited by L. P. Jacks), W. B. Selbie, the learned principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, and Rufus M. Jones, professor of philosophy in Haverford College, are ideally fitted to interpret their particular faiths.[1] Rufus Jones has been called the "ambassador plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary" of the Quakers to the whole world; while Principal Selbie is perhaps the leading English Congregationalist. The books follow a somewhat different method. That on the Quakers is primarily interpretative, with only the first brief chapter devoted to historical background; while the treatment of the Congregationalists is chiefly historical.

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[1] *Congregationalism*. By W. B. Selbie. New York: Doran, 1927. 199 pages. $2.00. *The Faith and Practice of the Quakers*. By Rufus M. Jones. New York: Doran, 1927. 181 pages. $2.00.

It would be difficult to make the faith and practice of a religious group more luminous than does Rufus Jones make that of his beloved Quakers. After explaining the background out of which Quakerism sprang, the author sets before us the type of Christianity which Quakerism represents—a type which emphasises experience rather than dogma; the great Quaker words being "light," "truth," "life," "love," "spirit," "way." The kind of worship and organization which have been adopted by the Friends grow naturally out of this emphasis. "Organization and external systems" do not appeal to him, nor do external rites or symbols. The Fourth Gospel, omitting as it does, reference to the Lord's Supper, and distinctly declaring that Jesus did not baptize with water, has always been the favorite gospel of the mystics. Here the Quakers found the charter of their faith.

The first half of the book is devoted to Quaker faith, the last to Quaker practice and in these latter chapters we find an account of how their peculiar faith has influenced their practice. With commendable pride the author tells the story of Quaker influence in peace-making, in education, and in humanitarian service. The book closes with a fine chapter on "The New Spirit and the New World," in which it is pointed out that the great problem in the world today is the formation of the right spirit and that the cultivation and practice of this right spirit have always been essential features of Quakerism.

Principal Selbie tells the story of Congregationalism down to the present, beginning with Wyclif and the Lollard background, where, he states, Congregationalism had its beginning. Robert Browne, the name most intimately connected with early independency, and whose influence is attested by the fact that the early independents were known as Brownists, does not present an appealing or an heroic figure. After spending his early years in denouncing episcopal government and in the organization of independent churches, he ends his days an ordained clergyman in the Established church, holding his ordination vows, however, very loosely and evidently retaining his congregational principles. The story of the heroic lives and martyrdom of Henry Barrow, John Greenwood, and John Penry (chap. iii) helps one to overlook, however, the pitiful wavering of Browne.

The familiar story of the Pilgrims—their Holland sojourn and their American experience—is related briefly in chapters iv and v. The next three chapters are devoted to the important years under Cromwell and the Restoration. In these years of unrest the Independents stood firmly by their principle of liberty as over against enforced uniformity. With the passage of the Toleration Act (1689) there began a period of religious decline which lasted until the evangelical revival. Congregationalism, during these years, manifested a narrow separatism. They still were subject to certain disabilities, such as exclusion from the national universities; and this seemed to give them little inclination to concern themselves with the well-being of the people at large. The Wesleyan revival gave them new life and imbued them with a new spirit, a spirit which has remained with them to the present.

Congregational movements outside England, Congregational theology, and modern developments are the subject of the final chapters. The greatest contribution made by Congregationalism has been in theology, though the names Robert William Dale and A. M. Fairbairn stand high among modern theologians; rather their chief contribution has been their leadership in the achievement of religious liberty and their zeal for education. In these respects all Protestant bodies are deeply in their debt.

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A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF WESLEY AND METHODISM

Here[1] is a rather unique synthesis of psychological and historical investigation. The historical setting of the rise of Methodism is swiftly but finely sketched. We see England at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution; the smug complacency of the rich and well-to-do, the sodden and miserable condition of the poor, the apparent lack of any sense of responsibility on the part of the church for the great mass of animal-like humans who worked in the mines and other dehumanizing places. Then the great religious revival under the leadership of Wesley and Whitefield broke out among these neglected peoples and spread to the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, bringing hope and newness of life.

With our present technique it is very difficult to combine a psychological study with an historical one; but the author probably does it as well as it can be done. He draws upon several branches of psychology, the introspectionists, the behaviorists, the psycho-analysts, the advocates of auto-suggestion, and the theories of crowd psychology. He makes no attempt to unite these diverse schools but uses them as they happen to throw light upon the occurrences of the great revival.

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[1] *The Psychology of the Methodist Revival.* By Sidney G. Dimond. New York: Oxford University Press, 1926. 296 pages. $3.50.

There is an excellent psychological study of John Wesley himself, with profound appreciation of that great man but without allowing enthusiasm to hamper the critical powers. There is a study of his habits, his instinctive and emotional equipment, his personal bias and peculiarities, his love affairs and marriage, and other psychological factors which entered into the constitution of his personality and the making of his career.

The Methodist revival is rich in material for the study of conversion, and Mr. Dimond gives more space to this, perhaps, than to anything else. Wesley's own conversion is analyzed and a number of typical cases among his followers are studied.

We believe the historical side of the book is of greater value than the psychological. This is partly due to the present unsatisfactory status of the science of psychology and partly to the eclectic way in which the author endeavors to make use of the various unreconciled schools of psychology.

But one ends the book with a deep impression of the great importance of the Methodist revival and the debt we owe to John Wesley. To indicate the psychological and historical significance of Methodism, he summarizes the researches of M. Halevy with statements such as the following:

> Events so diverse as the typically English achievement of the electoral Reform Act of 1832, the early Acts for the protection of factory workers, and the Act for the Abolition of Slavery in the British Colonies, are shown to have been either the direct work of evangelical leaders, or to have owed the support which placed them on the Statute Book to the unrecognized but dominating centre or evangelical party in politics. . . . .
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> In the early days of the nineteenth century the Methodist movement provided the necessary support for the Government in avoiding a revolution; it secured the Church against the forces of anarchy; and it enabled England to become the typical country in Europe for social order and political stability, and to stand out before the world as more than ever a Christian State.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

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HERRMANN'S THEOLOGY IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT-DAY THINKING

Nearly thirty years ago the writer of this review had the privilege of studying with Herrmann for a year. He still has in his possession the notebooks containing the lectures on theology delivered at that time. It is very interesting to compare that version of Herrmann's thinking with the useful translation which has just appeared.[1]

While the general outlines of his system remain relatively unchanged, the alterations in minor details give evidence of the untiring labor which Herrmann constantly expended in preparing his lectures. The positions which he had previously set forth were constantly subjected to the most rigid critical scrutiny and rewritten in the light of such examination. In this translation (which presumably represents the last stages of his thinking) there has been the elimination of a certain amount of controversial material which had been called forth in the latter years of the nineteenth century. There is an increasing effort to relate certain findings to the actual experiences of modern Christians; but the fundamental structure of the system never changed.

Herrmann was perhaps the most consistent representative of Christocentric theology. He was very emphatic in his assertion that true religion is not the creation of man's own thinking and that it cannot be derived by attempting to interpret the physical world of nature. Genuine religion must originate in the activity of God rather than in human effort. Herrmann, therefore, took his stand squarely as an advocate of a religion of revelation as over against any mere natural or rational religion.

It was in his attempt to define "revelation" scientifically and critically that Herrmann's most acute theological thinking was done. Revelation, he contended, must be discovered through the fact that it reveals. Pursuing this line of thought he came to the conviction that there is only one objective reality which completely fulfils these conditions. That reality is the inner life of the historical Jesus. The bulk of his theology consisted in showing how a person who comes into the presence of the inner life of Jesus will find himself so overpowered by the realization of the divine presence that he is led to trust and aspire and pray under the influence of Jesus.

This theology was an extremely effective means of maintaining a vital faith during the period when critical scholarship was making untenable the older concepts of the Bible. It seemed to enable Christians to preserve the older pattern of trust in revelation, while at the same time being free to employ critical inquiry in regard to the Bible and especially the records of the New Testament. The profound religious life of Herrmann, organized as it was around this center, made a deep impression on all of his students and seemed to indicate that the newer appeal to a Christ whom every man could discover for himself had all the evangelical fervor of the older theology.

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[1] *Systematic Theology*. By Wilhelm Herrmann. Translated by Nathaniel Micklem and Kenneth A. Saunders. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 152 pages. $1.50.

After the lapse of thirty years this theology seems to be seriously defective in two particulars. In the first place, the picture which Herrmann gives of Jesus is now seen to be one which is shaped almost entirely by the demands of Herrmann's theology. He is interested in Jesus, not so much for the purpose of ascertaining what the actual historical facts concerning Jesus are, but rather for the purpose of showing that Jesus is the channel through which God reveals himself to man. Moreover, the revelation thus obtained turns out to be one which is determined by the exigencies of Herrmann's own religious belief. It is very distinctly Lutheran in its flavor, making much of the process by which a man becomes conscious of his sin and receives free forgiveness, and making very little of those experiences which a man has in relation to the world of nature. Such a theology would inevitably seem somewhat sentimentally pietistic to many a modern Christian.

In the second place the Jesus through whom Herrmann derives the revelation of God is almost entirely unrelated to the world of nature. Indeed Herrmann was so distrustful of the religious possibilities of studying the natural world that he defined religion as the "spiritual victory over the world." It is true that he undertook to correlate the realm of nature with God by speaking of the universe as "God's world," but the relationship of God to the world is not determined at all by asking what kind of a world it is in which we live. The lordship of God over the world really is derived from an uncriticized a priori assumption:

> The Power to which we know ourselves to be subjected in free surrender *is already in fact conceived by us as that which rules the universe;* for we could not surrender ourselves utterly to a Being whom we did not regard in this light. The very experience, then, which brings us to the point of worshiping with perfect trust the Power which touches us in that experience, or of calling that Power God, produces in us the idea of omnipotence. [Italics mine.]

In reality Christianity as conceived by Herrmann was a self-sufficient religion existing on the foundation of a revelation kept distinct from the realms of general human history and the processes of nature. In these days, when the capacities of mankind are being ascertained in the light of man's place in nature and his dependence on social development, such a theological system as that of Herrmann's seems almost as much aloof as would the religion of the medieval monk. At the same time we cannot but be impressed by his sternly disciplined spirit of scientific inquiry; while his profound religious spirit will always be an inspiration and a challenge to those who are attempting to formulate Christian convictions.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CANON STREETER'S THEORY OF REALITY

Dr. B. H. Streeter, Canon of Hereford and Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, is well known in the theological world, as editor and a leading contributor in connection with four successive volumes, *Foundations, Concerning Prayer, Immortality,* and *The Spirit,* and as author of the original and important critical work, *The Four Gospels.* In his recently published book, *Reality,*[1] he gives us the result of his attempt to discover the truth about the Universe by means of a fresh correlation of religion and science.

Materialism is criticized as failing to realize that its mechanomorphism is no explanation of reality without some sort of anthropomorphism. Actual machines, as going concerns, are not only the product of intelligence and purpose; they have to be used and controlled by intelligent purpose. Ultimately the Universe, if it is to be regarded as intelligible, must be viewed as the expression of mind.

Religion is in some ways akin to science, it is pointed out; but in other ways it is more like art. In making assertions about the Whole and claiming to be knowledge of the truth, it is allied to science; but inasmuch as the truth it claims to know is primarily concerned with the quality of reality rather than with quantitative relations, which constitute the realm of science, religion is akin to art and may legitimately enough, after the manner of art, make use of myth as one of its vehicles of expression.

Canon Streeter makes a distinction between what he calls two ways of knowledge—the classifying, analytical law-formulating method of science; and a more direct, intuitive way, which he thinks must be used to supplement the results of the other method. Particularly when the phenomena we are dealing with are those of life and consciousness, is an anthropomorphically interpretative intuition called for. But while religion always starts with the method of anthropomorphic intuition, we must check the results reached in this way by constant reference to facts and laws of the scientific order, if degeneration into superstition is to be avoided.

Following out this program, with acknowledged obligations to Bergson, Dr. Streeter finds his basic metaphysical working hypothesis in the view that life, in the sense of conscious life, is the fundamental element in reality, and then proceeds to examine his hypothesis in the light of facts as he understands them. The hypothesis of a cosmic life-force will explain everything materialism tried to explain, and more also, he claims. "Life will account for the thing called mechanism, but mechanism will not easily account for the thing we call life." But, mechanomorphism aside, the creative principle we posit is not necessarily to be thought of as a blindly groping life-force, such as the unconscious life of vegetable organisms seems to be. It may well be that ultimate reality is less truly thought of as theriomorphic than as anthropomorphic. The only plausible argument for the former alternative is that which appeals to the fact of evil, and this is a consideration which must be dealt with. The author anticipates, however, that ethical monotheism or the "higher anthropomorphism," as he calls it, will be found to be a more satisfactory view than either the vitalistic hypothesis of an impersonal life-force or the idealistic conception of a static absolute or all-creating thought, of which contrasted positions it is, in a sense and to a certain extent, the "higher synthesis."

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[1] *Reality. A New Correlation of Science and Religion.* By Burnett Hillman Streeter, New York: Macmillan, 1926. xiii+350 pages. $2.50.

> The somewhat abstract intellectualism of the classical Idealism makes its world-view seem a trifle jejune beside a vivid Life-Force conception like that of Bergson; but its demonstration that it is a necessity of thought to postulate an ultimate Intelligence makes it a most valuable complement to and corrective of, his philosophy. For this demonstration entirely disposes of the possibility left open by Bergson, that the Life-Force may be only a purblind groping monster, a mere Will to live, at best half-conscious of its aims. If, then, we can correlate the principles for which Bergson and the Idealists respectively argue, in such a way that these will no longer conflict with but supplement one another, we reach a conception of the Universe as the expression of Desire and Will—but rational Desire and intelligently directed Will. Idealist philosophy has at times seemed to point us to a conception of the Reality behind Appearances as an Absolute of which nothing but negatives can be predicated—changeless, colourless, motionless, feelingless, and therefore, for all that is argued to the contrary, really dead. Creative Evolution on the other hand, pictures a Universe really alive, but leaves us wondering how far the *élan vital* is, or is not, more than an aimless Will to live. Combine the two conceptions, and we are on the verge of that splendid concrete vision of the ancient Hebrew prophets—a Living God [pp. 132–33].

As preliminary to taking up the problem of evil Dr. Streeter defends the Christian ethical ideal, as he understands it, in opposition to the ethics of Nietzsche. It is Nietzsche's ideal morality, not Christ's, which should bear the name of a "slave morality"; the will to power "represents the slave's dream of how he would behave if only he were free; it is the expression, not of greatness, but of a neurotic desire for greatness. The true expression of the freeman's temper is the princely motto—*Ich Dien* 'I am in the midst of you as he that serves.'" The will to pleasure and the will to power are rightly to be subordinated to the will to righteousness and the will to service.

The chapter entitled "The Defeat of Evil" contains much that is suggestive and valuable. Great stress is rightly laid upon the uniformity of nature as a *sine qua non* of any consistent action. Attention is also called to the fact that life in nature and in man has a curative as well as a creative aspect, and the question of the retrieval of moral failure should be considered, it is suggested, with this fact in mind. "Repentance is in itself an evidence of a moral advance already actually achieved. Its smart is the smart of 'growing pains.'" Initially considered, pain is useful as a warning of Danger or a spur to activity, but beyond the limited amount required for these purposes it is not ordinarily beneficial. However, when, as in the case of Christ, suffering is unavoidably encountered as a part of what is involved in the way of life required for the realization of a high ideal, the consequences of sufferings can be ennobling to the sufferer and an inspiration to others.

> A world in which suffering and sin are possibilities is a world better worth creating than one in which everything was automatic, smooth and easy. Without freewill goodness, without risk, courage could not exist; freewill involves the possibility of sin, risk that of disaster [p. 246].

There are many wise observations also in the chapter on "Religion and the New Psychology." The problem of the bearing of the new psychology on religion is rightly seen to be ultimately a philosophical and not a purely scientific one. If belief in the existence of God is philosophically defensible, the problem comes to be simply a new form of the old question of the relation of divine activity to the reign of law which was raised by the discoveries of Newton and again by those of Darwin. The general tendency of religion wherever it has come strongly under the influence of science, has been to look for the divine in the rational and the ideal, rather than in the irrational.

One of the questions particularly considered is that of the relation of the psychology of "projection" to the validity of the idea of God. While admitting that pathological symptoms sometimes accompany religious genius, as they may accompany genius in any other of its expressions, Streeter explains this by pointing out that genius "involves a more than ordinary sensitiveness to impressions. A razor is more easily notched than an axe, and enhanced sensitiveness cannot but be accompanied by increased liability to injury." But religion is a phenomenon characteristic of health, rather than of disease. Conversion is a movement away from dissociation toward integration of personality. While neurosis in religion may account for fanaticism, it cannot account for insight.

If God is "our Heavenly Father," then the right reaction towards Him must be analogous to that of a child towards its father; with the all-important proviso that we mean the reaction of a psychologically healthy child towards a good and sensible father, and not the pathological reaction known as a "father-complex" [p. 267].

Other topics discussed are prayer and auto-suggestion, intercession and telepathy, and the idea of immortality. If it is true that God exists, it matters little, it is pointed out, whether we use the term "auto-suggestion" or some other for the psychological mechanism by means of which this true belief is made effective below the merely surface consciousness. Telepathy (accepted by Dr. Streeter as a fact on the ground that it is the only reasonable alternative to spirit-communication as an interpretation of certain phenomena of psychical research) may be, it is held, a means which God uses to realize his purposes, and it may be that he can use it more effectively when we pray for others than when we do not. But intercessory prayer is addressed to God, and is not to be regarded as a mere attempt on our part to make use of telepathy. With regard to immortality, the conclusive consideration for the believer in the God of Jesus Christ is that it is inconceivable that such a God should permit his children, whom he loves, to perish.

Canon Streeter is not a professor of metaphysics, but in the opinion of the present reviewer he has succeeded much better in the difficult task of metaphysics than many of the professional philosophers of the day, and this chiefly for the reason that he regards both religious experience and science as sources of knowledge of the nature of reality and develops his theory accordingly. There are, no doubt, a number of minor criticisms which might be suggested; but perhaps the most serious objection which can be brought with justice against the work as a whole is that the philosophical structure it raises is rather loose-jointed; it hangs together, but some parts of it are a little too shaky for solid comfort. It is inconclusive; its case is not completely proved. But this much, I doubt not, the author himself would admit; and is it anything more than what is to be expected of a theory of the nature of ultimate reality in the present unsettled condition of science and with the still very incompletely developed possibilities of religion? As it is, metaphysical systems of the type represented by Canon Streeter—and he is not the only one who is working along these same general lines—compare very favorably with the possible alternatives, which seem to be three: materialism, or its practical equivalent; an anti-metaphysical and agnostic positivism; and a speculative metaphysics, generally idealistic, which claims to demonstrate a spiritually satisfactory world-view, but which turns out, on critical examination, to be ambiguous in its meaning or fallacious in its arguments, or both.

We should like to see a frank admission on the part of leading professional philosophers of the value of such a religious theory of reality as this of Streeter's considered merely as a metaphysical hypothesis; but any hope for such an expression of approval would probably, for the near future, be doomed to disappointment. Modern philosophy, in its professional aspect, is still pretty generally committed to the attempt to solve its problems without any recognition of the value of religious experience, even at its best, as a source of metaphysical insight.

D. C. MACINTOSH

YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND BEHAVIORISM

One of the most crucial problems in current religious education, as of any education, is concerned with the psychological viewpoint upon which a philosophy and procedure of education may be based. Mechanistic behaviorism has not only deeply invaded current psychology but has greatly affected educational theory and practice. Thoroughgoing mechanists who follow the lead of Mr. J. B. Watson are convinced that all human behavior can be accounted for entirely in terms of the mechanism of reflex and habit and that consciousness, thought, and purpose are irrelevant concomitants which may be neglected in any attempt to modify the objective behavior of persons. From the beginning there have been those who have seen in human behavior a depth and range of meaning that cannot be accounted for in terms of mechanism. To them human behavior is more than animal behavior, facing at the human level conflicts between impulse and impulse, between impulse and habit, and between alternative outcomes in problematic situations. These situations not only provide the conditions in which consciousness, reflective thinking, and the formation of purposes arise, but demand reflective thinking, the criticism of values, and the integration of choices for the intelligent and purposeful ordering of life. Professor Fiske, while making ample room for the mechanisms of conduct, believes that mechanism offers an utterly inadequate psychological and philosophical support for religious education.[1] His first chapter is devoted to the implications of these two viewpoints for religious education; and as the title of his book suggests, the author discusses the various aspects of the process of religious education from the purposive standpoint.

The book is devoted primarily to the discussion of the aims of religious education. These he conceives in terms of personal, institutional, and social objectives, insisting upon the primacy of the *spiritual* aim in each instance. The book is divided into two parts: the first is devoted to the elaboration of the foregoing aims; the second is devoted to the discussion of the content and procedures of religious education in the light of these aims.

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[1] *Purpose in Teaching Religion.* By George Walter Fiske. New York: Abingdon Press, 1927. 244 pages. $1.75.

Throughout, the author emphasizes the *religious* aspect of religious education which he insists need not and must not be lost sight of in the effort of the religious educator to achieve a scientific technique in this period of the reconstruction of religious education. The author maintains a balanced and comprehensive viewpoint throughout his discussion. He seizes upon the constructive contributions of variant and even extreme positions without a partisan committment to any of them, a sound position for the religious educator to assume in these days of rapidly changing concepts that require the testing of time and much experimentation. The discussion presents a constructive, stimulating, and suggestive interpretation of the best trends in current religious education. It is appropriately dedicated to the president-emeritus of Oberlin.

William Clayton Bower

University of Chicago

SEEKING CHRISTIAN UNITY[1]

A little book which appeared in Norwegian in 1922 by Mikael Hertzberg, pastor in Oslo, is now presented in a German translation as the first of a series to be issued in the interests of the unity movement, under the editorship of J. F. Laun. The editor contributes an Introduction explaining the purpose of the series, which is to replace a confessional by an ecumenical view of church history and systematic. Deploring the lack of interest, on the part of Germans, in the Lausanne conference, he asserts the need of a thoroughgoing examination of the theological fundamentals concerned in the union issue. Here some vigorous comments are made on the provincialism and one-sidedness of church-history teaching and research.

Hertzberg's study begins with a naïve sermon on Matt. 5:13–16, in which "salt" and "light" are taken as symbols of "evangelical" and "catholic" Christianity respectively. The chapters that follow carry more weight. The author gives a short exposition of seven ways to unity, viz., the dogmatic, the ethical, the biblical, the historical, the practical, the

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[1] *Die Einheit der Kirche.* By Mikael Hertzberg. (No. 1 of Series "Für die Einheit der Kirche," edited by J. F. Laun.) Gotha: Klotz, 1927. 83 pages. *The Heights of Christian Unity.* By Doremus A. Hayes. New York: Abingdon Press, 1927. 271 pages. $1.75.

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"My beloved is white and ruddy, the chiefest among ten thousand.	"My beloved is fair and ruddy, distinguished among myriads.
His head is as the most fine gold, his locks are bushy, and black as a raven.	His head is fine gold, his locks palm branches, as black as a raven.
His eyes are as the eyes of doves by the rivers of waters, washed with milk, and fitly set.	His eyes are like doves, by streams of water Bathing in milk, sitting by a pool.
His cheeks are as a bed of spices, as sweet flowers: his lips like lilies, dropping sweet smelling myrrh.	His cheeks are like beds of spices, exhaling perfumes. His lips are hyacinths, dropping flowing myrrh.
His hands are as gold rings set with beryl: his belly is as bright ivory overlaid with sapphires.	His hands are rods of gold, studded with Tarshish-stones. His body is a column of ivory, adorned with sapphires.
His legs are as pillars of marble, set upon sockets of fine gold: his countenance is as Lebanon, excellent as the cedars.	His legs are pillars of marble, set on bases of gold. His form is like Lebanon, as choice as cedars.
His mouth is most sweet: yea, he is altogether lovely. This is my beloved and this is my friend, O daughters of Jerusalem."	His mouth is sweet, and he is altogether lovely. Such is my beloved, and such my lover, O maidens of Jerusalem."

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MYSTICISM, REASON, AND SOCIAL IDEALISM

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A REVIVED interest in mysticism is a frequently noted characteristic of the spiritual life of the present. But the value of such a revival is appraised by the philosophically minded in two quite opposite ways. Some would regard it as a sign of neurosis in our time, as another instance of a widespread "failure of nerve," such as Professor Gilbert Murray finds to have been characteristic of the Graeco-Roman world at the beginning of the Christian era. They would point to the great social discouragement that has followed the war, and to the still more general tendency of a complex and ill-harmonized civilization to become a burden upon the human spirit. They would cite the flaring up of interest in spiritistic phenomena and other occult matters. And they would regard the turning to mysticism in religion as something closely correlated with these tendencies. It is, they think, a refuge, a defensive reaction toward too burdensome and sad a world.

A fuller citation of Gilbert Murray's characterization of the world at the time of Christianity's beginning will serve to bring out this estimate of our contemporary turning to mysticism. Comparing the great classical writers of Athens with those of the Christian era, Professor Murray finds a new quality appearing. He says:

> It is a rise of asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of self-confidence, of hope in this life and of faith in normal human effort; a despair of patient inquiry, a cry for infallible revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the state, a conversion of the soul to God. It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is not so much to live justly, to help the society to which he belongs and enjoy the esteem of his fellow-creatures; but rather, by means of a burning faith, by contempt of the world and its standards, by ecstasy, suffering, and martyrdom, to be granted pardon for his unspeakable unworthiness, his immeasurable sins. There is an intensifying of certain spiritual emotions; an increase of sensitiveness, a failure of nerve.[1]

Something similar certain thinkers would find to be the meaning of any revival of mysticism at any time. Thus Professor Santayana writes: "Mysticism is the most primitive of feelings and only visits formed minds in moments of intellectual arrest and dissolution. It can exist in a child, very likely in an animal; indeed, to parody a phrase of Hegel's, the only pure mystics are the brutes." And he adds: "In the Life of Reason it (mysticism) is, if I may say so, a normal disease, a recurrent manifestation of lost equilibrium and interrupted growth."[2]

But in contrast to these depreciatory judgments other important thinkers would regard a revival of mysticism as a sign of return to sanity. Mysticism, they would say, is a token, not of equilibrium lost, but of equilibrium regained; not of interrupted growth, but of escape from atrophy. Thus Bertrand Russell seeks to combine "mysticism and logic," holding that mysticism is "the inspirer of whatever is best in man"; and he speaks of "the true union of the mystic and the man of science" as being "the highest eminence . . . . that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought."[3]

Similarly, Havelock Ellis, writing in the *Atlantic Monthly* on "Science and Mysticism," says: "When we look broadly at the matter . . . . not only is there no opposition between science and mysticism, but . . . . they are essentially related." True, he says, "if the natural impulses which normally work best together are separated and specialized in different persons, we may expect to find a concommitant state of atrophy and hypertrophy, both alike morbid. The scientific person will become atrophied on the mystical side; the mystical person will become atrophied on the scientific side. Each will become morbidly hypertrophied on his own side."[4] But he holds that in the more normal spiritual life the scientific and mystical impulses are fused—a view for which he finds abundant evidence in history, and in support of which he narrates his own spiritual experience.

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[1] *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 103.

[2] *Reason in Religion*, pp. 277, 278.

[3] *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 4, 12.

Again Professor Pratt, in *The Religious Consciousness,* judges mysticism to be essentially a normal phase of religious experience. He points out that it always reasserts itself whenever religion has become one-sidedly rationalistic, or moralistic or traditional, and he says: "While it would indeed be untrue to assert that only the mystical are genuinely religious, it is safe to say that all intensely religious people have a touch of mysticism."[5]

Now these sharply contrasted judgments as to mysticism cannot but challenge us to reflection upon the matter. Is a revival of mysticism a sign of neurosis or does it mean a return of sanity? One thing by way of answer is perhaps sufficiently indicated by the very diversity of judgments about mysticism which we have noted, and that is that mysticism in its actual manifestations must be a very complex phenomenon—or perhaps better, a simple and elemental phenomenon that can enter into very complex relations with the rest of life. If this be true, it is evident that we cannot make much headway in understanding mysticism by talking about it purely in general or in the abstract. On the other hand, a wide inductive survey, enabling us to consider mysticism in all its diverse aspects or relations, is out of the question here. Hence it is necessary

[4] *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1913.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

for us to introduce certain criteria which we may tacitly or provisionally agree upon as tests by which we may determine whether mysticism is capable of functioning normally and valuably, and if so, when. One such criterion, I think, appears in the views already cited, namely, in the undertaking of Russell and Ellis to correlate mysticism and science as mutually reinforcing factors in human experience. I imagine the rightfulness of this criterion will be generally acknowledged. We may, indeed, feel disposed to insist that mysticism should not be a mere pensioner of science, with no power of earning its own way and no inherent rights of its own. But on the other hand, do we not agree that, unless mysticism can enter into some kind of fruitful relations with science, it is liable to be a hostile rival, and that in such a case a revival of mysticism is of dubious value?

But there is another criterion that seems equally important and obvious for our purposes, namely, social idealism. In contemporary religious thought mystical Christianity and social Christianity are often conceived to be inimical to each other. Is this so in principle and of necessity? Or can mysticism be fruitfully united with social idealism? Upon such questions as these I imagine our estimate of the value of a revived mysticism will largely turn. Thus the special subject of our inquiry becomes the interrelations, actual or possible, between mysticism on the one hand and reason and social idealism on the other.

I

But before we take up the consideration of the interrelations between mysticism and these other two phases of our spiritual life it obviously is necessary for us to specify in some fashion what the term mysticism denotes, or at least shall denote for the purposes of the present inquiry. The best way to do this is to begin with one or two concrete instances that probably we all would call mystical. It will help us, too, if we can find worth-while instances that are contemporary and that have at least a relative detachment from particular creeds or propagandist cults.

One such instance was reported in the *Atlantic Monthly* for May, 1916. It was given in an article entitled, "Twenty Minutes with Reality,"[6] and was an experience that occurred during the convalescence of a patient in a hospital following upon a slight operation. For the sake of brevity let me fuse into a paragraph a number of sentences scattered through this report. The patient has been for the first time wheeled out to the porch. She says:

> I cannot now recall whether the revelation came suddenly or gradually; I only remember finding myself in the very midst of those wonderful moments, beholding life for the first time in all its young intoxication of loveliness, in its unspeakable joy, beauty, and importance. I cannot say exactly what the mysterious change was. I saw no new thing, but I saw all the usual things in a miraculous new light—in what I believe is their true light. Whatever it is, the importance seemed to be nearer to beauty and joy than to an anxious morality. Certainly that unspeakable importance had to do with our relationship to the great Whole. For those fleeting, lovely moments I did indeed, and in truth, love my neighbor as myself. Nay, more: Of myself I was hardly conscious. Is it likely that I could have experienced such love if there were not some such emotion at the heart of Reality? In what I saw there was nothing seemingly of an ethical nature. There were no new rules of conduct revealed by those twenty minutes. Indeed, it seemed as though beauty and joy were more at the heart of Reality than an over-anxious morality. It was a little as though (to transpose the quotation),
>
> I had slept and dreamed that life was duty,
> But waked to find that life was beauty.
>
> Some may object that I preach a dangerous doctrine; others, that I am trying to whip a mad moment of Pagan beauty into line with Christian thought. Possibly I am; yet I am trying not to do the one thing or the other. I merely am wondering, and endeavoring to get at the truth of something that I saw.

Now this is evidently a report of mystical experience—not of the most intense or extreme form known as "mystical union," but of the more moderate form known as "illumination." And it appears to be an experience by no means uncommon even in our day. In a subsequent number the editor of the *Atlantic* wrote: "The *Atlantic* has discovered that 'twenty minutes of reality' is a conservative estimate. Since the first of May the editor's desk has been 'saturated with brightness,' and every mail brings its sheaf of visions, some mystical, others in plain testimony of patent facts of life. 'As though a star should open out, all sides,' these intimate and eager revelations glow and shine and will not be rejected."[7] And then he goes on to give several typical but contrasted ones. We must not make further citations, but it should be remembered that the instance already cited is representative of a considerable body of data.

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[6] See a volume with the same title, containing the article and some other material, by Margaret Prescott Montague.

We take, then, data like these experiences of illumination as our starting-point in determining the meaning of mysticism. But it could be readily shown that such experiences are continuous in certain of their characteristics with experiences that range in their intensity all the way up to the most extreme ecstasy; and also that they are continuous on the other side with experiences that range downward in intensity till a very mild type is reached—a type which, however, may be much more sustained and pervasive of the rest of life. Examples of the ecstasy need not be given, for they probably fill too large a place in the literature of mysticism already. An example of the moderate and pervasive type can be supplied from the article of Havelock Ellis already referred to. After describing the crucial phase of his religious experience, which was clearly mystical but more moderate than that of the author of "Twenty Minutes of Reality," he says: "Henceforth I could face life with confidence and joy, for my heart was at one with the world, and whatever might prove to be in harmony with the world could not be out of harmony with me."[8]

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[7] "Glimpses of Reality," *Atlantic Monthly* (July, 1916).

[8] His crucial experience came in connection with getting a certain new philosophical conception. Of it he says: "It acted with the swiftness of an electric con-

Now it is the more moderate and pervasive type, evidently, that most requires interpretation, just because it does not stand out so sharply from the rest of experience, and because at the same time it gives the most promise of fruitful relation with reason and social idealism. It must be primarily this type that Russell has in mind when he says: "Mysticism is, in essence, little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe."[9]

But unquestionably this more moderate and tempered form of mysticism may in turn easily shade off "into the light of common day." What, then, are the general characteristics which run through all the different phases of mysticism and which especially help us to identify its more moderate and diffused forms? I suggest that they are *immediacy, objectivity,* and *luminousness*. That is to say, the mystic experience is a direct awareness rather than an inference or a taking of things at second hand; it also is felt to be an apprehension of reality, and not a merely subjective spiritual experience; and in addition it has the quality of newness, of insight, of being a perception of something inherently meaningful. I believe that these three qualities will be found to be present in experiences milder and at the same time more pervasive than that reported by the author of "Twenty Minutes of Reality," and that at the same time they will help us to discriminate mysticism from other phases of experience, and also to discriminate the mystical element in religion from its other elements—such as religious belief, religious conduct, religious fellowship, and the like.

On the basis of these characteristics, then, we may define

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tact; the dull aching tension was removed; the two opposing psychic tendencies were fused in delicious harmony, and my whole attitude toward the universe was changed. It was no longer an attitude of hostility and dread, but of confidence and love. My self was one with the non-self; my will, one with the universal will. I seemed to walk in light; my feet scarcely touched the ground; I had entered a new world." See the *Atlantic Monthly* (June, 1913), pp. 771 ff.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

the meaning of mysticism. It need only be added that, if there are forms of mysticism that are not religious, we are concerned only with religious mysticism here, and that in religious mysticism the objective Reality is experienced as Divine. Mysticism, then, is *the sense of a Presence that is immediately felt to be Divine.* It is, to the person who experiences it, an immediate consciousness of God in which new insight comes and from which fresh life flows. This experience may be preceded by an elaborate, severe, exacting discipline like the "mystic way" described by the medieval mystics, or by a more simple, but methodical, "practise of the presence of God," or it may just happen, as in the special experience that we have reviewed. It may be very sporadic, occurring only once or twice in a lifetime, or it may be a fairly persistent or recurrent phase of experience. It may be a mode of experience that some people, including religious people, have comparatively little of, and that other people have a great deal of. But it is always direct and immediate—that is, an experience in which reasoning and moral effort are not active at the time; it is always felt to be a contact with Reality, not a mere change in one's self; and it is always luminous.

II

Having expressed thus, provisionally, what we understand mysticism to mean, let us go on to consider its possible relations to the other phases of experience that we have in view. Of course, if mysticism can enter into positive relations with these other phases of experience, it will acquire new meanings. And since social idealism is so decidedly in the forefront among the criteria that people feel should be applied to religion today, let us begin with that.

A noteworthy instance of the belief that mysticism and social idealism may be fruitfully related is furnished by a passage in Walter Rauschenbusch's last book. "The saint of the future," he said, "will need not only a theocentric mysticism which enables him to realize God, but an anthropocentric mysticism which enables him to realize his fellow-men in God. The more we approach pure Christianity, the more will the Christian signify a man who loves mankind with a religious passion and excludes none. The feeling which Jesus had when he said, 'I am the hungry, the naked, the lonely,' will be the emotional consciousness of all holy men in the coming days. The sense of solidarity is one of the distinctive marks of the true followers of Jesus."[10]

A similar idea is expressed, in a somewhat less pregnant fashion, by Lord Bryce, when setting forth the essence of democracy. "It is," he wrote, "the conception of a happier life for all, coupled with a mystic faith in the People, the great multitude through whom speaks the Voice of the Almighty Power, that makes for righteousness—it is this that constitutes the vital impulse of democracy."[11]

Now at first blush such expressions may seem to be quite at variance with mysticism. We perhaps cannot resist the impression that with respect to our human relations mysticism means detachment rather than attachment, and that it is just because our ordinary experience is "human, all-too-human," that men turn to mysticism as a means of escape to the superhuman. And it is quite true, of course, that mysticism often has served to detach men from their fellows, and that it often has consisted in a flight from the human in quest of the superhuman. But is such an antithesis necessary? And where it arises does it not hold apart two deep-seated needs of our nature that belong together? Certainly this antithesis is not required by the interpretation of mysticism which we already have given. The immediate consciousness of God in which new insight comes and from which fresh life flows is not necessarily conditioned on aloofness from human relations; it may spring out of an active cultivation of those relations and result in a deepening and strengthening of them. We all know, when we stop to think, that the unique meaning of Jesus' religious experience, and of Christianity among the religions, consists in a peculiarly vital interrelation between love for God and love for man. And even though mysticism often has meant detachment at the expense of attachment, why may not mysticism grow and take on new forms as well as do the other sides of our life?

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[10] *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, pp. 108, 109.

[11] *Modern Democracies*, I, 50.

What, then, are some of the results of a union of mysticism and social idealism? The first which should be noted is that mysticism helps to produce that sense of solidarity with all one's fellow-men, of which Rauschenbusch speaks, which is required for a sustained social idealism. We are members of one another, Christianity teaches, and the teaching is reinforced by many things from psychology, sociology, and philosophy. But we need to possess this teaching as an abiding sentiment, as a matter of second nature, and not only so, but also as a fresh, living impulse, from which we act spontaneously and which constantly kindles us to social action. Now this result is secured for us if we "realize our fellow-men in God" and God in our fellow-men.

For it is only through our better selves that we are really united. Our lower natures with their unharmonized instincts make us at enmity with each other, and our habitual natures, by encrusting us over with routine and professionalism, often effectively insulate us. But the true self is the "conjunct self," the social self. In other words, the spiritual and the social in us are most intimately bound up together, and that in us which is most akin to God is also most akin to our fellow-men. Now the more immediately and intimately we can apprehend the selves of one another as being grounded in God and essentially conjunct, the better it will be for our social action. That is to say, our social idealism can be only the gainer if it is pervaded by a direct, mystical sense of God immanent in humanity.

Of course, the relation between mysticism and social idealism is a reciprocal one. Our mysticism will be as much the gainer as our social idealism by the union of the two. For into whatever direct consciousness of God we may have will be carried the values resulting from our social experience and action. The God whom we experience will be—to quote Rauschenbusch again—"a God who strives within our striving, who kindles his flame in our intellect, sends the impact of his energy to make our wills restless for righteousness, floods our subconscious mind with dreams and longings, and always urges the race on toward a higher combination of freedom and solidarity."[12]

But now let us consider another contribution that mysticism may make to social idealism. We have said that mysticism may give us a direct sense of solidarity with our fellowmen in God. But it may also aid us to new social insights. Perhaps the most tangible evidence of this is the part which apocalypses and social utopias have played in human thinking and the extent to which they have been conditioned upon a mystical habit of mind. Plato is, of course, the supreme illustration at this point. A passage from the *Republic* may serve to bring before us the mystical quality in his thinking.

> In the world of knowledge, the essential Form of Good is the limit of our enquiries, and can barely be perceived; but, when perceived, we cannot help concluding that it is in every case the source of all that is bright and beautiful—in the visible world giving birth to light and its master, and in the intellectual world dispensing, immediately and with full authority, truth and reason; and that whosoever would act wisely, either in private or in public, must set this Form of Good before his eyes.[13]

Now Plato, the mystic, is also the radical and the social reformer, standing out thus in contrast with Aristotle, the logician and scientist, who is the social conservative. And it is from Plato that the world's most classic portrayal of ideal society, the *Republic,* comes. But a like mystical quality in St. Augustine produces the *City of God,* and in Sir Thomas More produces *Utopia,* and in Campanella *The City of the Sun.* And oldest of all, and yet nearest to our hearts today, is Isaiah, whose work began with the mystical vision in the temple, when he beheld the Lord on his throne and heard the seraphim crying "Holy, Holy, Holy," and who portrays for us the ideal toward which the spirits of men in these days are so ardently reaching out, the ideal of a warless world. No one today will question the social value of Isaiah's vision of "the mountain of the Lord's house" into which all nations shall flow, and from which shall go forth the law of the Lord; "And he will judge between the nations, and will decide concerning many peoples; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

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[12] *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, p. 179.

[13] *The Republic of Plato*, translated by Davies and Vaughan, Book VI, secs. 505, 517.

Now there is a direct connection between the religious experience of these men and their prophetic insight into social ideals, and the connective link seems to be of the mystical order. William James says, "This readiness for great things, and this sense that the world by its importance, wonderfulness, etc., is apt for their production, would seem to be the undifferentiated germ of all our higher faiths." And again he speaks of "the sense of the exceedingness of the possible over the real."[14] In other words, a direct, immediate sense of the presence of God may stimulate powerfully our perception of the possibilities in men and of the capacities in mankind for a better world.

Not that more mysticism could make us all writers of Republics and Utopias, any more than in general it could make us Platos or Sir Thomas Mores or Isaiahs. But it might well bring into our sphere of social action, whatever it may be, more of insight, of discernment, of fresh perception. A living sense of the presence of God might well help us, whether in a college, or a social settlement, or a rural community, to a keener realization of "the exceedingness of the possible over the real."

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[14] W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience,* pp. 505, 506, footnote.

But here again the relation is reciprocal. When mysticism enters into organic connection with social idealism it becomes stabilized. The effect of uniting the sense of God's presence and some high social vision or practical social task is to make that sense of divine presence more persistent and pervasive. "Once out of all the gray days of my life I have looked into the heart of reality," writes the author of the "Twenty Minutes." That is indeed much. But the fusion of mysticism and social idealism is more. A fine passage from Pratt will serve to express this point. He is speaking of the religious consciousness, which is a more general term, but he evidently has the more mystical phase of it in mind. He says:

> When one compares the deeply religious and spiritual person with the best and bravest of those who are not religious, one sees, it must be confessed, that the former possesses something which the others lack. It is not that he is any better morally than his non-religious brother, nor any more appreciative of beauty and love, nor any braver. It is, rather, that he has a confidence in the universe and an inner joy which the other does not know. He feels himself in touch, and he acts as if he were in touch, with a larger environment. He either has a more cosmic sense or his attitude toward the cosmos is one of larger hope and greater confidence. Besides this, or as a result of this, he has an inner source of joy and strength which does not seem dependent on outer circumstance, and which in fact seems greatest at times when outer sources of strength and promise fail. He is therefore, able to shed a kind of peace around him which no argument and no mere animal spirits and no mere courage can produce.[15]

III

But it is time for us to consider the other aspect of our subject, namely, the possible interrelations between mysticism and reason. And here the most fundamental question as to mysticism emerges. That question is: Does, or can, mysticism give us reality? Granted that mysticism may be valuable, we must still ask, Is it valid? Conceivably mysticism might have much worth in our human relations and yet not open the door to the superhuman. Are we justified in holding that the sense of God's presence means a real presence of God? Such questions involve submitting the testimony of mysticism to the test of reason.

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[15] *Op. cit.*, pp. 35–36.

In order to make sure of keeping touch, in this part of our inquiry, with the concrete facts of experience, let us go back for a moment to the "Twenty Minutes with Reality." We are fortunate, in considering the bearing of that experience on our present question, to have the help of Dr. Richard C. Cabot, who read the proof sheets of the "Twenty Minutes," and investigated the circumstances of the experience reported, and who, in the same issue of the *Atlantic,* discussed briefly the question, "Was it Reality?"

Dr. Cabot does not believe that the experience was a result of morbid fancy. To his personal knowledge no anaesthetic or drug had been taken during the seven days previous to the event described; also "there was no fever in the case, no fasting, nor any of the conditions under which ascetics see visions." On the contrary, instead of finding morbidness here, Dr. Cabot says: "There are signs of unusual health in the type of perception which this convalescent reports." He explains what he means by an illustration from our physical vision. He points out that the half of the retina which is continuously stimulated by the bright sky gets stale, and that when we bring the fresh half of the retina into use we get a keener perception. In looking at a sunset, for example, "by stooping or lying down one partly inverts the eye, reverses the retinal segments, and brings the fresh, unsated part of the eye-ground against the bright sunset colors. The familiar but fascinating result is that the sky colors appear brighter, more varied, and more beautiful."

Dr. Cabot goes on to say: "No one questions that the greater beauty appreciated by the fresh half of the retina is reality and not delusion or morbidness. The unsated tissues give us true sight of the colors. . . . . Ordinary perception is untrue, because it has become blinded by overuse. It is calloused and numb." And again, he compares the keener perceptions of children, which correspond to their greater health—their greater output of energy, their superior muscular control and co-ordination, the soundness of their sleep, etc.—with the prosaic perceptions of the adult. And he suggests "that our ordinary prosaic perceptions show strong evidence of morbidity. The familiar pictures on our walls are all but invisible to most of us. Shall we pride ourselves on this sort of blindness? It means falsity, not fact. . . . . Satiety is our average or 'normal' state about much of our experience in adult life, and satiety is demonstrably untrue, unscientific, maimed—in short, diseased." What we need, he thinks, is something to "crack the crust of habit and show us reality." And this was done, for the author of the "Twenty Minutes," after ten days of hospital atmosphere, "by the return to the sky and the moving winds."

Now all this suggests that mysticism may supplement reason in the understanding of the world in which we live, and that its method of doing so is that of intuition. Is it not true that by intuition we may get at reality which reason unaided by intuition could never attain with equal adequacy? On this view intuition becomes a means for the discovery of reality. And may it not be an indispensable element in all discovery of truth?

Such, though with a somewhat different application, is the view of Russell. "Instinct, intuition, or insight," he says, "is what first leads to beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or confutes; but the confirmation, where it is possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonizing, controlling force rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realm it is insight that first arrives at what is new."[16]

Of course, if our intuitions are withdrawn from the test of reason, an unfortunate dualism and tension is introduced into our religious life, whether individual or social. But there is no good ground for thus segregating our intuitions. They do not have to be infallible in order to be extremely important as ways of getting truth. The relation here should be thought of as correlative, as we have found to be the relation between mysticism and social idealism. Our intuitions must add themselves on to our previous body of knowledge, or be a new comprehension of it, and our rationally organized knowledge must welcome these supplementations and new interpretations. By such a fruitful interrelation our experience of reality may be constantly growing.

Now this intuitive element in our experience is by no means rare. In fact, it is something that we make everyday use of to a certain degree. The perception of personality in our fellow human beings is essentially intuitive. And no matter how much we may know about a man, we still employ intuition when we grasp his personality. A biographer, for example, has not only to collect the data about his subject, but also to interpret them as a living whole. But it requires intuition to grasp things as a whole and to penetrate to their inner meaning. And that is what we do when we get a living apprehension of a personality. That is why a gesture or a fleeting expression may be so significant in revealing a personality. It is not that such evanescent things are a trustworthy substitute for full and accurate knowledge of the person's deeds, ideas, and sentiments. But they may give us the clue to the whole of which these other things are parts.

Now religious experience often—we must not dogmatize by saying "always"—makes a more comprehensive and penetrating use of intuition than we make in ordinary life. The experience of God is the sense of a greater whole of which we are a part and to which we are akin and a perception of the meaning of this greater reality. Or, to draw more on our modern Christian experience, it is a consciousness of living relation with an Eternal Good Will immanent in nature and in man and an insight into what that Will intends. In other words, it is an experience of an intuitive character, and it adds to our other experiences of reality what the intuition of a personality adds to the knowledge of the person's deeds and thoughts; it is the discovery in the midst of the multiplicity of facts of something unified, meaningful, and dynamic and an entering into intercourse with it.

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[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

It is perhaps well to linger upon this point long enough to discriminate two principal varieties of these intuitions of reality. There is the experience of God that comes through a sudden attainment of inward harmony, or a fresh and uplifting perception of beauty in nature or in art, or a new sense of sacredness in a personal or social relation. And these experiences may be more accessible and available than the average Protestant Christian finds them to be. Edward Carpenter writes:

So thin a veil divides
Us from such joy, past words,
Walking in daily life—the business of the hour, each detail seen to;
Yet carried, rapt away, on what sweet floods of other Being:
Swift streams of music flowing, light far back through all Creation shining,
Loved faces looking—
Ah! from the true, the mortal self
So thin a veil divides!

But there is also the experience of God that takes the form of a synthetic intuition, a wide synoptic view of reality, in which we discern a moral law in things, a spiritual structure, a divine purpose, a redemptive process. It is this form of intuitive experience which we already have noted in Plato when he says that, having perceived the essential form of the good, "we cannot help concluding that it is in every case the source of all that is bright and beautiful . . . . and that whosoever would act wisely, either in private or in public, must set this form of good before his eyes."

Now this latter type of experience, at least, can be daily renewed. And thereby we gain something of the utmost importance from the standpoint of reason: a progressive discovery of the real, a growing apprehension of the reality and will of God.

Mysticism, then, may enter into fruitful relations with reason as a method of discovery, giving intuitions of reality—and especially discovering the Good in the real—and when these intuitions harmonize with and interpret our other knowledge of reality there is no ground for calling in question their validity.

But there is another aspect of the interactions between mysticism and reason which should be at least indicated before this inquiry is brought to a close. Mysticism may help reason not only to discover the real, but also to make the real. That is, mysticism may fuse with reason to make the creative personality.

Religion has the highest interest in making creative personalities. This ideal belongs to the very conception of men as sons of God, when that conception is thought through. It belongs to the conception of communion with God as well, if God be thought of as himself always creative, as an Eternal Creative Good Will.

Now one of the most important ways in which mysticism may contribute toward making personality creative is by enabling us to apprehend the meaning of the prophetic personalities who in the past have lived most creatively. A passage from Bergson will help to bring out this point. In his *Mind-Energy* he writes:

> It is the moral man who is the creator in the highest degree, the man whose action, itself intense, is capable of intensifying the action of other

> men, and, itself generous, can kindle the fire on the hearth of generosity. The men of moral grandeur, particularly those whose inventive and simple heroism has opened new paths to virtue, are revealers of metaphysical truth. . . . . It is in studying these great lives, in striving to experience sympathetically what they experience, that we may penetrate by an act of intuition to the life principle itself.[17]

Here is the supreme significance of Jesus for us today. The most important meaning of his divinity for us is to be found in the fact that he is the supreme manifestation of moral creativity in history and that he is uniquely able to impart moral creativity to the children of men.

But if this be true, the highest significance of mysticism for our experience is in its lifting us to the level of participating with God in his creative work. We possess this fruit of mysticism when we take up into our own experience such thoughts as we find expressed of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel: "I must do the will of him that sent me and accomplish his work"; and "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work"; and "He that sent me is with me."

But is there not a danger that we shall have these experiences merely in an inadequate and superficial way? And if so, how shall we know when we have them in a profounder way? I know of no answer except that which we have been trying to work out in this inquiry, namely, that the experience of God, and the ideal of the Kingdom of God, and the life of sonship to God in the quest of truth and the translation of truth into deed, need all to be kept in vital union. But so far as this takes place the practice of the presence of God is one of the most rational things that men can ever do.

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[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

THE DRAMA OF CATHOLIC CONFESSION

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BEHIND the cohesion and the discipline of the Catholic church there stands confession, and the haunting consciousness in the mind of every Catholic that unless he confesses his sins he cannot be saved. More stress is laid on confession in the religious instructions given to the faithful than on any other sacrament, and it is no exaggeration to say that every sermon delivered from Catholic pulpits contains at least implicitly the message, "Confess your sins." The crucial test of religious observance among Catholics is the frequenting of the confessional, and the seal of success in an apostolic venture is the bringing of a sinner to his knees before a priest. The Catholic mother who spends her days and nights in prayer for her wayward son finds her prayers answered when her son "goes to confession." Then her heart is brimful of joy. Or, if her husband, after a life of selfishness and vice, consents to have the priest come to his deathbed, she forgives and forgets all in her gladness, and loves him again with all the fervor of early days.

Those who visualize confession in colors, and with sympathy, see a sinner, broken and despondent, entering a Catholic sanctuary with faltering steps to unburthen his soul to a wise and kindly priest, who is vowed to secrecy and eager to bestow the balm of encouragement. They find much beauty and pathos and holiness in the scene. The priest, his face averted, listens with solicitude. The sinner, with bowed head, reveals the troubles of his anguished heart and finds hope and comfort in so doing. Presently the priest raises his hand to bestow absolution, and tears of joy fill the penitent's eyes.

He feels an inexpressible lightness of heart, and goes forth to face life with new courage. His step is firm as he leaves the church, and he murmurs to himself, "That man was a saint, God bless him."

Such a poetic vision of confession, though not without truth, is a very incomplete picture, and is calculated to convey an inaccurate conception of confession. It affords no insight into the mental attitude of the penitent toward confession, or into the nature of the struggle he has to undergo, nor does it give any inkling as to the attitude of the church toward the sinner, or the means she employs in bringing him to his knees. Nor does such a picture do full justice to the dramatic nature of confession, with all its interwoven elements of hazard, peril, and romance. There is something in confession, as we shall see, of a lone adventure; a wounded man fighting, single-handed, a desperate battle against fearsome intangible shadows; a crusader struggling for his spiritual survival, not on the fields of Palestine, but in a dark wooden box; not in a saddle, sword in hand but on his knees, clutching a crucifix. There is something in it of a last stand on a perilous edge, where a false step means eternal death. Confession, in fine, is a short intense drama on which momentous issues hang.

The presence of drama in Catholic ritual has received universal recognition, and the skill displayed by the Catholic church in dramatizing its most sacred ceremonies has awakened the envy of dignitaries of many other religious affiliations. If we take the mass as an instance of the church's power of dramatization, we find that she has converted the very simple "breaking of bread," as instituted by Christ, into an elaborate and impressive ceremony. The priest, attired in colorful, symbolic garb, slowly and solemnly ascends the altar. Hither and thither he moves, genuflecting, bowing, and performing many picturesque rites. He recites and reads sublime prayers in tones of voice carefully modulated to three keys. He is waited upon by acolytes in red or black with pretty surplices. As the drama approaches its crisis in the "consecration," the solemn hush is suddenly broken by the ringing of bells thrice three times. The host is raised aloft, and after it the chalice, which glints mysteriously in the dim light of wax candles. In it all there is unity, cohesion, and movement, and when the dénouement subsides into the *ite missa est* ("go, mass is over"), those present *feel* that a great and sacred mystery play has been enacted.

In confession we find even more striking proof of the dramatic instinct of the church. Unlike the mass, however, it is staged behind curtains and in strict privacy. It is a drama of a more personal nature, less ceremonial than psychological. To understand fully its atmosphere one must bear in mind the mentality of the believing Catholic, for whom the church is infallible and supreme in authority.

A Catholic who has sinned grievously, who has, that is, committed a "mortal sin," finds himself faced with the situation that develops into the drama of confession. His sense of guilt, thanks to his religious training, is acute, and it is accentuated by the fear of death in sin. To die in mortal sin is synonymous for a Catholic with eternal damnation, and the very thought of it robs him of peace of mind. As soon as he realizes his perilous condition his thoughts turn to confession as the one sure means of recovering peace of soul. But it is with mixed feelings that he contemplates the task of confessing his sin. Fear and shame make him shrink from confession. He finds himself in a wretched and tragic situation. If he does not confess he remains in guilt and danger. If he does confess—the torture of revealing his sin! The questions and reprimands of the priest! The possibility of absolution being refused, and of having to go to another priest or to the bishop! And if he knows that his sin is one of those on the list of "reserved sins," his fear is still greater, for absolution will not be given till he goes a second time to the priest.

Other anxieties disturb him. What if his courage should fail him on entering the confessional and he should conceal his sin? Then his confession would be "bad" and he would be in a ten times worse case than before. He would have added sacrilege to his sin. Or if his sorrow should be insufficient, or his purpose of amendment insincere? Again the confession would be "bad," and would have to be remade. He asks himself if it is wise for him to make the attempt, to take the risk of confession, seeing that he feels so doubtful of his courage. But he is caught in a painful dilemma. Even though he wishes to postpone his confession, he is not free to do so. He is under the obligation to confess his sins as soon as he conveniently can.

And the church fixes an absolute time limit. He must at very latest confess at Easter. Beyond Easter he cannot procrastinate without incurring excommunication. The church therefore forces upon him the life-and-death venture of confession. With menacing finger the church commands him, weakling though he be, to go forth to the battle. In that menace lies the hidden pulse of the drama of confession. The church is reckless as was Abraham of the life of Isaac. She takes the sinner and throws him headlong into the spiritual vortex of confession, to sink or swim, to survive or to be lost. What maternal solicitude could be more daring, drastic, or dramatic?

Could the penitent bide his time until some strong emotional impulse carried him through the ordeal of confession, or until he could find circumstances such that an easy confessor in some strange place could be found, it would not be so bad. But unless such an emotion awakens within the time limit set by the church, or unless the convenient circumstances that he desires present themselves opportunely, he is seized by the church and driven forth to play his part in the perilous drama of confession.

The day at length arrives, a Saturday evening very probably, when he makes his way to the church, nervous and depressed, hoping against hope that all will go well, and praying for the grace to make a good confession. When he enters the church he first of all takes a place in a pew, and kneeling down makes his immediate preparation for confession.

Saturday evening is for Catholics the favorite time for confessing their sins, and confessionals, which are usually hidden away in the church aisles, are much frequented on that evening. Outside each confessional folk await their turn to enter. A kind of panting silence pervades the church. Penitents move about noiselessly as though desirous of escaping observation. One hears, however, an ominous "click, click" as slides are drawn to or fro in the various confessionals, marking the beginnings and the endings of confessions. From some confessionals the ominous sound comes more frequently than from others. They are the confessionals where popular broad-minded priests are located. The popular priest is usually more expeditious than the others, for he knows that there are many waiting outside his "box" to be heard. He has not to draw out his work to make it last. Other confessors who have few penitents waiting outside their "boxes" are slower. Sometimes they make up for the infrequency of the clicks that issue from their confessionals by the noisiness with which they bang their slides. They are, perhaps, desirous that the other confessors should hear the clicking from their "boxes" and should form the idea that they, too, are kept busy.

For those who are waiting their turn to enter the confessional the clicking is disturbing, almost terrifying. It means for them that the ordeal of confession is approaching. They hasten to go over their sins once again in their minds, in order to be sure that they remember the precise words they have chosen wherewith to confess their sins. Much depends for them on having a suitable "formula," one easy to tell. Without it confession might be too hard, and they might in their shame and weakness conceal their sins. What an agony of mind should they find that they have indeed forgotten the "formula" determined on! To confess sins in plain biblical terms demands far more courage than average penitents possess. They cannot, for instance, get themselves to employ the words "steal" or "calumny," or "adultery." They prefer soft circumlocutions. "There was something, Father, it wasn't *very* valuable, but it didn't belong to me. I shouldn't have taken it, of course, but the person who owned it didn't seem to need it." Thus the thief avoids using the word "stole." Or again: "There was a married man, Father, and I'm afraid I allowed myself to get a bit fond of him. But he was very persistent, and one evening when we all had taken a glass of wine, I wasn't so well able to mind myself against him. But I'll keep to myself in future, Father." What woman can employ the plain biblical term, "adultery," when telling her sin? However, in the eyes of Catholic theologians it is not necessary to do so. Soft formulas suffice for the *integrity* of confession.

Much of a confessor's work is pure routine. He listens, asks no questions, proffers no advice, imposes a penance and absolves, dismissing the penitent with a blessing. But routine is frequently interrupted by the presentation of difficult problems in morals, the recitation of heartrending stories of sin or sorrow, or perhaps by some unexpected humorous occurrence. Sometimes a little child, escaping from his parents, will follow the example of his elders, and toddle into the confessional, and when the priest draws back the slide will look up smilingly at him. The child is there to play a game of "hide and seek," and he counts on the priest for a playmate. Again a little boy will enter to make his first confession, having been carefully trained by the nuns, and told what sins to confess, but so nervous that he mixes up his prayers and formulas. At the end of confession, instead of asking pardon "for these and all his other sins," he will perhaps ask pardon "for these and all his mother's sins."

The confessional, or confession-box, as some Catholics call it, resembles a telephone booth in structure, save that in the place of the telephone instrument there is a wire netting in the wall through which the penitent addresses the priest. Like the telephone booth, it is the play house for short dramas of the most intense and varied kind. Dramas that swiftly ascend to consummations at times felicitous, but often very tragic. No city telephone booth vibrates to as many heart-throbs, or hushes so many dread secrets, as the confessional. "My child," the priest whispers to a girl, "you must never see him or speak to him again. If you do you will be ruined." An audible sigh follows, an "Oh! my God," and sorrow and silence settle in the girl's heart. "My friend"—the priest is now speaking to a business man—"what you are doing is absolutely unjust. You must put an end to the practice at once." With a dry "Thank you, Father," the business man quits the confessional, to face either serious financial loss or painful efforts to stifle a troubled conscience. Whether or not the confessional be a sacred ledge between this world and the supernatural, it is certainly the scene of profound emotional reactions.

When the penitent enters the confessional he finds himself as it were imprisoned in a dark narrow space. Whatever fear or shame he feels is increased in measure according to the time he has to wait before the slide is drawn and the face of the priest appears in vague outline through the grating. The drawing back of the slide marks the opening of the drama. No sooner has confession begun than the penitent is subconsciously aware of an element of urgency. He senses the pressure of time. At most a brief period is at his disposal. Issues that are for him momentous must be decided against time. Others are waiting outside, and if the duration of his confession notably exceeds what is usual, there will be audible and embarrassing sounds of impatience from without: coughs, perhaps, and the stirring of feet. Unless the priest be very calm and tranquil (and few priests are sufficiently so) the penitent will feel hurried. And such is the agony of mind of some penitents that this feeling of being hurried gives birth to a mood of despair.

"I'm done for now," they say to themselves, "I absolutely can't make a good confession!"

It is, however, the ritual of confession that more than anything else increases the tension in the penitent. There are so many things to be attended to. Sins must be confessed audibly and intelligibly, according to number and species. Sorrow of a certain degree, called "attrition," must be felt for all of them. The will must be stirred to a sincere purpose of amendment. In addition the priest's commands, and the penance he imposes, must be noted and remembered. If the priest questions the penitent overmuch or tactlessly the latter is upset, sometimes to such an extent that he forgets what he had meant to say or to inquire about. Meanwhile in the penitent's mind there is a sudden uprush of anxieties. Has the priest heard and understood? Is he competent to give an authoritative solution of the problem presented? Is he a man of self-control, or is he about to fly into a temper?

In the law courts, if a judge loses self-control or through ignorance gives a decision at variance with the law, there is always a possibility of redress. The bad work can be undone. But the evil that an ignorant or ill-tempered priest may do in confession is not often capable of redress or remedy. Many nervous systems have been lastingly hurt by ill-tempered and incapable confessors. No clumsy psychoanalyst is ever in the position to jar and jag nervous systems to the same degree as priests. For the priest's authority is exercised over penitents at the precise moment when they are strung to the highest pitch of emotional tension.

There is no end to the variety of anxieties that assail penitents at the moment of absolution. Doubts of all kinds, which pious ascetical writers attribute to the agency of the devil, trouble them. What of past confessions? Were they all good? Should they be repeated now for safety's sake? Is it not better to make sure and to make a "general" confession covering every sin ever committed? For the penitent knows that if even one of his past confessions was badly made, the present one would be sacrilegious. The crisis of the drama is reached when at last the penitent has struggled through his part, and winds up with a subdued, "That's all, Father." Exposed and humiliated, he lies at the mercy of the priest, the very nakedness of his soul making piteous appeal for consideration and forbearance. At that instant his fate hangs in the balance. If absolution is refused or postponed he may never again have the courage to tear the bandage of secrecy from his spiritual wounds. One harsh word may freeze his soul forever into sullen rebellion against confession. A coarse question may transmute his docility into a sudden outburst of anger, and he may quit the confessional, as many do, unabsolved, and never to enter it again. At such a moment of extreme tension, when the mystery and awesomeness of religion pervades the atmosphere, and when the ego is anguished in its shame of self-revelation, very little separates the penitent from a tragic collapse.

The priest may be a bumptious young man just out of the seminary, who has neither lived nor suffered, cocksure of himself, and prone to strut where "angels fear to tread." The penitent at his feet may be a woman of exquisite refinement and delicate sensitivity, whom an impertinent question might hurt irreparably. The church takes the risk of such mishaps and bids the woman see and hear Christ in the priest. Or the priest may be a man whose evil life is widely talked of, whose coarseness may be known to the penitent, and yet she must unveil to him her maidenly fears and self-reproaches, in the belief that his words of absolution will be valid. Only in the case where the sinner at a priest's feet has been an accomplice in his sins are his words of absolution unavailing.

When the crisis of the drama is passed and the priest has decided to absolve, with the words, "say for your penance," he imposes as punishment the recital of certain prayers, and utters next the formula of absolution.

One cannot wonder that the penitent, after so trying an ordeal, after living through so intense a drama, should experience an emotional reaction of no ordinary kind. A thrill of joy surges through his soul. Peace has returned, and the sense of recovered innocence. Lovingly, even passionately, he kisses the crucifix hung in the confessional as the slide is drawn back to mark the end of confession.

Turning now to the question of the effect of confession on the penitent, we are met by the claim voiced by many both within and without the Catholic church that confession affords an admirable mode of release that the human heart when in trouble craves. "How many souls are there in distress, anxiety, and loneliness," wrote Cardinal Newman, "whose one need is to find a being to whom they can pour out their feelings unheard by the world. They want to tell them and not to tell them; they wish to tell them to one who is strong enough to hear them, and yet not too strong so as to despise them." Implicitly the great Cardinal hereby claims for confession the rôle of supplying a deep-seated natural need, the need of minds in trouble to reveal their grief. This claim, formulated in a more modern way, is said to have been admitted by the psychologist Jung, to whom is attributed the remark: "Catholics have no need of psychoanalysis because they have confession."

Is it true that confession, drama though it be, affords a healthful discharge for pent-up emotional troubles? Does confession supply Catholics with a safety valve which secures them against nervous breakdowns? Are Catholics saner and less abnormal than those affiliated to other religious tenets on account of having confession? Such questions are naturally provoked by the claims made on behalf of confession.

The writer of this paper has had considerable personal experience of Catholic confession. A thousand times or more he has confessed his own sins. He has heard, as a priest, the confessions of thousands of Catholics. Furthermore, he has been consulted, outside confession, by many Catholics whose analyses disclosed the fact that their mental health had suffered as a consequence of confession. He has had, therefore, the unique opportunity of studying confession from three angles: that of the penitent, that of the confessor, and that of the analyst. Relying on his experience, the writer is inclined to dissent from the view that confession, as a general rule, affords a healthy mode of self-revelation such as psychologists desiderate. It is too fragmentary, too artificial, and too coercive in character to be a health-giving mode of release. Legislation has dehumanized confession, and made it, for perhaps the majority of Catholics, a burthen rather than a source of comfort. And the proof that it does not protect Catholics from nervous trouble lies in the undeniable fact that Catholics to the same extent as others suffer from neuroses. And among nervous Catholics both priests and nuns are found in due proportion.

The "fragmentary" nature of confession results from the custom, encouraged by the church, of confessing isolated sins. A Catholic, when he commits a grievous sin, is supposed to hasten to confess *it* to the priest without connecting it in any way with the complexus of his life. The artificiality and coercive character of confession have already been alluded to.

Whether Catholics feel the need of confessing or not, they are bound by church law to confess at least once a year, and much pressure is brought to bear on them to confess every week, or at least every month. It is not a question with Catholics of satisfying a deeply felt need at a time and in a manner that appeals to them. The church arranges for the time, place, and precise manner of confession, and leaves little to natural impulse or inclination. The ritual or technique, as we have seen, is by no means simple, and there are dogmatic teachings as to what sins must be confessed and as to how they must be confessed. There are also conditions imposed in the case of certain sins which make it very arduous and humiliating to secure absolution. In fine, so exacting is the ritual of confession that Catholics are often disturbed rather than comforted by even "good" confessions. And it is likely that many Catholics pass through life without ever experiencing that kind of satisfaction in confession which to outsiders it seems calculated to afford.

One aspect of what I am venturing to call the artificiality of confession should perhaps be referred to. It touches on a point where confession diverges from what nature lays claim to, and where the penitent is, as it were, balked of the kind of comfort he seeks.

It often happens that the thing which is of serious consequence to the penitent, and about which dwells the penitent's most profound anguish, is not subject matter, in the theological sense, for confession, and confessors will point out to the penitent that the confessional is not the place for discussing such matters. A mother—to take one case from my experience—who had a few years previously drowned her infant child yearned to confess it all over again, although she had already been absolved. She was vainly seeking in confession the secret of oblivion. If only she could forget it all! Forgiveness of her sin had not brought her any comfort, nor were her thoughts so much concerned with the quality of sinfulness in what she had done; she was consumed with a tragic self-pity. Confession, from the dogmatic standpoint, is not created to deal with cases such as hers. On another occasion I remember hearing the confession of a girl who had gone very far astray. She confessed her sins in so far as it was theologically necessary to confess them, but when I told her that that was sufficient and that there was no need to go into detail, she seemed much upset. Her heart felt the need of "telling all" as she understood it, and unless she "told all" it was obvious she would be dissatisfied and would feel that she had not made a good confession.

At precisely this point the doctrine and practice of confession conflicts with what human nature requires. A confessor is taught that he must not allow unnecessary details to be described. But unless penitents who feel the need of describing details are suffered to do so, they are balked of the comfort they seek. My efforts to reassure this girl failed, and finally I had to show her by a word that I guessed what was troubling her, and then only was she content. Not till then did "spiritual joy" fill her soul, which would lead one to suspect that often "spiritual joy" in confession is not correlative to the knowledge of a duty performed, but rather to the sense of exteriorizing a hidden sorrow.

There are certain classes of Catholics who are disimproved by confession. Those who suffer from an inferiority complex, and who have constant recourse to confession, intensify their feeling of worthlessness and their expectation of failure in all their undertakings. Instead of depending on themselves, they come to lean more and more on their confessor, and they have recourse to him in every trivial trouble. Confession becomes for them a kind of warm bath to be taken when any fear or anxiety causes tension. They soon belong to the "clinging" type of men or women, and their moral fiber deteriorates. And yet there are confessors who encourage them to come often to confession, and who apparently enjoy being clung to.

One sees evidences of the classical types of abnormality in the manner in which penitents confess. Some develop spiritual "arithmomania" and insist on putting exact numbers on everything. Others show signs of masochism in the extravagant manner in which they depict their own wickedness. Echolaliacs abound, who repeat *ad nauseam* everything again and again; but the most common and most serious form of abnormality connected with confession is a form of anxiety neurosis called by confessors, "scruples."

Associated with every Catholic church there are quite a number of these unfortunate beings, stricken with "scruples," who plague confessors with their endless doubts and queries. They are never sure of anything. They cannot make up their minds about anything. They are in constant terror of sin and of making bad confessions. Some of them come to confession several times a day if they can find opportunities. They are forever introspecting and examining their consciences. "Did I confess my sins properly?" "Was I truly sorry for them?" "Was it a sin for me to go to a confessor who I thought would be patient with me?" "Was it a mortal sin to blow my nose immediately after communion?" and so forth. Their *folie de doute* reaches the most unbelievable extremes, and the more they confess the worse their mental sickness becomes. This type of mental disease usually originates in the exaggerated fear of making "bad confessions" which is instilled into the minds of Catholic children. On the occasion of a confession, where a high-strung child has something difficult to confess, if anything goes wrong he is thrown into an almost frantic state of mind, and as a result perhaps develops this terrible anxiety neurosis called "scruples."

It should not be concluded from what I have said as to the ill effects of confession on some temperaments that confession is uniformly unhealthy. I know of no evidence to warrant such a conclusion. Many Catholics are consoled and calmed by confession, and find in it not only supernatural but natural satisfaction. The extent to which my criticism goes is to indicate that confession, owing to its fragmentary, artificial, and coercive character, cannot be regarded as a satisfactory mode of self-revelation for those in trouble, and furthermore that it does positive harm to certain types of men and women, notably those who suffer from an inferiority complex or who are "scrupulous."

The great interest that Catholics manifest in confession stories is no doubt a testimony to the dramatic possibilities of confession. At the fireside of pious Catholics the advent of a priest is doubly welcome, bringing as it does the promise of "sick call" tales and experiences. Every priest has interesting tales of how he was suddenly summoned to the bedside of a dying man, and of the difficulties and perils he encountered on the way. "Were you in time to hear his confession?" is the question that is asked spontaneously. And if the priest has to answer, "No! he died before I could reach him," a tragic hush falls on the assembly. There, are, however, times when "sick calls" are in no way connected with the tragedy of a dying sinner moaning for the priest. Nor is fear of death the only motive that originates such "calls."

I remember an occasion when I was supplying for a brother priest on a group of desolate islands off the west coast of Ireland. Early one morning I received a summons to visit a sick woman. Her husband had come for me, with a few fishermen, to row me to the island where the woman dwelt. The sea was rough and the *currach* frail, and it took several hours' strenuous rowing to reach the island. When I landed I found that a half-wild pony had been provided for me to carry me across a range of mountains to my destination. It was no easy matter to follow the trail, but eventually I reached the "sick" woman. I heard her confession and set out for home, which I reached late the same night, tired and sore. When the priest for whom I had been supplying returned, I told him of my adventure, and he had a hearty laugh at my expense. "I should have warned you," he added, "about that old party. Whenever there is a new priest on the islands she pretends to be dying and sends for him."

Of all confessions, those which fail to reach a spiritual consummation, from which penitents depart with an additional burthen of sorrow, are the most dramatic, the most tragic. Such confessions resemble plays in which, through some unfortunate accident, the death, simulated in mimicry, becomes real. They are the acme of disaster for sinners.

One time—it is a distressing memory—I was hearing confessions in a very poor country church. The church was so poor that it was without the conventional confessional, and it was necessary to hear the confessions at the altar rail. The penitents in turn knelt at one side of the rail. I sat at the other. Meanwhile those waiting for confession occupied places in the nearby pews and watched what was going on, without, however, being able to hear more than an occasional word. It was evening and growing dark in the church, and there were many people still to be heard. A woman had begun her confession, and I remarked with surprise that she spoke very perfectly. I wondered how so refined a woman had come to live in such an out-of-the-way place. She was married and had a family of four. The birth of her last child had all but cost her her life. She could not get herself to face again such an ordeal. Besides, the family was very poor, for her husband, although a good fellow in every other way, was a hopeless drunkard. She had been taking steps that she knew the church forbade; but what else was there for her to do? Her husband was reckless and passionate, and she simply could not dream of abandoning her children. She understood perfectly the law of the church, and the conditions that she would have to submit to if she were to receive absolution. Still she yearned for the spiritual comfort that it seemed impossible for her to have. Why had she come to confession? Did she not know that it would only increase her anguish? I said little, for she described every aspect of the problem with a perfect understanding of my position as confessor and of the limitations of my powers. Her story took time. Meanwhile the dusk was thickening, and the waiting crowd, who little dreamed of the conflict that was raging in the woman's soul, was showing signs of impatience. A child began to cry, and a man got up to go outside the church door for a smoke. The noises in the church disturbed my penitent and pushed her to the verge of despair. The more, however, she realized the hopelessness of her case, the more she seemed to yearn for the absolution that she could not have. It was the world-old drama of human instinct hesitating and abashed before a religious ideal. The conflict resolved itself at length in a weary sigh—a sob, one would say, of impotent yearning. The woman moved slowly to one side on her knees, clinging to the altar rails, and then hurried away. I saw her no more. For such as she there is no comfort or promise of comfort in confession; only unhallowed martyrdom is to be found in it, and a purposeless tragedy.

CONVERTS OR CO-OPERATION: A STUDY IN MODERN MISSIONS

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THE LAST command of Jesus to be recorded in the scriptures is the passage known as "The Great Commission." In this passage Jesus addresses the eleven remaining apostles, bidding them to go and "teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." And the Christian church has accepted this command. Men and women almost without number have gone into the world, teaching and baptizing.

"Go ye therefore, and teach"! What shall we teach? Different generations and different people have given varying answers to this question. Some have preached Christ crucified—a bleeding, dying, resurrected Savior who gave his life for men, that men by believing in him might find life. This message has proved itself to be a powerful missionary dynamic. "Christ died for us. We who were sinners are saved. The necessity is therefore upon us to preach the glad tidings unto all men." Or another approach, "The world without Christ is lost. We who know Christ must help a sinful humanity to find him."

Other missionaries have found their impetus in the belief in the imminent second coming of Christ. "The world is bad. The signs point in but one direction—to the speedy return of Jesus Christ. In the meantime some souls can be saved. All will not believe, but all should have the opportunity of hearing the message." Fired by this motive, men have endured untold hardships and traveled almost unbelievable distances, that the ends of the earth might hear.

Still another group of missionaries has emphasized the love of God. "God is a father who loves all men. The world is a family in which all men are brothers. It is Christ who reveals the heart of God," and hence the *life* and teachings of Christ are placed at the center. The preaching of this group has a strong ethical emphasis.

"Go . . . . teach all nations, baptizing them." Baptize them! And the missionaries have baptized. Whether the converts have been taught or no, they have been baptized. Baptism has been the mark of the Christian, and has raised a most effective barrier between various communities of Christians. Even today the mission field is compelled to witness the sorry spectacle of conflict over the matter of baptism.

To disparage the missionaries and the missionary methods of the past takes us nowhere. Would that some of their indomitable spirit and fire might find its way into the modern world. The missionary goes abroad because he is a man of strong convictions, and certainly our world needs more and not less of principled conviction. But at the same time one reserves the right to question.

Historically the missionary movement has been based upon the uniqueness of the Christian revelation. "The Christian message is different from, and superior to, the messages of all other religions." The missionary has gone abroad because he has had something definite to give. There has been no question in his mind upon this point. Perhaps he has at times failed to separate the benefits of Western civilization from the benefits of religion; but at least he has been in earnest.

In the early days of missionary history the missionary was a dictator. He organized institutions and ran them as he himself saw fit. Coming in as he did with strange customs and a strange message, he did not receive the constructive criticism that is so helpful in the development of any new enterprise.

Perhaps already an individualist, the atmosphere in which he worked tended to make of him even more of an individualist.

And in the course of time came converts and the organization of a small Christian society. Absolutism gave way to paternalism. The missionary was now a father, and the members of the Christian community his children. The father heard the requests of his children and granted them as he saw fit. He counseled in a friendly manner, but the voice of counsel was strikingly like unto the voice of command. "Milk for babes, and meat for men." The Christian converts were spiritual babes and received their sustenance of missionary pap.

With the growth of the church the missionary problem became more complicated. A strong church demands a strong leadership, and a strong leadership means a growth in the spirit of independence. The most recent trend in missions has been toward an equality of status between missionaries and national leaders, with the missionaries at times taking subordinate positions under national leadership. There has been a most healthy development along the line of international co-operation.

As the church came more and more to the front, a new element entered into the definition of missionary purpose, culminating in the statement that the aim of missionary endeavor is the "formation of self-governing, self-supporting, and self-propagating churches." The terms "self-government," "self-support," and "self-propagation" might well be called the big three in recent missionary history. It is for the growth of the church that missionaries have professedly labored, and no effort has been spared in building up a stronger church. (Witness the growing tendency toward church union in missionary lands, in large measure missionary inaugurated.)

The extensive knowledge that we now possess of other nations is a comparatively recent achievement. Anthropological, geographical, and sociological research is each year adding a new chapter to the rapidly expanding volume of world-knowledge. Cook's tourists now rush in bravely where formerly angels feared to tread. The American business man who used to give of his means to "save the heathen" has discovered for himself that these so-called "heathen" have a culture and civilization of their own. Having served with pride upon the local committee responsible for the erection of the twelve-story building upon Main Street, he feels a bit taken back as he compares the city triumph with the matchless beauty of the Taj Mahal. Loud in speech and hurried in manner, he is just a bit uncomfortable in the presence of the quietude and sereneness of the East. Accustomed to Western harmony, even though he be somewhat of a musician, he experiences difficulty in appreciating the minute tonal divisions of the Indian scales. He senses a difference between the East and the West; and if he is honest with himself he cannot but question whether Western civilization is after all the final word. Perhaps the East has something to teach; but how few new missionaries come to a foreign land with the determination to learn.

The study of comparative religions has also had its effect. The early missionary was convinced of the absolute supremacy of the Christian message. "God had revealed himself in part to the Jews, but his final and complete revelation was reserved for the Christians. Christianity alone was true. All other religions were false, and their leaders blind leaders of the blind." The natural result was denunciation rather than appreciation. Of late there has been a shift. Christianity is seen as one of various approaches to God, though the great majority of Christians are convinced that it is of all the superior. The other world-religions are tolerated, but they must all be fulfilled in Christ. Christianity is the "crown of all." The figure is that of a triangle with religions placed one on top of the other in the order of their relative goodness, with Christianity occupying a lone position at the top.

With the concession of the toleration of other religions as an entering wedge a few missionaries are prepared to advance a bit farther and to declare themselves in favor of mutual respect and co-operation. They would replace the figure of the triangle and its horizontal divisions absolutely dividing religions with the graph, endeavoring to show the high ethical positions, the low ethical positions, and the common elements of all religions. They would reject the materials having little or no value for progressively developing the good life, and concentrate their attention upon the materials, drawn from whatever source, giving promise of more fruitfulness.

Having accepted such a position, the issue comes to the fore whether the missionary can continue to be a missionary in the accepted sense of the word, namely, a proselytizer, endeavoring to persuade men of other religious faiths to enter into the fellowship of his own. For some, the orthodox position is becoming increasingly difficult.

The writer happens to live in India. During the past centuries nations have risen and fallen; reformations have been followed by counter-reformations; religions have flourished and perished; but Hinduism has remained. It is true that popular Hinduism is grossly superstitious. It does not help the matter any to point out that religious superstition is also found in New York City. But it does help the matter when one endeavors to analyze the Indian situation. To attribute the ills of India to Hinduism is a far too simple solution of the problem. Probably the two greatest curses of India today are illiteracy and poverty. I say this advisedly, for in my estimation illiteracy and caste go hand in hand. Certainly among educated Indians there is not found the same caste bigotry that is found in the Indian village. Neither illiteracy nor poverty can be attributed to religion. To say that the poverty of India is due to the religious veneration of the cow is a striking but ill-founded particularism. Lack of proper rainfall, inadequate fertilization, lack of proper farming instruments—these are but a few of the contributing causes of

Indian poverty. And schools cannot be run without money. Government, Indian leaders, and missions are working at the educational and economic problems. Industry is beginning to lend its assistance in sharing the excessive burden hitherto borne by agriculture alone. No immediate relief looms upon the horizon; but, taking a long-range view, extreme poverty and illiteracy appear to be passing phases in the national development of India. And as these two enemies to Indian progress disappear we may look forward to a corresponding religious revival.

Philosophic Hinduism has produced some rare souls. I need mention but a few. Passing from the medieval saints to modern times, we have Raja Ram Mohum Roy making the endeavor to separate essential Hindu religion from its accretions, fighting idolatry and polytheism, coming out in favor of social reforms, and advocating education both for men and women. We have Devendranath Tagore, finding a pure theism in the Upanishads and promulgating a more or less definite theory of the intuitive knowledge of God. We have Keshub Chandra Sen endeavoring to establish a universal and cosmopolitan religion upon the foundations laid by Ram Mohun Roy and Devendranath Tagore. We have Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, of whom Swami Vivekananda said his mission in life was "to proclaim and make clear the fundamental unity underlying all religions," and who taught the doctrine of the motherhood of God. We have Vivekananda himself, endeavoring to carry forward the teachings of his master, Ramakrishna. We have Swami Dayanand Saraswati, the founder of the Arya Samaj, with his passionate desire to purify Hinduism and to get back to the religion of the Vedas. We have Ranade, social servant, religious leader, and patriot, and many others. These men have opposed the wrongs of untouchability. They have stood for education. They have worked for social reforms. They have brought their religion into life.

Shall the missionary oppose these attempts to reform Hinduism from within, or shall he co-operate with them? Co-operation does not mean that the missionary becomes any less a Christian. A man is no less a patriot because he sees beyond the bounds of his own village. He does not cease to be a citizen of his nation when he begins to think in terms of world-brotherhood. Nor does he cease to be a Christian as he thinks in terms of religious unity. As he works in and through the Old-World faiths he finds his Christianity becoming richer. He is now laboring *with* the people of the nation instead of *for* them. There is no necessity for the missionary to bear all the burdens of Indian society. Educated India has accepted social and religious maladjustment as its own problem. For years to come the missionary can stand shoulder to shoulder with socially minded Indians and will be welcomed as a co-operator and friend.

"But," the objection comes to the fore, "what of the church?" Yes, what of the church? The Christian church in India is a fact. It is growing in numbers and it is growing in influence. The church could not be blotted off the Indian horizon even if it were deemed advisable that it should be. But the Christian church can be purified. Instead of endeavoring to secure more converts, the missionary has a most fruitful field of work in helping the existing church to become a real spiritual powerhouse. Petty strifes, jealousies, intemperance, superstition, and ignorance must be banished before the church can stand as a city on a hill, or can act as the salt that gives savor to the earth. Under the co-operative conception of missions the function of the church ceases to be that of proselytism. It becomes the bolstering up of Indian life. Converts will come. But there is a difference between accepting mature men and women with definite convictions, and baptizing the masses. There is a difference between giving guidance to spiritual seekers and collecting together the widows and orphans.

One of the curses of India today is communalism, the struggle for power between the varying religious groups. While Hindus and Muslims are the main offenders, a small Christian minority is outspoken in "demanding its rights." Here is a fruitful field for Christian effort. The Christian church has a real opportunity to exemplify the spirit of brotherhood. It has the chance of co-operating with other religions for the welfare of the whole. It has the chance; but will it take it?

Idealists in all lands are longing for a new world. We do not hesitate to drink Indian tea, or to accept the contributions of so-called non-Christian lands to our material well-being and happiness. We do not regard the spheres of art, literature, and science as closed to any foreign influences. But when we come to religion we draw the line. Perhaps this accounts for much of the religious weakness that is found in the world today. Be this as it may, some minds are questioning. For some the missionary issue has shifted from converts to co-operation.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROPHECY

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DURING the past few decades there has been an increasing appreciation of the potential contribution of psychology to the understanding of prophecy. The psychology of prophecy has been approached from many varied angles; conclusions are as varied as the methods employed, but in the midst of a great deal of uncertainty there is a growing conviction that this immature science is bound to arrive.

One of the earliest attempts to think through the psychological problem involved in the study of prophecy was that of A. B. Davidson in *Old Testament Prophecy.* For him the prophetic state was one of perception, of degrees of mental tension, advancing from intuition and self-controlled excitation to asthenic ecstasy. He defined the "condition of prophecy" as a state of mind with which the Spirit of Revelation allied Himself. For him inspiration had in it a definite divine quantum. Of course Professor Davidson really defined nothing—he simply stated the problem. So of other writers who took up the matter of inspiration, such as G. Joyce in *The Inspiration of Prophecy*. J. H. Kaplan in his *Psychology of Prophecy* speaks of the prophetic premonition as a delicate instinctive adjustment for "catching distant vibration or over-tones of the operations of the universe."

But a real psychological approach to the study of the prophetical experiences was made by Hölscher, who, in the first part of his work on the prophets,[1] attempted to show that they are normal conditions of consciousness altered by an abnormal intensifying of the emotions. Thus he finds what to him is the clue to the understanding of the problem of prophetic inspiration—it is in a study of the emotions. The prophetic experience is not an abnormality off the beaten track of normal psychical life. The prophet's psychical experience is accompanied by a strong excitement of mind; the peaks of these excitations are called ecstasy. The word "ecstasy" says nothing about the cause of the excitation, hence it is used of both religious and non-religious experience.

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[1] *Die Propheten: Untersuchungen zur Religionsgeschichte Israels* (1914).

Emotional disturbances dam up the regular course of consciousness and have different effects on the course of ideas and bodily movements. There are two forms of affects or changes and interchanges in the realm of consciousness: these are either a concentration of consciousness upon a narrow circle of ideas or a condition of loss of self-feeling, with or without confusion of the course of thought. This disturbance, due to central stimulation, not to external sense impression, when of greater intensity, furnishes a condition for hallucination. The general susceptibility of the nervous system is of great importance for the disposition to have hallucinations, some individuals being very susceptible. The background and material for hallucinations come from normal sense perceptions. Impressions of recent experiences emerge in the hallucinations. The same is true of visions. Hypnosis is psychically similar, except that in the limiting of consciousness to a circumscribed circle of ideas, the suggestion determines the focus of these ideas. The suggestion may come from without or from the person himself (i.e., autosuggestion). Autosuggestion of course presupposes a special sensitivity of the nervous system, and hence it follows that "practice makes perfect."

With this treatment Hölscher introduced an epoch in the progress in prophetic studies from the historical field to the psychological. But he did not call up the method and technique of some of the newer fields of psychology such as the psychology of religion and social psychology.

Moses Buttenweiser, whose book on *The Prophets of Israel* appeared in the same year as that of Hölscher (1914), emphasized that "the visions of the literary prophets are in no way akin to the ecstatic visions and dreams of the diviner. They are spiritual experiences, the fruit of a mind consciously sounding the very depths of its being, a mind awakened to the fullest realization of its moral and spiritual constitution" (p. 139). On the other hand, T. H. Robinson[2] takes the view that ecstasy and mantism furnish the data for understanding the great prophets psychologically. According to him, the prophet would suddenly fall into an ecstatic fit; his speech would quickly change, his eye would assume a glassy fixation, and his limbs twitch violently. Those who saw him would say, "The Spirit of Yahweh is upon him"; and they would eagerly stand around to hear the divine message as soon as the prophet was able to tell what he had seen and heard in this ecstasy.

At this point in the discussion enters Micklem[3] to protest against dragging the prophets down to the level of primitive mantism and to insist on studying the *furor poeticus* from the angle of the experiences of poets and artists in their creative moments. His idea is that much of the current exegesis of the prophets is based on psychological notions which have been superseded by scientific investigators who have been studying the work of the poetic mind, and who have been investigating into the use of symbolism in poetry, painting, and dreams. Furthermore, the great prophets stood for a common religious position—all were reformers in the spirit and fashion of Moses. The great writing prophets of Israel were poets and profound thinkers, and we can the better understand their inspiration by comparing its technique with the described experiences of poets and artists of our own times instead of having to resort to the crudities of barbarous peoples. To the light of modern experiences we therefore turn, and learn, for instance, that the

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[2] *Prophecy and the Prophets* (1923).

[3] Nathaniel Micklem, *Prophecy and Eschatology*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1926. Pp. 248. 7*s*. 6*d*.

"fine frenzy" of Amos or Isaiah is more akin to that of the poet Wordsworth than to that of some mad mullah of the desert.

If these prophets of Israel were accustomed to act like the Baal prophets on Mount Carmel—dance about, stamp the ground, and cut themselves, without apparent conscious control of their actions—we should say that they were in a frenzy or ecstasy; but if they carried out symbolical actions consciously, to make their message striking, or if they uttered their words as a part of their own conscious thought and reflection, and their visions and auditions were similar to those of people of ordinary temperament in full possession of their senses, we should avoid the term "ecstasy" and speak of "absorption" or "recollection," or some other limiting word. That which religious writers call "recollection," and psychologists, "secondary condition," is that state wherein the mind is drawn into itself, as it were, and is the condition of meditation, deep thought; also of all imaginative and creative work. It is this condition we need to examine into psychologically.

Modern life has some fine contributions to make to the understanding of this "secondary condition" of the human mind in the experiences of some of our great artists and poets.

Professor Micklem then quotes a passage from Wordsworth, wherein the poet gives a picture of a "waking dream" he had while strolling in Salisbury Plain. He sees the men of the distant past carrying on their habitual actions of yore. This was a poetic experience involving hallucinatory, visional, and auditional elements. Wordsworth was not in a trance like that of a medium, but in his sober senses, though deeply and meditatively drawn into himself, he saw in his mind's eye impressive sights on the plain and heard voices. This experience of a modern poet sheds more light on the major prophets of the Old Testament than does a study of the actions of the priests of Baal in conflict with Elijah.

Another citation is that of Mozart's account of how he composed some of his great works. It is of sufficient interest to quote:

> Once I catch my air, another soon comes to join the first, according to the requirements of the whole composition, counterpoint, the play of the various instruments, etc., and all these morsels combine to form the whole. Then my mind kindles, if nothing happens to interrupt me. The work grows—I keep hearing it, and bring it out more and more clearly, and the composition ends by being completely executed in my mind, however long it may be. I then comprehend the whole at one glance, as I should a beautiful picture or a handsome boy; and my imagination makes me hear it, not in its parts successively as I shall come to hear it later, but as a whole in its ensemble. What delight it is for me! It all, the inspiration and the execution, takes place in me as if it were a beautiful and very distinct dream. What I get in this way I do not forget any more easily, and this is perhaps the most precious gift our Lord has given me. If I, then, sit down to write, I have only to draw from this store in my mind what has already accumulated there in the way I have described. Moreover, the whole is not difficult to fix on paper. The whole is perfectly determined, and rarely ever does my score differ much from what I have had already in my mind.

From this it may be seen that new creations arise from the unconscious into the conscious mind of the musician. Numerous artistic creators, of sound intellect, in possession of their waking senses, have described for us what William James called "imperfectly developed hallucination." Dickens relates that in composing the *Pickwick Papers* he would burst out laughing at the things he "heard" Sam Weller say. In the account of the call of Jeremiah, we have a similar "consciousness of a presence," to quote from Dr. Skinner.[4]

Another step found in the understanding of prophecy in terms of the "inspiration of poets" is in the study of poetic symbolism. Investigations into the use of symbolism in poetry, painting, and dreams sheds a surprising amount of light on prophecy. The language of much poetry is the heaping up of imagery. Great imaginative writing is packed with metaphor and simile; Professor Micklem gives a quotation from Francis

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[4] *Prophecy and Religion* (1922).

Thompson's "Orient Ode" in which the sunrise is compared to a ceremony in a church. The poet expresses a real identity between man's worship and nature's, and gives the same meaning in the earthly ceremony and the sunrise. Thompson would surely agree with anything that the scientist might say about the sunrise, but he goes farther in his use of words than the scientist could dream of. Imagery and language are stretched to a marvelous degree also in his "Ode to the Setting Sun" —indeed, we have a description of an emotional experience which is partly audition and partly hallucinatory vision. If read literally, the passage could be taken for the work of a lunatic. But his words are to be taken symbolically or mystically, and we thus have a deep understanding of the poet's profound appreciation of the sunset. Similarly in the psychological interpretation of the prophets, it is of supreme importance that we know how to distinguish symbolism from literal statement. We do not insist on interpreting poetry literally or allegorically, yet in regard to certain passages in the Hebrew prophets, a recent commentator said: "Either these passages are to be taken allegorically, or they are to be taken literally, so far as they bear any intelligible sense." "A finer equipment of psychological discrimination is necessary for the understanding of the more imaginative elements in Hebrew literature," is the conclusion of Professor Micklem to this situation.

In making another step toward the understanding of the prophetic inspiration in the terms of the psychology of poetic inspiration, our author points out that the symbolism of poetry and fancy is merely another form of picture-thinking manifested to all of us in dreams. The real meaning of a dream is usually hidden, but can be worked out when the things mentioned in it are taken as symbols. Those psychoanalysts who investigate dreams differ widely in their methods but seem to be in complete agreement that most dreams are highly significant, and that, by discovering the ideas connected with each bit of the dream, they can unravel the symbolism of the whole. Two illustrations of this are taken from the Bible. In the case of Peter's dream on the housetop at Joppa (related in the eleventh chapter of Acts), we have the solution of a problem coming into his consciousness during sleep. The psychologist considers that this dream was due to the repression of the qualms of conscience; his Jewish prejudice against receiving Gentiles was in conflict with the diviner notions he had received from Christ. The former had won out in practice but lost out in the vision. The interpretation of a vision seen in a trance or ecstasy is along the same lines as that of a normal dream.

The second illustration is taken from the second chapter of Daniel and may well be read in Professor Micklem's own words, as it shows his method in a limited space:

> We may picture the author, whom we will call Daniel, as entering the city perhaps by stealth, and seeing in the Temple precincts that image of Olympian Zeus which, perhaps resembling Antiochus himself, had been set up there. That image would seem to him to stand as the visible sign of the heathen empire by which his people was oppressed and of the heathen religion which he scorned and loathed. He remembers the long series of oppressions under which his people has groaned; his blood boils, but he realizes his impotence. How he would like to rise up and sweep the blasphemer out of Jerusalem, as later did the brave Maccabean brothers! Little wonder if in the heat of the moment his deeper and diviner intuitions left him, if he forgot that vengeance belonged unto his God, if he forgot that the Lord's servant should not strive nor cry, but should be the martyr and die "all in his simplicity."
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> That night, as he lies asleep, he dreams. He sees a monstrous image like the image of Zeus Olympios in the Temple, only vaster; it is curiously made, and he recognizes, when he wakes, that it represents the heathen empires of whom he has been thinking. In his dream he sees a small stone, and he knows, as one does know somehow in a dream, that no human hand has thrown it. It strikes the great image on the feet, and the whole image crumbles away to powder. Here is the wish-fulfilment again, the destruction of the heathen image. But the stone begins to grow and grow; it does not strike him as in the least degree strange, and just when it grows so large that it fills the whole world, he wakes up.
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> I should hesitate to say that this narrative must unquestionably be

the transcript of a dream; but be it dream, vision, or more or less conscious artistic creation, the interpretation and the method of interpretation will be the same, and we have another illustration of the way in which God may speak to man in visions and in dreams, bringing home to him those diviner truths which in his waking moments had been repressed into the unconscious.

In connection with the psychological interpretation of prophecy we find ourselves immediately confronted with the question: Is there a psychological distinction between true and false prophecy? For example, prophets in the day of Amos foretold the coming of the Day of Yahweh which would be a day of light—Amos said it would be a day of darkness! Did somebody lie? Or did they arrive at dissimilar conclusions by a similar psychological process? If we could study the environments and dispositions of these various groups of prophets, we should no doubt discover that from a rationalization of facts in their respective environments came their convictions that what had welled up into their consciousness was Yahweh's message for the hour.

Hence in discussing the wide divergence of opinion on the same subject between Micaiah ben Imlah and the four hundred prophets of Ahab, our author has this to say in italics: "*The prophet does not derive his certainty of the impending disaster from this vision, but the vision from the assurance of disaster*" (p. 36–7). These false prophets present no puzzle to the psychologist. He knows that a person conscious of some weakness and inferiority in the presence of his companions compensates his self-respect by phantasies of the great powers dormant within him and of the big things he is going to do some day. The desire that Ahab should triumph at Ramoth and the longing for the restoration of Israel's former glory might readily account for the bright visions of the so-called "false" prophets. The visions of the prophets of weal are the outcroppings of the imagination working upon the *material presented by the desires*. The prophecies of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, *et al.*, are not such fancies; they are the results of profound meditation into the *meaning and order of the actual world.* Their visions and messages are based on ethical insight into the moral order. It is because of this intellectual element that there is such a wide divergence between Amos and his contemporaries.

The above mentioned distinction is the key to the understanding of Professor Micklem's book. To emphasize his point of view and to clinch it, let us read these words of his, which certainly express his thesis and what he brings out again and again in discussing Elijah, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. He says: "The visions of the great prophets, whether for weal or woe, are, in fact, the result of careful thought, of ethical insight and principle; they are interpretations of the meaning of the real world, not imaginative pictures of the world as they would like it to be."[5]

After a careful study of the oracles and visions of Amos, Micklem concludes that not many of them were delivered in trance or ecstasy and that there is meager data upon which to build any theory of his *furor*. All he can say is that in certain passages where the verb of vision is employed, the prophet's inspiration may have been accompanied by hallucinations, but they were more like Wordsworth's on Salisbury Plain, and not cataleptic trances or maniac ravings. The data on Hosea are indecisive; there is no ground for supposing Isaiah an ecstatic in the same sense as the sons of the prophets. Jeremiah was not an ecstatic; his inspiration was no more unusual than one would expect to find with any poetic or creative artist. As for Ezekiel, certain oracles seem to be the outcome of very great emotional disturbance, but these show signs of careful, skilful, and labored compilation, as witness the image of the ship of Tyre. So far as subject matter goes, there is no difference in the teaching between visions extraordinary and revelations ordinary. The greatness of Ezekiel lies in what he taught and what he was.

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[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

After a detailed examination of all the great prophets from Elijah to Ezekiel, Micklem concludes emphatically that they were all great reformers in religion, who sought to lead the people back to the high ethical idealism of Moses. There was little if any connection between them and the current eschatology of woe. They took over only the symbolism from primitive religion and used it to express fundamental laws about the meaning of history and to mirror an overmastering sense of the presence and power of the living God. *Ethical supernaturalism* is the summary of the work of the true prophets; *phantasy constructions*, that of the false. Thus, in the name of psychology, our author enters a violent protest against those who represent the prophets as being neurotic by temperament and possessors of symptoms of hysteria.

In appraising to date the progress toward a science of the psychology of prophecy, one ought also to take some account of a book[6] which, although appearing prior to the publication of Professor Micklem's book, came too late for his consideration. Major Povah applies to some of the problems of prophetic inspiration the conclusions of Freudian psychology. Micklem makes use of the unconscious mind in his interpretations; Major Povah lays stress upon it, indeed, exploits it. By the term "unconscious mind" he means that vast subliminal field of consciousness, of which a man is quite unaware, but where are stored away forgotten and suppressed mental experiences. These things are in continual ferment, dissociated from normal consciousness, and beyond the pale of mental control. Here is consumed psychic energy, and here is a parasitical system or complex which, owing to its heightened sensibility, may well up into the consciousness of one who happens to border on mental instability.

In this matter of "unconscious mind" there are three processes especially to be noted: *repression*, *rationalization* and *projection*. One refuses to face an unpleasant duty and re-presses it or pushes it into oblivion. But long after it is forgotten it works on his unconscious mind and makes him ill at ease. Or one invents a reason for a mental attitude, the real motive for which is lost. Projection is attributing part of one's own mental attitude to other persons or entities. For example, one may work off one's dislike of a quality in one's self by abusing it in another.

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[6] Major J. W. Povah, *The New Psychology and The Hebrew Prophets* (1925).

Not only does the term "unconscious mind" represent the fermentation scene of repudiated thoughts and forgotten memories, but it is also the source of psychic energy. Here works the heritage of man from his ancestors, racial elements, and mental elements corresponding to the primitive instincts. Here works the driving force of man's psychic energy—the life force, *élan vital,* or *libido*. A civilized individual employs his *libido* along primitive channels—the preservation of the race—and along non-primitive channels, i.e., sublimating it, to produce culture, art, honesty in business, credit, and care for the weaker members of society. Sublimation of course involves conflict and repression.

Major Povah applies these results of the new psychology to the understanding of prophetic experiences. Many of them are illuminating and interesting. He does not attempt to think through and reinterpret prophetic problems in the light of this new approach. Probably that was not the purpose of his book, which is apparently an attempt to simplify and popularize the new psychology and the results of Old Testament criticisms in one and the same brief book. A few of his applications may be quoted in passing:

> In the early literature of Israel, what we call the incalculable, remarkable, outcroppings of the unconscious mind—whether outcroppings of goodness or of wickedness—of sanity or of insanity—or morale or of panic—are all ascribed to the Ruach of Yahweh [p. 66].
>
> Besides the dream symbols which are peculiar to the individual dreamer, the individual dreamer's dream may also contain symbols which are found in myths and are part of the *lingua franca* of the unconscious. Many of these symbols are sexual symbols.

> It will not, therefore, surprise us if we find such symbols present in the visions—symbolical as they have always been taken to be—which the prophets "saw" in dream or ecstacy. We have already noted that in the experience of Elijah on Horeb the cave is a symbol of the womb, and that Elijah's entrance into it and re-emergence from it symbolises rebirth. In Isaiah's vision at his call seraphim appear. The word saraph means a serpent; and the seraphim were probably regarded as serpent-like beings. Now the serpent is a common (male) symbol of the libido. It seems that light may be thrown on the interpretation of such visions as that which marked the call of Isaiah to become a prophet, by analysts who are students of the Bible [p. 131].

This material presented by Major Povah not only needs further study and evaluation; it needs fumigating!

A few years ago the writer of this article presented a method of approaching the understanding of the prophets by equating them psychologically with the great mystics and by studying their inspirations in terms of the psychology of mysticism.[7] A careful study of the experiences of prophets and mystics brings out the close parallelism between them. It makes some of the experiences of the prophets, notably those of Ezekiel, which were formerly baffling, appear intelligible. After further study the author is more convinced than ever that herein lies a fertile field for investigating the psychology of the prophets. One cannot read through such a book as that which recently came from the studies of Leuba[8] without finding many things that shed light on the prophets of Israel.

But the psychology of prophecy cannot be worked out by some psychologist with a half-baked knowledge of the background and development of life in ancient Israel. A thorough equipment and orientation in the life of the peoples around ancient Israel is necessary. The appreciative study of the prophetic messages has to link itself up with the study of Assyrians, Babylonians, Hittites, Egyptians, Persians, and Greeks, for with all these, Hebrew religion is intimately connected.

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[7] H. W. Hines, "The Prophet as Mystic," *American Journal of Theology*, XL (1923), 37–71.

[8] James H. Leuba, *The Psychology of Mysticism* (1925).

This is the *religionspsychologische methode* of Georg Wobbermin, and it is a necessary part of the process. But this calls for a specialized historical and linguistic training rare in a psychologist.

On the other hand, an Old Testament scholar can hardly expect to gain a superficial knowledge of psychology and hope to interpret the prophetic experiences therewith. The results of the studies in the psychology of religion, which have been so brilliantly worked out by a number of American scholars during the past three decades, are extensive and complicated. There are great differences in methods, points of view, and results; but there is a "vitality, independence and originality in this field"[9] which will intrigue the investigator who aspires to learn therefrom things that may shed light on the prophets of ancient Israel. One has to have an independent working knowledge of the developing science of the psychology of religion in order to exercise discriminatory judgment in using some of its results, for otherwise he may find himself on an unlisted detour. He may anyway; but in any case the exploration will be fascinating, if not immediately fruitful.

It is inevitable that the psychology of prophecy will work itself out and shed marvelous light on some of the dark problems of the exegesis of the prophets, but it cannot develop ahead of the psychology of religion and the psychology of mysticism. Pioneering is now being done in these fertile fields. Some day we shall understand and appreciate these profound geniuses of ancient Israel, whose influence penetrates even to the present, and then wonder why we stumbled over their mystical experiences without sensing their real value and without comprehending their psychological propinquity to the religious geniuses of the intervening centuries.

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[9] Edward L. Schaub, "The Psychology of Religion in America during the Past Quarter-Century," *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (March, 1926).

THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS, AND SOME RECENT BRITISH CRITICISM

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IN THE present article I purpose to give some account of the recent literary study of the Synoptic Gospels as it has been conducted in Great Britain, with special reference to the work of Canon B. H. Streeter, of Oxford. The broader aspects of the textual, linguistic, and critical problems will be considered first; and this will have the further advantage of preparing the way for the consideration of the Four Document and Proto-Luke hypotheses, the grounds on which they rest, and the discussions to which they have given rise. The criticism of the Gospels is, of course, an international enterprise, and for this reason it is well from time to time that we should have the opportunity of comparing notes. This is especially desirable in view of the rapidity of the literary output and the formidable difficulties imposed by distance and in some cases by language. As the nature of my subject does not permit of many references to the work of American scholars, I should like to say how much British scholarship owes to their abundant labors, and in particular to the work of B. W. Bacon, E. de Witt Burton, C. C. Torrey, G. F. Moore, H. J. Cadbury, S. J. Case, A. M. Perry, and others too numerous to mention. The space at my disposal will not allow me to speak of the problems of the Fourth Gospel, and on this question it must suffice to refer to my recent article in the *Hibbert Journal* (July, 1927) on "The Fourth Gospel and Some Recent Criticism."

I

Of the more comprehensive recent British surveys of Gospel problems as a whole, the most valuable are unquestionably

Canon Streeter's *Four Gospels: A Study of Origins* (1924), and Dr. A. H. McNeile's *An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament* (1927). Less directly concerned with the minute study of the Gospel literature, Dr. A. E. J. Rawlinson's great work, *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ* (1926), discusses with a wealth of learning the development of primitive Christian thought and the relationship between the portraiture of Jesus in the Gospels and contemporary religious movements. A striking feature of the works of Streeter and McNeile is the close association in which they place textual criticism and questions of literary and historical criticism. Both writers refuse to discuss these topics in isolation, and in many matters, notably the *Ur-Markus* theory and source criticism generally, are able to show how much light one line of inquiry throws upon another. Streeter's treatment of the textual problem is a fascinating attempt to relate the outstanding types of the New Testament text, and also the various Gospel sources, to the principal centers of early Christianity at Rome, Antioch, Caesarea, and Ephesus. Both Streeter and McNeile emphasize the importance of citing the textual authorities in groups, according as they agree with the Alexandrian, Eastern, or Western type of text. How far Streeter is right in isolating a Caesarean type of text, in the family Θ and its allies, remains as yet a disputed question. Burkitt objects that the text is too disparate to be treated as that of a family,[1] and Streeter has replied by claiming that W in Mark 5:31—16:8 "has preserved, with a relatively small amount of Byzantine correction, the fundamental text of the Θ family."[2] McNeile thinks that the position may become clearer if Streeter and Lake issue their projected edition of the Θ group.[3]

Streeter urges that it is of vital importance, when dealing with the synoptic problem, to realize that we must on occasion go behind the printed texts. With this opinion it is of interest to compare the views of C. H. Turner, who claims that the advancing study of the synoptic problem has provided us with an objective criterion additional to that of the MSS. "One accepts a reading, not because it is the reading of B, or of D, but because it conforms, say, to the Markan usage, or because it removes a difficulty in the way of the conclusion (reached on an independent line of argument) that Matthew and Luke tapped their Markan source without collusion with one another."[4] He goes on to say that the appeal to the *vera causa* of contamination of the text of one gospel by that of another, especially a more familiar gospel, "will often suggest the prima facie rejection of the reading of one group of authorities in favor of that of another group, without any absolute regard to their constituent members." Not many years ago this would have been regarded as a startling doctrine, and it is obvious, as indeed Turner recognizes, that the results of synoptic criticism must not be treated as necessarily final. None the less, and especially in his treatment of the minor agreements of Matthew and Luke, Canon Streeter has shown how great justification such a principle has, and how fruitful it becomes in various directions. "Renounce once and for all the chase of the phantom Ur-Marcus," he says, "and the study of the minor agreements becomes the highway to the recovery of the purest text of the Gospels."[5]

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[1] In the *Journal of Theological Studies* (April, 1925).

[2] In the *Journal of Theological Studies* (January, 1926); cf. also App. V in the second impression of *The Four Gospels*.

[3] Cf. *Introduction to the Study of the New Testament*, p. 429.

From the text of the New Testament to its language is but a step, and here it is enough to say that what has come to be known as "Deissmannism" becomes daily more securely intrenched in Great Britain. The successive issues of the parts of Moulton and Milligan's *Vocabulary of the Greek Testament* continue to reveal how closely related the language of the New Testament is to the vernacular of the times. The late J. H. Moulton's *Grammar* will shortly move another stage toward its completion in the hands of its learned editor, Professor W. F. Howard, of Birmingham; and in Part III of Volume II we shall witness a renewed attempt of modern research to come to terms with the vexed problem of Semitisms.[6] So far as the language of the Apocalypse is concerned, the works of R. H. Charles[7] have made a deep impression on the minds of those most insistent on the popular character of New Testament forms and usages.[8] On the other hand, C. F. Burney's *Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel* (1922) has failed to convince British scholars as to the soundness of its main thesis. The fact that Professor C. C. Torrey,[9] in supporting this hypothesis, rejected many of the alleged mistranslations on which Burney's argument rests, while advancing other examples of his own, has left an unfavorable impression. The Fourth Gospel doubtless reflects Aramaic formations, especially in the sayings of our Lord; but that the gospel is the translation of an Aramaic original does not appear to have been made out.[10]

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[4] Cited by McNeile, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

[5] *The Four Gospels*, p. 331.

The more interesting aspects of source criticism will be treated in Section II, but at this point it will be useful to speak of recent work regarding the much-debated source Q. In the main, British scholarship continues to hold firmly to the documentary theory of Q. In this persuasion it has not been shaken by H. G. Jameson's able attempt to rehabilitate the Augustinian theory of the priority of Matthew's gospel,[11] nor by the view of Jameson and E. W. Lummis[12] that Luke obtained his version of the sayings of Jesus from the First Gospel. The most recent treatment of the problem is that of Rev. J. M. C. Crum, in *The Original Jerusalem Gospel* (1927). Fresh and stimulating to a degree, this work, does not, I think, pay sufficient regard to the small amount of verbal correspondence in many of the sayings of Jesus common to Matthew and Luke. It is just the combination of close agreement and wide disparity in the sayings common to the two gospels which constitutes the crux of the problem, a difficulty seriously faced in Canon Streeter's M hypothesis, which is discussed later. The elimination of the Judaistic sayings from Q—a point on which Streeter and Crum differ—is confessedly a more speculative matter, and here again Streeter's hypothesis has very much to be said in its favor.

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[6] At the moment of writing, Part III of Vol. II is in the press.

[7] *Studies in the Apocalypse* (1913), and the *International Critical Commentary on the Apocalypse* (1920).

[8] Cf. Moulton's *Grammar*, II, 33 f.

[9] Cf. *Harvard Theological Review* (October, 1923).

[10] This is the opinion of Mr. G. R. Driver, in his article "The Original Language of the Fourth Gospel," in the *Jewish Guardian* (January 5 and 12, 1923). It is indorsed by Streeter, *op. cit.*, pp. 400 f., and by McNeile, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

[11] In *The Origin of the Synoptic Gospels* (1922).

[12] In *How Luke Was Written* (1915). Mr. Lummis has recently defended his theory in the *Hibbert Journal* (July, 1925).

As regards the wider questions of the historical value of the synoptic tradition, and, in particular, the views of the *formgeschichtliche Schule*, as yet little or nothing has appeared from the pens of British scholars. There is no doubt, however, that these questions are being patiently studied. From such indications as have appeared it does not seem likely that British scholars will consent to the abandonment of the Markan chronological framework,[13] although on the other hand they will welcome the classification and description of different types of Gospel narratives, put forward by Dr. Martin Dibelius and others, and will find in these studies a fresh pathway into the thicket of Gospel origins. Dr. McNeile, for example, while contending as against K. L. Schmidt's position in *Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu*, that the Markan outline must go back to the reminiscences of eyewitnesses, recognizes that "individual stories and sayings were undoubtedly handed down orally as isolated units," and that, in consequence, the Evangelists grouped and disposed "an almost haphazard bundle of treasures," each in his own way for his own reasons.[14]

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[13] "The verisimilitude of the development of the ministry as given in Mark is a miracle of artistry if it cannot be traced back to the coherent memory of a writer who recorded the story as he had heard it from one who was himself no small part in the developing drama" (Professor W. F. Howard, *London Quarterly Review*, July, 1927). The whole article ("The Study of the New Testament: Retrospect and Prospect") is a well-informed survey, mainly of British work and current developments in German criticism.

So far as questions of authorship are concerned, the only point which calls for notice here is that of the authorship of the Lukan writings. In this matter British scholarship continues to adhere to the view that both the Third Gospel and the Acts are the work of Luke, the companion of Paul. No doubt the investigation of Dr. H. J. Cadbury, in *The Style and Literary Method of Luke* (1919), has led to a more modest reliance on the "medical argument" so far as the Lukan vocabulary is concerned, though not to its abandonment.[15] But the negative attitude to the traditional authorship itself, present in *The Beginnings of Christianity* (Part I, Vol. II, 1922), and especially in the chapter[16] by Professor H. Windisch, has found little favor in Great Britain. The concluding pages of Streeter's *Four Gospels* supply what I think may be taken as a representative opinion[17] in relation to such points as the complex relations between the Acts and the Pauline Epistles, the "We-sections," the Apostolic Decree, the relation of Luke to Paulinism, the relation of Luke to Josephus, and the implications of Luke's Preface to the gospel. Of these points the only one on which there is any marked divergence is the alleged dependence of Luke on Josephus, and here, I imagine, the majority vote would be cast against the hypothesis of dependence.[18] On the question of authorship as a whole, Streeter voices a conviction widely shared when he says: "We thus arrive at the quite simple conclusion: the burden of proof is on those who would assert the traditional authorship of Matthew and John and on those who would deny it in the case of Mark and Luke."[19]

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[14] *Op. cit.*, pp. 451, 455.

[15] Cf. Moffatt, *Expositor* (July, 1922); Stanton, *Journal of Theological Studies* (July, 1923); McNeile, *op. cit.*, 92 ff.

[16] Discussed by the present writer in an article in the *Expositor* (October, 1925) on "The Lukan Authorship of the Third Gospel and the Acts."

[17] A still more recent survey is that of McNeile (*op. cit.*, pp. 85–108). McNeile urges that, if there are things which it is difficult to believe that a companion of Paul could have written, or omitted, "it is even more difficult to think, in many cases, that they could have been written or omitted by a later compiler who would presumably be in possession of the epistles and could keep all his statements in harmony with them" (p. 107).

II

In the present section I propose to discuss Canon Streeter's two recent contributions to the synoptic problem: the Four Document and the Proto-Luke hypotheses; and, in the case of the latter, at the suggestion of the editor of this *Journal,* some reference will be made to my own work in *Behind the Third Gospel*.

The Four Document hypothesis represents an attempt to do fuller justice to the complex facts of the synoptic problem than is possible by the aid of the well-known Two Document hypothesis. It is right, I think, to say that in presenting his new suggestion, Canon Streeter goes too far in saying that the Two Document hypothesis has "broken down." The theory that Matthew and Luke used two principal written sources—Mark and the Sayings document, Q—remains the key to the intricacies of the problem. What Canon Streeter has been able to show is that we need additional keys, or—if the expression be preferred—a more perfected key, if we are to achieve greater success. At the same time the more uncompromising manner in which he has expressed his views has enabled him to expose not a few fallacies of which Two Document theorists are often guilty. Among these is the idea that "it is just a little discreditable to any saying of our Lord if it cannot be traced to Q";[20] the delusion that the less written sources we posit, the better; the assumption that editorial modification of the same source sufficiently accounts for the differences between Matthaean and Lukan versions of the sayings of Jesus.

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[18] Streeter suggests that Luke may have heard Josephus lecture in Rome; but on the question as a whole is "quite unconvinced that there is dependence of any kind" (*op. cit.*, p. 557). Cf. McNeile: "The theory of indebtedness cannot be considered proved" (*op. cit.*, p. 35).

[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 562.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 227.

As the term "Four Document hypothesis" suggests, Streeter adds to Mark and Q two other documentary sources: a Jerusalem source (M), used by Matthew, containing discourse matter and parables; and a Caesarean source (L), embracing narratives and parables, used by Luke. The arguments in favor of this hypothesis follow, in the main, two distinct lines. On the one hand, Streeter stresses the probability of the existence of parallel versions of the sayings and stories of Jesus in various centers of primitive Christianity, and claims that, in point of fact, such versions actually existed. On the other hand, he points to evidence within the Gospels which leads us to presume the use of M and L.

The broader argument for the existence of parallel versions can hardly be resisted. "Whenever the sayings and doings of a remarkable person are preserved in the memory of his followers, different versions of what is substantially the same matter soon become current."[21] Convincing proof of this statement is found in the early lives of St. Francis, and Streeter is able to supply a modern illustration from his own experience in preparing for publication an account of the life and personality of Sadhu Sundar Singh.[22] But have we any positive evidence of the existence of parallel versions of the sayings and doings of Jesus? The argument from non-canonical sources[23] is less convincing, I think, than Streeter supposes it to be; for these sources may well have been oral only; and what we require is evidence pointing to written sources. Much the stronger argument is the contention that Mark and Q are independent; for if this can be sustained we have a definite example of separate and independent collections of Logia in different centers of early Christianity. We may say, indeed, that Mark's independence of Q, denied formerly by Streeter,[24] but now accepted by him,[25] is a position of fundamental importance in relation to the Four Document hypothesis.

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[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 238.

[22] *Op. cit.*, pp. 191 ff.

[23] The examples cited by Streeter are the Ep. of Clem. (xiii. 1 f.), the Gospel according to the Hebrews, the two ancient interpolations in Matt. 16:2 f. and 20:28, and the Oxyrhynchus Logia. *Op. cit.*, pp. 239 f.

But, apart from general considerations, what right have we to speak of such definite entities as M and L, and of their use by Matthew and Luke respectively? Streeter's answer rests, in part, on the serious difficulties left over by the Q hypothesis. In very many of the Matthaean and Lukan reports of the sayings of Jesus the high degree of verbal correspondence justifies us in assuming the use of the common source Q; but in other cases the linguistic agreement is so small that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to suppose that the Evangelists are dependent on Q alone. The Parable of the Lost Sheep (Matt. 18:12–14; Luke 15:3–7) furnishes a case in point. In order to trace the two versions to Q, Harnack was compelled to account for the saying, "There shall be joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, ..." by describing it as an editorial addition. Streeter's comment is: "The scales fell from my eyes."[26] Much the more rational supposition is that the Evangelists are dependent on at least two parallel versions of the parable. So far as Matthew is concerned, this inference is fortified by the study of the Evangelist's actual literary methods. In such test passages as Matt 10:9–15[27] and 13:31 f.[28] we can see him actually at work; and the method is that of a proved conflator of sources. Each passage is a literary patchwork of words taken from Mark and Q. Thus, Streeter enunciates, as a new principle of synoptic criticism, the following: "Whenever parallel passages of Matthew and Luke exhibit marked divergence, *editorial modification of Q*

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[24] Cf. *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, pp. 165 ff.

[25] Cf. *The Four Gospels*, pp. 186 ff.

[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

[27] The charge to the Twelve.

[28] The Parable of the Mustard Seed (cf. Mark 4:30–2, Luke 13:18 f.). Streeter argues that practically every word in Matt. 13:31 f. is drawn either from Mark or Q (*op. cit.*, p. 247).

is a less probable explanation than the conflation of Q by Matthew with the language of a parallel version."[29]

The next step is to show how this principle works out when it is applied. In the case of the Sermon on the Mount, after deducting obvious Q passages, we are left with some two-thirds of the Matthaean sermon, which "reads like a continuous and coherent discourse";[30] and the explanation appears to be that Matthew is conflating two separate discourses: "one from Q, practically identical with Luke's Sermon on the Plain, the other from M, containing a much longer sermon."[31] The same hypothesis gives an admirable account of other Matthaean discourses (e.g., the woes to the Pharisees and the charge to the Twelve), and an explanation of the Matthaean and Lukan forms of the Beatitudes, the Lord's Prayer, the Parables of the Lost Sheep, the Marriage Feast, and the Talents. That a continuous source is in question, Streeter argues from the common features possessed by contexts in which the use of M may be suspected,[32] and, in particular, from the signs of a Judaistic tendency in such passages as Matt. 5:17–20; 10:5 f., 23; 23:2 f.

Taken as a whole, the M hypothesis seems to me to possess considerable force; it certainly throws light upon many difficulties left over by the Two Document hypothesis. But, by its very nature, the new hypothesis must always remain inferential in character, since M, if it really existed, has found its grave in a single gospel.

The corresponding case for presuming the existence of L is, I think, of a much more dubious character. We have little or no evidence to show that Luke was a conflator of sources.

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[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 249. The italics are Streeter's.

[30] *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

[32] Streeter suggests that Matt. 5:17–20 "reflects the attitude of Jewish Christians who, while barely tolerating the proceedings of Paul, regarded as the pattern Christian, James, surnamed the Just." He suggests that Matt. 10:5 f. and 23 "look like the beginning and end of a Judaistic version of the charge to the Twelve" (*op. cit.*, pp. 255–57).

Moreover, the more we invoke the aid of M to account for passages where the linguistic agreement between Matthew and Luke is small, the less need have we to presuppose the existence of L as a sayings document; it is enough in such cases to say that Luke is reproducing Q. Another objection is the formless character of the L tradition. "Anyone who will make a list of the sections peculiar to Luke from 3:1 onwards will find what a formless collection it is; it is not even the remains of a documentary source. In this respect it compares unfavorably with Mark and Q, and even with M, so far as we can trace this source in the canonical Matthew. Under scrutiny L crumbles away, except as a convenient symbol for the oral tradition of Caesarea, or for this tradition reduced to writing in the rough jottings of Luke's notebook."[33] On the synoptic problem as a whole I am strongly inclined to ask: Is not the solution to be found by positing three foundation documents, Mark, Q, and M, Matthew using all three, together with the oral tradition of the place where his gospel was written (Antioch?), and Luke employing Mark and Q, the oral tradition of Caesarea (L) and the special sources on which Luke, chapters 1 and 2, rest?

In treating the Proto-Luke hypothesis it is important to insist that it does not depend on the validity of the Four Document hypothesis. Indeed, Canon Streeter stated the former before developing the latter, and my own investigation in *Behind the Third Gospel* starts from the Two Document hypothesis. As a matter of fact, the Proto-Luke hypothesis is not tied down to any theory of the composition and nature of Q. "Even if Q were a purely oral source, a view which is most improbable, it would still be possible to deduce the existence of Proto-Luke from the disposition of Markan and non-Markan matter within the Third Gospel."[34]

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[33] Cited from my article on "The Four-Document Hypothesis" in the *London Quarterly Review* (July, 1926).

[34] *Behind the Third Gospel*, p. vii.

I propose merely to state, in a somewhat summary fashion, the broad arguments on which the Proto-Luke hypothesis rests, and to discuss at greater length some of the questions which arise out of it and some of the criticisms to which it is exposed. The principal arguments may be stated as follows: (1) In Luke, Markan and non-Markan matter is distributed in belts or stripes. (2) The passion narrative (22:14 ff.) appears to consist of a continuous non-Markan narrative supplemented by "Markan additions." (3) The non-Markan sections possess real, though not unbroken, continuity, and can be read as a whole. (4) On the contrary, the Markan sections have no such unity; each has a special character of its own; and together they supply what is lacking in the non-Markan sections. (5) Q matter appears in non-Markan contexts only, where it is fused with the special Lukan tradition (L). (6) The omission of so much of Mark presents no difficulty if this document is used by Luke as a secondary source. (7) Many striking phenomena within the Third Gospel are at once explained if the non-Markan sections are the sundered parts of an original source which constitutes the framework of the gospel.[35]

On the basis of these arguments it is suggested that at least two stages lie behind the canonical Luke: (1) Q has been cast into narrative form by the aid of local tradition, and fitted with a passion narrative. (2) Later, into the framework thus provided, sections have been inserted from the Gospel of Mark, and the whole preceded by the preface and birth stories of Luke, chapters 1 and 2. Streeter's suggestion[36] is that Luke made good use of his opportunities of collecting information and made copious notes during the two years he was at Caesarea in the company of Paul, and that later on, "probably not till after the death of Paul,"[37] on the basis of a copy of Q and his own notes, Luke "composed Proto-Luke as a Gospel for the use of the Church in the place where he was then living." This last suggestion[38] is not, of course, a necessary part of the hypothesis; and on the whole it is better, I think, to speak of Proto-Luke as a first draft which never passed into circulation because of its incompleteness. "No longer in touch with his intermediaries, St. Luke could proceed no further with his task until he lighted upon the Gospel of St. Mark."[39] The question of the authorship of Proto-Luke will no doubt be variously estimated, but on this matter the advantage lies, I think, with the view which identifies its author with the Evangelist.[40] The question of the writer's intermediaries is more speculative. The best suggestion, supported by the contents of Proto-Luke, is that the author derived his information through such (secondary) intermediaries as the daughters of Philip the Evangelist at Caesarea (cf. Acts 21:8 ff.).[41] Proto-Luke might well be called the "Gospel of Woman."

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[35] E.g., the opening verses of Luke, chapter 3, the position of the genealogy, the order in which Mark is reproduced, the position given to the Sermon at Nazareth, the so-called "Greater Interpolation," the position assigned to the Cure of the Blind Man at Jericho, and the implications of Luke's preface.

[36] *Op. cit.*, pp. 218 f.

The hypothesis just outlined has been received in Great

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[37] This should be remembered in connection with Dr. E. G. Selwyn's preference for Streeter's date (given by Dr. Selwyn as A.D. 57–59) rather than mine (A.D. 60–65). See *Theology* (March, 1927), pp. 121 f. Dr. Selwyn is thinking, I believe, of Streeter's first statement of the Proto-Luke hypothesis in the *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1921 (cf. p. 112), but in *The Four Gospels* Streeter has modified his view, to the improvement of the hypothesis. Cf. *Behind the Third Gospel*, pp. 25, 211 ff.: "Notes would doubtless be made at Caesarea, but that Proto-Luke was actually compiled there is open to question. One feels that further efforts would have been made to expand the account of the earlier Galilean period had St. Luke been in immediate touch with his informants at the actual time of writing. . . . For these reasons we date Proto-Luke A.D. 60–65, and look upon Caesarea as the place where the first steps were taken, rather than the actual place of composition" (*ibid.*, pp. 212 f.).

[38] On this point see Streeter's reply to Dr. Headlam's preference for the idea of two stages, rather than two editions, of the Gospel (*op. cit.*, p. 221). Cf. Headlam, *The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ*, pp. 20 f.

[39] *Behind the Third Gospel*, p. 213.

[40] Cf. Streeter, *op. cit.*, pp. 217 ff.; *Behind the Third Gospel*, pp. 202 ff.

[41] Cf. Streeter, *op. cit.*, p. 219; and see also Harnack, *Luke the Physician*, p. 157, and Sanday, Streeter, and Bartlet in *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problems*, pp. xxi, 224, 351 ff.

Britain with a large measure of sympathy and support.[42] With reference to the preference of Luke for the non-Markan source as a whole, Dr. F. C. Burkitt has said:[43] "This is very much what I said in *Earliest Sources* (p. 97), as Canon Streeter points out on page 158. It is a great satisfaction to find one's own theories indorsed by subsequent independent investigation!" Indeed, as I have elsewhere endeavored to show,[44] the Proto-Luke hypothesis stands in line with quite a number of earlier inquiries into the composition of Luke's gospel on the part of such scholars as Feine, B. Weiss, J. Weiss, Burkitt, Stanton, Hawkins, Bartlet, Sanday, and Perry.

The main points in the Proto-Luke hypothesis which have been singled out for criticism are: (1) the view that the Lukan passion narrative is based on a non-Markan source; and (2) the claim that Mark does not supply the framework of the Third Gospel. Other objections[45] have also been raised on the ground of the admirable balance of Luke's gospel and the confusion which follows when the Markan sections are removed; the fragmentary character of the journey section, and the failure of Proto-Luke to leave on the mind an impression of internal completeness; the fact that, on the Proto-Luke hypothesis, the supplementary character of Mark becomes a "happy coincidence."

Of these criticisms the most important are the first two; the others do not seem very formidable. The superiority of the Third Gospel in balance and arrangement over what, by hypothesis, is a first draft, is merely what we ought to expect.

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[42] General agreement with the Proto-Luke hypothesis has been expressed by F. C. Burkitt, A. S. Peake, A. H. McNeile, H. G. Wood, J. V. Bartlet, W. K. L. Clarke, H. T. Andrews, W. F. Howard, G. S. Duncan, and others. J. V. Bartlet prefers to find the basis of Proto-Luke, not in a Q document, but in Gospel tradition "in the mixed form of sayings at the heart of incidents" (*Congregational Quarterly*, January, 1927).

[43] *The Journal of Theological Studies*, XXVI, 280.

[44] *Op. cit.*, pp. 2–27.

[45] In the review of *Behind the Third Gospel* in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (January, 1927). Preference is also expressed for the orthodox doctrine that Mark is the framework of Luke.

I agree that, with the removal of the earlier Markan sections, the Galilean ministry is seriously attenuated; but can we say that "the proportion of the work is wholly destroyed"? In the following table the verses of the four sections in the Third Gospel, Luke 1—4:15, 4:16—9:50, 9:51—20, 21–24, are compared with the corresponding verses in Proto-Luke.

Luke . . .	185 (16.0%)	273 (23.7%)	475 (41.2%)	218 (18.9%)
Pr. Lk. . . .	53 (7.5%)	117 (16.6%)	389 (55.4%)	143 (20.3%)

I suggest that these figures show that the final building has followed, with improvements, the lines of the first erection. Whether Proto-Luke leaves upon the mind "an impression of internal completeness" or not will no doubt be variously estimated. Much depends on the kind of standard we apply. A source beginning with a sixfold date and including a swift review of the Galilean mission and a loosely constructed journey section, leading on to a passion and resurrection narrative, may leave a good deal to be desired; but it is not a formless collection. It is true that the "We-sections" in the Acts are very different in character; but here, as I believe, Luke was an eyewitness. In the case of Proto-Luke he was dependent on good, but secondary, tradition. As to the objection that the supplementary character of Mark is a "happy coincidence," I can only ask if this is not always the situation when one source is expanded by means of another. As well might we say that the JE hypothesis would be "strengthened" if the supplementary character of E "were not merely a happy coincidence"!

The case against the non-Markan character of the Lukan passion narrative is stated by Mr. J. W. Hunkin in the April issue of the *Journal of Theological Studies* (1927), where it is contended that "the simplest hypothesis is that St. Luke deliberately corrects the Markan narrative." Faced by the low percentage of Markan words in Luke 22:14—24:11 (27 per cent as compared with 53 in the earlier Markan sections), Mr. Hunkin bases an argument on Luke 21:5–36 (the eschatological section). Here the percentage of Markan words is 37, and the inference is drawn that Luke "uses Mark with a degree of freedom which varies very considerably from section to section." The usefulness of this argument is apparent, but its basis in the eschatological discourse seems to me extremely doubtful.[46] But, even if this were not so, are we to ignore such Markan passages as Luke 4:31–44 (52 per cent); 5:12—6:11 (53.6 per cent); 8:4—9:50 (53 per cent); 18:15–43 (68 per cent); 20:1—21:4 (61.9 per cent); and must we find our criterion in Luke 21:5–36 (37 per cent) alone? In the main Luke follows Mark with a high degree of fidelity: What, then, are we to make of a percentage of only 27 in the passion narrative, especially when we find so many of the Markan words massed in short passages which have every appearance of being secondary strata? The difficulties are still greater when we discover that many of the items in Hawkins's list of twelve variations from the Markan order coincide with these "secondary strata." The same hypothesis which explains them as "insertions" accounts for the variation of order. Pendants to the Lukan story, their position, as compared with Mark's order, is bound to be different. This view of the situation is further confirmed by the fact that, while many of these "insertions" appear in new contexts, they do so in the order of their original Markan sequence.[47]

Mr. Hunkin adroitly suggests that, roughly speaking and with certain important omissions, my list[48] of fourteen "Markan insertions" gives a table of contents of Luke 22:14—24:12, and says: "If these are 'Markan insertions,' then the framework of the whole section is Markan." A sufficient reply to this contention is the character of the list. It consists of five sayings of Jesus, one of Pilate, a quotation from the Psalms, a list of names, two narratives (the Denial and the Burial), and brief references to Simon of Cyrene, the superscription, the miraculous darkness and rending, and the severing of the high priest's servant's ear. The attempt, by the aid of this list, to show that "Mark seems to provide the general outline of the whole story" is not a hopeful undertaking. One has to try to cover what is not really a framework at all with the burden of the abundant material which Luke had himself collected. Probability and simplicity are surely on the side of those who reverse this process.

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[46] Cf. Perry, *The Sources of Luke's Passion-Narrative*, p. 38, and also my own investigation, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–25. Mr. Hunkin invokes the verdict of "the great majority of scholars" who "will probably agree with Professor Burkitt that Mark, chapter 13, is here the only written source before St. Luke." In reply, I suggest that Luke, chapter 21, still calls for further study; as yet most scholars have approached the passage holding the view that the framework of Luke's gospel is Markan.

[47] Cf. *Behind the Third Gospel*, pp. 72 ff.

[48] Luke 22:19*a*, 22, 34, 46*b* (?), 50*b*, 52–53*a*, 54*b*–61; 23:3, 26, 34*b* (?), 38, 44–45, 50–54; 24:10 (?).

In turning to the question of the framework of the Third Gospel, I should like to call attention to the large measure of agreement between Mr. Hunkin and supporters of the Proto-Luke hypothesis. Mr. Hunkin frankly concedes the existence of a document Q+L, though he prefers to think of this document rather as a collection of discourse, the discourse being sometimes attached to, or imbedded in, anecdote. He is also ready to accept Streeter's hypothesis so far as it concerns the origin of Luke 9:51—18:14.[49] What is more important still, he admits that Q, worked over and improved upon by the Evangelist, enters into the final composition only through the document Q+L. The point of difference concerns the use of Mark as a supplementary source, and here Mr. Hunkin is of the opinion that Luke adopts the Markan framework.[50] The Evangelist rewrites the Markan narratives, correcting them and making additions from his own stock of material (Q+L, and other records, L′). The point might be thought to be one of subordinate importance, and in a sense it is, but on the other hand, the opinion we form on this question must affect the value we put upon Q+L, and determine our right to speak of this document as Proto-Luke.

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[49] "The theory that this collection was formed by building on to extracts from Q material collected by St. Luke himself during his visit to Palestine, particularly during his stay at Caesarea, is an illuminating theory which seems to fit the main facts and may well be accepted" (*op. cit.*, p. 255).

[50] Dr. T. Stephenson had already expressed a similar opinion in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, XXIII, 250. Dr. Stephenson agrees that Q and L had been combined into a unity before they were united with Mark, but hesitates in relegating Mark to a secondary position.

Mr. Hunkin gives a good deal of attention to the application of his theory and is able to show that it gives a good account of the composition of the Third Gospel. But no one, I think, will question this, certainly not those who prefer the Proto-Luke hypothesis. "It is not to be denied that the accepted theory explains many facts within the Third Gospel, but the question is whether it explains all the facts, and whether indeed the facts which it does explain are not better accounted for by the Proto-Luke hypothesis."[51] This, I suggest, is the issue which critics of the newer views will have to meet; the credibility and consistency of the orthodox theory is not in dispute. It is in this respect that Mr. Hunkin's criticism seems to me unsatisfactory. This is especially the case if he has failed, as I think he has, in showing that the passion narrative rests on the Markan framework. "If St. Luke uses Mark as his principal authority, why does he abandon that source at its final and most important point?"[52] The question is but one of many which arise when we try to explain the Third Gospel as a revised and expanded edition of Mark. Why, for example, is not Q+L broken up and distributed within the Markan outline? How is it that when Luke rejects a Markan narrative he does not insert his parallel version at the same point? Why does he dislocate the Markan framework by inserting some 350 verses (the so-called "Greater Interpolation") between Mark 9:40 and Mark 10:13? Why is so much of Mark's gospel omitted? How is it that the non-Markan sections possess a unity which makes them readable, while the Markan sections are topical panels which supply the deficiencies of Q+L? Most of these questions are not discussed by Mr. Hunkin. He concentrates rather upon the looseness of the structure of the non-Markan sections, and suggests that as they lay in Q+L, the structure was looser still. Luke 3:1—4:30 is selected for more detailed discussion, and, as against Canon Streeter,[53] it is claimed that this passage consists of excerpts from Q+L (3:7–20 and 4:1 ff.) fitted within the Markan outline.

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[51] *Behind the Third Gospel*, pp. 182 f.

[52] *Op. cit.*, p. 184.

Stated briefly, Mr. Hunkin's account of the composition of Luke 3:1—4:30 is as follows. To a statement from Mark (Luke 3:2*b*–4), Luke prefixes the chronological statement of Luke 3:1–2*a*, adds two more verses to the quotation from Isaiah, and inserts Luke 3:7–20 from Q+L. He then takes Luke 3:21 f. from Mark (1:9–11) and inserts the genealogy before passing on to the temptation (Luke 4:1–13). "He follows Mark in putting this account here, but takes the story itself from Q." In giving Luke 4:16–30 (the rejection from Nazareth) its present position, the Evangelist may have been influenced by Mark 1:14 (cf. Luke 4:14 f.). After inserting this incident from L, he returns to Mark at Luke 4:31.

It will be seen that the alleged points of connection with the Markan outline are 3:2*b*–4, 3:21 f., and 4:14 f. In all these cases, except to some extent the first,[54] the linguistic agreements with Mark are of the slenderest; while in the case of the second (the baptism), the differences from Mark (1:9–11) and the agreements with Matthew[55] (3:16 f.) point rather to the use of Q. Mr. Hunkin rightly points out that Luke 3:18–20 "looks very much like an editorial summary," but this does not necessarily imply that Luke 3:7–20 was a separate unit in Q+L. Such editorial summaries are numerous in the Lukan writings,[56] and, I believe, are matters of style in the course of continuous narrative, rather than the *termini* of fragments. Moreover, on Mr. Hunkin's theory one would expect the passage to have been cancelled[57] in the process of dovetailing. The theory is open to other objections,[58] but the main difficulty is the fact that the proposal as a whole makes Luke 3:1—4:30 a skilfully executed mosaic, more like the craftsmanship of the First Evangelist than the bolder and freer treatment characteristic of Luke.

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[53] *Op. cit.*, pp. 205 f.

[54] The phrase "the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins" is probably taken from Mark. Cf. Streeter, *op. cit.*, p. 205, and see *Behind the Third Gospel*, p. 77.

[55] In using ἀνοίγω and the participle of βαπτίζω

On the Proto-Luke hypothesis, the Evangelist's procedure, I submit, is simpler and more convincing. In constructing Proto-Luke, he takes three sections from Q—the preaching of John, the baptism, and the temptation. He expands the first, precedes it with the sixfold date, and rounds it off with a characteristic summary. To the second he appends the genealogy, at the point where Jesus is mentioned for the first time. The third is followed by the reference to the departure to Galilee[59] and the synagogue-ministry, which prepares the way for the account of the sermon at Nazareth. When producing the Third Gospel, the Evangelist takes over the entire section to form the beginning of his new work, adding, it may be, a few details from Mark such as the phrase "the baptism of repentance unto remission of sins." He then draws from Mark the Galilean section, 4:31–44, which describes a typical twenty-four hours in the ministry of Jesus.

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[56] Cf. Luke 1:66, 80; 2:40, 52; 3:18–20; 4:13, 14 f.; 7:1; 8:1–3; 11:53 f.; 13:22; 19:28.

[57] The anticipatory reference to the imprisonment of John in 3:19 f. is somewhat strange even if 3:21 f. is from Q; but it is still stranger if the source is Mark 1:9–11, where John's activity is specifically mentioned.

[58] Thus, I find it difficult to think that the Western reading in 3:22 might represent "a deliberate intention" on the part of Luke, especially if he had transcribed the birth stories. To the question "Where more properly should the author have placed [the genealogy]?" the answer is "Nowhere, if the Proto-Luke hypothesis is true." The point is that on this hypothesis the position is self-evident. The same is true of the sixfold date in 3:1 f.

Luke's suggested aversion to camel's hair (Mark 1:6) is not convincing. Did he not know his Old Testament? Cf. II Kings 1:8 and Zech. 13:4.

The reference to angels (Mark 1:13) is absent from Luke's account of the temptation, probably because Q did not mention them; Matt. 4:11*b* is from Mark. I should reverse Mr. Hunkin's argument. Having regard to Luke's fondness for angels, his silence suggests that he is not using Mark at all. See further my article in the *Journal of Theological Studies* January, 1928: "Is the Proto-Luke Hypothesis Sound?"

[59] Streeter suggests that 4:14 f. may be derived from Q. He points out that Matt. 4:13 and Luke 4:16 agree in using the form *Nazara,* which occurs nowhere else in the New Testament. "It would look as if Q . . . . had a brief notice of the change of scene in which the name *Nazara* occurred" (*op. cit.,* p. 206).

For the reasons outlined, the Proto-Luke hypothesis, as originally presented, seems to offer the best available account of the composition of the Third Gospel. It may very well be that the conception of Q+L as a collection of discourse matter, sometimes imbedded in narratives, may carry us into the stages which lie behind Proto-Luke itself; but, as a modification of Streeter's hypothesis, Mr. Hunkin's suggestion does not commend itself as an improvement.

The critical reasons for presuming the existence of Proto-Luke are fortified by a review of its historical and doctrinal character. Its theology is of a primitive cast, consisting of the representation of Christ as "the Divine Son, anointed by God, who in filial obedience fulfils a ministry of Grace involving suffering and death."[60] Streeter's opinion is that as historical authorities Mark and Proto-Luke "should probably be regarded as on the whole of approximately equal value"; and it is on this ground that he claims that "far more weight will have to be given by the historian in the future to the Third Gospel, and in particular to those portions of it which are peculiar to itself."[61] The conclusion reached in *Behind the Third Gospel*, after a detailed study of the historical value of Proto-Luke, is that we have good reason to trust it as an early and reliable historical work.[62] "Its study does not in the least lead us to disparage Mark, or to make impossible claims for John, but in important respects it does permit us to supplement these gospels, and in a measure this is true of the Third Gospel also."[63] Proto-Luke does not supply us with the record of an eyewitness; its narratives often describe incidents "seen as through a veil, by which details and sharp outlines are hidden,"[64] and its account of the progress of events is slight and fragmentary. None the less it furnishes invaluable independent tradition, based on foundations which do not crumble under scrutiny: "It throws back into the earliest stages of Gospel tradition the picture of a Christ whose compassion blesses the outcasts of society, and whose last words to man are a message of hope to a dying thief."[65]

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[60] *Behind the Third Gospel*, p. 271.

[61] *Op. cit.*, p. 222.

[62] *Op. cit.*, p. 254.

NOTE.—I have attempted to supply a provisional reconstruction of the text of Proto-Luke, in the language of the R. V., in *The First Draft of St. Luke's Gospel* (a pamphlet printed by the S.P.C.K., London). The text includes the following passages: Luke 3:1—4:30; 5:1–11; 6:12—8:3; 9:51—18:14; 19:1–28; 19:37–44; 19:47–48; 22:14–24 (less the "Markan insertions" mentioned above).

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[63] *Op. cit.*, p. 254.

[64] *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

[65] *Op. cit.*, p. 274.

THE CULT STORY OF THE EARLY CHURCH

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INCREASING light is being thrown upon the problem of gospel origins by a consideration of the material contained in them from the point of view of its function in the life of the early church. The most fruitful researches in recent years have been made by those scholars who see the beginning Christian church as a vital social movement and seek to orient it again in its own world. This reorientation has illuminated, in a remarkable way, the function of the various literary productions of the church; but the greatest gain has been made in the light that has been thrown upon the processes of gospel formation. The activities in the church, which placed their stamp upon the gospel material, have given an entirely new interest to the whole field of gospel study.

Special attention has been directed to the central importance of the passion story in the early church, as the nucleus around which the gospel material gradually took its final shape. The German *Formgeschichte* has rendered good service at this point, mainly in the way of calling attention to the fluid state of the material before it was written down as it stands now in the gospels. The method has been unable, however, to do more than to recognize this period when the gospels existed in the form of unwritten material, and has not been able to make any adequate contribution to the problem that remains for the investigator, after he has reached this point. Bertram's excellent research on the passion story, in which he handles the material up to the death of Jesus, suffers from an inadequate definition of "cult." He defines cult as that mystical union of the believer and worshiping community with the cult Lord, such as characterized the Pauline churches.[1] This overlooks the fact that Paul's mysticism was by no means typical of all the churches and that very many activities in addition to mystical devotion and fellowship contributed to the formation of gospel material, and to the life of the church in general. It is correct, however, to consider the narrative of the death and resurrection of Jesus as the cult story of the beginning church.[2] The interest of this research is directed in particular to the narrative of the resurrection.

The word "cult," as used here, means the Christian movement in all of its aspects—its missionary activities, its ceremonies, and its private and corporate devotional life, experience, and thought. The cult story is always an important feature of religion. In all primitive religions it was the central feature, for it was that body of traditions which was most closely associated with their ceremonials.[3] It was the literary basis of the activities and furnished the interpretation of them. The cult lore was intimately bound up with the sacred ceremonials and partook of the same sanctity; it furnished the imaginative setting which produced the dramatic illusion and emotional satisfaction; it was the verbal expression of the ideational processes; the myth usually was descriptive of typical experiences of the tribe attributed to ancestral beings; and, because they represented real experiences, they were accepted without question from generation to generation; the leader as the determining factor in the hunt or war naturally came to assume importance in the myth, and so the kings, warriors, and heroes, as saviors of the social group, caused an increasing importance to be ascribed to divine men, with the consequent replacing of the sacred animals, and the anthropomorphizing of the gods. Now, in the present discussion, Christianity is not considered as a primitive religion, but the function which the cult myth of the primitive religion served is of help here in the understanding of the use which the early church made of the passion narratives.

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[1] Georg Bertram, *Die Leidensgeschichte Jesu und der Christuskult* (1922).

[2] B. W. Bacon, *The Apostolic Message* (1926), pp. 121 f.; M. Dibelius, *Geschichte der urchristlichen Literatur* (1926), I, 32 ff.

[3] E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (1910), pp. 152 ff.

I

It is clear, in the first place, that the narrative of the resurrection of Jesus was very prominent in the preaching of the early church. The earliest witness to this fact is Paul. The resurrection story was central in his preaching, according to his own summary of what he preached to the church at Corinth (I Cor. 15:1–8). He was very careful to prove by many witnesses that Jesus had risen from the dead. The resurrection demonstrated to Paul that Jesus was the Son of God, that he was given pre-eminence over all creatures; because of it Jesus had been permitted to sit down at the right hand of God, after bringing redemption and salvation and conquering death; the resurrection of Jesus was an example of the martyr's reward, it showed God's great power, and, in short, was the gospel of Christ which Paul preached. We may be certain, therefore, that Paul told the story of the resurrection over and over, wherever he preached, in Syria, Asia Minor, and Europe.

The resurrection of Jesus, as has often been shown, did not have the same sacramental function for most of the early Christians that it had for Paul; but the function which it did have for them was none the less vital for their religious life. This conclusion is borne out by the record of the place held by the resurrection in the early preaching recorded in Acts. At his ascension Jesus told the disciples that they should be his witnesses to all the earth; and, that that meant bearing testimony to the resurrection, is shown by the selection of Matthias, in the place of Judas, explicitly for that purpose. The first great example of this witnessing and preaching was the sermon of Peter on Pentecost; and its central theme, before the assembled multitudes, was that Jesus had risen from the dead. In Solomon's porch, a short time later, the burden of

Peter's sermon was the same. For this very reason, the Sadducees were aroused to suppress the preaching of Peter and John; and when Peter made his defense before the Sanhedrin, he bore his testimony to the same fact again. Under the stimulus of the persecution, it is reported that the apostles gave their witness with great power. When Stephen was brought before the council, he gave the historical justification for his message, and then, while being stoned, bore his testimony to the resurrection by describing his vision of the risen Lord at the right hand of God. Philip began with the suffering-servant passage and preached Jesus to the Ethiropian. After Paul's conversion, he began, at once, to preach that Jesus was the Christ and the Son of God. The message which Peter carried to Cornelius was that Jesus had risen. The message presented on the mission fields of Asia Minor was summarized by Paul at Antioch of Pisidia, where he said that Jesus saw no corruption. The same testimony was borne by Paul at Thessalonica, Athens, Corinth, and, later, before the mob in Jerusalem and the Roman courts. All of this shows that, although the resurrection did not have the same sacramental significance in the Book of Acts that it had in the letters of Paul, the central theme of this remarkable volume is the same testimony.

The testimony of Paul and Acts as to the content of the early Christian preaching is supported by the evidence of the other New Testament sources. The greatest witnesses of all are the Gospels. When they were written, the passion story, to which the resurrection alone gave validity, had assumed the primary place in tradition, and in the experience of the church. No other conclusion can be drawn from the large amount of space which the Gospels devote to the passion. It cannot be doubted that, where the Gospels originated, the passion and resurrection furnished the chief materials for preaching. It seems probable even that the Gospels originated from sermons which were written down after the original eyewitnesses were dead. At least, that is the explanation which Papias gives for the origin of Mark.[4] Matthew and Luke are literary expansions of Mark; but that does not weaken the statement that the original tradition took form through preaching. Nor does the absence of any reference to the resurrection in the Logia weaken that conclusion. One might conclude just as logically that Matthew and Luke did not have a resurrection story, since they have the Logia. We simply do not know the history of the Logia earlier than its form in the Synoptics. The importance of the resurrection in the preaching of the second generation is shown by the fact that later tradition gave validity to its practice by having Jesus himself preach his own resurrection before his death, and then open the Scriptures to explain it, after his rising. And the testimony of the remaining books and Revelation is all to the same effect, that one important function of the written accounts, as well as the oral tradition of the resurrection, was to provide the early Christian preacher with his message. And that the same is true of the second century and later is made certain both by the large number of uncanonical accounts of the passion and resurrection which continued to appear and by the numerous treatises in defense of the resurrection which were written by the early Church Fathers.

II

A second use of the resurrection narrative, as well as the entire passion story, was in connection with the celebration of the Lord's Supper. The narrative accompanied the celebration just as was the case in the ceremonials of all ancient religions. The earliest accounts of the Lord's Supper occur in Paul's letters. The sacramental nature of the ceremony is shown by his statement that the cup and bread are a communion of the body and blood of Christ, and by his setting of the table of the Lord in opposition to the table of demons, which was found in the rival cults in Corinth (I Cor. 10:16–21). The celebration had become an orgiastic meal at Corinth, just like those in the cults; and the apostle disapproved of this. He wanted it to be done with proper decency and courtesy. In order to correct the abuses, he called attention to the sacredness of the ceremony by citing the narrative which it portrayed, and which was, no doubt, told in connection with the celebration. He explained how, on the night of his betrayal, Jesus had blessed the bread and the cup and told the disciples to keep the ceremony in memory of him. And to make specific just what he meant, he said: "For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink the cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till he come" (I Cor. 11:17–34). The word used by Paul here is χαταγγέλλειν, the very word used to denote the telling of the sacred narratives which accompanied the celebration of the cult ceremonies of the time.[5] There can be no doubt that the Lord's Supper acquired its meaning from the relating of the events leading up to the tragic death, of the triumphant resurrection, and of the expectancy of his imminent return. The incidental way in which Paul mentioned these facts shows that they were familiar to the church. The same custom is borne out, also, by the record in the Book of Acts. The disciples "continued steadfastly in the apostles' teaching and fellowship, in the breaking of bread and the prayers" (2:42–46). In Troas the disciples met on the first day of the week to break bread and "Paul discoursed with them, intending to depart on the morrow; and prolonged his speech until midnight . . . . and when he was gone up, and had broken the bread, and eaten, and had talked with them a long while, even till break of day, so he departed" (20:7–12). There can be no doubt, on the basis of the practice in Corinth, that, in all these assemblies to break bread, which were maintained so steadfastly, the story which constituted the heart of Paul's Gospel was told over and over, just as it had been received.

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[4] Eusebius, *H. E.* iii. 39. 14–15.

The Gospels themselves bear out this same conclusion. It is to be presupposed that the records of the institution of the

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[5] B. W. Bacon, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

Supper preserved in the Gospels were the authentic accounts in the circles where the various gospels were used; and that the celebration of the ceremony would be prepared for and explained by the reading of the authentic account of its institution, and of the whole passion story, when time permitted. That was true, at least, in Justin's day.[6] Now, in the Gospel of Mark, as well as in Matthew and Luke, who follow Mark, the narrative of the institution of the Supper has become the very frontispiece of the whole passion story; so that all that is told in the story is presented by the Supper in symbol (14:12 ff). The two are inextricably bound up together. The institution is filled with meaning by the story; and the narrative of the Supper was naturally read in connection with the whole passion story. Mark introduces the narrative of the Supper with the anointment for burial and closes it with the prediction of the resurrection, showing how closely the narrative of the resurrection was connected with the celebration. It cannot be mere accident that the material has this careful arrangement. It represents, no doubt, the procedure which was followed in the worship on the first day of the week, in the churches where the Gospel of Mark came into form.

It is well recognized that John has revised all the Synoptic teaching about the institution of the Lord's Supper. In his Gospel the meal at which Jesus instituted the Supper, as related by the other gospels, is neither the Passover nor the Supper, but has become simply an ordinary meal which Jesus ate with the disciples on the evening before the Passover (13:1–38). John has placed his account and interpretation of the Supper far earlier in his Gospel (6:1–71), so that, just as the Supper is the frontispiece of the passion story in the Synoptic Gospels, it becomes really the frontispiece for his entire Gospel. The Gospel is constructed with reference to the feasts of the Jewish year, and the appropriate Christianization of each of them is given. It is plain that, although the last Passover has disappeared from John and Jesus was crucified on Passover Day, as the Passover lamb, John presents the Supper as the true Christian Passover. That is very appropriate, in view of his making Jesus the Passover lamb, and of his interpretation of the Supper as eating the body and drinking the blood of the Son of Man. That is the Christian Passover. How essential was the passion story, especially the resurrection, for an understanding of the Johannine point of view is shown by the teaching about the bread of life, and that one must eat the body in order to have life. The whole conception here is one that has been reached in the light of the resurrection faith, which has been projected back into the life of Jesus, so that from the very beginning of the world Jesus was the resurrection and the life. He had come into the world to bring this life to men, and would give it to those who were reborn by water and the spirit and were nourished by the sacramental feasting upon his body and blood.

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[6] *Apology* 67.

Passing to the apostolic fathers, we find Ignatius urging frequent assemblies, at which, no doubt, the Supper was celebrated.[7] He makes a very intimate connection between the passion and the Supper. He says, "they do not confess that the Eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ who suffered for our sins, which the Father raised up by his goodness."[8] But the most significant passage of all in Ignatius is, "breaking one bread, which is the medicine of immortality, the antidote that we should not die, but live forever in Jesus Christ."[9] So, although Ignatius gives us no account of the actual observance of the Eucharist in his day, the intimate connection which he makes between it and the passion, and, especially, the sacramental potency, as an antidote against death and for imparting immortality, shows how fundamental the resurrection narrative was for his view and for the interpretation of it by his churches.

According to the Didaché, thanks are to be given for the

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[7] Eph. 13:1.

[8] Phil. 3:3; 4:1.

[9] Eph. 20:1.

"life and knowledge which thou didst make known to us through thy child . . . ."; "us thou hast blessed with spiritual food and drink and eternal light through thy child . . . ."; "come together on the Lord's day of the Lord, break bread and hold Eucharist."[10] The day of the resurrection was the day designated specifically for the Lord's Supper; and that naturally implied telling the story which gave that day its meaning.

Another witness to the same primitive custom of observing the Eucharist on the Lord's Day, probably, is Pliny, who writes to Trajan that the Christians were accustomed to meet on a stated day before it was light for worship, "after which it was their custom to depart and to meet again at a common innocent meal."[11] But one of the most important witnesses of all is Justin, who describes a service of worship according to the custom of his day.[12] No one was to be admitted to the celebration save those "who had been washed with the washing that is for the remission of sins, and unto regeneration, and who is so living as Christ had enjoined"; and the authority for the ceremony was drawn from the account in the "memoirs of the apostles, composed by them, which are called gospels"; while the significance of the Eucharist is shown by, "so likewise have we been taught that the food which is blessed by the prayer of his word, and from which our blood and flesh by transmutation are nourished, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh." At this service on the day called Sunday, "the memoirs of the apostles or the writings of the prophets are read so long as time permits." "Sunday is the day on which we all hold our common assembly, because it is the first day on which God, having wrought a change in darkness and matter, made the world; and Jesus Christ our Saviour on the same day rose from the dead. For he was crucified on the day before that of Saturn; and on the day after that of Saturn, which is the day of the Sun, having appeared to his apostles and disciples, he taught them these things, which we have submitted to you also for your consideration." There could hardly be clearer evidence than these express statements of Justin to show how great was the functional value of the resurrection narratives in his day for the celebration of the Eucharist.

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[10] Didaché, 10, 14.

[11] Pliny's *Letters* x. 96.

[12] *Apology* 65, 66, 67; cf. also, *Dialogue* 41.

III

Another central Christian ceremony was baptism; and the narrative of the passion and resurrection was just as vital for its proper celebration as it was for the Supper. That was true at least for the Pauline churches. Paul wrote,

> We who died to sin, how shall we any longer live therein? Or are ye ignorant that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried therefore with him through baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life. For if we have become united with him in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection; knowing this, that our old man was crucified with him, that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin; for he that hath died is justified from sin. But if we died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death no more hath dominion over him. For the death that he died, he died unto sin once: but the life that he liveth, he liveth unto God. Even so reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus.[18]

Without a knowledge of the resurrection narrative this teaching of Paul would be incomprehensible. The narrative was necessary, in the first place, as a basis for the thinking of Paul; and, in the second place, to enable the readers to understand his terminology. The statements involve a knowledge of the crucifixion, death, burial, resurrection, and of the ascension to the right hand of the Father. It is indeed from this imagery that we learn most about Paul's own knowledge of the passion story, and we may be certain that he made use of the story when he baptised his converts. The narrative attained ever increasing and widening value as the gentile mission made its way into Asia Minor and Europe.

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[18] Rom. 6:2–11; cf. also, Col. 2:12–13; 3:1.

The record of early preaching, as already shown, bears out the conclusion that is reached above with regard to Paul. The central content of the Christian sermon was the story of the cross and the resurrection. That was the word of the Lord. By it converts were made in multitudes, if the account in Acts is at all reliable. And the convert was never really a Christian until he had been baptized. So much emphasis was placed upon baptism that it was usually performed immediately, regardless of the time of day or night, while the facts of the story that had been told were fresh in the convert's mind. We read of the lone Ethiopian on the wilderness road, that Philip began with the suffering-servant passage of Isaiah and "preached unto him Jesus. And as they went on the way, they came unto a certain water; and the eunuch saith, Behold, here is water; what doth hinder me to be baptized? And he commanded the chariot to stand still: and they both went down into the water, both Philip and the eunuch; and he baptized him."[14] And a very illuminating experience is that of Paul and Silas in the prison at Philippi, who, after the jailer had fallen penitently before them, "spake the word of the Lord unto him, with all that were in his house. And he took them the same hour of the night, and washed their stripes; and was baptized, he and all his, immediately."[15] Scenes similar to these were, no doubt, taking place throughout that world, wherever the missionaries carried their gospel. In time the procedure of the baptismal ceremony became standardized. Clearly defined rules were made to control it. A definite body of ethical instruction came to precede baptism. The Didaché furnishes the interesting regulation:

> Concerning baptism, baptise thus: Having first rehearsed all these things, "baptise, in the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit," in running water; but if thou hast no running water, baptise

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[14] Acts 8:26–40.

[15] Acts 16:23–34.

> in other water, and if thou canst not in cold, then in warm. But if thou hast neither, pour water three times on the head "in the Name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit." And before the baptism let the baptiser and him who is to be baptised fast, and any others who are able. And thou shalt bid him who is to be baptised to fast one or two days before.[16]

Under the influence of this standardization, baptism loses some of the freshness and charm that characterized it in the earlier preaching, and the cult story does not seem to have been quite so important as formerly; though, of course, even here, its central significance for the whole ceremony is just as fundamental as ever.

IV

Still another ceremonial of the early church was the Christian adaptation of the Jewish Passover. There is abundant evidence that the early Christians continued to keep the Passover. At the beginning, even, they continued to keep the appointments of Jewish worship in the temple at Jerusalem with joy and zeal.[17] Paul, himself, according to the record of Acts, continued to keep the requirements of the law.[18] And the synagogue observance might be added to this evidence. But there is better evidence still. Paul uses terminology in writing to the Corinthians which would be inexplicable without their observance of Passover:

> Know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, even as ye are unleavened. For our passover also hath been sacrificed, even Christ: wherefore let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth [I Cor. 5:6–8].

The same presupposition lies behind the statement of I Peter: "Ye were redeemed . . . . with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, even the blood of Christ" (1:19). The statement of Acts, "We sailed away from Philippi after the days of unleavened bread," followed by anxiety to reach Jerusalem by Pentecost, indicates that, although far away from the Holy City, the days of unleavened bread had been observed in some fitting way. But Paul had given the Christian Passover observance an entirely new meaning. The lamb which was slain for Christians was Jesus; and the same is true in I Peter. It is no doubt due to this new interpretation of Paul that the Gospel of John has revised the entire scheme of the passion, as presented by the Synoptics, and placed the death of Jesus, who was "the lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world," and of whom "not a bone should be broken," on the day of Passover, at the very hour when the Passover lamb was slain (1:29; 19:14, 36). This Gospel has changed, also, the nature of the last meal that Jesus ate with the disciples; it is no longer the Passover; and it was not the occasion of the institution of the Lord's Supper. Instead, the Supper has assumed infinitely greater importance. The evangelist has very skilfully presented his conception of the Supper in his account of the Jewish Passover (6:1–59). It is the body and blood of the Christian ceremonial that give Passover a real meaning. The Christian feast brings life, and there is no other way for life to be attained. The Lord's Supper is the real Passover here; the Passover is to be observed as before under Jewish interpretation, but now the old interpretation is gone, while the date Nisan fourteenth alone remains. This transformation in the Fourth Gospel is in line with the strong anti-Jewish polemic throughout.

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[16] Didaché, vii.

[17] Luke 24:53; Acts 2:46.

[18] Acts 21:17–26; 20:16.

The same transformation of the Passover into the Lord's Supper has taken place, also, in the Synoptic Gospels. In these Gospels Jesus really eats the last Passover meal with the disciples, but the meal becomes the occasion for the institution of the Supper, which is clearly to supplant the Passover in the Jewish sense, and the Lord is given the place of predominance in their thinking in the celebration of this festival. The Lord is not to eat the Passover again with his disciples until they have the privilege of sitting with him at his table in his kingdom, that is, not only at the regular Passover time, but at every celebration of the Lord's Supper in the church.[19]

The two celebrations, however, persisted side by side in the church, and the conflicting traditions about the last meal of Jesus with the disciples—that Jesus ate a real Passover with his disciples, as related by the Synoptics; that Jesus was himself the Passover lamb and died before the eating of the Passover, according to John—were perpetuated in the observance of the Passover in the church, and led to the famous quartodeciman controversy between the churches of Asia Minor and those of the rest of the world, under the leadership of Rome. The churches in Asia Minor observed Nisan fourteenth only, closing the Passover celebration on the evening of that day with the Lord's Supper, emphasizing mainly, the crucifixion; whereas all other churches began the celebration on Nisan fourteenth and closed it on the following Sunday, which was really the culmination, in emphasis of the resurrection.[20] Mark has the Roman tradition, and John, that of Asia Minor, indicating the places of origin of those gospels. The vitality of this controversy, which continued to rage to the end of the second century, bears eloquent testimony to the place of the Passover celebration in the life of the early churches; and the point at issue in the discussion calls attention to the Christian transformation that had taken place. The Passover was no longer a Jewish festival at all; it was now a "feast of the Savior's passover." "Synods and assemblies of bishops were held on this account, and all, with one consent, through mutual correspondence drew up an ecclesiastical decree, that the mystery of the resurrection of the Lord should be celebrated on no other but the Lord's day, and that we should observe the close of the paschel fast on this day only."[21] This transformation of the Passover bears abundant testimony, not only of the function which the story of the death and resurrection of Jesus served in connection with the observance at the time, but also of the rôle which the use of the story in the services of the church of every sort had played, in all the years of the church prior to that time. It was that use of the cult story of the church which transformed the Jewish feast into a Christian festival, that filled the water-pots with wine.

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[19] Mark 14:25, and parallels.

[20] Eusebius, *H. E.* v. 23–25.

[21] *Ibid.*, v. 23:2.

V

Up to this point we have observed how the narrative of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus, the cult story of the church, functioned in the early preaching, in the celebration of the Lord's Supper, at baptism, and in the observance of Passover. It is in place, now, to consider the question of how the cult story of the church came to have this central importance. The answer is to be found in two directions. There was the use of similar narratives in the religions from which Christianity won its converts, and the needs which had been nourished there were brought over with them into the new religion; and, in the second place, the answer lies in the meaning of the narrative to the early Christians in a symbolic way as a presentation of the great truths of their religion.

The religion out of which Christianity was born, and from which it continued to draw converts for many decades, was Judaism. It is but natural, therefore, to look into the religion of Judaism for cult practices similar to that of telling the passion story of Jesus in the early church. The greatest ceremonial celebration in Judaism was the annual Passover. It was undoubtedly one of the oldest and most revered of Jewish institutions. In connection with the celebration of the Passover, which began on Nisan fourteenth and continued, as the feast of unleavened bread, until the twenty-first, there was a very definite cult story, which was always faithfully told, from which the ceremony got its significance for the worshipers. It was the vivid story of the deliverance of the children of Israel from the bondage of Egypt under the leadership of Moses, the servant of God. After many contests with Pharoah in which God had shown his power, the time came when a last plague was to be sent upon the Egyptians, the first-born in every home was to be slain. The only way to escape from this awful tragedy was to slay a lamb, to sprinkle his blood upon the lintels of the doors, and to eat the roasted flesh according to very specific directions. By doing this the Israelites were saved from the plague, which, on the other hand, struck every Egyptian home. The Israelites set out at once on their journey to freedom with God leading them, as a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night. Moses commanded to keep the Passover in memory of that event forever. "And it shall come to pass when your children shall say unto you, What mean ye by this service? that ye shall say, It is the sacrifice of Jehovah's passover, who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when he smote the Egyptians, and delivered our houses."[22] It is not necessary to go back into the primitive origin of the Passover feast to understand the significance which it had for the Jews in the light of this cult story. This was the story of their redemption, and, as often as they ate the Passover lamb, they proclaimed that fact to the world, just as the Christians proclaimed the death of Jesus by the celebration of the Lord's Supper. We can easily see how the Jews who became Christians would need a Christian story to take the place of the one they were giving up. The transition from the Jewish to the Christian Passover, from the Passover lamb to the Lamb of God, from eating the roasted flesh to the Supper in the church, is clear in this light. The first Jewish Christians brought over their own story, but it gradually acquired a new meaning, as the Christology of the church developed away from orthodox Judaism. The church became the only true Judaism, and the Jews were regarded as a lost people because they had not accepted the redemption through Christ, which was proclaimed in the new cult story and celebrated as the true Passover, both at the regular Passover time and also on the first day of every week.

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[22] Exod. 12:26–27; Lev. 23; Num. 9; Deut. 16.

VI

Most of the converts of early Christianity were found, however, in the gentile world; and in the religions of that world, cult stories similar to the passion of Jesus existed in great abundance. The testimony of Justin alone is sufficient evidence of that fact. A typical passage out of Justin's apologetic for the Christian cult story is the following:

> But if any one objects that he was crucified, in this also he is on a par with those reputed sons of Jupiter of yours, who suffered as we have now enumerated. For their sufferings at death are recorded to have been not all alike, but diverse; so that not even by the peculiarity of the sufferings does he seem to be inferior to them; but, on the contrary, as we promised in the preceding part of this discourse, we will now prove him superior. . . . . And if we even affirm that he was born of a virgin, accept this in common with what you accept of Perseus. And in that we say that he made whole the lame, the paralytic, and those born blind, we seem to say what is very similar to the deeds said to have been done by Aesculapius. . . . . And when we say also that the Word, who is the first-born of God, was produced without sexual union, and that he, Jesus Christ, our teacher, was crucified and died, and rose again, and ascended into heaven, we propound nothing different from what you believe regarding those whom you esteem sons of Jupiter. For you know how many sons your esteemed writers ascribed to Jupiter: Mercury, the interpreting word and teacher of all; Aesculapius, who, though he was a great physician, was struck by a thunderbolt, and so ascended to heaven; and Bacchus too, after he had been torn limb from limb; and Hercules, when he had committed himself to the flames to escape his toils; and the sons of Leda, and the Dioscuri; and Perseus, son of Danae; and Bellerophon, who, though sprung from mortals, rose to heaven on the horse Pegasus. For what shall I say of Ariadne, and those who, like her, have been declared to be set among the stars? And what of the emperors who die among yourselves, whom you deem worthy of deification, and in whose behalf you produce some one who swears he has seen the burning Caesar rise to heaven from the funeral pyre? And what kind of deeds are recorded of each of these reputed sons of Jupiter, it is needless to tell to those

> who already know. This only shall be said that they are written for the advantage and encouragement of youthful scholars; for all reckon it an honorable thing to imitate the gods.[23]

That these stories were not mere poetic myths that had lost their meaning for men of that time, that large numbers of the Christians themselves had formerly believed them, is shown, also, by Justin's own words:

> And, secondly, because we . . . . who, out of every race of men, used to worship Bacchus the son of Semele, and Apollo the son of Latona . . . . and Proserpine and Venus (who were maddened with love of Adonis, and whose mysteries also you celebrate), or Aesculapius, or some one or other of those who are called gods—have now, through Jesus Christ, learned to despise these, though we be threatened with death for it. . . . . Those who believe these things we pity, and those who invented them we know to be devils.[24]

That was the religious situation that Justin faced in the first half of the second century. It is a vivid picture of a world that was used to cult stories on every hand similar to the Christian narrative. The recent discovery of an orpheum at Pompeii, in a private villa that has lain buried since A.D. 79, when it was covered up by the eruption of Vesuvius, is striking evidence that these very cult stories were being used in the mystery cults there right at the time when Paul was preaching the cross of Christ in Rome.[25] In the interior of this secret shrine there was found a series of pictures used in the preparation and initiation. The set consisted of two series representing the various stages of the new-birth process, and culminating in the resurrection experience, where the new life was realized. Various other features of the orphic ceremonies, such as the sacramental meal, are evidenced from the remains of birds which were deposited in one room of the building. The ceremonies were organized around the cult story, as shown by the pictures, which told of the death and resurrection of Dionysus-Zagreus.

[23] *Apology* 22–21.

[24] *Ibid.*, 25.

[25] Macchioro, *Zagreus* (1920), pp. 93 ff., 206 ff., 258 ff.

This god, by virtue of his own suffering and victory, imparted victory and immortality to those who were initiated into his mysteries.

VII

This religious situation, which prevailed when the gospel of Christ was first being preached, explains why the cult story of the church was so effective. Just as the first Christians came out of Judaism, where they had been used to the Passover story, so the later converts came from the gentile religions of redemption; and so, for every convert, regardless of the source whence he came, the passion story of Jesus found its value by enabling him to understand the ceremonies of the church which he had adopted, and as a basis for his devotional meditation in the worship of the new Lord, who had become his savior from death through his victory over death and the realm of the dead. The beauty of such a cult story is that it is a symbol whose meaning is dependent upon the understanding of the worshiper. He understands the experiences of Jesus just to the extent that he has become acquainted with them in his own life. It was natural that the story of Jesus was not understood in the same way by all of the early Christians. It had different meanings for converts out of Judaism and the mystery cults, but in both cases it was equally effective. For Paul and James the meaning of the story of Jesus was entirely different, but, nevertheless, indispensable for them both. For many of the early Christians, especially in times of persecution, Jesus became the ideal martyr; and it was necessary to experience martyrdom to become his disciple in the fullest sense. In times of great moral struggle and temptation, Gethsemane and the words on the cross found their greatest usefulness. The disciples of Paul saw in the story the symbol of their own experience of redemption and of new-birth to divine life. They were crucified to the world; they died to sin; they were buried with Christ; they rose with him in the glory of a new resurrection experience in this present life; and they ascended with the risen Christ to the heights of heavenly places in mystical union with the Lord, who himself had been enthroned at God's right hand.

The resurrection story, in one way or another, presented not only the risen Lord in his glorified form, superior to all material, spatial and temporal limitations, but symbolized all that inhered in the conceptions of immortality itself, both in this life and the life to come. There was room for Jewish bodily resurrection or for Greek immortality of spirit; or for a fusion of the two ideas, such as one finds in Paul. The stories about the risen Lord's return to the disciples, at various times and in varied forms, assuring them that he was really alive again, presented the daily fellowship in the most intimate and personal terms with the cult Lord, when the church met around the communion table to break bread, of fishermen at their nets, or of wanderers along a lonely road. The Pentecost scene presents in symbol the return of the exalted and glorified Christ to the missionaries of his gospel, to direct their activities and inspire their message as they started out to the ends of the earth, and to take up his permanent dwelling in the hearts of believers, which had become the temples of his continuous abiding presence.

VIII

This use of the story of the passion of Jesus in the early church throws light upon the whole problem of gospel origins. One can see the material contained in the Gospels taking form, and there can be no doubt that the nucleus around which it collected was the story which was the very heart of all the cult activities. This story itself went through a long process of development. There was a time when the entire story was comprised in the six words: ἠγέρθη ὁ κύριος καὶ ὤφθη Σίμωνι (Luke 24:34). From that tiny nucleus it has grown to the elaborate forms in which we now find it. The story of this development is the record of that vitality which lay at the heart of the beginning church. It is, on the one hand, the experience of individuals who came to the resurrection faith and of their personal life of fellowship with their Lord; on the other, it is the story of the new church adapting itself to the manifold needs of a Jewish and a Greek world, of coming to grips with every ultimate religious problem of the syncretistic Hellenistic civilization. Every new situation of the beginning church, in ministering to that complex religious world, has left its stamp, in one way or another, on the gospel story; and has had its part in giving permanent form to that material which has become the priceless heritage of the church.

CRITICAL NOTES

THE "NEGATIVE" GOLDEN RULE

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BISHOP HEADLAM, in his book *The Life and Teaching of Jesus the Christ* (p. 82), refers to the well-known story of Hillel and the proselyte and the saying of the former: דעלך סני לחברך לא תעביד זו היא כל התורה כולה ואידך פירושה הוא זיל גמור. ("That which is to you hateful do not to your neighbor. This is the whole law; the rest is commentary on it; go, learn!") (*Shabbat* 31*a*),[1] and has this to say upon it:

> Hillel showed clear insight in seeing that here was the essential point of the law of which it perhaps represents the highest attainment, but there is a wide difference between what he taught and the Christian ethic which puts the rule before us in its positive and not in its negative side, turns it into a great imperative of moral enthusiasm, and allows it to permeate all teaching and life.

I

The bishop, in putting a lesser value upon Hillel's negative golden rule than upon Jesus' positive one—"All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them" (Matt. 7:12; cf. Luke 6:31)—is but giving expression to an opinion common to many writers. A. B. Bruce, in the *Expositor's Greek Testament*, Vol. I, commenting on Matt. 7:12, says: "The negative rule confines us to the region of *justice;* the positive takes us into the region of *generosity* or *grace*, and so embraces both law *and* prophets." Plummer, in *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Luke* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons), in his comment on Luke 6:31, quotes Tob. 6:15, "Do that to no man which thou hatest," and adds, "This purely negative precept, which was common with the Rabbis, falls immeasurably short of the positive command of Christ." One might add similar statements from such writers as Bishop Gore, in his *Sermon on the Mount;* Votaw, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible,* V, 42; Tasker, in Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels,* I, 653; and others. It is just possible that some of the depreciation of the negative golden rule as "negative" goes back to Edersheim, whose books, with their mass of rabbinical material, marked at all points by an evident bias against rabbinism, have formed a fountain for quotation by subsequent writers. At any rate, in his *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah* (8th ed. rev., Longmans, Green & Co., I, 535), he has this to say:

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[1] A similar story, with an interesting addition, is given of Akiba in *Abot de Rabbi Nathan* (ed. Schechter, second recension, chap. xxvi, p. 53): "It happened that one [an ass-driver, according to another reading] came to R. Akiba and said to him, 'Rabbi, teach me the whole Law all at once.' He answered, 'My son, Moses, our teacher, tarried on the mountain forty days and forty nights before he learned it, and you say, Teach me the whole Law all at once! Nevertheless, my son, this is the fundamental principle of the Law: That which you hate respecting yourself, do not to your neighbor. If you desire that no one injure you in respect to what is yours, then do not injure him. If you desire that no one should carry off what is yours, then do not carry off what is your neighbor's.' The man betook himself to his companions. They journeyed and came upon a field full of seed-pods. The others took two pods each, but he took nothing at all. They journeyed and encountered another field full of cabbages. The others took two cabbages each, but he took nothing at all. His companions asked him why he had taken none, and he replied, 'Thus R. Akiba taught me, That which you hate, ...' "

> The merest beginner in logic must perceive that there is a vast difference between this negative injunction, or the prohibition to do to others what is hateful to ourselves, and the positive direction to do unto others as we would have them do unto us. The one does not rise above the standpoint of the Law, being as yet far from that love which would lavish on others the good we ourselves desire, while the Christian saying embodies the nearest approach to absolute love of which human nature is capable, making that the test of our conduct to others which we ourselves desire to possess.

But derogatory remarks regarding the negative golden rule are not confined to English writers. Gerhard Kittel, *Jesus und die Rabbinen,* asserts (p. 14) that *Die negative jüdische Formulierung ist tatsächlich etwas anderes als der positive Satz Jesu* ("The Jewish negative formulation is, indeed, something other than the positive putting of it by Jesus"), and quotes Georg Heinrici, *Die Bergpredigt,* Beiträge III, 1, in support. Strack, in his *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus* (1922), in his comment on Matt. 7:12, says: *Die positive Fassung in Jesu Mund geht über die negative Fassung ebensoweit hinaus, wie etwa "helfen u. fördern" hinausgeht über "nicht schaden"* ("The positive setting in the mouth of Jesus surpasses the negative setting just as far as perhaps 'to help and to benefit' surpasses 'not to injure' "). Paul Fiebig's recently published *Jesu Bergpredigt* (1924) appears to share this general depreciatory estimate, to judge by his note (p. 143) on Hillel's saying: *Jesus kann dies Wort Hillels gekannt haben. Sein Wort aber ist positiv, ausserdem pluralisch*

("Jesus may have known this saying of Hillel. His saying, however, is positive in form, and, in addition, plural").

II

The golden rule in the negative form did not originate with Hillel. It had found currency before his day, and it also survived him. It appears in Tob. 4:15: "What you yourself hate, do to no man." In the Aramaic text of the same (Neubauer [Oxford, 1878], p. 8) it has the form: "What is hateful to yourself do not do to others"; and in the Hebrew text (*ibid.*, p. 24): "That which you hate for yourself, do not do to others." It is to be found also in the Hebrew text of the Testament of Naphtali (Charles, *Greek Versions of the Testaments of the XII Patriarchs*, Appendix II, p. 239, l. 12):[2] "That one should not do to his neighbor what he does not desire for himself." The Palestinian Targum inserts it at the end of Lev. 19:18, making the latter part of that verse read: "But you shall love your neighbor; what is hateful to yourself you shall not do to him; I am Jehovah." The Letter of Aristaeus 207 significantly combines the negative and the positive rules: "What is the teaching of wisdom? . . . . As thou desirest that evils should not befall thee, but to partake of all that is good, thou shouldst act in this spirit to thy subjects and to offenders, and shouldst very gently admonish such as are virtuous" (Thackeray's translation in *Translations of Early Documents*). This extract is especially interesting in that, though its phraseology differs from the golden rule as formulated by Jesus, yet it contains the idea and that in positive form. Philo also has the negative rule; but his phraseology, "What any one hates to suffer, let him not do [to another]," leads Abrahams to suggest (*Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, First Series, p. 21) that the source of Philo's phraseology is not Jewish, but Greek.[3] The

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[2] The Hebrew text presented by Charles follows a thirteenth-century MS. Charles (*ibid.*, pp. li–lii) combats Gaster's contention that this Hebrew text is the original version of the Testament, and renders the following verdict on the question: "All that could be urged is that the two texts [the Hebrew and the Greek] possess an exiguous amount of common material. In all other respects they diverge, and the evidence points to the conclusion that the Hebrew text is, in fact, based directly or indirectly on the primitive Hebrew text from which the Greek Testament was translated." Unless it be maintained that only such material in this Hebrew version as shows verbal coincidences with the Greek Testament is to be admitted as having been in the primitive text, the way is not closed to at least the possibility that the negative rule was in that text.

[3] Klein, in *Der älteste Christliche Katechismus und die jüdische Propaganda-Literatur*, quotes approvingly (pp. 84 f.) the opinion of Jacob Bernays that Philo did not take over his form of the rule, unaltered, from the treasury of Hellenic

Bezan text of Acts 15:20, 29, adds the following to the prohibitions enforced upon the Gentile Christians: 20, "And whatsoever they do not wish to be done to them, not to do that to others"; 29, "And whatsoever you do not wish to be done to yourselves, do not to another." The Didaché[4] brings together the negative form of the golden rule and the combination found in the Synoptic Gospels: "And all things whatsoever you wish should not happen to you, neither do you to another" (Schaff, *op.*

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maxims, παθεῖν ἐχθαίρει being a clumsy translation, due to the deference paid by Philo to the Aramaic original, that Aramaic original containing a word which could be literally translated "hateful," but which, in the living usage of the language, includes everything disagreeable. The fact, however, that Isocrates has the maxim: ἃ πάσχοντες ὑφ' ἑτέρων ὀργίζεσθε, ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ ποιεῖτε "What provokes you when suffered of others, do not do to others," does appear to support rather the contention that Philo, in a collection of such humane and moral laws of the Jews as could be recommended also to non-Jewish readers, purposely made his form of the law conform in phraseology to one already current in Hellenic circles. The golden rule was to be found outside of Judaism. But it was the heart and soul of Judaism. It grew out of the interpretation of the written law, as an induction from its particular regulations. Though Philo's *form* of the rule may be Grecian, Jewish teaching was the source from which he derived the rule itself.

[4] J. Vernon Bartlett, in his article on the "Didaché" (Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, Extra Volume, pp. 438 ff.) has this to say: "In the original framework of the *Two Ways*, this negative form of the Golden Rule, 'according to the traditional Jewish interpretation' (Kohler), practically cancels the larger spirit of the words of Lev. 19:18; so that on it the exegesis or teaching proceeds. This defect was soon felt by the Christian consciousness and was rectified in the fuller Didaché." This criticism of the Didaché he repeats in the *Apostolic Age* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909, p. 253): "It fails to realize something of the very spirit of Christly piety. For it is content to add, as a paraphrase of the second Great Precept, the Golden Rule in its old Jewish and negative form, which falls far short of what is in a heart of love." One has a feeling that only an obsession with regard to the negative rule could prompt this criticism and read into the body of Didaché a deliberate attempt to correct the law with which it starts out. One wonders why, if such correction were necessary, the positive rule was not chosen in the first place, and why the negative rule was continued in the literature related to the Didaché—the Egyptian Apostolic Church Order, the Apostolical Constitutions, etc. If behind the Two Ways section of the Didaché may be seen a manual of Jewish teaching for Gentile proselytes—whether written or not may be left a debatable matter—the only conclusion that can be drawn from the fact that the Jewish Christians, in their first efforts to instruct their Gentile converts, took over the negative golden rule, and made no change in its form, is that they recognized no difference between the negative and positive rules. This conclusion is further substantiated by the fact that no change was subsequently made in the form in the related literature. Indeed, the Apostolical Constitutions make Matthew responsible for the negative rule: "Matthew said, Everything that thou wouldest not should be done to thee, that do not thou also; that is, what thou hatest do not to another" (Schaff, *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* [2d ed.], p. 251).

cit., text of Didaché, chap. i, vs. 2). Finally, the negative form of the golden rule lies behind Rom. 13:10. Paul first quotes Lev. 19:18: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and then adds his explanation of it: "Love worketh no ill to his neighbor," in a form reminiscent of the Targum.[5]

Positive forms of the rule are also to be found in Jewish literature. In *Abot* II, 14, appears that of Eleazar ben 'Arach: "Let the honor of your neighbor be as precious to you as your own." In the *Abot de Rabbi Nathan* XV, 1 (Babylonian Talmud, Widow & Brothers, Romm edition, Vol. XIV), this saying is enlarged upon in a combination of positive and negative forms: "Just as a man takes heed to his own honor, so let him take heed to the honor of his neighbor; and just as he does not desire that there be an evil report concerning his own honor, so let him desire not to spread an evil report against the honor of his neighbor." R. Jose, the fellow-student of Eleazar, gives another turn to the rule: "Let the property of your neighbor be as precious to you as your own" (*Abot* II, 16). These are positive. If it be urged that these two forms of the rule are later than the time of Jesus, one considerably earlier than his time can be pointed out in Ecclus. 31:15.[6] Positive forms of the rule have, therefore, had a place in Judaism.

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[5] Professor W. H. P. Hatch gives in the *Harvard Theological Review,* XIV, No. 2 (p. 194) an interesting passage from the Syriac *The Book of the Laws of the Countries* (early third century A.D.) which combines the positive and negative rules: "For there are two commandments set before us, which are meet and right for free-will: one, that we should depart from everything that is evil and we hate to have done to ourselves; and the other, that we should do whatever is good and we love, and are pleased to have done so also to ourselves."

[6] The Greek of Ecclus. 31:15 is:

νόει τὰ τοῦ πλησίον ἐκ σεαυτοῦ,
καὶ ἐπὶ παντὶ πράγματι διανοοῦ.

This has been variously translated. Thus the R.V. has it:

"Consider thy neighbour's liking by thine own;
And be discreet in every point,"

while the rendering of it in *The Septuagint Version with Apocrypha, Greek and English* (S. Bagster & Sons) is: "Judge of thy neighbour by thyself: and be discreet in every point."

The Hebrew version of this verse (see *The Hebrew Text of the Book of Ecclesiasticus* [ed. by I. Levi, 1904]) is:

דעה רעך כנפשך ובכל ששנאת התבונן

This too has been variously translated. In the volume of Ecclesiasticus which he edits in *The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges* Oesterley renders it (in a foot-

Maimonides goes farther, and in his *Sefer ha-Mitzvoth* (H. Heller edition, Petrokoff, 1914, p. 64), commenting on the command to love one's neighbor, gives both the positive and negative forms of the golden rule together, as the embodiment of normal Jewish piety: "Whatsoever I desire for myself I will desire for him as himself, and whatsover I hate for myself . . . I will hate for him as himself." Further still, in his *Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Ebel* XIV, 1, he recites certain rabbinical rules about visiting the sick, comforting mourners, etc., which belong to *Gemilut Hasadim*—"deeds of loving kindness"—and says they fall under the general rule, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and then adds, in a form nearly identical with that of Jesus: "All the things which you desire that others should do to you, do you to your brethren in the law and in the commandments." Cf. also *Hilkot De'ot* VI, 3.

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note): "Know that thy neighbour is like thee (lit. 'like thy soul')," but in his translation of the Hebrew text in *Translations of Early Documents* it appears as:

"Honour thy neighbour as thyself,
And think over whatever may be distasteful to thee."

Box, however (Charles, *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament,* Vol. I), translates the verse as follows:

"Be considerate to thy companion as thyself,
And be mindful of all thou detestest."

Box here accepts the reading suggested by Smend (*Die Weisheit des Jesus Sirach*)—רעה instead of דעה—translating רעה as "be considerate."

In his Hebrew text, Levi has the following footnote to the first word of the verse (דעה): "ר.ל., in ink which looks quite modern," this with reference to the marginal gloss. An examination of the gloss as it appears in *Facsimiles of the Fragments hitherto recovered of the Book of Ecclesiasticus* (Oxford-Cambridge, 1901) makes the appearance of a ל very doubtful. A blot makes the gloss most difficult to decipher, but a rather illegible רעה appears discernible. If this is correct, then the gloss bears out Smend's reading. The first portion of the verse would then appear as: רעה רעך כנפשך "Take delight in (or 'honor' in the sense of 'hold precious,' a meaning which is attested for רעה in 38:1 by the Versions and the citations of the Talmud and of the Midrashim) your neighbor as yourself." This is simply another phrasing of Lev. 19:18: ואהבת לרעך כמוך, and is in line with Jesus' golden rule and with Maimonides. The second half of the verse repeats the thought of the first in the parallel fashion characteristic of the book: "Therefore reflect on all which is hateful to you" (that you may not delight in such or desire such for your neighbor). This brings this part of the verse in line with Tobit, the Testament of Naphtali, the Palestinian Targum, and Hillel.

Mr. Box (*loc. cit.*) takes "companion" to be companion at table, fellow-guest, and refuses to see in the dictum an anticipation of the golden rule, as not being sustained by the context. It is very evident that there is some confusion in the paragraph in which verse 15 appears, which is not improved by Mr. Box's transposition of verses 14 and 15, yet what more apt than to introduce the golden rule as a standard for manners at an Eastern banquet!

III

In the Palestinian Targum, Lev. 19:18 reads in full: "Be not revengeful, nor cherish hatred to the sons of your people; but you shall love your neighbor; what is hateful to yourself you shall not do to him; I am the Lord." The Targum here inserts, as has been pointed out by Abrahams (*op. cit.*, p. 21), the negative rule as an explanation of "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Samuel Edels (Polish rabbi and commentator, 1550–1631), commenting on the story of Hillel and the proselyte, says that Hillel made use of a negative command in elucidating the Bible verse (Lev. 19:18), because the first part of the verse reads, "Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge"; and the second part of the verse, "But thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," refers to this. The reflections attributed to Hillel are Edels' own, but a certain value attaches to his comment in the calling attention to the fact that the command to love one's neighbor has as a basis a negative command.

Bacher, in *Die Agada der Tannaiten* (2d ed., I, 4), is in agreement with Edels that Hillel had in mind Lev. 19:18 when he made use of the negative rule (*Dieses Wort ist nichts anderes, als die negative Ausdrucksweise für das biblische: "Liebe deinen Nächsten wie dich selbst"*), though admitting that it is not expressly so stated. The negative rule, however, as we have seen, did not originate with Hillel. It might very well have been a commonplace in his day and so have been made use of by him without any thought of biblical connection.

There are, however, indications that point to at least the possibility that the negative rule did originally arise as Bacher suggests, in connection with the interpretation of Lev. 19:18. In Tobit the setting of the rule is a series of exhortations with respect to the burial of the dead, almsgiving, love of the brethren, the payment of wages when due—not very dissimilar to the content of Leviticus, chapter 19. It is just possible that in the case of the Palestinian Targum the negative rule appears as a quotation from Hillel or other outside source, but it is significant that it occurs in the Targum just where it does.

When we turn to the Gospels, we find Luke with a setting of the positive rule that is to be preferred to Matthew's. Luke is speaking of love as the principle of conduct and is pointing out how, in concrete situations, it may operate (6:27–30). He then presents the golden rule as the summation of conduct. Here the background of the teaching might also well be Lev. 19:18. On the other hand, Matthew's words after the rule—"for this is the law and the prophets"—are omitted by Luke. They are the very words, however, that betray the Jewish source of Jesus' saying. They take us back to the story of Hillel and the proselyte, and Hillel's comment on his own saying: "This is the whole law; the rest is commentary"; and to Akiba's dictum that the same principle of love was "the great fundamental principle of the Law."

Bacher (*loc. cit.*) goes farther and supposes that Hillel deduced his form of the golden rule from the unusual ל in לרעך of the Hebrew text of Lev. 19:18. This supposition loses its force in the light of what has been previously said of Hillel's use of the negative rule. It might be added that precisely the same construction occurs in Lev. 19:34. Ibn Ezra, commenting on Lev. 19:18, remarks that in the opinion of many interpreters the ל is redundant, being "added as in לאבנר [see II Sam. 3:30, הרגו לאבנר ("[they] slew Abner")], but in my opinion it is to be taken literally, that he should love the good for his neighbor as for himself."

Back of the Greek text of Matt. 7:12 and Luke 6:31[7] a ל is to be discerned, which Hebrew versions of these verses[8] have been under the necessity to reproduce. If the origin of the negative rule goes back to the commandment of Lev. 19:18, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," that of the positive rule may well lie there also. This is all the more probable as we see Jesus placing the seal of his commendation on the command of Lev. 19:18 in Luke 10:27, 28.

IV

One wonders if a great deal too much has not been made of the superiority of the positive over the negative golden rule, especially in the light of their possible relation the one to the other and to Lev. 19:18, as revealed in the foregoing study. Modern psychology tells us, it is true, that we "should extol the good, and show its reasonableness and its beauty, rather than warn against evil and insist on its hatefulness." Some truth there is in this, though one cannot but remark that neither Jesus nor Hillel possessed any knowledge of present-day psychology. Jesus on occasion gave his teaching in negative form—"Judge not, that ye be not judged," "Swear not at all," "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth," to give a few instances. As Friedlander remarks,[9] most laws are given in the negative form. The negative golden rule teaches a negative morality only in the mind of him who wishes to persuade himself that it does. Abrahams (*op. cit.*, p. 23) states in this regard:

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[7] Votaw, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* (V, 4), says: "It would be difficult to explain these two divergent forms [that in Matthew and that in Luke] as coming from a common Greek original; perhaps they represent two lines of transmission, arising from two different translations into Greek of the same brief Aramaic utterance." Tasker makes the same suggestion. I venture to suggest that Jesus' original saying was briefer in form than the Hebrew translations (see note 8), resembling closely that of Hillel, and that the Greek of the First Gospel is a more accurate translation of the original utterance than that of the Third.

[8] Cf. the Hebrew translations of the New Testament of Delitzsch and of Salkinson-Ginsburg, and that of the London Society (dated 1909, translator not named).

> The Old Testament commands in "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Leviticus 19:18) and "ye shall love the stranger" (Deut. 10:19) are positive enough, and Hillel himself elsewhere (Aboth i. 12) . . . . uses a quite positive (and general) phrase when he accounts as one of the marks of the peace-loving disciples of Aaron "love for fellow creatures." It would be absurd to maintain that Philo, who also, as has been seen, uses the negative form, teaches a negative morality. Similarly with Tobit. The negative rule occurs in a chapter full of positive rules of benevolence: Give alms of thy substance; Love thy brethren; Give of thy bread to the hungry, and of thy garments to them that are naked; bless the Lord thy God always—and so forth.

Hillel himself certainly did not expect that study of the Jewish law would be confined to his negative rule, as his last words—"Go, learn!"—plainly show. If Hillel's command be obeyed in only cursory fashion, it will be found that the moral teaching of Judaism on the obligations of love to others are as positive as can be imagined.

One of the reasons for the social disturbances of today is that children are not being taught and men and women are forgetting that there are things they *must not do* if we are to have a stable civilization. To quote Abrahams again: "The axiomatic truth on which the moral life of *society* is based is the right of the unimpeded enjoyment of the fruits of his labours, in short, the claim of each to be free from his fellow-man's injury." Paul certainly did not believe that the negative golden rule inculcated a negative morality, for after stating that "love worketh no ill to his neighbor"—his version of "That which is to you hateful do not to your neighbor"—he adds, "therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." Love can express itself in obedience to a negative command as to a positive one; however expressed, it is a fulfilling of the law. If there is to be disparagement of the negative form of the golden rule, there must be condemnation of the use of it in Christian circles by Paul, the Didaché, the author of the Bezan text of Acts, and others.

How foolish praise of the positive golden rule by Christian scholars may be made to appear is seen when Rabbi Gerald Friedlander (*op. cit.*, p. 214) turns (though perhaps not consciously) that praise back on them in regard to Jesus' command, "Judge not, that ye be not judged." Friedlander says:

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[9] G. Friedlander, *The Jewish Sources of the Sermon on the Mount*, p. 235.

> We offer as a contrast the much earlier saying recorded in the Mishna. Joshua, the son of Perachyah said: "Judge all men in the scale of merit" (Aboth i.6 and cf. Shebuoth, 30a). In our opinion this Pharisaic teaching is infinitely superior to that of the Gospel. In the first instance, it is impossible to carry out literally the Gospel injunction. Man will always pass judgment on his fellows. Again, the Gospel saying is inferior because it is negative, whilst the Rabbinical saying is positive, universal, and based on the ultimate human principle of love.

Yet Friedlander himself is at some pains to defend the practicality of the negative form of the golden rule over that of the positive!

The writers who make such an ado about positive and negative seem to imagine that Hillel was anticipating Kant in laying down a universal criterion of moral action: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only," instead of getting rid of an impudent and insincere questioner.

It is time, then, that the dispute as to the superiority of positive over negative golden rule came to an end. There is no basis for extravagant praise of the positive any more than there is ground for Abrahams' assertion that the negative is the more fundamental of the two, "going deeper into the heart of the problem." Basically they are the same, in idea as in origin.

V

The opprobium expressed in the phrase, "negative golden rule," is due apparently to the idea that the teaching of Jesus must be placed on a pinnacle above that of his day, and especially of his Jewish contemporaries. But that is to forget that Jesus habitually attended the synagogue from his youth up, and all indications in the Gospels point to his doing so from love of its services; it naturally follows that he owed much to its instruction. He went up once and again to the temple at Jerusalem. Whatever harsh things he may have said in the course of his ministry about the Pharisees, it must not be forgotten that he commended their work: "The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat: all things therefore whatsoever they bid you, these do and observe" (Matt. 23:2).[10] The law of his day, too, the commonly held verdict on which is given in a recent writer's statement that it "was a codified, connected, and continuous system; it was legal, external, mechanical," Jesus expressly declared that he had come "not to destroy, but to fulfil."[11] He commended also Pharisaic punctiliousness—"these ye ought to have done"—though deprecating the leaving undone "the weightier matters of the law, justice, and mercy" (Matt. 23:23). The estimate of many modern writers to the contrary, Jesus himself, by action and word, put a high estimate upon the religion and thought of his day.[12] In Strack-Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch* (I, 353–64), it is maintained, with an impressive array of evidence, that in the Jewish teaching of Jesus' day the non-Israelite was not comprehended in the command to love one's neighbor. There are Jewish scholars who combat this and hold that the command was taken to apply to all men. If Strack's contention be granted that the greatness of Jesus lies in his giving to the golden rule which he formulated a universal application when his contemporaries gave theirs but a narrow national one, yet even so, it must not be forgotten that the starting-point of his was the Scriptures of his race in whose teachings he had been nurtured from his youth. Jesus himself admits his obligation to the teaching which he had received when he declared of his own rule, "this is the law and the prophets." Whatever valuation is placed upon the teaching of Jesus, it ought in fairness to be arrived at by a just and impartial valuation of that of his fellow-countrymen and contemporaries. Nothing is gained by a hasty and unfair estimate such as that which scorns the "negative" golden rule as teaching a negative morality.

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[10] Attempts have been made, in the supposed interest of uniformity of teaching, to excise such commendatory words of Jesus as these. A broad survey of Jesus' attitude to the law of his day would justify rather the excision of his condemnatory words.

VI

Edels, at the end of his comment (mentioned previously) on Hillel's saying, adds the following: "'And thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself'; according as it is said, 'Your life has precedence over the life of your brother.'" There is an interesting piece of casuistry about this point in the *Sifra*, on Lev. 25:36 (cf. *Baba Mezi'a* 62*a*). Two men are in the desert with a little water in possession of but one of them. If the one drinks it, he will reach civilization; but if the two of them share it, both will die. Says the *Sifra:* "Ben Paṭuri interpreted: Let the two of them drink and die, for it is said, 'That thy brother may live *with* thee.' R. Akiba said to him: 'That thy brother may live with *thee'*; your life has precedence over the life of your fellow-man."[13]

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[11] The πληρῶσαι of Matt. 5:17 points to an original קיים, "fulfil," "carry out," e.g., S. Singer, *The Authorized Daily Prayer Book:* "O put it into our hearts to understand and to discern, to mark, learn and teach, to heed, to do and to fulfil (לקים) in love all the words of instruction in thy Law (p. 39); "and fulfil (קים) unto us, O Lord our God, that which is written" (p. 9).

[12] Jesus' idea of the law is worked out impartially and quite fully in Walker, *The Teaching of Jesus and the Jewish Teaching of His Age*, pp. 262–66.

The casuistry aside, this Jewish comment on "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" touches upon a point which applies as well to the golden rule of Jesus. There is a tendency on the part of some writers and commentators today to overemphasize Jesus' teaching upon denial of self and to make submergence of self the great principle of conduct for the follower of Jesus. But this is to forget that Jesus also taught a regard for one's fellow-man, *the criterion of which is self-regard*.[14] "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you" is to be the basis for action in regard to others. What do we wish most for ourselves? What do we strive hardest to make ours? *That* we must wish and strive for for others. Conversely, only as we have a high standard of achievement, material and physical, *for ourselves,* can we have a high standard *for others*. "We needs must choose the highest" for ourselves, and having chosen it for ourselves, choose it for our neighbors. To speak in the language of today, we will strive as individuals for the fullest possible life, and what we strive for as individuals we will strive for for society as a whole.

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[13] As Dr. George Foot Moore remarks (*Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era,* II, 83 n.): "You must be alive, if he is to live with *you*."

[14] The connection between duty toward one's neighbors and duty toward one's self Hillel also emphasized in a striking epigrammatic saying: "If I am not for myself, who is for me? And if I am for myself alone, what then am I? And if not now, then when?" (*Abot* I, 14).

BOOK REVIEWS

INTERPRETATIONS OF JAPANESE RELIGIONS

Two recent books[1] by Japanese thinkers dealing with the two religions of Japan are of especial interest and importance both because written by scholars of the first rank and also because each author while able to think and write objectively and with unprejudiced vision is an enthusiastic follower of the religion which he expounds. This fact gives to these books a peculiar value which the writings of western scholars on Shinto and Buddhism can never possess.

Nor is this initial advantage by any means their only unique quality. Each book has its special contribution to make. Western students of religion whose knowledge of Shinto is based chiefly on the Kojiki and the Nihongi and the interpretations given by Aston, Knox, Hearn, Chamberlain, and Holton, will find in Dr. Kato's book a new point of view. And an expression from Dr. Kato on this matter deserves the attention of everyone interested in the subject. He has been for many years professor of the comparative study of religion in the Imperial University of Tokyo, and has given to Shinto as profound and prolonged a study as perhaps anyone living. He has published numerous monographs on various problems of Shinto history, and in the present volume he presents in unitary form his conclusions as to the nature of the religion as a whole. His aim is to show that Shinto is not the merely primitive thing nor the merely patriotic thing depicted in nearly all Western expositions of it, but that it is, like Buddhism and Christianity, a growing religion, which has developed out of primitive forms into something very different from what it was in its ancient cradle.

Dr. Kato does not conceal nor belittle the primitive and animistic nature of early Shinto. Eight chapters of his book are, in fact, devoted to these aspects of the subject. But, having revealed at length the nonmoral, unphilosophical, naïve, fetishistic polytheism of ancient Shinto, he goes on to show both that the seeds of something more lofty were already present, and how—particularly under the influence of Buddhism and Confucianism—this simple and primitive faith and cult developed those nobler aspects which are necessary in any religion which is to nourish the spiritual life of modern men. "In my opinion," he writes, "Shinto is by no means to be classed with religions of the past. It is alive; it is very vitally active in the ethico-religious consciousness and national life of the patriotic Japanese of today. Shinto is, in truth, like Christianity, Buddhism, or Islam, one of the world's living religions. It has passed through a lengthy meandering course of development parallel with the national life of Japan. Starting as a nature religion, it has evolved into a peculiar form of ethico-intellectualistic religion. While intrinsically national in itself, it has, at different times, assimilated spiritualistic nourishment in the form of Confucian ethics and Buddhist philosophy, and today it stands stronger perhaps than ever before, inseparably interwoven in the national life of the Japanese race."

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[1] *A Study of Shinto, the Religion of the Japanese.* By Genchi Kato. Tokyo: Meiji Japan Society, 1926. x+254 pages. *Essays in Zen Buddhism.* By D. T. Suzuki. London: Luzac, 1927. x+423 pages.

While the question might perhaps be raised whether Dr. Kato has not in some respects idealized the native religion of his country, there can be little doubt that he is right in insisting that Shinto can be understood and rightly evaluated only when taken as a whole, in the full story of its development. It is at least as unjust and as unhistorical to define Shinto by what one finds in the Kojiki as to define Christianity by what one finds in the Book of Acts. Both Shinto and Christianity are currents of spiritual life flowing down through the ages, and neither is to be understood by any cross-section of the stream.

That the same form of judgment, based upon a long-continued development, must be applied to Zen Buddhism is one of the fundamental principles underlying Professor Suzuki's treatment of his subject. There are few things in the spiritual life of the East so difficult to make even remotely comprehensible to the western mind as Zen; and one can say without fear of contradiction that no one else has come so near succeeding in this task as Professor Suzuki. He has been for years professor of Zen Buddhism at the Otani Buddhist College in Kyoto and has written rather widely on Mahayana Buddhism in general and on Zen in particular. Several of the chapters of the present work, in fact, have appeared, in somewhat different form, as separate monographs on phases of Zen in the *Eastern Buddhist*, a scholarly periodical of which Professor Suzuki is editor. One of the chief aims of the book under review is to show that Zen Buddhism is not an isolated and merely queer excrescence incidentally thrown off by Buddhism (as the uninitiated Westerner is too likely to believe), but a natural outgrowth of a very central factor in the original teaching and experience of the founder. In fact, one of the most important contributions made by Professor Suzuki is to be found in his illuminating discussion of the Buddhism of Gotama. The founder of

Buddhism was not merely a coldly logical thinker (though he was doubtless coldly logical); and the new thing he gave his followers which for centuries set India aflame was not merely the Four Noble Truths. Something happened under the Bodhi tree, something comparable to a conversion experience; and in addition to his clearly reasoned conclusions, the Buddha brought to his disciples a new form of experience and of vision. This vision and experience, according to Professor Suzuki, handed on down the ages, constituted the heart of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism and of Japanese Zen. The history of this characteristic form of Buddhist mysticism as it developed in China and Japan is traced with some detail in Professor Suzuki's pages, and a careful analysis is made of it, not only from the historical but from the psychological point of view. We have in this peculiar and (in a sense) atheistic form of mystic revelation known technically as *satori* a most interesting subject, not only for the student of Buddhism, but for the psychologist and the student of the religious consciousness in general. The serious reader can hardly fail to find peculiar fascination in Professor Suzuki's masterly account of the very queer methods and sayings and experiences of these Zen mystics.

On the whole it may be said that the two books here reviewed constitute a contribution to our knowledge of the religion of Japan, both in its historical development and in its present condition, which no student of the subject can afford to neglect.

JAMES BISSETT PRATT

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

OLD TESTAMENT TEACHING ON WAR

This is manifestly a Doctor's dissertation,[1] and as such is unusual. There is nothing particularly original in it, and the author apparently knows no Hebrew and is content to use the translation of the American Revised Version, which in many places is anything but true to the original. In a Doctor's thesis one would expect the author to go back to the original sources, and one would assuredly expect a wide knowledge of the literature in the field. Here not a solitary foreign writing is quoted, and the bibliography is confined to the more common English books. However, if one is content to accept the translation of the American Revised Version, the treatment is quite satisfactory and does call attention to an anomaly on the part of Christian teachers, who, although professing to oppose war, often use material from the Old Testament that stimulates the war spirit rather than its opposite. The work was "undertaken with the hope that it might enable curriculum-makers to discover more readily what portions of the material are suitable for their purposes in respect to attitudes toward war, and to treat any part of the material in a manner likely to quicken the ethical discrimination of their pupils." If teachers will take the pains to read the book and follow the suggestions made at the end of the volume, "Educational Implications," it will undoubtedly accomplish that purpose and so help tremendously in the great work of peace. If the Christian church could only be trained to think and act in other than warlike terms and take a really positive attitude toward peace and a negative one toward war, the millenium would not be far distant. Books like the present volume ought to help in that direction.

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[1] *The God of the Old Testament in Relation to War*. By Marion J. Benedict. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1927. viii+185 pages.

The Old Testament material is arranged in the chronological order as given by Bewer in his *Literature of the Old Testament in Its Historical Development*, and the attitude toward war ascribed by each writing to God is carefully and critically examined. The appraisal is very fair throughout and brings out clearly the diverse character of the literature in the Old Testament. The last chapter discusses the Old Testament resources for education with regard to peace and war, and offers important suggestions as to curriculum policies. The book has no index—a surprising omission for a pedagogue to be guilty of.

THEOPHILE J. MEEK

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

A STUDENT'S GRAMMAR OF THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT

A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament,[1] by H. E. Dana and J. R. Mantey, is designed as a brief, yet comprehensive, handbook to meet the needs of the average student. This design controls both its extent and the manner of presentation. The results of research are assumed and are reported with a minimum of historical and comparative exposition. This gives the textbook the appearance of the deductive method, as the authors frankly state. They have been willing to accept the limitations implied by the book's purpose.

As is to be expected, the conception of purpose has made the organization of materials conventional. Accidence is briefly treated. In syntax the exposition of the noun is relatively extensive, but the authors have succeeded in discussing the verb very succinctly. Clauses are studied still more briefly. Paradigms are grouped into an appendix.

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[1] *A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament*. By H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey. New York: Macmillan, 1927. xx+356 pages.

One feels that the desire to compress materials has led to undue restraint in citing examples. Indeed, this largely accounts for the apparently deductive method, since uniformly only one printed example carries the responsibility for illustrating each phenomenon. Abundance of illustration would not only suggest a greater degree of induction, but would assist the student to regard grammar as the discovery, rather than the pronouncement, of principles.

The standpoint of the grammar closely approximates that of Professor Robertson. The noun, for example, is treated as appearing in eight case forms. Moulton receives considerable recognition, but in most debatable cases the view of Robertson is affirmed. Indeed, the influence of the Robertson grammar appears so strongly that the present work suggests it at every hand. Doubtless it is because of the elementary purpose of the book that only studies in English are cited. However, the researches of continental European scholars are not apparent even when it might be expected that they would be seen.

The special advantages of this grammar inhere chiefly in the success of the authors in achieving their purpose of preparing a manual for the average student. Doubtless it will be a useful text as such. Several matters are treated extremely well. For example, the discussion of accent should be helpful to the student. So, too, should the diagram of the uses of prepositions (p. 113), and the tables of usage (e.g., contraction, p. 25, prepositional meanings, p. 114, classification of conjunctions, p. 257). On the other hand, one may question the practicality of isolating paradigms into an appendix; students are not eager to look up references cited. The inclusion in the paradigms of forms which do not occur in the New Testament is also questionable. Why, for example, should all forms of the optative be cited?

Clearly there is a field of usefulness for such a grammar as this. Its bulk is proper for a textbook. The success of the authors in articulating the materials to the needs of the average student meets a particular demand. Used as a point of departure for the historical and comparative study which it excludes, this work will doubtless be highly efficient in the field to which the authors have directed it.

DONALD W. RIDDLE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE GENESIS OF LUKE-ACTS

Professor Cadbury has already done notable and original work in the elucidation of the Lucan writings, and in the present book he gathers up his earlier results and extends his inquiries over a much wider field.[1] He writes in an interesting manner, and his argument at most points can easily be followed by any intelligent reader. At times, perhaps, he has been unduly careful to make everything clear and simple; but no one who is acquainted with the subject can mistake the value of the book. There is more genuine scholarship in it than in nine-tenths of the ostentatiously learned books that are being written today about the New Testament. Its outstanding merit is that in every chapter it is the outcome of first-hand research. Dr. Cadbury tries to forget as far as possible all theories that have been held about the Lucan writings, and examines them by themselves and in the light of other first-century literature. His method may be compared to that which Shakespearean scholars are now employing with such fruitful results. In order to understand Shakespeare they investigate the conditions of authorship and stage production in his time, the state of the drama as he found it, the work of his contemporaries. Dr. Cadbury, in like manner, has prepared himself for the study of Luke by saturating himself in the historical writings of the age and collecting all available facts as to ancient literary habits and conventions.

He lays stress, at the outset, on the unfortunate consequences of the division of Luke from Acts in our Bibles. Undoubtedly the author "to Theophilus" intended the two writings to be volumes of the same book, and we cannot rightly understand either of them unless we take them together. For want of a better name Dr. Cadbury speaks of the complete work as "Luke-Acts," and analyzes the process of its composition. Four factors are considered, each of them in a number of separate chapters: (1) the materials at the writer's disposal; (2) the modes of thought and writing in vogue at his time; (3) his own individuality; (4) the purposes he had in view. Questions concerning the identity of the author and the value of his work—which are usually considered at the outset—are reserved for brief treatment in a concluding chapter.

Perhaps the chief impression which the book leaves on us is that of the importance of Luke's own part in the making of his work. He is not to be regarded as a mere manipulator of sources. While he uses documents that lie ready to his hand, he rewrites them in his own style and adapts them to his own notions of how history should be composed. Far-reaching theories based on the Hebraic coloring of certain chapters, on the primitive character of discourses and incidents, on the use of "we" in the narrative of Paul's voyages, are not admissible. These and other peculiarities may be due to the literary craftsmanship of Luke himself, and find their parallels in other first-century writings. The speeches in Acts may be set down to Luke's own composition, and this is probably true also of what purport to be letters and official documents. Dr. Cadbury makes the highly important suggestion that in the later part of his work Luke relies more on his own personal knowledge than on sources, conforming in this respect to the custom by which ancient historians transcribe their predecessors until they reach the period within their own field of observation. In some very interesting chapters Dr. Cadbury discusses Luke's interpretation of the Christian message. He shows that Luke has a better understanding than any New Testament writer of the Jewish messianic hope, and that he lays emphasis on the resurrection rather than the death of Christ. The death is treated only as the prelude to the resurrection. New light is thrown on the so-called "socialism" of Luke. Dr. Cadbury holds that Luke's concern is not so much with the rights of the poor as with the duties of the rich, and that his attitude is to be explained from the traditional Hebrew ideas. With regard to the apologetic purpose of Luke's work, Dr. Cadbury shows that it is wider in scope and at the same time more definite than is usually assumed. Luke aims at proving not merely that Christianity is politically harmless but that it is sufficiently akin to Judaism to be classed as a *religio licita*, and that it is also fully in keeping with the best pagan belief. On most of the debated questions Dr. Cadbury takes up a guarded position. He does not deny the identity of his author with Paul's companion, but is by no means certain of it. He inclines to the view that Luke makes no use of Josephus or of Paul's Epistles. He appears to be doubtful of the theory lately advanced by Streeter and others that the framework of Luke's gospel is a document other than Mark. On the main question of Luke's fidelity to facts he ventures no decided opinion. His conclusion apparently is that while in the main Luke is trustworthy, his standards are those of ancient historians, who are as much concerned with the beauty and effectiveness of their narrative as with its accuracy. Perhaps the chief criticism which most readers will make on the book is that it so often avoids definite pronouncements. To many, however, this will appear a merit, and it certainly belongs to the writer's purpose. He rightly feels that Lucan criticism has been too much dominated by preconceived theories, and confines his attention to the facts, which are seen on examination to fit in with none of the theories. No doubt it would be a satisfaction to most of us to feel that the problems of Luke have been finally solved. Dr. Cadbury does not pretend to offer us this happiness. He is content to make us realize, more vividly than before, what the facts are and how difficult they are to explain. Perhaps a full explanation will never be forthcoming, but all future attempts to reach it will have to take account of the material which Dr. Cadbury has placed before us in this book.

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[1] *The Making of Luke-Acts*. By Henry J. Cadbury. New York: Macmillan, 1927. x+385 pages. $3.00.

E. F. Scott

Union Theological Seminary

FIRST-CENTURY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

The aim of a recent book by Dr. Zenos is to trace the development of Christian thought during the period covered by the New Testament.[1] In the author's view all the main conceptions of the Gospel were already given in the teaching of Jesus; but in the century that followed they were still in process of being molded into their definite theological form. Dr. Zenos has won a wide reputation as a skilful and inspiring teacher, and from this book we can gather at least part of the secret of his success. He arranges his topics carefully in their logical order, and his exposition is always admirably clear. He is never dull or irrelevant, and while he takes account of conflicting opinions, he does not allow them to bury or confuse his own line of thought. Without ever indulging in mere homiletics he makes us feel everywhere that he is himself profoundly convinced of the truth and value of the Christian message. Apart from its actual contents the book is well worth studying by the theological teacher for the sake of its method. Dr. Zenos adopts what might now be regarded as a somewhat conservative position. He is fully acquainted with the most recent literature, and makes ample use of it. He readily accepts any suggestions which commend themselves to his mind as important, admitting, e.g., that Paul may have been influenced by the mystery religions, that the Epistle to Hebrews has no special relation to Jewish Christianity, that the "John" of the Fourth Gospel is another than the apostle. His conservatism, in fact, is little more than a disinclination to abandon positions generally held in favor of others which are still quite conjectural. Sometimes it appears to us that he carries his caution too far, e.g., when he uses James and even II Peter as possible sources for the earliest type of Christian teaching. But for the purpose which he has in view his book gains by the uniform soberness of its judgments. Readers who wish to make acquaintance with the progress of New Testament thought may feel assured that they have here before them not merely the arbitrary guesses of a single scholar but the results on which most scholars are now broadly agreed.

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[1] *The Plastic Age of the Gospel: A Manual of New Testament Theology.* By Andrew C. Zenos. New York: Macmillan, 1927. xi+264 pages. $2.75.

The first part of the book is occupied with a discussion of the teaching of Jesus, grouped around a compact and luminous definition of Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God: "that order of things in Israel and through Israel in the world, in which men would recognize God's fatherly rule, submit themselves to him in faith, and enter into fraternal relations with one another, looking forward to the consummation of the will of God in an ideal human society." In the remainder of the book Dr. Zenos traces the manner in which the message of Jesus was presented, in its various aspects, by the primitive church, by Paul, and by the Fourth Evangelist. The exposition of Paulinism is particularly full and suggestive. All the elements of Paul's thinking are carefully considered, and due emphasis is placed on the religious conceptions which underlie and give meaning to the theology. The book closes rather abruptly after the account of Johannine teaching. It might have been well if Dr. Zenos had added a concluding chapter for the purpose of bringing together the results of his inquiry and indicating the main forces which had been at work throughout the development. Much attention has rightly been directed, of late years, to the diversities and contradictions of New Testament thought. The time has come when its identity under all the varying forms should be brought into proper relief, and in this matter Dr. Zenos, in some later edition of his book, may see his way to help us. As it is we thank him for a piece of work which will have a double value in theological study: as an excellent survey of the New Testament field, and as an introduction to the history of doctrine in the centuries succeeding the plastic age.

E. F. SCOTT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

RELIGION'S QUEST FOR TRUTH

When pragmatism began to make inroads on idealism, many feared that religion would suffer. The advent of the realisms was also viewed with alarm. James himself, it is true, proclaimed a new era for religion as soon as it should become truly empirical. But the new era has been slow in dawning, especially as pragmatism has insisted on vaunting its naturalistic side and some of the realisms have taken unto themselves a behavioristic psychology.

Now, however, there are signs that the new age is near. One of the signs is the gradual disappearance from books on the philosophy of religion of the phrases drawn from the vocabulary of epistemology which were once used to define or suggest the relation of the finite to the infinite. The religious problem is viewed today as a problem of adjustment rather than knowledge. We hear much about "man as organic to nature," "interaction between organism and environment," and the need of "conserving experienced values." More and more the fact of God's existence and of man's knowledge of him is being taken for granted. The question is becoming that of separating those experiences which can be defined as having their source directly in God and as being specifically religious, from those which are more appropriately considered secular.

A recent and vigorous spokesman for the new movement is Professor H. N. Wieman, whose latest volume[1] carries on and helps to explain the ideas of his earlier work on *Religious Experience and Scientific Method*. Professor Wieman's view is that God is that in our environment which sustains the spiritual life. Man enters into relation with him through the religious experience, which is an experience of the total mass of stimulation flowing over one at any time. In it established habits and customary modes of reaction are broken down. It thus becomes a means to the acquisition of new data as to what is best in human life, also a preparation for the setting up of new responses and new habits. In a word, religious experience is experimental. It is the most adequate means the race has of freeing itself from the old and reaching out toward the new. It is a return to the springs of being for a new view of what life really means and for new power to achieve what this view reveals. God is the life-bringing part of our environment. God therefore exists. We cannot doubt him any more than we can doubt that we have been brought into existence, and that there is an element or group of elements in the universe that nourishes and sustains us and helps us to attain our highest good.

The appeal of this line of reasoning is apparent even in the most summary statement of it. Here is a proof for God which keeps close to common sense on the one hand, and on the other is more logic-tight than the ontological proof itself. The only question that arises is whether the God given us by this means is the same God which the religious man has claimed to know. Professor Wieman admits that his views are more definite on the score *that* God is than in their account of *what* he is, but claims that the nature of God is something for religion itself to work out empirically. Among his own definitions are the following: "God is [that] most subtle and intimate complexity of environmental nature which yields the greatest good when right adjustment is made," or the "feature of our total environment which most vitally affects the continuance and welfare of human life," or "that in the universe which will yield maximum security." Religion is "man's acute awareness of the realm of unattained possibility and the behavior that results from this awareness;" it is "the striving toward interaction with the widest and fullest environment, physical and social, minute and vast, past, present, and future, near and far, actual and possible." Worship means (1) exposure to the divine influence, i.e., to that in the environment which stimulates one spiritually; (2) diagnosis of one's spiritual condition; (3) reconstruction in the light of this diagnosis.

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[1] *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*. By Henry Nelson Wieman. New York: Macmillan, 1927. xi+256 pages. $2.50.

Suggestive as are these definitions, they still give rise to some ambiguity. Is God the totality of man's environment (cf. p. 140), or the beneficent aspect of that totality (cf. p. 71)? Perhaps Professor Wieman means that in the long run the totality itself is beneficent; but we should expect more emphasis on selection from one whose sympathies are so distinctly pragmatic. Again, why is the author, both in this book and the earlier one, so insistent that religious experience is sensuous? If, as modern psychology seems to indicate, its significance lies in the fact that it effects a new and creative synthesis of subconsciously felt purposes and desires, and brings insight by some intuitional process, which again must be described in terms of an organization of mental data which is largely unconscious, it is difficult to see that the sense element is important at all. Professor Wieman does point out that sense experience may be non-cognitive. But this only means that we need a clearer psychological analysis of this sensuous but non-perceptive experience when the total mass of stimulation plays on one and brings new insight.

It is interesting to observe how much of Professor Wieman's arresting argument is paralleled in other writers. To say this is not to deny the real originality he has shown, but rather to point again to an important tendency of our day. The description of religious experience, except for its emphasis on sense-content, is like James's description in "A Suggestion about Mysticism." The idea of religion as adjustment to environment has been developed by D. C. Macintosh and by G. B. Smith in "Is Theism Essential to Religion?" (this *Journal*, July, 1925). Professor Wieman indicates his dependence on Hocking and Dewey and explicitly identifies his God with Whitehead's principle of concretion. It may be doubted, however, whether this identification really helps his argument. The principle of concretion is too largely responsible for things as they are, and the mirroring of all the world in each event is too non-selective, to bear much resemblance to the God of love or the beneficent aspect of the universe.

Professor Wieman's eagerness at times leads him astray. When he says (p. 234) that "religion values truth more than science," what he means is that religion, more than science, is concerned with the existence of certain facts, with the question whether or not its beliefs are true. When he observes (p. 244) that "in religion we find truth sought more earnestly and prized more highly than anywhere else," he means that religion, to a greater extent than either science or philosophy, is interested in establishing the truth of certain specific ideas. Again, the statement (p. 158) that in religious experience "we have reached the ultimate source and condition of any world, in adaptation to which all possible worlds may be developed," would be more exact if it were expressly limited to the realm of ethical and religious value. Once more, justice is hardly done in the first chapter to the God of the dreamer. Religion has often meant a revolt against the brutal present, and the "dreams" it has evoked have frequently prevented brutality in the future.

It has seemed worth while to offer these comments because the book itself is a valuable contribution to our thought about God and about religious experience. It is less uneven than the author's earlier work and it goes further into the ethical implications of his view. What is needed now is a more complete statement of the metaphysical presuppositions of this philosophy, and a further psychological analysis of the way in which the God here described makes himself known among men. It is to be hoped that Professor Wieman will give us this soon.

J. S. BIXLER

SMITH COLLEGE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PERSONALISM

This[1] is the most systematic, complete, and thorough presentation of personalism of recent date that has come to the attention of the reviewer. The prominence of personalism in the philosophic religious thinking of United States, and to some degree throughout the world, makes it deserving of our most careful attention. In this book the author searches throughout the entire history of philosophy to find every stream and rivulet that has been taken up into the present philosophy of personalism. In fact the purpose of the book, professedly, is to show that personalism is the culminating outcome of all the past. "It represents one of the oldest and broadest currents in the history of human thought. . . . . It is the ripe fruit of more than two milleniums of intellectual toil, the apex of a pyramid whose base was laid by Plato and Aristotle." Perhaps every philosophy makes this claim for itself, at least tacitly.

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[1] *The Philosophy of Personalism*. By Albert C. Knudson. New York: Abingdon Press, 1927. 438 pages. $3.50.

Personalism, as expounded by Professor Knudson, declares that the whole world of time and space and matter, generally called nature, is the realm of phenomena, and the proper field of science, but does not directly concern philosophy and religion. At any rate these latter go deeper and find their proper field of investigation in the "ontological" realm. This realm of true being is spaceless, timeless, and immaterial and consists of persons or souls or minds or spirits or selves, as one may choose to designate them. Hence science and religion cannot clash if each keeps to its proper realm, science dealing with phenomena made up of space-time material things, while religion and philosophy deal with that which underlies and sustains nature, the "power world" as our author calls it. This method of solving the problem of science and religion has the merit of neatness and completeness.

Nature is the product of the constant "energizing" of God. Just what it means for God to "energize" is not made plain. But in any case God is not in nature. "It [nature] is ceaselessly produced by a power or powers outside itself" (p. 66). Another way the author has of stating it, is to say that nature is altogether and absolutely "other" to God, although dependent upon him as indicated.

All causation is due to personal agents, whether human or divine. There is no cause save that which consists of the "activity" of timeless, spaceless, immaterial souls. The soul or self or personal agent is not something back of its activity. Rather it is identical with its activities. We are not quite clear just what these activities are. They cannot be observed in nature, for that would make the self a part of nature, which is contrary to the teaching of personalism. Neither can they be observed introspectively, at least the reviewer cannot find them in himself. We gather the author to mean that they are beyond the reach of observation altogether, being simply another word for that ontological self which everyone "experiences" but which no one can directly observe. Cause, self, soul, and activity, then, become transposable words having the same identical meaning. Energizing is probably another word which could be substituted for any of these without making any difference. They all pertain to that something which is beyond the reach of observation and scientific investigation because it is not in the realm of phenomena but in the "power world."

The difficulty in having so many equivalent terms for the same entity is that it becomes exceedingly difficult to define that entity without using another equivalent term. After considering various definitions proposed by different personalists the author comes down to this: Personality is (1) individuality, (2) self-consciousness, (3) free activity, (4) worth. But there is no proximate genus and distinguishing species in this definition. On examination these four characteristics are found further to be equivalent terms for that same entity called personality. Personality and individuality are equivalents. There is no personality which is not individuality; and there is no individuality which is not personality. So our author teaches. As for self-consciousness, plainly "personality" can be substituted for "self," thus making the definition read: "Personality is personality-consciousness." When we come to the third factor, we have already seen that activity and personality are identical terms. As for the adjective "free," all true activity is free according to this philosophy, hence the adjective does not qualify any one kind of activity as distinguished from another. The fourth factor in the definition, "worth," is not sufficiently discussed in this book to make clear just what meaning should be attached to it here.

Three dominant thoughts run throughout the book. They are as follows:

1. Personality or self, and it alone, "combines in its own being unity with plurality and identity with change." Consequently in personality alone do we find solution of the fundamental problem of all metaphysics. We question this. We ask: Can we not, in the same sense as we experience this combination in ourselves, likewise experience it in the continuity of nature? But we have not space to discuss this point as we should like.

2. "Reality is deeper than logic," hence the theoretical faculty is not sufficient to lead us to the whole truth. It must be supplemented by practical or moral considerations. For example:

> If the universal vital interests of men are deeper and more controlling than the theoretical reason, it may fairly be concluded that they are in their essential nature independent of it, and that religion, for instance, does not derive its right to exist from the intellect. . . . It is as valid as the a priori principles of thot.

It seems to the reviewer that this view involves confusion. Of course nothing that exists derives its right to exist from the intellect. That is as true of religion as of anything else. Error does not derive its right to exist from the intellect, but it exists just the same along with religion and science and smallpox and self-deception and immorality. Religion is a fact of human nature like error and truth-seeking, but the fact of its existence does not make it valid any more than the fact of the existence of error makes error valid. In fact, validity does not apply to existence as such at all. A belief does not need to be valid in order to have a right to exist. Validity has to do with the truth of a belief, not with its right to exist. Surely the author would not say that every religious belief is true simply because religion is a necessary factor in the make-up of the human spirit. And how can this fact, that it is a necessary part of human nature, help us to distinguish what religious beliefs are true and what are false? Thinking is also an essential factor in the make-up of man, but that fact does not help us in the least to ascertain what thinking is valid and what is not.

All human cognition involves not only logical processes but also volition and "practical interests" generally, simply because everything man does requires some volition and desire or other form of impulsion. One cannot formulate a belief and cannot hold it as true without the exercise of volition. No one disputes that. The only question at issue is whether the volition and practical interests involved in a belief provide further evidence for the truth of that belief in addition to its logical consistency with other beliefs and the experimental tests. Men have desired and willed to the death beliefs that were wholly contradictory to one another. The contradictories could not both be true; and the desire and will supporting them could not make them both true. Desire is needed in order to have any belief at all, but it is just as much needed for a false belief as for a true one—perhaps more so. If desire and will provided evidence for the truth of the beliefs they sustain, insane delusions would not be delusions.

3. The third dominant thought of the book is that determination makes truth impossible. "If false ideas are as necessary as true ones, there would seem to be no means of distinguishing between them. The very notion of a rational standard would be abrogated." This thought is greatly emphasized and upheld as one of the chief contributions of Bowne to modern thought. The reviewer cannot see its cogency.

By freedom or indeterminism the author means choice without a cause. To be determined, or under necessity, is to choose and act by virtue of a cause. But suppose the cause for one's error is inaccurate thinking and the cause for one's true belief is accurate thinking? How, in such case, does determinism or causation destroy reason? Rather it would seem that such determinism is indispensible to reason and without it the "rational standard would be abrogated," which is exactly opposite to the view of the author. If true belief is not caused by accurate thinking, and false belief by inaccurate thinking, but each is a matter of uncaused free choice, then indeed would we have a collapse of reason. Thus indeterminism rather than determinism destroys all possibility for exercise of reason.

But perhaps the personalist would insist that we go deeper. Granted that accurate thinking causes one to reach a true belief and that inaccurate thinking causes one to fall into error, yet what causes one to think accurately in the one case and inaccurately in the other? Is one under necessity to be accurate in the one case and inaccurate in the other? Or does one freely choose without any cause whatsoever to think accurately in the one case and inaccurately in the other? Whoever, in trying to solve a problem, ever chose, freely, deliberately, and without a cause, to think inaccurately? For example the author and the reviewer hold different views on this matter under present consideration. One of us is, and possibly both of us are, thinking inaccurately. But we have not freely and deliberately and without cause chosen to think inaccurately. To say that one's opponent thinks as he does out of mere perversity is an old method of claiming victory in debate, but it is too easy. If the reviewer is thinking inaccurately, as probably he is, it is due to deficiency in his past philosophic training or in his native endowment, or to the distorting influence of some religious or other prejudice, or a combination of these. I am sure it is not due to the fact that he has freely chosen to think inaccurately while the author has freely chosen to do the opposite.

After a careful study of the philosophy expounded in this book, and after having once in his youth been an ardent advocate of it, the reviewer reaches two conclusions about it. He cannot escape them. If he were free to choose, he would select another conclusion. But he is not free to choose. He is under necessity. The author would say that in such a state he "suffers a collapse of reason."

First, it is a philosophy built up to defend certain pre-established moral and religious convictions. The convictions are not an outgrowth of the philosophy. The convictions came first, and the philosophy was built up to shelter them and make it unnecessary to change them. Personalists themselves in a certain sense admit this, for they say that moral and religious and other vital interests and desires stand on their own right; and that reason (and therefore philosophy) must be made to conform to them. We have already discussed this point.

The second general conclusion is that this philosophy is eclectic. Ideas are culled from all the great thinkers of past and present and put together in such a way as to defend and preserve with least change the above mentioned convictions. Any idea that seems to give promise of support to these convictions is eagerly seized and built into the philosophy. When the ideas thus gathered cannot be made to fit together, and a gap yawns, a "mystery" or miracle is called in to fill up the gap. For example:

> . . . . the contradition in the causal idea is removed by two miraculous powers of the soul, its unifying and self identifying consciousness and its power of self-determination. How these powers are possible we do not know, but they are manifest factors of experience [p. 224].
>
> Whatever independence finite spirits may have, they are still part of the world and, as such, dependent upon the same ultimate cause. How they manage to combine dependence with a measure of independence is indeed a mystery [p. 200].

Our criticisms have been directed against the philosophy of personalism. The scholarship which Professor Knudson shows, the clarity of his exposition, and the mastery of his materials are of the highest order.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE MAKING OF CHRISTIANITY

Professor Guignebert is widely known, in his own country and beyond it, for his work on the history of dogma and on various questions relating to Christian origins. In the book before us[1] he has sketched the whole development of Christianity, from the appearance of Jesus to the present day, in the light of the somewhat negative theories which he has advanced in his earlier writings. He deals first with the classical period, and discusses the Gospel history, the influences to which the religion was subjected in the course of the gentile mission, the formation of the Catholic church and of theological doctrine. The second, and to our mind the most interesting and valuable, part of the book is concerned with the Middle Ages. The characteristics of this period are examined in masterly fashion and it is shown that beneath the apparent stagnation there was constant movement. Particular attention is given to the undercurrents of revolt, too often forgotten, which were continually active during the so-called ages of faith. They finally gathered head in the Reformation, and from this point onward M. Guignebert traces the fortunes of Christianity in its conflict with humanism, nationalism, modern philosophy and science. Protestantism itself receives meager and rather superficial treatment. "The inevitable dénouement of the Protestant evolution, whatever the sect in question, is *adogmatism,* purely personal religion," and for M. Guignebert Christianity is indissolubly bound up with the church as an institution. He therefore closes the book with an examination of the present condition of the Catholic church, which, partly by its own deliberate action, partly because no evolution of the old dogmas is now possible, has become incapable of further development. This fixity is the beginning of the end. In a measurable time Christianity, having lost the power of self-adjustment to new conditions, is bound to go the way of previous religions and merge itself in some new form of belief. Guignebert, indeed, asserts that the Western peoples have never understood or accepted the Christian dogmas, which grew out of the presuppositions of Oriental thought. "The Western races have never, strictly speaking, been Christians."

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[1] *Christianity, Past and Present*. By Charles Guignebert. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927. xxvi+507 pages. $4.50.

This sweeping statement connects itself with the fundamental thesis of the book. Christianity, as M. Guignebert regards it, is essentially a syncretism. Jesus himself (of whom very little can certainly be known) taught a simple form of Judaism, in which the chief stress was laid on moral duties. His message was taken up by Hellenistic Jews, who were strongly affected by the syncretistic temper of the age. In Antioch, which must be regarded as the true cradle of the new religion, Christ was transformed into a divinity and the church was constituted on the model of the cults and wove a mystical ritual and theology around the redeemer-god. The religion was thus placed in a position to compete with the other spiritual movements of the time, and to absorb into itself their vital elements. It finally vanquished its rivals, in virtue partly of its stern exclusiveness, partly of the moral and monotheistic principles it had taken over from Judaism. By assimilating through many centuries what was given it from without, it continued to maintain itself, but its power of adaptation failed when it was confronted with a new world of thought. It stands out as the religion of one given epoch, which is now definitely closing.

The book is ably and sometimes brilliantly written, and is the product of much learning in a wide variety of fields. But as a history of Christianity it suffers from radical defects. Too evidently the author has never seriously asked himself what Christianity is, in its intrinsic nature. He assumes, apparently, that the work of Jesus himself was negligible. What he gave was at most some kind of nucleus—the stone at the center of the snowball—around which the later movement formed itself. Christianity in the proper sense only began through the contact with Hellenism. It consists in a huge aggregate of rites and dogmas taken over from ancient religion and carrying in them the seeds of their own disintegration. What was it that absorbed and vitalized all this given material? To this question, which is the only one that really matters, no answer is ever attempted. Again, the assumption runs throughout the book that in so far as it absorbed foreign elements, Christianity became always less Christian. We are given to understand that to call it a "syncretism" is only another way of saying that it has no intrinsic religious value. This idea that a living organism becomes less itself by taking in nourishment belongs to a naïve stage of thought. We had hoped that serious writers on Christianity had now got beyond it. Once more, the author is unable, as we have seen, to think of Christianity apart from its embodiment in the official Catholic church. To those who do not identify their religion with the Roman conception of it he says in effect "you are not Christians and have no right to speak." This is an attitude not uncommon in negative writers of Catholic antecedents. They discard everything in the Roman tradition except the arrogance. A further defect in the book, due perhaps to the effort to force too much into a limited space, is its constant reference to theories as if they were proved facts. M. Guignebert is undoubtedly a scholar who could produce able reasons in support of every view he holds. He may be excused from withholding them, but he might at least have indicated, for the benefit of readers who have no expert knowledge, that some of the positions on which he confidently builds are still in process of discussion. We regret that the translator has too modestly suppressed his name. He has rendered the book in such excellent English that it reads like the original. Was it worth translating?

E. F. Scott

Union Theological Seminary

JESUITISM REVIEWED BY AN EX-JESUIT

"Twenty years of adult manhood is the price I paid for the experience on which this story is built," writes Dr. E. Boyd Barrett in the preface to his vigorous critique of Jesuitism.[1] His book is a penetrating and intimate interpretation of the history, principles, practice, and psychology of the Society of Jesus, of which he was a member from 1905 to 1925. It has none of the nastiness or bitterness of the ordinary literature of exposure. It ranks with the works of the German ex-Jesuit, Graf Paul von Hoensbroech,[2] as the product of a mind of exceptional force and erudition. Of the two converts the Irishman surpasses the German in desire to deal fairly with the accused. They differ also in the fact that von Hoensbroech became a pronounced opponent of Roman ultramontanism, while our author's attitude is that of revolt against the repressive internal system of the order itself. His book indicates no disaffection toward the Holy See except as such may be implied in a trenchant criticism of the order, and in references to its sinister influence at Rome.

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[1] *The Jesuit Enigma.* By E. Boyd Barrett. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1927. 351 pages. $4.00.

The thesis of the book is stated in chapter i in such sentences as the following:

> In the romance of the Jesuits there is abundant material for students of economics, ethics and psychology. . . . . Running through it all one finds the ever present enigma; the contradiction inseparable from Jesuitism; the interchanging of opposites; wealth that is evangelical poverty; equivocation that is truth; laxity that is purity of doctrine; wrongs rendered good by the end in view; gross disobedience that is holy docility; rotting idleness that is labour in the vineyard; astute and cunning diplomacy that is dove-like simplicity; heroism that is the offspring of fear; chilling indifference that is the charity of Christ.

Most of these paradoxes are amply illustrated in course of the treatment. In the whole story of this society founded upon contradictions there is found "a salient note of failure." Contrary to its avowed aims, the order has afforded more trouble than aid to the pope, given a new lease of life to Protestantism, proved a barrier to science, and left the youth of the church without religious education. Chapter ii examines historically the claim made by Jesuit official historians, for example by Fr. T. J. Campbell, that the society has always exhibited profound affection, reverence, and obedience to the pope. The claim is demolished, largely on the basis of Fr. Campbell's own admissions. The chapter on the *Spiritual Exercises*, "the book that made the Jesuits," is an acute analysis of the manual, with constant reference to its habitual modern use. Loyola's merciless repression of human nature under sanctions of spiritual terror, his dependence upon a technique of external stimuli to produce mystical experiences, and the resulting misery, indifferentism, or revolt in the mind of the exercitant, could hardly be more vividly described than in these pages. Ample illustration is given of the superiority complex that obsesses this aristocratic order, as also of the humiliating position in which its members and even its officials are placed through the unchecked authority of superiors. Authority is protected by means of a consummate system of espionage which results in insecurity and distrust, and in "the shelving of honorable and independent men."

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[2] *14 Jahre Jesuit*. 2 vols, 1909–10; *Der Jesuitenorden, eine Enzyklopädie*, of which the first volume appeared in 1926, and the second is forthcoming posthumously.

The system produces, we are told, an extraordinary crop of mental abnormalities. Persecution mania, sadism, masochism, exhibitionism, hypochondria, and homosexuality are common aberrations. The defective psychotherapy of the *Jesuit Constitutions,* based on the principle that "opposites cure opposites," is employed in their treatment. The penances and humiliations inflicted in order to cure only aggravate the disease. "The Jesuit is dehumanized by repression," and nature seeks an escape which can only be found by some infringement of the rules.

Dr. Barrett shows, however (chap. xii), that Jesuitism itself has developed an "escape-mechanism" by which it is possible for the society to evade the inconvenient rulings of popes, and for members to obtain privileges on some pious pretext. Thus repression is to some small degree modified by equivocation. Regarding an oft-reiterated charge against the Jesuits the author holds that while no Jesuit doctor has taught that the end justifies the means, this principle has been nevertheless freely practiced in the society.

There is much else of interest in this arresting book, such as the study of the Jesuits and women (chap. vi), the exposure of the low condition of Jesuit education (chap. viii), the estimate of the society's secret and overt influence in public affairs (chap. x), and the account of the condemnation of the Jesuits by Clement XIV and of Tyrell's strictures upon the order as "the counter-extravagance to Protestantism" (chap. xiii). The last two chapters are devoted to the author's personal experiences as a Jesuit. The story is attractively and not sensationally told, and, as might be expected, adds evidence in condemnation of the system.

One or two general observations are forced upon the reviewer. While not disposed to dispute the testimony of an intimate observer regarding the prevalence among Jesuits of psychic disorders, one may still question whether these are to be attributed solely to the repression of the system, or explained as the outcropping of conditions almost equally prevalent in lay society. But if Dr. Barrett is right one may also suggest the wide implications of his argument on repression. The charge here made applies not only to the Jesuits but to all monasticism, of which Jesuitism is the quintessence. Repression is the salient principle of all institutionalized asceticism. The cure of sins and temptations by their opposites *(e contrariis curare contraria)* is the accepted method of the monastic spiritual physician from the beginning; though never before was the technique of this treatment worked out so purposefully as in the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius and the *Industriae* of Aquaviva. There is of course a recognizable survival of these conceptions in Protestantism, notably in Puritanism. Dr. Barrett's book will lead thoughtful Protestants to consider whether their own communions have not felt the tendency to reduce Christianity to a technique for crushing natural desire. Wherever such interpretations appear they are, by implication at least, arraigned in this book before the bar of history. "The religion of Christ," says Dr. Barrett, "is to conquer the world by Love; that of Ignatius, to conquer by Strategy," and this criticism has a wide sweep.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A ROMAN CATHOLIC ANTHOLOGY

Dr. Thomas Walsh has edited a volume[1] which deserves the attention of all readers of poetry. When we observe that it bears the authorization of a Roman Catholic archbishop we are not surprised by the interpretation put upon the word "Catholic" in the title. More than nine-tenths of the space is given to the work of medieval and modern Roman Catholic poets. These poems are arranged in three sections in chronological order, the divisions being made at the sixteenth century and at the year 1870. The latter date is chosen because it lies on the fringe of the period of "contemporary" poets. There is no topical arrangement.

The principle of selection is not one that would have been made either on purely aesthetic or on purely religious grounds; the basis is that of Roman orthodoxy. To quote the Preface: "The editor has purposely chosen the completely Catholic utterances of his poets in preference sometimes to their pieces of general aesthetic charm. The orthodoxy of the poet has been another consideration, and where that has been found unquestionable the editor has felt some liberty to vary the coloring of his selection. Wherever there has been a question of the full orthodoxy of the poet, care has been taken to represent him only by utterances in his work that are unmistakably Catholic." Full advantage is taken of the degree of elasticity here indicated. Extracts are given from poetic works which the Church of Rome has allowed only in expurgated editions. Translators are exempted from the requirement of obedience to

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[1] *The Catholic Anthology*. By Thomas Walsh. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 552 pages. $2.50.

Rome, and Neale, Longfellow, Trench, and even Shelley are among those whose translations have been drawn upon.

The editor has also observed that sometimes "in the expressions of dissidents and even of enemies of the Church, one discovers original traces of its cultural forms which create, in a way, a body of Catholic poetry." He has accordingly added a fourth section, entitled "Catholic Poems from Non-Catholic Poets." This section is disappointingly meager; and such gems as it does contain are already familiar.

A marked feature of the book is the amount of space given to translations. A large number of these, especially from the Spanish, are by the editor himself. These are on the whole well chosen and rendered into acceptable English verse; though one (from Jorge Manrique) is of excessive length and inferior quality. One of the most quotable pieces in the book is Dr. Walsh's rendering of an anonymous sixteenth- or seventeenth-century Spanish sonnet: "To Christ Crucified," which gives expression to an enlightened, evangelical devotion, combined with the "disinterested love" of Catholic mysticism. It may be permitted to quote the sextette:

> Yea, to Thy heart am I so deeply stirred
> That I would love Thee were no heaven on high,
> That I would fear, were hell a tale absurd!
> Such my desire, all questioning grows vain;
> Though hope deny me hope I still should sigh,
> And as my love is now, it should remain.

One impression made by these poems is their comparative freedom from extreme or pathological elements. Mariolatry, asceticism, mysticism, and occasionally penitence find expression, but nearly always in the language of a restrained devotion. The souls that speak here are souls in poise. There are sparkles of playful humor, and one or two pieces have no other interest than that of pure fun. A notable instance is the seven-page translation by Francis Mahoney (Father Prout) of Louis Gresset's whimsical tale of the accomplished parrot who responded to the Abbess' remonstrances with "three oaths, and every one a whacker," and so put to flight the daughters of religion. This piece is in the meter of Hudibras, and, like that classic, abounds in surprising rhymes.

One is occasionally surprised by omissions. Why, for instance, is Columcille represented merely by two pieces of local Celtic loyalty when his noble *Altus* is available in a worthy translation by A. Mitchell? And why does the last section not include Marjorie Pickthall's "Mary Shepherdess," a uniquely charming expression of the tenderness of Mary? Other queries of this kind arise; but we must allow a wide latitude to the compiler of an anthology, and remember that no reader has a right to regard himself either as infallible or as representative of public taste.

Short biographical notices of the known authors are supplied. Too many pieces are left in air, with no indication of source or approximate date, with the label "anonymous." If this word means that nothing is known of authorship, it is inaccurate to use it, for example, in connection with the rhymed paternoster of the *Lay-Folks Mass Book*. The proofreader has had a few lapses (e.g., on pp. 6, 233, 453), and has sinned unpardonably in the case of Ezra Pound's impressive "Ballad of the Goodly Fere" (p. 479).

JOHN T. MCNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PRESENT-DAY EUROPEAN PROTESTANTISM

In his little volume entitled *Dynamis,* Dr. Keller, the well-known European secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, has interpreted for German Protestants the vital forces of religious life in America. In his present volume[1] he offers, in co-operation with Dr. Stewart, pastor of the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church of New York, to American readers a picture of European Protestantism of today. In his preface to the work, Dr. Macfarland calls it the first of what may prove to be an ecumenical literature, thereby characterizing the chief aim of the authors, namely, to lead to an appreciative understanding of the great historic churches of Europe. Surely the book will adequately render such a service. The very fact that one of its authors is the secretary of the European Bureau for the Relief of Evangelical Churches, which was of immeasurable help to all the European churches in their distressing calamity of the post-war years, insures the book's great practical importance. Not always outspokenly, it tells the story of an ecumenical co-operation of the American and the European churches and of a spirit of brotherhood within the protestant communions the significance of which is only too seldom fully recognized. The book will also prove to be scientifically very valuable. It is one of the rare pieces of literature on present-day church history. It is a contribution to the much-needed comparative history of Christian communions.

The authors expound their wealth of material in two parts. In the first part they describe in nineteen chapters "Europe's Cultural Maelstrom"; in the second they discuss the "Scope of European Churches" under most specific representation of protestantism throughout Europe. Their task must have appeared to them nearly impossible. One can hardly think of Europe as a cultural unit. Much less can one conceive a politically united Europe. How can one approach such a task as to represent European protestantism in its crisis and its outlook, knowing that the European protestant churches are culturally and politically linked inevitably to the status of the countries to which they belong? To avoid the difficulties involved, the first part deals therefore mainly with the situation in Central Europe. Here again a seemingly insurmountable difficulty arises both for the authors and for their readers. Who could hope to understand impartially and objectively the various cultural trends of Central Europe after the great breakdown of European civilization?

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[1] *Protestant Europe: Its Crisis and Its Outlook.* By Adolf Keller and George Stewart. New York: Doran, 1927. 385 pages. $3.50.

In view of these difficulties the authors have completed an admirable work. Though they sometimes give the impression that their own outlook is altogether too pessimistic, and though more recent years have already promoted a cultural re-establishment and restoration of the European powers, so that some representations of the book describe situations of the past, one must admit that the picture they unfold is as objective as it can be under the circumstances. A wise interpretation of historical backgrounds and a rational use of statistics clarify the outline. The totally changed political basis of the former European state churches, the weakness of European protestantism in its relationship to modern industry and labor problems and in its attempts at adjustment to the economic conditions of the modern world, its attitude toward the cultural trends in European life as exhibited especially in the powerful youth movements, the changing fronts in social work, education, peace movements, interdenominational relationship between established Protestantism on the one side and the different free churches and Catholicism on the other, and finally the changing theological front—all are adequately and clearly analyzed.

Such an exceedingly helpful, consistent, and accurate collection of facts about the present situation of the protestant churches in the different European countries as given in the second part can hardly be found anywhere else. It must be considered as a necessary handbook for all students of contemporary church history. In a second edition numerous misspellings, especially of proper names, might well be eliminated.

WILHELM PAUCK

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE CHURCH IN SOVIET RUSSIA

The conflict between the Russian church and the Soviet government, and the controversy within the church itself, have been discussed widely abroad in books and periodicals. Most of this discussion[1] has been based on fragmentary materials or the impressions of short visits and even casual interviews. Here finally the student is given a full and carefully documented account, the most important documents being given in their complete texts. Some of the documents had to be taken from the publications of the opposing, hostile side, but in such instances the writer, it would seem, has been able to satisfy himself with respect to the accuracy of the text. On this question of documents of the Revolution used in this study one reservation must be made. A letter credited to peasants and workmen, demanding the use of the church-consecrated valuable objects for famine relief, suggests dictation from above, and its genuineness as representing the attitude of the masses may be questioned.

The fact that the church was drawn into the politics of the Revolution is clearly established by this study. It would have been unreasonable to expect the church to stand aside and remain neutral when it was one of the objectives of attack by the new leadership which established itself. The policy of the Communists toward the church and religion in general is noted as the critical events in the long conflict are analyzed. In the concluding chapter the writer speaks of the spirit of militant atheism as finding greater support in Russia than in other countries, and of the forces working against religion as cruder than elsewhere. The deliberate and organized campaigns against religion and the legislation of the Soviet government suggests somewhat stronger statements. While the anti-religious campaigns are directed against the widespread superstitions which still prevail in the Russian masses, they are more than this, representing part of a program of education and training based on rigid materialistic conceptions.

The Russian church has much of the element of "magic," and this has undoubtedly contributed to its weakness in the conflict. The reviewer is reminded of a talk with a parish priest in a small peasant village some thirty miles from city or railway. Pessimistic over the future of the church under the Soviet régime, this modest but sincere religious worker remarked, "Our religion was of the soul and not of the mind," and he believed that this was perhaps the main reason for the many defeats which the church has suffered during these last years. This local priest, for example, had remained on the fringe and practically completely out of a mass meeting of the village which was held during my stay in the community. Strict prohibition of social service activity on the part of religious organizations is one of the penalties which the church now suffers because of its position under Tsarism and its attitude toward the Revolution. This restriction is also a matter of principle of the Soviet régime. The Russian church, it is true, had not done much in the field of social service activity under the old order. The tragedy of its position today is the inability, because of legal restrictions, to develop such work in the conditions of awakened activity in the masses. This important aspect of the position of the church under the Soviet régime should have received in this study more emphasis than one finds.

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[1] *The Church and the Russian Revolution.* By Matthew Spinka. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927. xii+330 pages. $2.50.

The author brings out clearly the divisions in the Russian church, within the Soviet Union, and in the "emigration," and notes the recent efforts toward the re-establishment of unity. Each group is carefully analyzed with respect to its policy and viewpoint, and also its leadership. These leaders of the opposing groups, who have been mere names for the outside world, are carefully characterized. Thus the true character of some of the leaders who were heralded abroad as great religious reformers is made clear. The author expresses himself frankly on the question of the sincerity of this or that individual leader.

Many of the points which have been subject to sharp discussion abroad in connection with the interest in the events in Russia during the years of revolution are given detailed analysis and a statement of judgment. The author suggests, for example, that when the Soviet government insisted on taking over the objects of value used in the church, to supply funds for famine relief, it had in its possession the crown jewels and other similar objects of value. Again the available statistics are given on the number of church buildings converted to other uses, into workmen's clubs or educational institutions. On such points of detail as well as on the general question of the position of the church as the result of the Revolution the author has given the results of long and careful study on the background of specialization in the history of the Russian church.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO SAMUEL N. HARPER

THE AUSTIN PAPERS

Volume I of the Austin papers under the editorship of Professor E. C. Barker, of the University of Texas, was brought out in 1924 in two parts by the American Historical Association. This volume covered the years from 1789 to 1827, while a second volume is to be published by the Association covering the years from 1827 to September, 1834. Unfortunately the American Historical Association could not give more than 3,000 pages to these papers, and for that reason it was necessary to break the series, and this last volume has been published by the University of Texas. Professor Barker in 1925 brought out a life of *Stephen F. Austin* (Dallas, Texas: Cokesbury Press, 1925) which represents the flower of his investigations into the early history of the colonization of Texas.

The period covered in this third volume of Austin letters includes the years of the Texas war for independence.[1] The volume opens with a series of letters by Austin written while in prison, he having been arrested by the Mexican authorities charged with treason against the Mexican government. He was arrested in December, 1833, and was not released until July, 1835. On his release Austin at first tried to heal the widening breach between Mexico and Texas, but war soon began, and he threw in his lot with the revolutionists, becoming the commander of the volunteer troops. During the first six months of 1836, he was a member of a mission to the United States attempting to win sympathy and support for the Texans. Soon after his return to Texas from this mission, he became a candidate for the presidency, but was defeated by General Houston, who made him Secretary of State. Austin died in December, 1836, just as the independent republic of Texas was getting under way.

Several letters in this volume have a particular interest to readers of the *Journal of Religion*. In a letter to a Mrs. Holley, dated January 7, 1836, Austin appeals for support of Texas on the ground that the war is for liberty and freedom of conscience. "We are trying, he says, to banish from our homes religious intolerance and despotism, and to establish in the place of it, liberty and freedom of conscience. How many thousands of pious families of all denominations might find a home and become the proprietors of the soil in Texas . . . . if religious toleration were once firmly rooted there!" He further says, "We expect aid from the religious portion of the community, and that the pulpit will pour out its fervent prayers to a just God for his blessing on our endeavors, and send its eloquent voice to the people in the cause of all free churches—the cause of truth and justice" (pp. 300–301).

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[1] *The Austin Papers, October, 1834—January, 1837*. Edited by Eugene C. Barker. Vol. III. Austin: University of Texas, 1926. 494 pages. $4.00.

One of the conditions on which United States settlers were permitted to colonize Texas was that they should accept Roman Catholicism. The Mexican constitution of 1824 states "The religion of the Mexican nation is, and will be perpetually, the Roman Catholic Apostolic. The nation will protect it by wise and just laws, and prohibits the exercise of any other." The constitution of the state of Coahuila and Texas contained (Article IX) practically the same statement, and no colonist could legally take up his residence in Texas who would not accept this condition.

In April, 1836, the very month in which the Texans had won the battle of San Jacinto, Austin addressed a letter to President Andrew Jackson, several members of his cabinet, and members of Congress in which he appeals eloquently for the support of the United States, stating "That an additional army of 8,000 men is organizing in Mexico . . . . to march to Texas and exterminate the *heretic Americans*." The next month, May, a letter to Austin from New England informs him that once the people of New England find that the Texans are fighting for *religious liberty* and *rational freedom* they "will fly to the rescue" (pp. 353–54).

Little attention has been given to this phase of the Texas revolution, but there is little doubt but that the religious situation was of considerable importance in arousing the Texans to revolt. It has been pointed out that in the Texans' declaration of independence, among the fourteen points specified as reasons for revolt, only religion is referred to more than once. (W. S. Red, *The Texas Colonists and Religion, 1821–36* [Austin, Texas, 1924]).

Aside from their importance as documents bearing on the early history of Texas, the Austin letters are extremely interesting human documents. They reveal Stephen F. Austin to be a man of character, thoroughly imbued with a spirit of unselfishness and a desire to be helpful to his fellow-men.

The editor evidently expected the letters to tell their own story, for there are few footnotes or other explanations. To the present reviewer it is a refreshing experience to be allowed to read such a book without such "helps."

W. W. Sweet

University of Chicago

HUMANIST SERMONS

This volume[1] contains sermons from eighteen contributors, all of whom, with one exception (Professor Haydon), are affiliated with Unitarian churches. The significance of the book lies in the fact that it shows the tendencies of thought and the vital interests of those who are leaders in the "Humanistic" movement largely in the Middle West.

They are agreed on many things, but differ radically on others. They are all deeply impressed by the present disintegrating state of organized religion; and they have no hope for its recovery. No religion of the past nor of the present is satisfactory. Most of them abandon Christianity, apparently without the slightest regret. To some of them modernism, whether in the evangelical or Unitarian churches is a *bête noir*. Only one or two ever use the term "Unitarian," and the one who uses it most freely thinks Unitarianism is not Christian. Humanism, however, is to go far beyond Unitarianism. The "fatherhood of God" and the "leadership of Christ" are discarded. The profound religious experience and theistic interpretation of the earlier Unitarianism no longer play the rôle they did. It is man who has the center of the stage and plays the chief part. His nature, his ends, his interests, his character, his enrichment, his planetary future are the supreme concern of these Humanists, and for most of them the only concern.

The natural and the social sciences determine their interests and interpretations. For nearly all of them philosophy and theology have lost their occupations. Man as set in the natural order is their object of interest and study. For some the natural order is to be wholly controlled and harnessed in years to come in the service of man, even tidal waves, earthquakes, and volcanoes. For others it is a terrible, pitiless, brutal, blind force which will at last make débris of all man's work. Most of them abandon all hope of immortality. The grave is the end of all. The pilgrimage of life is from the womb to the grave. Some regret the abandonment of this hope; others do not.

The attitude toward theism is, negatively, the most significant part of the volume. Most of them have little or no place for the old or the new theism. Some deny or wholly ignore, the reality, or even the idea of God; one or two maintain an "inverted" theism, i.e., man creates God, not God, man; several have a vague, indefinite, ghostly God or god; one or two entertain a mystical idea but make little use of it. Some, however, are definitely theistic, Dr. Holmes in particular.

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[1] *Humanist Sermons.* Edited by Curtis W. Reese. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1927. xviii+262 pages. $2.50.

For most of them man has taken the place of God, and it is for this reason they call themselves Humanists. The faith some men place in God they place in man; they capitalize Man; one decapitalizes god. This faith is vigorous, confident, expectant. No other mind, or power, or resource in the universe is necessary. Man himself is sufficient for all things. Some are dithyrambic in their praise, and their imaginations run riot in their pictures of the future when Humanism triumphs. These are the cheerleaders of Humanism. There are others, however, who neither shout, nor sing. They are hesitant, doubtful. They are given pause by something in men which makes it difficult for them to cheer. The ignorance, irrationality, inertia, brutality, and the grave evils of human life make them sober and fearful.

There is much in this volume common to all modern-minded men. There have been Humanists through the centuries, and they are found today in all lands. In the affirmations of the *Humanist Sermons* we all agree; in their vital interests we all join; in their devotion to welfare of their fellows we are at one with them. We too count nothing human alien to us.

Our difficulty with the kind of Humanism in this volume is that it is not Humanist enough. It is not true to the whole of human nature. It certainly does not do justice to the religious needs and longings of the soul, its cry to God, its faith in him, and fellowship with him. Whether illusion or reality, this Godward side of human life has persisted and is the profoundest experience of men. Nor is it Humanist enough in its attitude toward the craving for, and the hope of, immortality. The natural order may contradict his hopes and annihilate him, but man has thus desired and believed. If man is the measure of all things, may not this craving and hope indicate his personal persistence in the cosmos? If man is an end in himself, and not a means, does the realization of this end take place adequately here and now; and if it does, does it involve man's cessation at his very best? If man is an end in himself, then can he be merely "an experiment of the universe," as one preacher holds? or simply a contribution to the good posterity, in which good he himself is not a partaker, as most of them hold?

Again the book fails to live up to its expressed purpose in not giving a satisfactory interpretation of man's cosmic situation. The editor insists that Humanists must interpret human life in its total setting, but he himself declares that "In its basic nature Humanism short-circuits cosmological theories and lays supreme emphasis upon human attitudes which may or may not be enhanced by cosmologies." Since, however, they all would be nothing if not scientific, their views are wholly determined by science and uninfluenced by philosophy or theology. It is the scientific view of the natural order that yields them their cosmological outlook, and not their philosophical views of man. For this reason some maintain that the natural order is blind and pitiless; others seek satisfaction for their feelings in a sentimental mysticism; the few theists amongst them are the only persons who realize that "to short-circuit" in this fashion is to stop the traffic of the human mind with the divine realities of the universe.

Daniel Evans

Andover Theological Seminary

EXPERIMENTS IN LITURGY

The "offices" of mystical religion should be seen to be appreciated.[1] Dr. Guthrie offers here what he calls "a sample of one man's endeavor to solve the problem of free, perpetually fresh forms of worship." They are not religious dramas; they are rather dramatic liturgies, involving the participation of dancers, as well as cantors, choirs, and ministers. In book form, they will probably be unintelligible to the average reader; but even the average reader would find his imagination stirred and his spirit exalted could he go into St. Mark's in-the-Bouwerie and see and hear these liturgies. Moreover, his understanding would be enlarged and his admiration for Dr. Guthrie increased, could he know something of the history of St. Mark's. A few years ago it was a chocolate-painted edifice "squatting like a dusty melting caramel in a deserted yard, piebald with sour patches of wire grass and melancholy with sickly trees." Inside it was "glutted with golden oak and brass." Like many a down-town church, it had been practically deserted by its former congregation. When Dr. Guthrie went there, it was in the midst of a colony of artists' studios. He at once cleared the edifice and the churchyard of their abominations and made the church a beautiful place in which to worship. He then turned his attention to developing a type of service that would minister effectively to the artistic group which made up so much of the church's immediate neighborhood. The liturgies he has worked out he expects to publish in four volumes, the present one being the first. It is quite impossible to describe the services; for what would it mean to say that the first one is entitled "A Lyrical Office of Aspiration," and uses as its symbol the skylark? It has gathered together a sort of anthology of poems about the skylark, and sets these in a mosaic of hymns, responses, and prayers. This seems only bizarre in print, but when presented in the church to the accompaniment of delicate lighting effects and soaring music, it is probably a thing of beauty. "The Office of the Children of the Zodiac" and "The Office of the Holy Element Water" are far less understandable. The first impression one has when he picks up this book and reads a little of it, is similar to his impression should he come across a group of futuristic paintings in a gallery devoted to photographs. Yet Dr. Guthrie, with these services, has ministered to overflowing congregations; and he has won the disapproval of Bishop Manning.

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[1] *Offices of Mystical Religion*. By William Norman Guthrie. New York: Century, 1927. 416 pages. $2.50.

Fred Eastman

The Chicago Theological Seminary

THE RÔLE OF THE AGRICULTURAL VILLAGE

A new orientation is given to sociological investigation of urban and rural relations as a result of the series of studies of the American village by the Institute of Social and Religious Research of which Village Communities[1] is the fifth and concluding number. The book is written by Edmund de S. Brunner, the director of the entire series of studies, and summarizes their findings. In all, 140 villages, carefully selected in co-operation with state agencies so as to give a fair view of village life in all parts of the country, were surveyed by trained field workers. Eight of these 140 surveys chosen on account of the location and distinctive characteristics of the villages studied, are printed in full in a second section of the volume. Thus, the final product and a good sample of the original data on which generalizations and conclusions are based are brought together for the student.

For two outstanding reasons this study is important. First, the village as a social and economic entity was almost unknown previous to this investigation. Its very existence was unrecognized in the statistical tabulations of the census bureau which lists all villagers with open country dwellers under the classification "rural." Indeed, the question was raised whether it was worth while to undertake this investigation, since the village was believed to be a factor of steadily decreasing importance in American life. This investigation makes it clear that the village not only exists but that it is growing rapidly. There are six times as many villages as places with larger populations. One-eighth of all Americans and one-

[1] *Village Communities*. By Edmund de S. Brunner. New York: Doran, 1927. 244 pages. $2.25.

fourth of all non-city dwellers live in villages. There were 3,000 more incorporated villages in 1920 than in 1900 despite the fact that 950 villages became urban communities during the same period "through the simple process of exceeding the 2,500 population line which marks the census boundary between urban and rural." And again, the rate of population growth during this period was 51.3 per cent for villages as against 19.5 per cent for all rural areas outside incorporated villages.

In the second place, the study is important as showing that the village not only lives and grows but that it is cast for an important rôle in the drama of American social and economic life. Its strategic location and its distinctive characteristics destine it to play a significant part in the conflict of interest between rural and urban population—a conflict which is coming to assume even larger proportions than the traditional conflict of labor and capital. "Main Street," the author tells us, "has an importance beyond its size. To the city it is the representative of rural America; to the farmer it is the interpreter of the city."

How the agricultural village is fitted for this rôle is abundantly illustrated with an extravagant wealth of statistical data throughout the volume and particularly in the chapters on "Village and Country" and "The Economic Life of Villages." "For the purposes of this study an agricultural village was defined as an incorporated place whose population ranged from 250 to 2,500, whose location was in a strictly farming area and whose chief function was to act as a service station to the surrounding country-side." Purely industrial villages and villages in resort and suburban communities—about one-fifth of the total number of such places—were excluded from the investigation. The study reveals that agricultural villages exist mainly to serve the farmer and must necessarily have a large share in any final organization of rural life, in spite of the fact that, so far as the makeup of the population is concerned, agricultural villages are more like cities than like the rural population with which they are now classed. "The high proportion of country pupils in village schools, the concentration of rural churches within the incorporated villages, the centering of organized social life and of many of the farmers' own economic enterprises in the village, all indicate the gradual focusing of rural life in the village." It is the nexus of urban and rural life.

Whether the country-man journeys to the city or simply deals with urban facilities for commerce, credit or transportation, it is largely through the gateway of the village that he gains contact with the city. To one-third of America the village represents the outpost of urban civilization. Conversely, the urbanite reaches rural America through the village. The great banks rely upon their village correspondents for information. The house that sells to a national market . . . . rests content in its efforts to reach rural America if the village department store carries its line.

Exhaustive information based upon painstaking statistical study is given with regard to the service areas of villages, the kinds of service rendered, the make-up of the population, its dependence on agriculture, the degree of industrialization in villages and the relations existing between village and country and village and city.

What rôle, then, is the village to play in the conflict of interest between rural and urban population—a conflict growing out of the fact that these two groups live on opposite sides of a load of food-products? The conviction grows with the farmer that the city dweller has placed him at a great disadvantage in the bargaining process, and he proposes a radical readjustment. In this conflict, then, will the villager share the radicalism of the farmer or the conservatism of the city dweller? Dr. Brunner's data seems clearly to indicate that the influence of the villager will continue to be, as it has been in the past, almost wholly on the side of the urbanite. His analysis accounts for the disparity between the strength of the farmers' vote and the census enumeration of the rural population. The farmer never registers at the polls as strongly as might be expected. The explanation lies in the fact that the village votes with the city rather than with the country. Among the factors of social stability in the village Dr. Brunner notes the high proportion of old people. Nearly 12 per cent are sixty-five years or older as against 4 per cent in the city, and an even lower proportion in the open country; the preponderance of females over males, 94.5 per cent males to every 100 females, whereas in both open country and city there is a preponderance of males; the stability of the population —agricultural villages are much more nearly 100 per cent American than either cities or open country; and particularly the fact that villages have become to a considerable extent the homes for old and retired farmers. "The older people have a peculiar economic interest in preserving the status quo in the village. In addition there is the factor of age. These people have lived their lives. They now ask of the world not opportunity, but peace and quiet. There seems to be, on the whole, no more conservative element in the entire population of America than the retired farmer and his wife or widow." At the same time, the villager's location and function gives opportunity to him, as to no other, to help resolve the conflict between the farmer and the city dweller. Here these two elements of the population meet; here their conflicting interests focus; and here, if anywhere, the terms on which they shall deal with each other must be worked out.

Separate chapters, every paragraph heavily weighted with dry but informing statistics, deal with education, wealth, the church and social life in villages. Especial interest for readers of this review will probably attach to the chapter on "The Church in the Village." The importance of this study is indicated by the facts that in these 140 agricultural villages there were 1,400 churches, no other institution approaching it in frequency; that the capital invested involved $12,500,000; and the cost of upkeep approximated $2,000,000 annually. The investigation, however, brought strong confirmation to the suspicion that a numerical increase of churches may mean an actual decrease of efficiency, although the author says that the sample of churches was not sufficiently large to produce conclusive results. But it is significant and interesting to note that while, according to the United States religious census of 1916, urban churches with less than 1 church to each 1,000 of the population reached 45.9 per cent of the population, these village churches, with 1 church for each 100 of the population, enlisted only 28 per cent of the population of their communities. And again, "where competition among churches was severe there was much complaint that religious differences prevented unified action in various community projects. . . . . This was especially noticeable in a Pennsylvania community in which 18 churches had enlisted barely half the population of 1,500." In contrast with this, reference is made to "Parma, Idaho, where one of the most successful rural churches in America ministered to the entire community with its church and community house." It seems rather clear from the evidence at hand that the churches too frequently, instead of integrating the community into a fellowship of worthy purpose, tend to split it into rival groups and that social cleavages become more marked as the number of churches increases. Thus the churches themselves defeat one of the main purposes for which they exist. Altogether the record is not a very cheering one. "There was the familiar story of small memberships, three-fifths of the churches having less than one hundred; of poor buildings, one-half with but one room; of Sunday Schools poor in equipment of all kinds, archaic in method and lacking trained teachers; and of a church program highly stereotyped and built around the preaching function." Moreover, village churches fail in larger degree than urban churches to reach men as well as women, and a very disproportionate number of village-church memberships was found to be made up of older people; especially of women over forty-five years who comprise about one-fourth of the church membership. These churches fail sadly in their appeal to youth. About the best that can be said positively for these churches is that they "exert a considerable influence as a conservator of moral opinion. While it was often said that the church had little influence on conduct, it was observed that those things which it condemned were more often opposed than condoned by the public opinion of the place." The description of church life in particular villages in Part II strongly confirm the view that these churches are much more effective as conservators of conventional morals than as builders of better things. And yet this is the state of things which home mission societies foster. "Over half the villages had in them some church receiving home mission aid; the average grant being $350 and amounts from $600 to $900 being in no way exceptional." One of the conclusions at which the author arrives is that "it is in the village that the Protestant sects must settle the question as to whether there is to be competition or cooperation among rural churches."

Another important finding is that the "trend of rural Protestantism is villageward." The open country church is shown by a statistical analysis to be a declining institution. And yet the church is failing adequately to reach the non-village people of its community. "The proportion of country people who are enrolled in the church is only about one-half that of the villagers. The village church could not exist without its country membership; but its service to the country is partial and haphazard." The villageward trend was everywhere admitted, but nowhere administratively recognized by the local churches studied. "The facts would seem to call for study by the denominations and for the development of a policy that would integrate the church work so as to serve the entire community."

All of these facts give especial significance to the study of various forms of united churches which have sprung up in villages within the last twenty-five years, which the Institute for Social and Religious Research published a year ago under the title *United Churches*. The findings of this volume are summarized in this chapter. The conclusion which the author reaches with regard to this movement is that "while new, experimental and admittedly opportunistic, it was found to be arousing great interest in villages; and the possibility of the ultimate unifying of at least some of the churches in the community was frequently mentioned by leaders in a great majority of the villages studied except in the South."

The author's claim that "the volumes of this series taken together furnish the beginnings of a sociology of rural life" is a very modest one. It is indeed that, for previous investigations have been few in number and limited as to geographical areas, whereas this has been national in scope. But it is more. A mass of factual information of great value is now available where formerly little more than conjecture was to be found. As the author tells us, "the findings of this investigation may be of value to educational and religious administrators, social organizations, governmental agencies and business concerns ready to found policies on the results of research." And, fortunately, their number, even among religious denominational strategists, steadily increases. For all such persons and groups this investigation represents a very important contribution of significant factual material and soundly based conclusions.

Charles Thomas Holman

University of Chicago

RELIGION IN TOUCH WITH THE TIMES

The charge frequently brought against the Christian ministry that it is out of touch with the times receives much justification in the Saturday newspaper announcements of the succeeding Sunday's sermon topics. A good many preachers seem to be spending their efforts attempting to strengthen the quite obsolete defensive works which have been built up around religion; a still larger number fritter away their time and the time of their congregations endeavoring to tickle the popular ear with all sorts of balderdash. But this is not the whole story. One who has opportunity to hear many different preachers and to read current religious literature knows that there is no inconsiderable number of ministers who are keenly alive to the emergent problems of our own times and who are contributing largely toward their interpretation and solution.

Three books, representative of this temper, are here brought together for review. One is a book for ministers, written by the editor of the United Church of Canada Publishing House,[1] the second is a collection of twenty-two sermons by an outstanding American preacher,[2] and the third comprises the Cole Lectures for 1926 delivered before Vanderbilt University by one of the authentic voices of modern evangelical liberalism.[3]

Stimulating is the word which best describes Dr. Pierce's book. The author indeed possesses, as Dr. Lynn Harold Hough, who provides the Introduction, says, "a vital and kindling mind." "This book," he goes on to say truly, "will rouse [the reader] if he is in a state of mental lethargy. It will quicken him if his mind is eager and alert." The essays which make up the volume were written, the author tells us, with one main purpose: "that of awakening and fostering a sense of the dignity and imperativeness of the minister's calling," and they are well calculated to achieve that end. The thirty-one chapters are really so many essays which originally appeared over a considerable period of time in the *Christian Guardian* and the *New Outlook*. Consequently there is no particular logical sequence in the book; it moves freely from one topic to another. Some of the chapter titles will indicate the freshness and originality of the author's work, as: "The Decay of Yelling," "Twenty Thousand Sermons—Mostly Duds"; while others indicate the free and untrammeled mind which here finds expression as "The Faith of a Liberal," "Old Wine in New Bottles," "Religion on Terms with Life." Dr. Pierce is frankly a liberal; and if his work and his official connection is an indication of a like freedom of mind and spirit in the new United Church of Canada, that church is indeed fortunate. It will be concerned to come to grips with reality rather than merely to repeat the traditions of the fathers. The quotations with which each chapter begins are exceedingly well chosen, and the bibliographical suggestions at the close of each chapter are remarkably extensive and valuable. They will, together with the author's constant emphasis upon the value of wide reading, provoke the reader to further perusal of worth while books.

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[1] *In Conference with the Best Minds.* By Lorne Pierce. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1927. 271 pages. $1.75.

[2] *The Sufficiency of Jesus.* By James Austin Richards. New York: Doran, 1927. 232 pages. $2.00.

[3] *Expanding Horizons.* By Cornelius Woelfkin. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1927. 270 pages. $1.50.

Dr. Richards' volume of twenty-two sermons is a tonic. This is indeed great preaching. There is fine restraint; yet one gets the sense of great reserves of power. And it is brave preaching; for Dr. Richards' congregation is made up largely of the well-to-do, and this preaching opens the eyes and awakens the conscience concerning those subtler forms of sin to which people of wealth, culture, and respectability are prone. The sermons reveal genuine prophetic insight in their application of the principles of the religion of Jesus to the social problems of our day: war, poverty, nationalistic imperialism, autocracy in industry, child labor, and much else. And yet these problems are not chosen as sermon topics; rather the social-mindedness of the preacher makes it inevitable that the social implications of the Gospel shall find expression. There is no amateurish dabbling with technicalities, and there is no slipping down from the pulpit to the lecture platform. These sermons are a revelation of what the modern preacher can do in providing authentic spiritual guidance to men who really want to find the Christian way of life in all human relationships. There are a few sermons for special occasions—Thanksgiving Day, Christmas, Easter, Memorial Day, a high-school commencement, a college class reunion, the reception of new members, and a missionary sermon—all of which are entirely free of the platitudes so often spoken on such occasions. They reveal at once a mind which discerns the peculiar problems of our day and a heart eager to serve its need and to stimulate others to such service.

Expanding Horizons is unusually accurate as a descriptive title. As science has steadily widened the boundaries of human knowledge during the past fifty years, and as the historical method of investigating the Scriptures has progressed during the same period, it has seemed to many that the record of religion has been simply the giving up of one cherished conviction after another as the findings of students in various fields made these convictions untenable. Will anything be left to religion, they wonder, when the process is complete? Not so Dr. Woelfkin. Far from narrowing his religious outlook, the increase of knowledge has served to expand his horizons. And with him it is no academic matter. Beginning his ministry fifty years ago as an ultra-conservative, he becomes at the end of the period an avowed liberal; but a liberal of most robust religious faith. During all this time he has been adjusting his own thinking to the enlarged world which scientific investigation has made known, and has been helping multitudes of students and common people to find a greatly enriched spiritual life in this world of vastly increased resources. There is a poignant quality in the volume. Dr. Woelfkin has been critically ill for many months past;[4] he was seriously ill when these lectures were prepared; and one feels that he was eager to put into these addresses the message which he was most anxious to give to his fellows, wrestling with the perplexing and vital problems with which he has struggled through many years. And the gracious, poised, radiant, and courageous quality of his personality permeates everything he says. Especially moving and intimate are the series of sketches which constitute an addenda, in which the author gives his reader a look into his own heart. There is a singularly wistful quality in these notes which express the basis of his faith in immortality.

There are six lectures in the series. The first, under the title, "The Universal Kingdom," deals with millenarianism. Dr. Woelfkin began his ministry as an ardent advocate of this theory, and consequently appreciates its vitality and power. And, while a more devastating argument against its credibility could hardly be offered, he suggests that the idea has genuine validity for today as "a spiritual genius that will include all human relations and pervade the life and work of all society." There will be no cataclysmic overthrow of the established order and miraculous establishment of a new; but the present social order may be spiritually transformed. Perhaps the second lecture, "Dissolving Fictitious Lines," best of all expresses the widening religious outlook of the author. The fictitious line is that which is believed to divide the "merely natural" from the supernatural. As scientific investigation has brought more and more of that which was mysterious into the sphere of the explicable, the realm of the so-called "supernatural" has been correspondingly reduced. But why accept this fictitious line? Why shut God out of the natural? "If there is a God at all, he must be in the universe which is now being scientifically interpreted." If this position be accepted there are at once opened up "new horizons of religious interest" and the spirit is set free for adventurous inquiry and rewarding endeavors. The remaining chapters of the book, all marked by the same freedom, balance, and deep religious feeling, bear the titles, "The Wider Evangelistic Message," "Catholicity in Worship," "A Divine Consciousness," and "The Quest for Immortality." It is to be hoped that the book may be widely read. It will be most valuable to that increasing number of thoughtful persons who cannot stultify their intelligence but earnestly wish to be religious.

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[4] Since this review was written Dr. Woelfkin has passed away. His death occurred in New York, January 6, 1928.

C. T. Holman

University of Chicago

BOOKS RECEIVED

(The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length)

RELIGIONS IN GENERAL

BAER, EMIL. *Das Geheimnis des Wiedererkennens—Pratyabhijna-hridaya.* Zürich: Verlag Kanaresische Mission, 1926. ix+109 pages. 3*s.* 6*d.*

The first number in a projected series of studies under the general title, Missions-Wissenschaftliche Arbeiten.

BROWN, BRIAN (editor). *The Story of Buddha and Buddhism—His Life and Sayings.* 290 pages. *The Story of Confucius—His Life and Sayings.* 265 pages. Philadelphia: David McKay Co., 1927. $2.50 each.

Books intended for the general reader who wishes to become familiar with the career and teachings of these two reputed founders of religions as they are known in popular tradition.

CARUS, PAUL (CATHERINE COOK, editor). *The Point of View—An Anthology of Religion and Philosophy.* Chicago: Open Court, 1927. xvi+211 pages. $2.50.

A selection of passages from the writings of the late Paul Carus. The anthology offers, not an epitome of each of the author's volumes and pamphlets, but a collection of sentences combined under new captions, such as "God: Man's Highest Ideal," "Soul and Man," "Mind and Morals," etc.

CLEMEN, CARL (editor). *Die Religionen der Erde.* München: Verlag F. Bruckmann, 1927. xii+515 pages. M. 22.

This history of the world's religions is a work of collaboration by specialists in the several fields. Grounded on scholarly research, it aims to be also a popular handbook. The work falls into three main parts: primitive religion, folk religions, and world-religions. This last section, claiming almost one half of the book, treats in detail Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. For the first time in any work on religions we have a treatment of prehistoric religion. Strange that the editor should include this and not consider the religions of the Americas which have never yet been seriously treated in any general history of religions. The authors have had in mind the interrelationships of religions and have indicated the apparent mutual influences. More than a hundred illustrations add to the value of the text and enhance the beauty of a very attractive piece of bookmaking.

DEVARANNE, THEODOR. *Der Gegenwärtige Geisteskampf um Ostasien.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1928. vii+96 pages. M. 3.

The author is a Christian with liberal ideas in regard to future methods in missions. He surveys the modern religions and religious tendencies of China and Japan to discover the prospects of Christianity as the future religion of the Orient. The Chinese identification of Christianity with imperialism, industrialism, and the mailed fist he recognizes as an earned penalty, a just reaping of Karma. He is sure that the religion which alone is "from above" will win final supremacy in both countries but must be permitted to take the form and embodiment dictated by the soul of each people. The task of the missionary is to evangelize, not to Christianize.

FLOWER, J. CYRIL. *An Approach to the Psychology of Religion.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928. xi+248 pages. $3.50.

The main thesis of the author is that all religions involve, as their common characteristic, the experience of frustration in situations felt to be beyond personal control. The author opposes those who would derive religion from any one instinct or group of instincts and connects it more intimately with tendencies of behavior.

PAVRY, CURSETJI ERACHJI. *Iranian Studies.* Bombay: Captain Printing Works, 1927. xxii+239 pages. R. 10.

All students of Zoroastrian religion who have wrestled with the difficulty of making the connection between the Iranian religion of the third century and that of the modern Parsees will be grateful for this translation from the Gujarati writings of Dasturji Pavry. The author is a priest of the religion, a mediator between the conservative and radical wings of Zoroastrianism, and a scholar trained in the use of critical method. These essays offer illuminating and fertile suggestions as to the original form, the development, and meaning of many phases of cult, ritual, custom, and ideology.

SMITH, W. ROBERTSON. *The Religion of the Semites* (edited by S. A. Cook). New York: Macmillan, 1927. lxiv+718 pages. $3.75.

This classic work, first published nearly forty years ago, now appears in a third edition under the competent editorship of Stanley A. Cook. The original text has not been altered in any important particular. The editor has presented his contribution to the volume in the form of an introduction sixty-four pages long and a series of supplementary notes filling two hundred closely printed pages. An asterisk inserted into the margin of the original indicates the point at which notes have been added. It would have facilitated the finding of these notes if the page on which they are printed could have been given along with, or in place of, the asterisk. At any rate the notes must be read. They alone would have constituted an independent volume of indispensable worth for a student of the religions current around the eastern end of the Mediterranean in ancient times.

HEBREW LITERATURE AND RELIGION

BEER, GEORG. *Welches war die älteste Religion Israels?* Giessen: Töpelmann, 1927. 39 pages. M. 1.50.

A lecture by a well-known Heidelberg professor delivered before a ministers' union at Karlsruhe in July, 1927. His thesis is that fear of God was the basal element in Old Testament religion, and that only as he is feared "does God remain God for us." This is thought to be the great lesson that the ancient religion of Israel can teach men today.

BENEDICT, MARION J. *The God of the Old Testament in Relation to War.* New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1927. viii+185 pages.

Reviewed in this issue.

Budde, Karl. *Jesaja's Erleben* (Bücherei der Christlichen Welt). Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1927. vi+123 pages. M. 5.

A semi-popular exposition of Isa. 6:1—9:6 by a long-famous Old Testament scholar of Marburg, Germany. More than usual stress is placed upon the personality and experience of the ancient prophet in this exposition of a selected portion of his writings.

Creelman, Harlan. *An Introduction to the Old Testament* (chronologically arranged). New York: Macmillan, 1927. xxxiv+383 pages. $1.50.

A critical discussion of the problems connected with the books of the Old Testament treated in chronological sequence. The volume is suited primarily to the needs of students in the theological seminary, but it will serve also as an excellent text of reference for Sunday school teachers.

Cross, Earle B. *The Hebrew Family.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. xi+217 pages. $2.50.

This treatise, based upon a critical and historical study of the Old Testament, seeks to trace the main lines along which the history of the Hebrew family developed as a social institution. The author combines critical scholarship with a sociological point of view in a very helpful manner.

Fosdick, Harry Emerson. *A Pilgrimage to Palestine.* New York: Macmillan, 1927. xv+332 pages. $2.50.

The impressions of a visitor to Palestine are here vividly described by one who had eyes to see and a ready pen. The writer has not contented himself to record simply his passing impressions, but has employed his sight-seeing experiences to give lifelike character to a review of biblical history. This fact is indicated by such chapter headings as "The City of David," "With the Master in Nazareth," "Going up to be Crucified." The untechnical character of the book, its vivid style, and its reliable information should insure a deserved popularity and usefulness.

Hageman, G. E. *The Prophet Jonah.* Boston: Stratford, 1927. 90 pages. $1.25.

A homiletical treatment resting upon a literal interpretation of the biblical story.

Sanders, Henry A., and Schmidt, Carl. *The Minor Prophets in the Freer Collection and the Berlin Fragment of Genesis* (Vol. XXI, University of Michigan Studies). New York: Macmillan, 1927. xiii+436 pages. $3.50.

A very complete study of two papyrus fragments of the Septuagint, the one covering all the minor prophets, and the other containing most of the Book of Genesis.

Schmidt, Dr. Hans. *Hiob.* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1927. 54 pages.

A translation in German verse, to which are appended some brief supplementary interpretative remarks.

Weiner, Harold M. *The Altars of the Old Testament.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1927. 34 pages. M. 5.

NEW TESTAMENT

Buck, Oscar MacMillan. *Our Asiatic Christ.* New York: Harper, 1927. viii+181 pages. $1.25.

Five lectures, delivered at Ohio Wesleyan University, dealing in a descriptive way with the attitude toward Jesus that has manifested itself during recent years in India.

Burton, Ernest De Witt. *New Testament Word Studies.* Historical and linguistic studies in literature related to the New Testament. Edited by Harold R. Willoughby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. xv+117 pages. $2.00.

A new number in the series of monographs composing the "Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament" issued under the direction of the Department of New Testament and Early Christian Literature of the University of Chicago. The late Professor E. D. Burton had begun the preparation of a dictionary of the English New Testament. Such materials as he had gathered are here published. They cover the following terms: "Sin," "Repentance," "Forgiveness," "Law," "Faith," "Righteousness and Justification," "God as Father," "Titles and Predicates of Jesus," "Spirit," "Soul," "Flesh," "Apostle," "Grace," "Peace," "World, Age, Forever," "Reveal and Manifest," "Kingdom of God, Kingdom of Heaven."

Dana, H. E., and Mantey, Julius R. *A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament.* New York: Macmillan, 1927. xx+356 pages. $4.00.

Reviewed in this issue.

Goodspeed, Edgar J. *New Solutions of New Testament Problems.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. xi+127 pages. $2.00.

The main theme of the book is that the collection of Paul's letters into a corpus was a direct result of the publication of the Book of Acts, and this corpus in turn exerted a wide influence upon later Christian writings.

Jones, E. Stanley. *Christ at the Round Table.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1928. 328 pages. $1.50.

This book is a reflection of the author's earnest endeavors to present Jesus in appealing fashion to the soul of India. Naturally it is the Christ of experience—of the author's own experience and of that which he sought to effect in his hearers—rather than the historical Jesus that is uppermost in the representation. Something of the same charm attaches to this story that so conspicuously marks the same writer's earlier book, *The Christ of the Indian Road.*

Lavergne, R. P. C. *Synopse des Quatre Évangiles. D'après la Synopse Grecque du R. P. M.-J. Lagrange.* Paris: Librairie LeCoffre, 1927. 267 pages.

A harmony of the four gospels in French following the scheme of the Greek harmony of Lagrange.

Stalker, James. *The Ethic of Jesus.* New York: Doran, 1927. xxi+403 pages. $2.00.

Although this printing is called a new edition, it appears to have the same form as when originally published. Undoubtedly the work made a contribution to the social interpretation of Christianity when it appeared, but the present reprint sheds no new light on the contemporary situation.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

Abel, Annie Heloise, and Klingberg, Frank J. (editors). *A Side-Light on Anglo-American Relations, 1839–58.* Washington: Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1927. vii+407 pages. $2.15.

This is a collection of letters written by Lewis Tappan, the American philanthropist, and others interested in the cause of the abolition of slavery to members of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. As the title indicates, this correspondence furnishes some interesting side lights on Anglo-American relations during those years when the slavery agitation was at its height. The letters deal with such subjects as the position of the Negro in the United States, in Canada, and in Liberia; the coast-wise slave trade; the attitude toward slavery of the churches, their ministers, and their missionary boards; and the question how best could Britain help the United States in her anti-slavery struggle.

Acta V. Conventus Velehradensis. Moravia: Academia Velehradensis, 1927. 322 pages.

The report of the assembly that met at Velehrad in the summer of 1927. This is the fifth "International Congress on Eastern Religious Reunion" held in the interests of bringing the Eastern Catholic Church of Czechoslovakia into the Western Roman fold.

Barker, Eugene C. (editor). *The Austin Papers—October, 1834, to January, 1837.* Vol. III. Austin, Texas: University of Texas, 1927. xxxv+494 pages. $4.00.

Reviewed in this issue.

Baynes, Norman H. (compiler). *The Early Church and Social Life: A Selected Bibliography.* London: G. Bell & Sons, 1927. 1*s.*

Ferm, Vergilius. *The Crisis in American Lutheran Theology.* New York: Century, 1927. xiii+409 pages. $3.00.

This is an expanded Doctor's dissertation at Yale University, dealing with the period in American Lutheranism from the organization of the General Synod in 1818 to the triumph of the conservative party in 1857. During most of this period Dr. S. S. Schmucker, the founder of Gettysburg College and Theological Seminary, is the leading figure, and this study deals largely with his efforts to inculcate an American spirit into American Lutheranism. The great migration from 1830 to 1850, however, brought hosts of conservative Germans to America and a strong tide of strict confessionalism arose about him. These forces soon overwhelmed the liberal party within the church and Dr. Schmucker lost his leadership; American Lutheran theology was suppressed, and in its place there came a rebirth of an inherited European Lutheran theology in America.

The Franciscan Educational Conference, IX, No. 9. Report of the Ninth Annual Meeting, Athol Springs, New York, July 1–3, 1927. 596 pages.

The official report contains papers on Franciscan preaching read before a conference of the Franciscan educational leaders of America. Most of the material is of historic interest. Notable is the rather laudatory but well-informed paper by Fr. Victorine Hoffman on "Franciscan Preaching in the Past," and the extended bio-bibliographical study by Fr. Anscar Zawart entitled the "History of Franciscan Preaching and of Franciscan Preachers (1209–1927)," which occupies more than half the volume.

GOLLANCZ, SIR HENRY. *The Settlement of the Carmelites in Mesopotamia* (seventeenth to eighteenth centuries). New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. xxiii+669 pages. $14.00.

This book contains the complete original Latin text, followed by an English translation, of a document relating to the history of the Franciscan mission at Bassora in Mesopotamia founded in the year 1623. The scholarly translator prefaces his volume with a few descriptive remarks, and apologizes for the very much to be regretted fact that ill health prevented him from writing a more elaborate introduction.

GUIGNEBERT, CHARLES. *Christianity*. New York: Macmillan, 1927. xxvi+507 pages. $4.50.

Reviewed in this issue.

HIRSCH, ARTHUR H. *The Huguenots of Colonial South Carolina*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1928. xv+338 pages. $5.00.

This is a painstaking and exhaustive study of the comparatively small group of French Protestants which settled in South Carolina in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Mr. Hirsch has seemingly consulted all available sources of information pertaining to his subject, a large proportion of the manuscript materials never before having been used.

The book falls into twelve chapters: two devoted to background and settlement, three to the Huguenot churches and political and religious affairs, two to their economic interests, two to their cultural influence, especially in Charleston, and the remaining three to the outstanding Huguenot families and their assimilation, with a concluding summary. There is an elaborate bibliography of eighteen pages, an appendix of forty-eight pages, and an index, made up largely of names of individuals and families.

The book is factual rather than interpretative, though in a brief concluding chapter there is an attempt to sum up the meaning of the facts so elaborately set forth.

Kultur- und Universalgeschichte (collection of essays). Leipzig: Teubner, 1927. iv+567 pages. M. 35.

This large volume contains more than thirty historical essays published in celebration of the sixtieth birthday of Walter Goetz. One group of papers treats themes belonging to the period of the Middle Ages. Five of the essays relate to the time of the Renaissance. Others classify under the "modern" period, and still others under the more general caption "Philosophy of History, Historiography, Methodology." The student of Christianity's history will find here much that is of especial interest to him. The first paper presents a heretofore unpublished sermon of Lupus of Ferrieres. There is a brief essay—entirely too brief, in view of the importance of the subject—on the thinking of Marsiglio of Padua and of Nicholas of Cusa. There is a suggestive study on the artistic and religious development of Michelangelo, and another on Campanella as a chiliast and utopian. Of more modern interest is the paper on Max Weber's application of sociology to the study of religion; and in a more philosophical vein is the article on "The Course of European Piety," the main trend of which is found to be a struggle for union with the eternal which was also the fundamental element in the religious experience of Jesus.

LACOMBE, GEORGES. *La Vie et les Oeuvres de Prévostin.* Bibliotheque Thomiste, Vol. XI. Kain, Belgium: Le Saulchoir, 1927. x+221 pages.

Prévostin, whose forename was probably William, though sometimes written Peter, was born between 1140 and 1150 and died in 1210. A native of Northern Italy, he became Chancellor of the University of Paris in a very important stage of the development both of the university and of scholasticism. In the scholaristic movement he takes a place of such importance between Peter Lombard and Alleutus Magnus that he deserves to be known by students of the history of medieval thought. The present volume is introductory to a critical edition, mainly also by Father Lacombe, of the entire works of Prévostin. The account of Prévostin's life occupies less than fifty pages; the remainder of the volume is devoted to a chronological examination of his works.

MACLEAN, DONALD. *Aspects of Scottish Church History.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner, 1927. xi+184 pages. $2.00.

Five scholarly but readable lectures delivered at the University of Amsterdam in March, 1927.

Maryknoll Mission Letters—China. Vol. II. New York: Macmillan, 1927. xvi+402 pages.

A collection of extracts from letters and diaries of the pioneer representatives of the Roman Catholics in missionary work among the Chinese. A former volume presented documents for the years 1918–21, and the present volume covers another three years.

OWEN, E. C. E. *Some Authentic Acts of the Early Martyrs.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. 183 pages. $3.00.

A very useful collection in English translation of the literature of martyrology down to the time of Diocletian. Care has been taken to select none of the spurious "Acts," and to print only those thought to have some real claim to historical accuracy—thirteen in all. On this point judgments will inevitably differ, but it should be said that more than usual caution has been exercised by the present compiler. His selections are accompanied by brief but informing introductions and helpful notes. The little book will be gratefully received by every student interested in Christianity's conflict with the Roman state.

ROWLAND, J. M. (compiler). *The Southern Methodist Pulpit.* Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1927. 199 pages. $1.50.

This collection of sixteen sermons is by fifteen active pastors and one editor of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. They are evidently typical of contemporary preaching in the best southern Methodist pulpits. Most of them are on familiar themes and might be classed as rather old-fashioned gospel sermons.

SHOTWELL, JAMES T., and LOOMIS, LOUISE ROPES. *The See of Peter.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. xxvi+737 pages. $10.00.

A collection in English translation of historical texts relating to the origin and history of the papacy.

SMITH, PRESERVED. *A Key to the Colloquies of Erasmus.* Harvard Theological Studies XIII. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927. 62 pages. $1.50.

A compressed study showing the incidents and persons in real life referred to in the Colloquies, and illustrating the growth of the work in its thirteen succeeding editions, 1497–1533.

VAN SANTVOORD, SEYMOUR. *Saint Francis, the Christian Exemplar.* New York: Dutton, 1927. ix+157 pages. $1.50.

This book represents no new knowledge or viewpoint. It is a fair example of the Francis-worship that finds frequent expression today. A sentence printed on the jacket of the book: "After Jesus Christ the next most perfect man was Francis of Assisi," might have been adopted as the author's text. Notwithstanding a few misleading statements, such as this, "in the Saint's philosophy the human body is an unimportant and negligible adjunct of the soul" (p. 126), the book will serve the purpose of familiarizing a fresh group of readers with the salient facts about St. Francis. But Mr. Chesterton has done the same thing much more brilliantly than Mr. Van Santvoord.

WHITE, EDWARD LUCAS. *Why Rome Fell.* New York: Harper, 1927. x+364 pages. $3.50.

A rather discursive treatment of ancient history down to the end of the Roman Empire, with especial emphasis upon the religious conflict in the late Empire. The main thesis in this part of the book is that Christianity, in bringing about the extinction of the worship of the Olympian gods, became "the positive, active, major, and paramount cause of the ruin of the Roman Empire and of the annihilation of the Graeco-Roman culture and civilization." The rather fictitious subject of Rome's "fall" has often prompted speculation, and in recent years has been a topic of much research with which the present author seems largely unfamiliar.

WILLEY, JOHN HESTON. *Early Church Portraits.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner, 1927. 255 pages. $2.00.

Biographical essays for the edification and instruction of the layman. The characters chosen for treatment are Polycarp, Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Chrysostom, Augustine, Gregory, Charlemagne, Peter the Hermit, and Dante. The treatment is wholly uncritical of the source materials involved, but the author has a fascinating way of visualizing, even if sometimes idealizing, the characters whom he portrays.

ZAWART, ANSCAR. *The History of Franciscan Preaching and of Franciscan Preachers (1209–1927).* New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1928. Pp. 241–596.

ZENOS, ANDREW C. *The Plastic Age of the Gospel.* New York: Macmillan, 1927. xi+264 pages. $2.75.

Reviewed in this issue.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND ETHICS

Appuhn, Charles. *Spinoza.* Paris: Delpeuch, 1927. 364 pages.

This is the tenth volume in a series entitled, *Civilization et Christianisme.* It gives a readable survey of Spinoza's life and the influences which entered into his thinking. Considerably more than half the space is given to selections from the most important of Spinoza's works dealing with ethics and religion. The treatment is objective and furnishes a good means of becoming acquainted with the mental characteristics and the attitudes of Spinoza.

Bethune-Baker, J. F. *The Way of Modernism and Other Essays.* Cambridge: University Press, 1927. 150 pages.

An interesting and stimulating collection of addresses given on various occasions. All deal with the problems of the adjustment of traditional theology to the necessities of modern scientific knowledge. Emphasis is courageously laid on the duty of facing the facts, even if such facing involves perplexing or unpleasant consequences. At the same time critical inquiry serves to distinguish incidental and technical questions from the main issues of religious thinking.

Brunner, D. Emil. *Der Mittler. Zur Besinnung über den Christusglauben.* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1927. x+565 pages.

The so-called "crisis theology," at present much discussed in Germany, here expounds more specifically its Christology.

Duhm, Bernard. *Das Geheimnis in der Religion.* 2. Auflage. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1927. 29 pages. M. 1.20.

A reprint with a few verbal changes of an address first given and published in 1896. The emphasis laid by the author on the mystical element in religion is timely today in view of recent developments in German religious thinking.

Gunkel, Hermann, and Zscharnack, Leopold (editors). *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1927. 16–17 Lieferungen (Bogen 44–49), cols. 1377–1568, v. Burger–Christentum V, M. 3.6. 18–19 Lieferungen (Bogen 50–55), cols. 1569–1760, Christentum V–Czersky, M. 3.60. 20–22 Lieferungen (Bogen 56–65) cols. 1761–2052, M. 5.40.

The first volume of the new edition of this extremely valuable work is now complete. The conscientiousness with which the editors have done their work is most commendable. The reduction in space given to the more important topics has usually resulted in giving quite as much information with improved organization, thus making consultation of the articles easier and speedier. Some articles are enlarged, notably those on "China" and on "Christentum." In the latter article American and German interests are displayed in somewhat significant (though unintentional) contrast; the section on "Gegenwartslage," by Charles S. MacFarland, being almost entirely concerned with social problems, while the section on "Wesen," by Steinmann, is primarily doctrinal. The article, "Christlich-social," is exclusively concerned with Europe. The status of the social gospel in America might well have been considered. This lack is scarcely compensated for by the inclusion of Calvin Coolidge among the religious leaders who receive biographical mention. The changed political situation in Germany is reflected in the omission of the article on "Deutsch-Afrika," and the introduction of a new article on "Demokratie." The influence of sociological considerations is seen in a group of articles (new) on "Dorfjugend," "Dorfkirchenbewegung," and "Dorfpredigt."

HAITJEMA, TH. L. *Karl Barths "Kritische Theologie."* Wageningen: H. Veenman & Zonen, 1927. 168 pages.

A German edition of lectures given at the University of Groningen. They give a rather uncritical but accurate presentation of the "Theology of Crisis," and may serve as a first introduction.

JERNEGAN, PRESCOTT F. *Man and His God.* To be had from the author, Mayfield, Palo Alto, California. viii+187 pages. $1.25.

A rather rambling series of comments on various questions connected with the problem of defining God in the light of modern science. The author finds comfort in metaphysical agnosticism, coupled with a mystical feeling of awe and reverence for the wholeness of things, which may be called God, but may not be defined as Christian theology has defined God.

KRÜGER, GUSTAV. *The Immortality of Man according to the Views of the Men of the Enlightenment* (the Ingersoll Lecture for 1926). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927. 39 pages. $1.00.

In view of the primary place which was assigned in traditional theology to rewards and punishments in the future life, the study undertaken by this lecture is very illuminating. The men of the enlightenment were eager to eliminate all superstition from religion. The pictorial conception of the future disappears in favor of philosophically tenable views concerning the nature of the soul. In proportion as the significance of the Copernican view of the universe was really felt, emphasis comes to be laid on the experienced relations of a conscious being to the infinity of the one universe, rather than on a hypothetical future state. Professor Krüger, with a wealth of scholarly knowledge, has given us interesting glimpses of the history of the rationalization of the conception of immortality.

LERCHER, LUDOVICUS. *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae.* Vol. I. Ceniponte (Innsbruck): Feliciani Rauch, 1927. x+658 pages.

The first volume of the handbook of systematic theology, written by the Jesuit professor of theology at the University of Innsbruck. It unfolds in ample consistency and under occasional refutations of the modern Protestant point of view the Catholic doctrine of religion and revelation as given in Jesus Christ, of the church, its constitution and its institutions, its proprieties, its power and infallibility, of tradition and of the Scripture.

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD. *Does Civilization Need Religion?* New York: Macmillan, 1927. 242 pages. $2.00.

This is the work of a practical and effective minister who appreciates the difficulties as well as the necessity of making religion socially effective in modern times. The kernel of the book is well expressed in the author's own words: "Civilization may be beyond moral redemption; but if it is to be redeemed a religiously inspired moral idealism must aid in the task. A purely naturalistic ethics will not only be overcome by a sense of frustration and sink into despair, but it will lack the force to restrain the self-will and self-interest of men and of nations" (p. 238).

SMITH, GERALD B. *Current Christian Thinking.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. ix+209 pages. $2.00.

Here the main features of various types of Christian belief are clearly and comprehensively set forth.

SMITH, GERALD B. (editor). *Religious Thought in the Last Quarter-Century.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. vii+239 pages. $3.00.

A series of eleven papers, reprinted from the *Journal of Religion,* surveys the various fields of theological study during the first quarter of the twentieth century.

SODEN, D. HANS FREIHERR VON. *"Was ist Wahrheit?"* Marburg: Elwert, 1927. 27 pages. M. 1.

This inaugural address of Professor von Soden as rector of the University at Marburg deals with an issue that is lively in Germany today. The "theology of crisis" would deny that the critical student of history can hope to discover religious truth. This contention is stoutly resisted in the present pamphlet.

SPERRY, WILLARD L. *The Paradox of Religion.* New York: Macmillan, 1927. 63 pages. $1.00.

Two lectures delivered during the early part of 1927 on the Hibbert Trust Foundation. The main thesis of the lecturer is that religion is by no means the simple affair that some have thought it to be. On the contrary, the basic fact of religious experience is complexity.

STOLZ, KARL R. *Evolution and Genesis.* Boston: Badger, 1927. 222 pages.

An effort at harmonization by accepting evolution in science but insisting that only spiritual forces can safeguard a scientifically manipulated world.

WARFIELD, BENJAMIN BRECKINRIDGE. *Revelation and Inspiration.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. ix+456 pages. $3.00.

The late Professor Warfield, of Princeton, provided in his will for the republication of his numerous articles on theological subjects contained in encyclopedias, reviews, and other periodicals. Other volumes are to follow. The author was an eminent representative of conservative Protestant thought, and this projected collection of his papers will be a great convenience for historians.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect.* New York: Macmillan, 1927. x+88 pages. $1.50.

Symbolism is the means by which different modes of perception are organically connected so that we are not left with separate bits of experience, but may relate various experiences into a coherent whole. The technical aspects of symbolic reference are discussed, and a practical and pertinent application of the analysis to social life is made. Society depends for its existence on the employment of a symbolism common to all. Language, rituals, customs are such symbols. The advance of civilization always involves the disruption of current symbolism. It is imperative that symbols should be constantly revised. If this does not take place society faces a revolution where the new demands of men repudiate an antiquated symbolism without having developed a socially binding new symbolism.

WOODBURNE, ANGUS STEWART. *The Religious Attitude.* New York: Macmillan, 1927. x+353 pages. $2.50.

An attempt to define the function of the religious consciousness as distinct from that of the scientific, aesthetic, or ethical consciousness. The author's positions are enlarged from his experiences in India.

MISSIONS

BURTON, MARGARET E. *New Paths for Old Purposes.* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1927. x+211 pages. $1.00.

A study of the task confronting the modern missionary enterprise.

CAVERT, SAMUEL MCCREA. *The Adventure of the Church.* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1927. 256 pages. $1.00.

An exposition of the missionary enterprise of Christianity in the light of its past history and its present outlook.

MOORE, JESSIE ELEANOR. *The Missionary Education of Beginners.* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1927. ix+130 pages. $1.00.

An elementary book designed for the guidance of one teaching children.

SEABURY, RUTH ISABEL. *Our Japanese Friends—A Course for Junior Boys and Girls.* New York: Friendship Press, 1927. 144 pages. $0.75.

An aid for teachers desiring to acquaint children with Japanese life as a basis for implanting the germs of a missionary interest.

STAUFFER, MILTON (editor). *Voices from the Near East.* xiii+141 pages. *Thinking with Africa.* xviii+184 pages. *An Indian Approach to India.* xvii+186 pages. *Japan Speaks for Herself.* xviii+149 pages. (Christian Voices Around the World Series.) New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1927.

Papers by leaders of thought in India, Japan, Africa, and in the Near East dealing with questions of especial interest to Christian missionaries.

PREACHING AND WORSHIP

COMO, REV. JOHN FREEMAN. *The Church of the New Testament* (Stratford Sermons). Boston: Stratford, 1927. 32 pages. $0.50.

Four sermons from the uncritical point of view.

EDMONDS, HENRY M. *About the Manger* (Stratford Sermons). Boston: Stratford, 1927. 32 pages. $0.50.

HARMON, NOLAN B. JR. *Ministerial Ethics and Etiquette.* Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1928. 180 pages. $1.50.

A systematic statement of the code of ethics pertaining to the profession of the minister in various relationships. His duties as man, citizen, brother minister, pastor, his obligations to the church and in public worship and other services are all worked out with care. Apparently there is here much useful material.

HAWTHORNE, WILLIAM. *By These Things Men Live* (Stratford Sermons). Boston: Stratford, 1928. 36 pages. $0.50.

PALMER, ALBERT W. *The New Christian Epic.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1927. 195 pages. $1.50.

[illegible] collection of short essays by an effective modern preacher. The first essay provides a title for the volume, while some of the other titles are "The Stars above the Freight Trains," "Is the Bible Complete?" "Cathedral Lives," "The Christ of Modern Thought."

PIERCE, LORNE. *In Conference with the Best Minds.* Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1927. 271 pages. $1.75.

Reviewed in this issue.

REESE, CURTIS W. (editor). *Humanist Sermons.* Chicago: Open Court, 1927. xviii+262 pages. $2.50.

Reviewed in this issue.

RICHARDS, JAMES AUSTIN. *The Sufficiency of Jesus.* New York: Doran, 1927. 232 pages. $2.00.

Reviewed in this issue.

SCLATER, J. R. P. *The Public Worship of God.* New York: Doran, 1927. 199 pages. $2.00.

The Yale Lectures for 1927. A very significant practical discussion. Trenchant criticism of the current order of worship from the point of view of the development of religious mood. One wonders, however, whether the argument is based on a real or a theological psychology. The subject calls for experimental investigation.

SHIMER, REV. HERBERT D. *The Ten Words of Happy Marriage* (Stratford Sermons). Boston: Stratford, 1927. 32 pages. $0.50.

Exhortations to the youth contemplating matrimony.

SMITH, H. AUGUSTINE. *The American Student Hymnal.* New York: Century, 1928. xxvi+443 pages.

TITTLE, ERNEST FREMONT. *The Religion of the Spirit.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1928. 327 pages. $2.00.

Sermons by the pastor of the First Methodist Episcopal Church at Evanston, Illinois.

WOELFKIN, CORNELIUS. *Expanding Horizons.* Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1927. 270 pages. $1.50.

Reviewed in this issue.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

COUNCILOR, HOMER J. *The Junior Church.* New York: Century, 1928. xiv+181 pages. $1.50.

This is virtually the record of an experiment in establishing and conducting a junior church as a means of religious training for young people. It is not so much a book of instruction about how the task should be done as it is an account of how in one instance—that of the Calvary Church in Washington—it has been accomplished.

COWLES, MAY K. *Problems in Living*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. x+130 pages. $0.75.

This book was developed by the author working with junior high school boys and girls in Van Wert, Ohio. Thirty lessons are planned to develop right Christian attitude for critical character situations. It does not provide for thorough discussion of any topics, but is suggestive and can be developed as teachers may desire. Pupil activities need to be extended to projects related more closely to living than the writing and memorizing asked for in the text.

CRANDALL, EDNA M. *A Curriculum of Worship for the Church School*. Vol. III. New York: Century, 1927. xvii+354 pages. $2.00.

This is the third volume in a three-year series of programs for worship in the junior department of the church school. Each volume may be used separately and independent of the others. A carefully prepared series of programs are ready for use as they are or for adaptation. The author has tried consistently to separate preparation for worship from the worshipping period. Very much is made of memory work. Pictures and instrumental music are used to help create the right atmosphere. The content varies from Sunday to Sunday with a theme for each month, but the form remains almost the same throughout the year. How much carry-over into life such worshiping may have needs testing and experimentation. A child may use words fluently without feeling the significance of worship, or without becoming religiously motivated by the experience of the formal worship.

LOBINGIER, JOHN LESLIE. *Our Church—A Course of Study for Young People of High School Age*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. viii+121 pages. $0.75.

This is a course of study for young people of high school age and would make an excellent unit of study for either church school or Sunday evening young people's meeting. It is organized to provoke thinking and ought to help young people consider carefully some of the real values of the church. It is planned for the age when a large number are tending to be careless and indifferent and to drop away from the church. Under good leadership and with a little more variety in method than the book itself suggests this course should be very attractive and fruitful. It analyzes the practices of the church, briefly reviews its history, discusses its various sectarian forms, and indicates the tendency in its emphasis today.

NEUBERG, MAURICE J. *Right Living, Series II*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. *Teacher's Manual*, vii+130 pages. $0.75. *Pupil's Manual*, vii+152 pages. $0.75.

This discussion course for eighth- or ninth-grade boys and girls continues the method of the first volume, with considerable improvement. Thirteen topics are included dealing with life-situations involving such matters as co-operation, vocational guidance, food and drugs, gambling, and dependability. The pupil's book gives the pupil the task of discovering why rules are made and what rules are best. The stories, questions, assignments, references, and bibliography demand a healthy reaction from these junior high school students. The teacher's manual furnishes an abundance of practical suggestions and is based on the experimentation of a number of teachers with the material of this course. The difficult problem of giving religious motivation to ethical conduct is approached satisfactorily, but not thoroughly developed. There is need of much more study in this line by teachers using this and like courses.

SHAV[illegible] ERWIN L. *The Other Fellow's Religion.* ix+54 pages. *Christianizing [illegible]munity.* ix+61 pages. *A Christian's Education.* ix+52 pages. *A [illegible] Patriotism.* ix+58 pages. Chicago: University of Chicago [illegible]7. $0.50 eac[illegible]

[illegible] programs fo[illegible]g people make ten very suggestive outlines that [illegible]ublished in this series. They are studies organized with the problem-project method and give opportunity for consideration, investigation, discussion, and action on topics of vital concern to young people. Each book gives plenty of guidance for carrying through the project, but leaves room for initiative, choice, and responsible research work on the part of the young people. There are suggested programs, considerable reference and source material, and ways outlined for making very attractive meetings. They may be used for Sunday morning, Sunday evening, week night, or as the basis of a unified program. For success in using this material, adult counsel and very careful planning are neccessary. The approach tends to be quite intellectualistic and expects more serious application than most young people's groups are accustomed to maintain.

STEWART, GEORGE. *Ask Me a Bible Question.* New York: Century, 1927. viii +137 pages. $1.50.

An invasion of religion by the "Ask me a question" fad. The questions, which occupy 87 pages, "range," as the advertisement on the wrapper professes, "in difficulty and interest from the primary class to those which will furrow a bishop's brow." Inspection shows that they range from the most simple and unimportant mechanical facts concerning the Bible to questions the answer to which would require familiarity with the history of the manuscripts and the translations that have entered into the making of the Old and New Testaments, [illegible] historical and textual criticism, with biblical introduction, and with systematic theology. They do have the merit of including important facts about the Bible which every student of the Bible should know. There is no suggeston of [illegible]ding. There [illegible]tion of sources that would lend a vital significance to such knowledge as might [illegible] method, even from a purely informational point of view. [illegible] is [illegible] in the back of the book, which has the effect of reducing [illegible] procedure to [illegible]ical method of the most formal sort and which may [illegible]ct a real [illegible] of the Bible and its vital message. One wonders what a serious-minded religious educator must think of such profitless puzzle questions as the following: "How many letters in the Bible?" "How many words?" "How many times does the word 'and' occur in the Bible?" "Name a word which occurs only once." "What is the middle verse in the Bible?" etc. As a manual for a quiz game the book may have some use; as a manual of religious education it is an excellent illustration of what religious education is not.

MISCELLANEOUS

BRADFORD, GAMALIEL. *D. L. Moody—A Worker in Souls.* New York: Doran, 1927. 320 pages. $3.50.

An account of the personality and work of this great revivalist.

ELLWOOD, CHARLES A. *Cultural Evolution—A Study of Social Origins and Development.* New York: Century, 1927. xi+267 pages. $2.50.

This book is an attempt to evaluate the traditions of our civilization and the various factors in social and cultural evolution, with a view to discovering our present stage of progress and why things are as they are in the world of today. While no part of the book is entirely without interest for the student of religion, [illegible] ter deals particularly with the development of religion. Here is plotted [illegible] development that is thought to be moving in a rational course toward [illegible] otheism. The volume is primarily a study in the theory of social evolution.

HASSELL, RICHARD B. *The Chums and Their [illegible]ows.* Boston [illegible] 1928. x+118 pages. $2.00.

Het Schild (Apologetisch Tydschrift), October, 1927. Schiedam: Het Schild. Pp. 145–192. Fr. 0.30.

HOLMES, JOHN ANDREW. *Wisdom in Small Doses.* Chicago: University Publishing Co., 1927. 116 pages.

Epigrams, more or less on the subject of religion, distributed for consumption on each day of the year.

MACHEN, J. GRESHAM. *The Attack upon Princeton's Seminary—A Plea for Fair Play.* Philadelphia: Johnson & Price, 1927. 48 pages.

MEREJKOWSKY, DMITRI. *Julien L'Apostat.* Paris: Editions Bossard, 1927. 468 pages. Fr. 12.

SMITH, PAULINE HERRON. *The United States and Japan. Their Problem and Its Solution* (Essays in Applied Christianity, Hattie Elizabeth Lewis Memorial). University of Kansas, 1927. 39 pages.

THOMPSON, JOHN GIFFEN. *Urbanization: Its Effects on Government and Society.* New [illegible]on, 1927. xiii+683 pages. $6.00.

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ORPHISM AND PAULINISM

VITTORIO MACCHIORO[1]
Naples, Italy

I

HISTORY distinguishes Jewish Christianity from Greek Christianity. That is, in the formation of Christianity it distinguishes two phases. The first phase is that in which the religious movement had the living person of Jesus as its center of interest and evolved in Jewish territory. The second is that in which this movement lost sight of the concrete person of its Master and set out upon the course of its development in Greek territory.

Notwithstanding the very close continuity between them, we are really speaking of two different movements which correspond exactly to two names, "Jesus" and "Christ"; for in the former case we have to do with a fundamentally Jewish teaching preached by Jesus, while in the latter we are dealing with a fundamentally Greek religion reared about Christ.

This second phase of the movement, which was itself definitive and aggressive, history calls Paulinism, considering Paul as its author and almost its creator. But, to be more exact, he was rather the systematizer and formulator of an existing religion which preceded him and which was most assuredly

---

[1] It gives the *Journal* great pleasure to introduce to its readers this distinguished Italian scholar. Among his books, those of especial interest to students of early Christianity are *Zagreus: Studi sull' Orfismo* (Bari, 1920); *Orfismo e Paolinismo* (Montevarchi, 1922); *L'Evangelio* (Firenze, 1922); *Eraclito: Nuovi Studi sull' Orfismo* (Bari, 1922).—EDITOR.

Greek Christianity; or, otherwise stated, the belief of the Greeks in Jesus as Christ. And as the work of Paul is differently evaluated, so in turn opinions vary as to the origin of the Pauline theology and mysticism. On this subject there are two types of opinion, the one inclining toward conservatism and the other toward liberalism. Adherents of the former type, seeking to remain in the greatest possible degree faithful to tradition, reduce to the narrowest possible limits Paul's connection with Hellenism. The more liberal view is at present represented by two different schools. One group, continuing the thought of F. C. Baur, regards Hellenistic influence upon Paul as a consequence of Platonic or neo-Platonic philosophy received either directly or mediated by Hellenistic Judaism. The other school, without denying the influence of philosophy, sets alongside of it, and gives first place to, the influence of the mystery religions.

The school stressing the importance of the mysteries is in the ascendant at present. Even traditional orthodoxy is no longer able to remain immune from its influence or to deny that the more liberal opinion conforms with the truth when it insists that the origins of Paulinism must be sought in Hellenism, in the sense that Paulinism is not to be considered as other than the Christianity of the Greeks. That is, the Pauline type of belief was essential Christianity at the time when Jesus passed from Judea into the Greek world. Thus, Paulinism would be regarded as the Greek form of the Christian faith; or, if one prefers, as the Greek reinterpretation of Jewish messianism.

In this investigation the mystery religions occupy a large place. But notwithstanding the numerous agreements that one can establish between these religions and Christianity, as yet we have not been shown a series of agreements so decisive as to give the impression that in them is contained the key to the problem. The investigations thus far carried on have certainly demonstrated that there were very close relations between Greek mysticism and Paulinism, but they have not yet discovered the origin of the process, pivotal for Pauline mysticism and for Christian mysticism in general, by which the external historic fact of the death and resurrection of Christ becomes an inner spiritual fact for the believer. Everybody agrees that this cardinal experience was universally taught by Paul; but the way in which it took shape in the consciousness of Paul remains obscure. And since, unquestionably, it cannot have been of Jewish origin, one must look for it in Hellenism.

I believe, indeed, that science long ago would have succeeded in finding the key to the problem if it had adopted, in its comparisons with the mystery religions, a good scientific method. On the contrary, it is undeniable that in this inquiry specific data are often lacking, and the investigation rests on no substantial historical basis. One speaks of the mystery religions in general, giving to this term a collective significance, as if the various mysteries were so harmonious and similar that they could be considered a unit. Thus one creates a hybrid medley in which there no longer exists a true scientific criterion capable of supporting a comparison with Christianity on the one hand and with the mysteries on the other. One speaks of "Christianity and the mystery religions" as though one could institute scientific comparisons between a unified and individual phenomenon on the one side and a complex mass of phenomena on the other, these being various and widely separated from one another in time and space. Therefore conservative criticism is right in not accepting the conclusions that are offered it on these premises.

What method of procedure is to be adopted? Exactly that advised by Clemen,[2] the most vigorous and uncompromising adversary that this line of research has ever called forth. He lays down three conditions to be met before affirming any connection whatsoever between the mysteries and Christianity. These are: (1) The idea or the institution compared must be incapable of explanation by reference either to Christianity itself or to Judaism. (2) Between the ideas and the institutions compared there must be a correspondence, not only in external form, but also in inner character. (3) The religion which is compared with Christianity must have existed prior to Christianity and in its environment.

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[2] Clemen, *Der Einfluss der Mysterienreligionen auf das älteste Christentum* (Giessen, 1913), pp. 2 f.

Applying these entirely proper criteria to all the various mystery religions in turn, one will see that no one of them answers all three requirements. Sometimes the point of agreement is not such that it is absolutely impossible to explain it without recourse to the Greek world. Sometimes the correspondence is purely external. Sometimes the religion compared is later than Christianity in time and too far distant from it geographically. There is only one mystery religion of such a character that it corresponds perfectly to the canons of Professor Clemen. That is Orphism. Indeed, (1) Orphism contains those mystical elements in Paulinism which cannot possibly be explained either by reference to Judaism or to Jewish Christianity; (2) the correspondence between Orphism and Paulinism is not simply external or accidental, but pertains to the inner experience of death and rebirth through Christ; and (3) Orphism was already in actual operation many centuries before the time of Jesus, and had spread to Judea and to the countries where Christianity began.

Certainly one will ask in surprise how it has happened that so simple a truth has never been discovered before. The explanation lies in the fact that the studies which have been concerned with the origin of Paulinism often have, strangely enough, disregarded Orphism proper.[3] Thus science has, as it were, lost sight of Orphism and is never prepared for a serious investigation of an Orphic-Christian parallelism. This prevailing neglect is, however, explained by the fact that only in recent years, and especially since the discovery of the Orphic liturgy of Pompeii, has the knowledge of Orphism so progressed as to insure for itself scientific recognition. The present study is concerned, not with ignorance or neglect of Orphism, but simply with its significance as an established phase of knowledge.

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[3] E.g., Pfleiderer (*Das Urchristentum*, 2. Aufl. I, 29 f.) speaks of the mysteries in general and specifically mentions only Mithraism; J. Weiss (*Das Urchristentum* [Göttingen, 1914], I, 129 and 357) does not fix on any one mystery religion; G. F. Moore (*History of Religions*, I, 579 f.) takes account of only the religions of Cybele, Isis, and Mithra; Weinel (*Paulus* [Tübingen, 1915], 38 f.) speaks of mysteries in

II

I shall now endeavor to show how Orphism immediately satisfies the rules of Professor Clemen. The nucleus of Orphism was the myth of Zagreus. This myth narrated that Zagreus, son of Zeus and of Persephone, was killed by the Titans, who devoured him, with the exception of his heart, which was saved by Athena. Then Zeus, after smiting the Titans, caused the second Dionysus, son of Semele, to be born from that heart, and then from the ashes of the Titans men were born. The barbarian and primitive myth,[4] given form in pre-Christian times, always remained central for Orphism down to the Christian era; and in the theological elaboration of Orphism we distinguish five constituent elements: (*a*) Zagreus is a son of Zeus;[5] (*b*) the Titans kill him;[6] (*c*) Zeus restores him to

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general; Morgan (*The Religion and Theology of Paul* [Edinburgh, 1917], 107, 127) does not fix on any mystery religion in particular; Omodeo (*Prolegomeni alla storia dell' età apostolica* [Messina, 1920], 416) speaks of all the mystery religions except that of Orphism; Toussaint (*L'hellénisme et l'apôtre Paul* [Paris, 1921], 355) does the same; Clemen (*op. cit.*, p. 5) does not discuss Orphism because he knows too little about it; Kennedy (*St. Paul and the Mystery Religions* [London, 1913], pp. 12-18) mentions the mysteries of Cybele and of Isis, but not Orphism; and so forth.

[4] On the antiquity of the Greek theogonic myths, see Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion* (London, 1901^2), chap. x. For the frequently recurring myth of the devouring god (Kronos devours his sons; Zeus gulps down Phanes or Metis or the heart of Zagreus; the Titans devour Zagreus), see the corresponding myths of the Basutos, Indians, Eskimos, and Zulus in Lang, *op. cit.*, I, 295.

[5] Plato, *Gorg.* 523A; cf. 524B, 526D.

[6] Clement Alex., *Protr.* II, 17, 2; Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* II, 3, 23 f. (Dindorf); Kern, *Orph. fragm.* 34. Cf. Arnobius, *Adv. nat.* V, 19; Nonnus, *Dion.* VII, 169 f; Hyginus, *Fabulae*, 168, 238; Origen, *Contra Cels.* IV, 17.

life;[7] (*d*) he has him raised to heaven;[8] (*e*) he gives him a kingdom.[9]

Unquestionably all of these mythical features appear again in connection with the figure of the Pauline Christ, who later was consecrated in the creed. Furthermore, the resurrection of Dionysus was always regarded by the ancients as a real fact,[10] so that at Delphi his tomb was shown,[11] and in the Orphic theology the identity of Dionysus and Zeus, that is, the identity of the son and the father, is affirmed.[12]

It is also very significant that the correspondence between Zagreus and Christ was noted by the early Christians themselves, who found it so unique that they considered it to be the work of the devil. Justin Martyr explains this resemblance by supposing that, since the future advent of Christ was learned from the prophets, the interpretators of the ancient poets invented the sons of Zeus in the hope that the things pertaining to the Savior might be considered as fables, similar to those of the poets. In this way the Christian apologist explains the truly unique correspondence with the prophecy of Jacob in Genesis.[13] Justin assumed that the passage appropriately applied to the advent of the Messiah and to the figure of Dionysus, and he supposed that Bacchus, son of Zeus—his life, dismemberment, resurrection, and ascension to heaven—had been invented in accordance with this scripture.[14] And Justin adds that, although many injurious myths might be invented, no one of the Greek gods had dared to invent the crucifixion.[15] This indicates that from the point of view of the mystery there was nothing that distinguished Dionysus from Christ except the manner of his death.

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[7] Diodorus, III, 62, 7. According to Cornutus (*De nat. deor.*, XXX, 220), Dionysus was restored by Rhea.

[8] Justin, *Apol.*, I, 54; *Dial.* 69; Origen, *Contra Cels.*, IV, 17.

[9] Proclus, *In Plat. Crat.*, 296B p. 56, 5 (Pasquali); *In Plat. Tim.*, V (III, 310, 32. See Diehl); Olympiodorus, *In Plat. Phaed.*, 163, p. 121 (Norvin).

[10] Plutarch, *De Ei apud Delph.*, LX, p. 388F; Diodorus, III, 6, 6 (Vogel: κατεφηθέναι πάλιν δέ . . . . νέον γεννηθῆναι); Origen, *Contra Cels.*, IV, 17; Justin, *Dial.*, 69.

[11] Plutarch, *De Iside*, 35, p. 305A.

[12] Dionysus was identified by the Orphics with Phanes (Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.*, II, 102; cf. Diodorus, I, 2, 3; Kern, *Orph, fragm.*, 237), Phanes was identified with Zeus (Hermias, *In Plat. Phaedr.*, 141; Macrobius, *Sat.*, I, 18, 17). The identification of Zeus and Phanes was represented in the former's swallowing of Phanes. (Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.*, II, 95F; Kern, *Orph. fragm.*, 167). Cf. Proclus, *In Plat. Parm.*, 621 (Stallbaum) and *In Plat. Crat.*, 66; Kern *Orph. fragm.*, 168.

[13] Gen. 49:10 f.: The scepter shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler's staff from between his feet, until Shiloh come; and unto him shall the obedience of the peoples be.

This fundamental likeness between Christ and Zagreus is a feature not yet sufficiently studied in the polemic of Celsus' *True Word*.[16] One of the arguments of this pagan apologist was in part founded on Orphism and consisted in setting over against the teaching and theology of Christianity the dogmas of his own religion, particularly as found in the books of Orphism. "Come therefore," says Origen to Celsus, "produce the poems of Linus, Musaeus, Orpheus, the histories of Pherecydes; compare them with the laws of Moses, setting the histories over against each other, and the moral discourses against the laws and precepts."[17] Thus the basis of Celsus' polemic was the canonical books of Orphism.[18] From the very arguments of Origen one is able to obtain an approximately exact idea as to the fundamental teachings of Celsus and to conclude with assurance that they were derived from Orphism. This is illustrated, for example, by the eschatology of Celsus. Evidently he denied the validity of Christian eschatology. And so Origen replies to him that if the Christians are wrong, so also is Celsus himself. And why? "Since Celsus says," Origen remarks, "that the Christians are led astray by wretched hopes, we reply to him who blames them for their teaching about the blessed life and communion with God: 'Certainly, according to you, friend, they, too, are led astray by slender hopes who have accepted the teaching of Pythagoras and of Plato, according to which the soul by virtue of its own nature mounts to the vault of heaven and in the celestial region contemplates the sight of the happy spectacles. According to you, O Celsus, they who have learned that the soul is freed, and so conduct themselves as to become heroes and live in the company of the gods, are led astray by slender hopes.' "[19] It is evident that Origen here alludes to those Orphic-Pythagorean doctrines which taught that the soul was elevated to heaven after death, and which described in vivid colors the blessed sights beyond the grave where the soul of the initiate becomes a hero who goes to live in the company of the gods. As for the allusion to the liberation of the soul, this evidently points to the well-known belief that the soul was shut up within the body as in a tomb from which death liberated it.

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[14] Justin, *Apol.*, I, 54 and *Dial.*, 69.

[15] Justin, *Apol.*, I, 54.

[16] Orphism is not even referred to by the more important students of Celsus; see Pressensé, *Histoire des trois premieres siècles de l'Église*, 2d series, II (Paris, 1861), 115–42; Neander, *Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche* (Gotha, 1863), I, 203–14; Baur, *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche* (Tübingen, 1863), I, 382–409; Keim, *Celsus' wahres Wort* (Zürich, 1873); Muth, *Der Kampf des heidnischen Philosoph Celsus gegen das Christentum* (Mainz, 1899); E. de Faye, *Origène* (Paris, 1923), pp. 138–89; L. Rougier, *Celse* (Paris, 1925); Anna Mura-Stange, *Celsus und Origines* (Giessen, 1926). I am not acquainted with Pélagaud, *Étude sur Celse* (Lyons, 1878), and the edition of Celsus by Neumann. Keim, who professes to reconstruct the work of Celsus, does not even transcribe the passages to which I refer, and affirms (p. 199) that Celsus ignored the idea of the suffering Messiah.

[17] Origen, *Contra Cels.*, I, 18.

[18] The φερεκύδον γραφή of which Origen speaks is the πεντέμυχος *opera cosmogonica* preserved by the Orphics (Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, I, 427 f.).

The particular use which Origen makes of this incident gives a unique value to these allusions. In fact, his entire discourse would have no polemic value unless Celsus also consented to their mutual acceptance of these opinions, notwithstanding his disrespect for the not greatly dissimilar Christian teachings. Only on this assumption can one justify the ironic invitation which Origen addressed to Celsus, admonishing him to be sincere, to confess that he is an Epicurean and that he does not believe in the survival of the soul, when he sets over against the Christian views of death the similar affirmations of the Greek philosophers and of the mysteries.[20]

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[19] *Contra Cels.*, III, 80.

Elsewhere Celsus clearly alludes to that Orphic teaching which represents the soul as shut up in the body to atone for its former sin, a doctrine which, as Origen says, is found in Pythagoras and Plato and Empedocles, the authors most frequently cited by Celsus.[21]

Over against the Christian eschatology Celsus set that of the mysteries. Indeed, we know that over against the Christian imagery of punishments beyond the grave he set the Orphic imagery;[22] and if he approved of the Christians for promising felicity to the righteous and condemnation to the wicked,[23] that certainly was because of the fact that Orphism had a similar doctrine.

Also the cosmology of Celsus was derived from Orphism, because he set over against the story of Satan's struggle with God the story of the Titans and giants narrated in Orphic theogony.[24] Also he affirmed the successive destructions of the world by fire, according to the doctrine of the Orphics, of Heraclitus, and of the Stoics,[25] and the perpetually recurring restoration of things.[26] And, finally, even his anthropology was Orphic, for he held evil to belong to the very nature of man,[27] and regarded the body as the prison house of the soul.[28]

[20] *Ibid.*, III, 80.

[21] *Ibid.*, I, 32: ἢ εὐλογώτερον ἑκάστην ψυχὴν κατά τινας ἀποῤῥήτους λόγους (λέγω δὲ ταῦτα νῦν κατὰ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα, οὓς πολλάκις ὠνόμασεν ὁ Κέλσος,) εἰσκρινομένην σώματι κατ' ἀξίαν εἰσκρίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ τὰ πρότερα ἤθη.

[22] *Ibid.*, VIII, 48: ὥσπερ σὺ κολάσεις αἰωνίους νομίζεις, οὕτως καὶ οἱ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐκείνων ἐξηγηταὶ τελεσταί τε καὶ μυσταγωγοί, ἃς σὺ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπειλεῖς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ σοί.

[23] *Ibid.*, VI, 42.

[24] *Ibid.*, VI, 42.

[25] *Ibid.*, I, 19: πολλὰς ἐκ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐκπυρώσεις γεγονέναι. Cf. Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.*, 19.

[26] *Ibid.*, IV, 60: κοινὴ ἡ πάντων . . . . φύσις καὶ μία ἐς ἀμοιβὴν παλίντροπον ἰοῦσα καὶ ἐπανιοῦσα. IV, 69: ἕκαστα τοῦ ὅλου σωτηρίας εἵνεκα γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται ἀμοιβὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἄλληλα. Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.*, 19.

[27] *Ibid.*, IV, 65.

[28] *Ibid.*, VIII, 53. He calls the body δεσμοτέριον of the soul. According to VII, 28, Celsus follows the eschatology of the *Phaedo*, which is Orphic.

The thinking of Celsus was, we conclude, thoroughly saturated with Orphic doctrines, and these doctrines constituted the main ground of his polemic, which consisted in setting over against Christianity an equivalent religion. Consequently Origen rightly asked him whether the Christian beliefs were not more worthy of veneration than the story of Dionysus deceived by the Titans, cast down from the throne of Zeus and torn in pieces by them, and the story of the reassembling of his body and resuscitation and ascent to heaven.[29] And Origen was justified in exclaiming, "I marvel that Celsus does not praise Orpheus to strengthen his case with us and cheapen Jesus."[30]

Yet the choice of Orphism as a basis of his polemic was not made by Celsus without ample reasons. Indeed, he did not wish to overthrow Christianity, but only to reconcile it with paganism.[31] Hence it was appropriate to show how in paganism there were some of the dogmas or fundamental myths of Christianity, and ultimately, on the strength of these, to bind the two great enemies together by demonstrating that in reality on fundamental matters the two religions coincided. Only thus could one hope to reconcile them. There was no basis of reconciliation available in paganism outside of Orphism. At this point Celsus had no choice.

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[29] *Ibid.*, IV, 17.

[30] *Ibid.*, VII, 54. It is strange that Celsus, when combating all the dogmas of the Christian faith, seems to ignore, as Muth well notes (p. 101), the Trinity and the Eucharist, although as to the former he records the name of the three persons (VII, 9; VI, 70, 73). I suppose Celsus would not refer either to the Trinity or to the Eucharist because in the case of the former, Orphism had a somewhat similar thing in the identity of Zeus the father and Dionysus the son, and in the case of the latter, the mystical process of initiation was the same thing.

[31] Baur, *Das Christentum und die christliche Kirche*, pp. 387 f; Keim, *op. cit.*, pp. 190 f.; Pélagaud, *Étude sur Celse*, pp. xv and 454; Aubé, *Histoire des persécutions de l'Église* (Paris, 1878), pp. 168 f.; Neumann, *Der römische Staat und die allgemeine Kirche bis auf Diocletian* (Leipzig, 1890), I, 35; Muth, *op. cit.*, pp. 159 f., following Overbeck (*Theologische Litteraturzeit.* [1878], p. 536), and Koetschau (*Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, XVIII [1892], 631) believes that the purpose of Celsus was to combat the particularistic exclusiveness of the Christians and to recall them to union with the pagans.

III

One might say that this agreement between Christianity and Orphism was purely external, that it was merely formal or fanciful, and that behind the parallelism in the outlines of the mystery there were concealed two mystery-procedures of an entirely different character. At this point therefore, in accordance with Clemen's demand, we ask whether back of this purely external parallelism there was also a more essential agreement.

The Orphic anthropology which was derived from its theology, that is, from the Orphic myth of Zagreus, affirmed that in addition to the Dionysiac nature in man there is also the Titanic nature.[32] Consequently man carries in himself the guilt of the original sin committed by the Titans when they killed the deity,[33] and the soul atones for it by remaining shut up in the sepulchral prison of the body until it is liberated therefrom.[34] Hence the ecstasy, which the rites of the mysteries insure, permits the soul to escape from the body and joins it once more to the Dionysiac divinity whose image is within us.[35] Thus by means of the mystery, souls which are chained to the body and prefer the Titanic to the Dionysiac life, when purified from their Titanic taint, become Bacchuses.[36]

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[32] Data in Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 357. The Orphic tablets found at Thurium allude to this Titanic origin, and to the guilt of the Titans. (Olivieri, *Lamellae aureae orphicae* [Kleine Texte, 133, Bonn, 1915], Wieten, *De tribus lam. aur. quae in sep. Thurinis sunt inventae* (Diss. Lugd., 1915); Kern, p. 104, n. 32C. Also Kern, *Orpheus* (Berlin, 1920), p. 5, and Ciaceri, *St. della M. Gr.*, II (Milan, 1927), 114 f.

[33] Dion Chrysostom, *Or.* XXX, p. 550 (Dindorf); Olympiodorus in Wyttenbach, *Platonis Phaed.* (Ludg. Bat., 1810), p. 134. The Orphic Hippolytus (Euripides, *Hipp.*, ll. 1379 f.) alludes to this notion of original sin.

[34] Philolaus apud Clement Alex., *Strom.* III, iii, 17, 1 (Stählin, p. 203); Diels, *Fragmente* (3. Aufl., Berlin, 1912), I, 315 (Fr. 14); Hippolytus, *Refutations*, VI, 24 (Duncker-Schneidewin, p. 267); Athenaeus, *Deip.* IV, 157C (Meinecke); Plato, *Gorg.*, 493A, *Phaed.* 6B, *Crat.* 400C; Iamblichus, *Protr.* 8 (Pistelli, p. 47); Plotinus, *Enn.* IV, 1 (Volkmann, p. 469). Cf. Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Ep.* V, pp. 73, 9 f. (Bywater); Sextus Empiricus, *Hyp.* III, 230 (Mutschmann); Gregory Nazianzus, *Or.*, VII, 22 (Migne, *Patr. Gr.* 35, col. 784D); Basil Min. (of Seleucia), *Scholia ad Gregorii Naz. Or.* VII (Migne, 36, col. 1200, n. 63); Olympiodorus, *In Plat. Phaed.* 62D (p. 2, Norvin).

[35] Proclus, *In Plat. Crat.*, p. 82, CXXXIII (Pasquali).

The Orphic anthropology and soteriology have perfect counterparts in Paulinism. Christ dead and restored to life by the Father corresponds to Zagreus dead and brought back to life by the work of Zeus. Paul's "body of death" which weighs him down parallels the Orphic bodily tomb in which the soul is shut up, and the notion of original sin inherited from Adam parallels the conception of original sin inherited from the Titans. Both Orphism and Paulinism think of sin, not as an individual fault, but as an inferior state, a permanent evil innate in the flesh in consequence of another's crime, and automatically operative, from which man must be liberated. Nor is this all. The renewal effected through union with Christ corresponds to the renewal effected through union with Dionysus. The notion of a new spiritual body corresponds to the idea of attaining to the Dionysiac nature. The rite of baptism which gives salvation parallels the Orphic initiation which insures a beatific state. The Orphic acquired the very nature of Dionysus, and the Christian wins the nature of Christ.[37] By means of the rite of the mystery, man was transformed from a Titanic to a Dionysiac nature, and by means of the rite of baptism he was transformed from the natural (psychic) into the spiritual (pneumatic) man.

Thus we see that, in addition to the identity in the myth, there is also an identity in experience, which means that the agreement is not only formal but substantial. But on this point it seems to me useless to linger because anyone will perceive that here we have far more than simply a mythical coincidence.

IV

Next we turn to the third canon of Professor Clemen and endeavor to show that Orphism existed and was functioning long before the time of Jesus; also that it had spread to the neighboring territory and within the very regions where Christianity arose. Indeed, we believe it to be wholly unnecessary to demonstrate the former of the two items affirmed in this canon, since everyone knows that Orphism existed and was widely diffused in Greece from the sixth century B.C. onward, and that from it Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Pindar, and Plato, not to mention others, drew inspiration. To argue the point would simply mean rehearsing information with which every intelligent person is already familiar. Instead, we shall deal more extensively with the second point, which is of especial importance, and shall endeavor to demonstrate that Orphism was widely diffused in just that territory where Christianity arose.

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[36] Olympiodorus, *In Plat. Phaed.*, 161B (p. 120, Norvin).

[37] I Cor. 15:16 f.

At the time when early Christianity was taking form we find Orphism stretching like a huge net over a region contiguous to Judea, particularly in Phoenicia.

On the coins of Sidon no divinity appears so frequently as Dionysus all through the seventh century B.C. At Berytus he appears much later, in the age of Hadrian. At Tyre he appears on the coins of Seleucus IV; at Orthosia, on coins of the year 20 B.C.[38] Beneath this Greek divinity there must have been concealed a local divinity on whom people already believed. Certainly Osiris[39] took the place of Esmun.[40] This identification presupposes that the fundamental traits of the two divinities would be the same. Esmun, too, was a "son" of god, not to be compared with the great divinities like Zeus or Kronos, but with other more youthful gods represented as sons of these deities.[41] Also Esmun was a dying and rising god like

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[38] Baudissin, *Adonis und Esmun* (Leipzig, 1911), pp. 231–41. For Carthage there is the testimony of Vergil, *Aeneid*, IV, 58.

[39] Dussaud, "Le dieu phénicien Echmoun," *Journal des Savants*, Nouv. Série, V (1907), 40.

[40] Baudissin, *op. cit.*, pp. 242 ff., especially 256 f.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

Adonis and Tammuz.[42] Now the identification of Esmun with Dionysus presupposes that these essential characteristics were also connected with Dionysus. It follows, therefore, that this Dionysus, who was equated with Esmun, was Zagreus; just as Zagreus is exactly that Dionysus with whom Adonis is equated in an Orphic hymn.[43] This situation presupposes that in Phoenicia, by about the first century B.C., the Orphic religion was so widely diffused and accepted as to make possible the substitution of Zagreus for the native deity, Esmun.

Another center of Orphic religion was the kingdom of the Nabateans, which extended from Arabia at least to Damascus. These people traded in bitumen and asphalt produced by the Dead Sea. They exported these products to Egypt, where they were used in the process of embalming.[44] Damascus had surrendered itself voluntarily to the Nabatean King, Aretas,[45] whose ethnarch attempted to make Paul a prisoner at Damascus.[46] In the year 99 A.D. the Nabatean dominion is shown by an inscription to have extended at least to the northeast of Damascus.[47] Thus in the age when Christology took its start, the Nabatean kingdom encircled like a girdle Palestine and Judea.

The principal divinity of the Nabateans was Dusares,[48] about whose cult we find many statements in Epiphanius. According to him, the feast of this god was celebrated by the Greeks with solemn ceremonies on the day of Epiphany. To quote Epiphanius: "Indeed, the originators of idol worship, producing illusions for the purpose of leading astray those idolators who believed them, are constrained to confess a part of the truth when they celebrate in many places a very great feast on the very night of Epiphany, in order that, trusting in error, they might not seek the truth. Above all, there is the celebration in Alexandria in the so-called Korion. They have there a very great temple which is the sanctuary of Kore. During the entire night they remain awake singing to the idol certain hymns to the accompaniment of flutes. Then, continuing the festival after the crowing of the cocks, torch-bearers descend into a certain underground shrine and bring up a wooden image, naked, seated on a litter, with a sign of a cross gilded on its forehead and two other similar signs upon each of the two hands and two others upon the two knees. The five signs are all stamped in gold. Then they carry the image seven times in a circle around the central point in the temple, with an accompaniment of flutes, drums, and hymns, and after feasting they carry the image back to its place underground. Then when one asks What is this mystery? they answer and say: Today at this hour Kore (that is the Virgin) bore Aion."[49] Thus writes Epiphanius. And he concludes the account by adding that the Arabs celebrate the same ceremony on the same day at Petra, where the original goddess is called χααμοῦ, and the god, Dusares. Therefore, Dusares and Aion were one and the same.

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[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 345 f., 372 f.

[43] XLII, 5 f. (Abel): εἴτ' ἐν 'Ελευσῖνος τέρπῃ . . . . ἢ Κύπρῳ τέρπῃ.

[44] Diodorus, XIX, 98 f.

[45] Mommsen, *Provinces of the Roman Empire* (New York, 1887), II, 162, n. 2.

[46] II Cor. 11:32.

[47] Mommsen, *op. cit.*, II, 162, n. 3.

[48] On Dusares, see De Vogué, *Inscr. semit.* (Paris, 1863); E. Meyer in Roscher's *Lexikon*, I, 1206 ff.; Cumont in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, V, 1865 ff.

What god was this Aion? Aion was the son of Kronos,[50] or, according to the Orphic theogony of Hellanicus, he was Protogonus, born from the egg of Kronos.[51] But Protogonus was identical with Dionysus and with Phanes,[52] and Phanes was the same as Aion.[53] In fact, in an inscription on a statue of Aion at Eleusis, the god is characterized as Phanes or Orphic Dionysus.[54]

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[49] Epiphanius, *Panarion haer*, 51, 22, 8–10 (Holl, II, 258 f.).

[50] Euripides, *Children of Hercules*, l. 898.

[51] Kern, pp. 130, 54; 158, 85.

[52] Aristocr. Manich., θεοσοφία (Buresch, p. 116, 15); Kern, n. 61. Erikepaeus is equal to Dionysus (Hesychius, *s.v.*; Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.*, II, 102D, E; Kern, n. 170; Macrobius, I, 1, 12; Kern, n. 237. In *Orphic Hymns*, VI, 6, "Erikepaeus" is an epithet of Dionysus. Phanes is equal to Erikepaeus (*Hymn* VI, 9); cf. Preller-Robert, *Griechische Mythologie*, I, 42; Gruppe in Roscher's *Lexikon*, III, 2259, 2267, and in *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, I, 430; Waser in Pauly-Wis-

Nor is that all. Epiphanius says that he was a son of Kore, by which unquestionably Zagreus is meant.[55] Furthermore, Suidas calls a statue of Aion, ἄρρητον,[56] and Damascius refuses to name it;[57] but a Dionysus ἄρρητον cannot have been other than Zagreus.

Of course we do not mean by this to assert that Aion is invariably identical with Zagreus, but that among the many, mystical identifications—very numerous in Hellenistic syncretism—Zagreus was also one of the figures to receive the impersonal designation of Aion. And this particular fusion of gods had its center at Alexandria, the real focal point of the cult of Aion.[58] Later, at Alexandria, according to Cosmas, the scholiast on Gregory Nazianzus (Migne, Vol. 38, col. 464), a feast was celebrated during which the devotees assembled in a sanctuary, and at dawn they carried in a procession a statuette of the lately born solar god, and just at sunrise they proclaimed: "The virgin has brought forth, the light will increase."[59]

The two feasts were almost identical. The only real difference between them is the fact that the former was held on

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sowa, *Realencyclopädie*, VI, 453. "Protogonus" was an epithet of Phanes (Damasc., *De princ.*, 111; Kern, n. 64), and of Erikepaeus (Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.*, 29A; Kern, n. 167).

[53] Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.*, Prooem. E (Kern, n. 107).

[54] Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 3 ed., III, 1125.

[55] The feast of Koreion continued for a time to be celebrated as a Gnostic feast, but nowadays it is recognized as a pagan feast (Holl, "Der Ursprung des Epiphanienfestes," *in Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften* [1917], p. 426).

[56] Suidas, *s.v.* 'Ηραΐσκος, I, 872 (Bernhardi).

[57] Apud Suidas, *s.v.*; Epiphanius, I, 2 p. 481 f. (Bernhardi).

[58] On the cult of Aion at Alexandria see Reitzenstein, *Das iranische Erlösungsmysterium* (Bonn, 1921), pp. 188–207. Reitzenstein, however, believes it necessary to leave Aion undetermined (p. 197).

[59] Holl, *op. cit.*, p. 427, 4: ἡ παρθένος τέτοκεν αὔξει φῶς.

the night of December 24–25, and the latter on the night of January 5–6. But is it possible to assume that within the space of a few days they could have celebrated in the same city two feasts almost identical, both in the ritual performed and in the formula pronounced? Is it not more reasonable to think that here we have to do with only one feast and one divinity, and that the differences are to be accounted for by some inexact items in the tradition?[60]

However, there are some variations in the nomenclature. In the account of Epiphanius, the mother goddess is called Kore and the son is called Aion, while in the account of Cosmas, the mother is called Parthenos, and the son, Phos. As regards the difference between Core and Parthenos, it is easy to imagine a Christian's using the word *Kore* with a double meaning, when he wished to speak of Kore, daughter of Demeter, or of any virgin whatsoever. For the Christian attitude of mind, which was disposed to see in these cults parodies or profanations of the Christian mystery, the double usage was even more easy, and doubtless was not involuntary. The comment of Epiphanius, "that is the virgin," certainly must be intentional.[61]

The parallel between Aion and Phos is more difficult to explain. On the assumption that Aion is Orphic Dionysus one can show that Phos can be understood in the same way.

Dionysus was often thought of as a luminous deity[62] in Elis,[63] and in Thrace[64] he became the equal of Helios, just as happened in Orphism.[65] Also Osiris was equated with Helios, and was, according to Plutarch,[66] identified with Dionysus. Also between Aion, who is Dionysus, and Osiris, the Egyptians assumed an affinity,[67] and this identification exercised in turn an influence upon the Orphic tradition.[68]

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[60] Norden (*Die Geburt des Kindes*, p. 28) observes that the statue described by Epiphanius is not that of a child. But in Greek mythology there are newborn gods who are pictured and thought of as adults, e.g., Athena, Apollo, Hermes. In the pseudo-Homeric hymn to Apollo it is said that Apollo at the moment of birth leaped forth to the light (1. 120: ἐκ δ᾽ ἔθορε προφόωσδε. Cf. Callimachus, *Hymn to Delos*, l. 255).

[61] Reitzenstein (*Das iranische Erlösungsmysterium*, p. 191) believes that the notion of virgin divinity in general is meant. But from Plutarch, *De sollertia anamalium*, 36, we infer that this Kore was a very definite divinity.

[62] Sophocles, *Antig.*, l. 1146; Aristophanes, *Ran.*, ll. 343 f. Cf. Wetter, *Phos.* p. 98.

[63] *Etymologicum Magnum*, 277, 45.

[64] Macrobius, *Sat.*, I, 18, 11.

Therefore, Helios and Dionysus were identical in Orphic tradition. It is even apparent that this identification actually originated in Egypt. But Phos, mentioned by Cosmas, was certainly Helios. This follows from the calendar of Antiochus, where December 25 is designated "birthday of Helios; the light will increase,"[69] thus repeating almost the same formula referred to by Cosmas.

Hence both the feast of Aion and of Phos are in reality but one solar feast of Dionysus-Zagreus, or, if one wishes to keep them distinct, two different feasts in honor of Dionysus, in the first of which he is honored as Aion or Zagreus, and in the second as Phos or Helios.[70]

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[65] Macrobius, *Sat.*, I, 23, 22: Solem esse omnia et Orpheus testatur his versibus: Κέκλυθι . . . . ἀγλαὲ Ζεῦ Διόνυσε . . . . ''Ηλιε παγγενέτορ (Abel, *Orphica*, Frag. 235). *Ibid.*, I, 18, 17: Solem Liberum esse manifeste pronuntiat Orpheus hoc versu: ''Ηλιος ὃν Διόνυσον ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσι. Et is quidem versus absolutior ille vero eiusdem vatis operosior: εἷς Ζεύς, εἷς 'Αΐδης, εἷς ''Ηλιος, εἷς Διόνυσος. (Abel, *Orphica*, Frag. 169). In the Orphic hymns Helios and Dionysus have common, or equivalent, epithets: Helios (*Hymn*, VIII, *passim*): οὐράνιον φῶς, πυρόεις, Φαιδρωπός, πυρίδρομος, φωσφόρος, ζωῆς φῶς. Proclus in the *Hymn to Helios* (l. 24) calls him Διωνύσοιο τοκῆα. This identification fits the tradition that Orpheus was killed by Dionysus because he neglected him and worshipped Helios alone (Pseudo-Eratosthenes, *Catast.* 24, p. 140; Hyginus, *Astron.*, II, 7), a tradition followed by Aeschylus in his (no longer extant) *Orpheus*. One may speak of a type of tradition characterized by a contrast between the religion of Apollo and that of Dionysus.

[66] *De Iside*, 35, p. 494E.

[67] Suidas, *s.v.* ''Ηραΐσκος. In an oracle of Ammon occurs the expression Αἰὼν Πλουτώνιος (Reitzenstein, *Das iranische Erlösungsmysterium*, p. 189). Reitzenstein (*Poimandres*, p. 276) and Bousset (*Kyrios Christos*, 2. Aufl., pp. 135 and 272) identify Dionysus and Osiris on the strength of this passage. The observations of Holl (*Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie* [1917], p. 431) against the identification are not adequate. Suidas affirms that Heraiskos was capable of making the distinction when the statute of Aion was possessed by Osiris, and for that very reason distinguished the two divinities. Yet between these divinities one must assume a magical relation, a certain identity, if it was believed that one of the divinites could exert an influence upon the statue of the other. The observations of Holl lose their force in view of the counter-observations of Reitzenstein (*ibid.*, p. 198).

[68] Diodorus, I, ii, 3; Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.*, IX, 27D; Abel, *Orphica*, 152; Kern, *Orph. Frag.*, p. 250, n. 238.

[69] Norden, *op. cit.*, p. 25, n. 2.

Now we are prepared to return to the problem of Dusares. Epiphanius records the Alexandrian feast of Aion to show that the cult of Dusares was widely diffused; therefore, in the thinking of Epiphanius, Dusares and Zagreus are the same god. It is strange that, according to Epiphanius, they celebrate in Syria and in Arabia the birth of a solar deity born of a feminine divinity called Chaamou, whom Epiphanius himself calls the virgin (*κόρη*).[71] Certainly we find here the same equivocation in the use of Kore's name that has already been seen in the case of Aion's. But in this instance the identity of the two divinities should be even more clear. There are also concurring witnesses that identify this Dusares with Dionysus. Suidas says that Dusares was the Dionysus of the Nabateans.[72] Coins of Adraha and of Bostra, in commemorating the feasts of Dusares, exhibit as a symbol the torch which is the symbol of Dionysus.[73] And surely there is a reference to this identity of Dusares and Dionysus in the tradition reported by Herodotus,[74] Strabo,[75] and Arrian,[76] to the effect that the Arabs honored Dionysus along with Urania and Zeus, not to mention the late tradition that Zeus brought Dionysus to life in Arabia.[77]

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[70] A ceremony connected with this same divinity, probably a sacred marriage of Dionysus, is recorded by Firmicus Maternus, *De errore prof. rel.*, XVIII, and there the god is saluted with the cry *νυμφίε χαῖρε νυμφίε χαῖρε νέον φῶς* (XIX, 1).

[71] Epiphanius, *Panarion haer*, 51, 22 (Holl, II, 286).

[72] Hesychius, *s.v.* *Δουσάρης τὸν Διονύσον Ναβαταῖοι.*

[73] Eckhel, *Doctrina numorum veterum*, III, 500 and 502; Mionnet, *Description de médailles antiques*, V, p. 578, Nos. 5 and 6, p. 585, No. 37; Mordtmann in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XXIX (1876), 102 and 104. In antiquity Dionysus' epithet "Lenaios" was by common consent taken to be derived from a wine-press (Diodorus, III, 67; Scholiast on Hesiod, *Op.*, 506; Stephanus Byzantinus, *s.v.* *Λήναιος*).

[74] III, 8.

[75] XVI, 741.

[76] *Anab.*, VII, 20, 1.

[77] *Dionysius Periegesis*, 733. During the imperial period Dusares was identified with Sol (Cumont, in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, V, col. 1867).

From all this evidence we conclude that the chief god of the Nabateans either was derived from Zagreus, or, as is more probable, had been assimulated to him even to the point of becoming confused with him. Assuredly this Arabian Dionysus must have seemed very similar to Christ, if, as the account of Epiphanius proves, Christ had become so completely confused with this Dionysus that the Christian feast had come to fall on the day of Epiphany, if Kore, as the mother of Dionysus, was substituted for the Virgin, and if Epiphanius, like Justin Martyr also, was unable to explain this correspondence except by supposing it to be the work of gods hostile to Christianity.

The kingdom of the Nabateans, as we have said, encircled the whole of Palestine as with a girdle. Consequently, in the time of Jesus all Palestine was surrounded by this Nabatean religion, which had as its chief god, Dusares, a divinity nearly identical with Dionysus, who later, in the time of Epiphanius, appeared confused with Christ.

A third great area of Orphic diffusion was Asia Minor. In the time of Jesus this region exhibits everywhere the dissemination of *speirai,* or Orphic associations. They are found at Pergamon, at Eretria, at Philadelphia, at Emonia, at Magnesia, at Smyrna, at Teos, at Ephesus, at Sardis, and other places.[78] As a matter of fact, in the period when Christianity arose there was hardly a city of Asia Minor that did not have its Orphic cult association. Lucian bears witness to the fact that in Ionia the passion for the Dionysiac dramas was universal, and so strong that the people in that region forgot everything else and remained for whole days watching the ceremonies. Also he says that even persons of dignity and the aristocrats used to participate as actors in the dramas.[79]

The spread of Orphism in Asia had taken place at a very early date. Indeed, tradition records names, both real and fictitious, of several Orphic poets, like Prodicus of Samos, Herodicus of Perinthus, and Persinus of Miletus.[80]

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[78] Quandt, *De Baccho ab Alexandri aetate in Asia Minore cultu* (Dissertationes phil. Halenses, XXI [1912]), pp. 241 f.

[79] Lucian, *De saltatione,* 79.

Coming now more particularly to Tarsus, we find the cult of the god Sandan widely diffused in Paul's native land. This god was one of the many Syrio-Oriental divinities who died and returned to life, like Adonis, Attis, Osiris, and Tammuz. Sandan belonged to a type of divinity fundamentally similar to Dionysus, and he was the principal god of Tarsus.[81] His resurrection was celebrated in Phrygia.[82] Nor is that all. In the first Tarsian oration of Dion of Prusa we find clear allusions to the Orphic beliefs of the people of Tarsus. Dion hints at the Titanic ancestry of certain founders of the city, at the cosmogonies taught by the seers, and at the doctrine of death and resurrection.[83] In another discourse from the same orator we find an evident allusion to the Orphic identification of Helios with Dionysus.[84] Especially significant is the description of the Titans as ancestors of the Tarsans because this conception can be referred only to the Orphic belief that men were descended from the Titans, who also in the Orphic Hymn XXXVII are addressed as progenitors of the human stock. In the presence of such testimony one cannot doubt the general diffusion of Orphism in Tarsus.

[80] Rohde, *Psyche*, 5. Aufl. (Tübingen, 1910); II, 106, n. 2.

[81] Dion Chrysostom (*Orat.* XXXIII, 47 [Arnim, I, p. 310]) calls him ἀρχηγός.

[82] Plutarch, *De Iside*, 69.

[83] *Orat.* XXXIII, 2–4 (Arnim, I, p. 298): ἀρχηγοὺς ἔχετε ἥρωας καὶ ἡμιθέους, μᾶλλον δὲ Τιτᾶνας . . . . δοκεῖτέ μοι πολλάκις ἀκηκοέναι θείων ἀνθρώπων, οἳ πάντα εἰδέναι φασὶ καὶ περὶ πάντων ἐρεῖν ᾗ διατέτακται καὶ τίνα ἔχει φύσιν, περί τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ δαιμονίων καὶ περὶ θεῶν, ἔτι δὲ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θαλάττης, καὶ περὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, καὶ περὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου, καὶ περὶ φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως.

[84] *Orat.* XXXI. (Arnim, I, p. 222, 11): τὸν μὲν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὸν Ἥλιον καὶ τὸν Διόνυσον ἔνιοί φασιν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ὑμεῖς οὕτω νομίζετε . . . . ὥστε μηδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ τοῦτον ἢ ἐκεῖνον τιμᾶν. Cf. the Orphic fragment, Justin, *Cohort*, 15; Abel, *Orphica*, Frag. 7; Kern, n. 239 f. For this whole question, see Böhlig, *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos im augusteischen Zeitalter* (Göttingen, 1913), pp. 44 ff. In addition to the work of Böhlig on the culture of Tarsus see Ramsay, *The Cities of St. Paul* (London, 1908), pp. 85–244; and Toussaint, *L'hellénisme et l'apôtre Paul* (Paris, 1921), pp. 185 ff.

Thus all Palestine was, so to speak, hemmed in by the Orphic religion. Moreover, within Palestine itself we find the cult of Dionysus at Caesarea, Damascus, Scythopolis, and Raphia. The last three of these cities even connected their founding with Dionysus.[85] Nor should we neglect the Essenes, who must have been an effective and important instrument for the spread of these ideas. They were somewhat numerous[86] and subdivided into many small communities; they pursued a manner of life and affirmed certain doctrines that amounted to Orphism. More than anything else, their eschatology proves to be purely Orphic in that it held the body to be mortal and the soul immortal, and that when death liberates the soul from the chains of the body, the soul rejoices and soars aloft. Also, the good go to definite happy abodes beyond the ocean, while the wicked are destined for a great subterranean cave full of torments.[87] This doctrine is purely Orphic. Also, when one remembers that the Essenes were accustomed to express their rules for a chaste and virtuous life allegorically, in accordance with ancient usage,[88] that they gave much attention to ancient writings,[89] and that they practiced divination by means of sacred books and used purifications,[90] one will conclude that the sect was far closer to Orphism than is commonly

[85] For documentary evidences see Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, 4. Aufl. (Leipzig, 1907), II, 37 and 56 (Damascus); 38 and 56 (Scythopolis); 55 (Raphia). Cf. Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, p. 336, n. 3.

[86] They were reckoned at about 4,000 (Philo, *Quod omnis probus liber sit*, 12, 75 (Cohn-Reiter; Mangey, II, 457); Josephus, *Ant.* XVIII, i, 5.

[87] Josephus, *War*, II, viii, 11: ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀνεθῶσι τῶν κατὰ σάρκα δεσμῶν, οἷα δὴ μακρᾶς δουλείας ἀπηλλαγμένας τότε χαίρειν καὶ μετεώρους φέρεσθαι. καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀγαθαῖς . . . . ἀποφαίνονται τὴν ὑπὲρ ὠκεανὸν δίαιταν ἀποκεῖσθαι καὶ χῶρον οὔτε ὄμβροις οὔτε νιφετοῖς οὔτε καύμασι βαρυνόμενον, ἀλλ' ὃν ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ πραῢς ἀεὶ ζέφυρος ἐπιπνέων ἀναψύχει. ταῖς δὲ φαύλαις ζοφώδη καὶ χειμέριον ἀφορίζονται μυχὸν γέμοντα τιμωριῶν ἀδιαλείπτων. Hippolytus, *Ref. omn. haer.*, IX, 27, 1: ἣν (the soul) χωρισθεῖσαν νῦν ἔστιν εἰς ἕνα χῶρον εὔπνουν καὶ φωτεινὸν ἀναπαύεσθαι ἕως κρίσεως (Wendland, p. 261).

[88] Philo, *op. cit.*, 12, 82. (Cohn-Reiter; Mangey, II, 458, 20).

[89] Josephus, *War*, II, viii, 6 (136).

[90] *Ibid.*, II, viii, 12 (159).

believed; in fact, that it was, properly speaking, a veritable offshoot of Orphism.[91]

And to whom, if not to the Essenes, can Justin's allusion to the diffusion of the Zagreus myth *within* Palestine refer? This is in effect what Justin says when he affirms that the demons, learning of Christ's advent from the prophets, invented the myth of Zagreus and spread it among the Greeks and *among the other peoples where the demons apprehended that the prophetic announcements of Christ would be especially believed.*[92] The country in which the prophets had announced Christ is, of course, Judea; and it was exactly in Judea, according to Justin, that the demons had taken delight in spreading the cult of Zagreus.

All of these evidences are supplemented by another important testimony. Antiochus Epiphanes, in his struggle against Judaism, decreed that the Hebrews should take part in the Dionysiac processions, and that every person should build in front of his own house an altar for the god and offer a sacrifice to him.[93] This custom, which is found in other solemn public festivals, proves that at Jerusalem the religion of Dionysus was very important, and we might also say that it was the most widely diffused, since Antiochus Epiphanes decreed that Dionysus himself be honored, and not some other deity, for example, Zeus.

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[91] Some scholars have connected the Essenes with Pythagoreanism, as Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker* (Leipzig, 1821), IV, 40–75; Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, 4. Aufl., II, 670, 678–80. A few others have considered the Essenes as of Orphic-Pythagorean origin, e.g., Döllinger, *Christentum und Kirche in der Zeit der Grundlegung* (Regensburg, 1868), p. 127; Baur, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie*, edited by Zeller (Leipzig, 1875), pp. 216 f. Still others deny to the Essenes any features of either Orphism or Pythagoreanism, e.g., Réville, *Jésus de Nazareth* (Paris, 1897), I, 136–73; Moffatt in Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, V, 400. With entire justice Bugge (*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, XIV [1913], 146 and 149) adduces the fact that the Essenes constituted a real mystery fraternity with various grades of initiation.

[92] Justin, *Apol.*, I, 54: ὅπου μᾶλλον ἐπήκουον τῶν προφητῶν πιστευθήσεσθαι τὸν χριστὸν προκηρυσσόντων.

[93] II Macc. 6:7.

Furthermore, at Jerusalem there was a temple of Dionysus, and this Dionysus is called in tradition "Dionysus of Orpheus."[94] In other words, that Dionysus who, under Antiochus Epiphanes, was perhaps the most conspicuous divinity at Jerusalem, even having a temple there, was the Orphic Dionysus, that is, Zagreus. This observation serves to remind us again of a Philisto-Arabian silver coin of the fifth century B.C. in the British Museum.[95] This shows on one side a bearded head with a helmet. On the reverse is a bearded divinity seated on a winged chariot with his right hand wrapped in his mantle and holding a falcon in his left. On the right of the picture one sees a mask, and in the open space above is the name *Jahve* in Hebrew characters, that is, *Jahve* represented as Dionysus.[96]

By the foregoing presentation of evidence I think I have fully met the third requirement of Professor Clemen.

V

At the present time I do not wish, even were it possible, to carry my demonstration to greater length. I shall do this in the second edition of my *Zagreus,* of which an English rendering is now in preparation. For the moment it is enough to have persuaded the reader, if not of the complete truth of my thesis, at least of its verisimilitude. I do not believe that there can be any possible doubt regarding the necessity of a thorough knowledge of Orphism for an adequate understanding of the origins of that Greek Christianity of which Paul was the apostle and of the theology which has been called after him Paulinism.

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[94] Johannes Lydus, *De mensibus,* IV, 53 (Wünsch, p. 109, 18): "Ελληνες δὲ τὸν Ὀρφέως Διόνυσον ὅτι . . . . πρὸς τῷ ἀδύτῳ τοῦ ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ναοῦ etc. See Kern in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft,* XXII (1924), 199.

[95] Hill, *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Palestine* (1914), XIX, 29; Leipoldt, *Die Religionen in der Umwelt des Urchristentums* (Haas, Bilderatlas zur Religionsgeschichte, 9–11. Lieferung, Leipzig, 1926), Fig. 81.

[96] Gressmann, in *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft,* Neue Folge, II (1925), 16 f.; Leipoldt, *op. cit.,* p. xi.

If I am not mistaken, there are several features of the early history of Christianity upon which it is possible to shed fresh light by a better knowledge of Orphism. In the first place, Orphism helps to explain the rapid success of Paul's preaching among the Greeks. At first sight reasons for this success are not self-evident, if, as is commonly supposed, he used the word "Messiah," which must have appeared entirely new, especially to Greeks. The notion of the Messiah was utterly incomprehensible for the Greeks. But the fact that the message of Paul found so ready a hearing means that in it there was an element that immediately aroused the interest and sympathy of the Greeks. In other words, this success shows that the Greeks were even better adapted than were the Hebrews to understand the theology and the mysticism of Paul.

One may note, for example, the effect produced by his discourse in Athens. Some of his audience, on hearing him speak of the resurrection of the dead, made fun of it; but others said "we will hear you again on this subject."[97] Among those who had heard Paul were the Epicureans and Stoics. Now certainly the Epicureans were unable to agree with him, since they denied the resurrection. So, too, the Sadducees had been unable to approve of him, since they also denied the resurrection.[98] On the other hand, the Stoics ought to have assented, for they assumed not only the survival of the soul until the time of the universal conflagration, but also a bodily resurrection similar to that taught in Christianity. They affirmed that after the conflagration the world would be restored as at first, with the same men and the same destiny as a consequence of the cosmic renovation.[99] Therefore it is the Stoics to whom Paul turns, and it is to them that he speaks when, citing Cleanthes, he says "*your* poets." It is for their sake that the whole discourse so interweaves Stoic notions as to justify Norden in calling it a sermon constructed on the scheme of the missionary discourses of the Hermetic writers on the Stoic theme "About the Divinity."[100] The notion that God does not dwell in temples made with hands is an idea attributed to Zeno.[101] The fundamental notion that we exist and live and move in God, which Paul reinforces with a half-line from a hymn of Cleanthes, recurs throughout this hymn.[102]

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[97] Acts 17:32.

[98] Acts 23:8.

[99] Chrysippus in his treatise on *Providence*, according to Lactantius, *Div. instit.*, VII, 23; Von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum Fragmenta*, II, 189 (Frag. 623).

Why has Paul given so lively a Stoic coloring to this discourse?

The policy followed by Paul in his preaching is well known. This he himself defined when he affirmed that he became as one who has no law in order to win those who have no law.[103] But perhaps the importance of this policy of his has not been fully estimated. Gebhardt has understood it better than any other scholar.[104] He observes how, as the needs of his preaching required, Paul tried specifically to put himself in harmony with his hearers. So in his letter to the Galatians, the central thought about which the whole letter revolves is the renewal in Christ. This is the Greek element in Paul's teaching. On the other hand, the epistle to the Ephesians, which is not from Paul, but is based on Pauline thinking, presents Christ as the one who fulfils the promises of God. This is the Jewish element in Paul's teaching. Similarly, to the Greeks of Athens Christ is presented as a man who through the resurrection is chosen and accredited by God to judge the world;[105] but to the Hebrews he is presented in his messianic character as sent for the redemption of sinners.[106] This policy is followed even with the Stoic audience at Athens, to which Paul presented the doctrine that harmonized best with Stoic teaching and expounded it in agreement with the ideas which must have seemed to him most acceptable. If what we have been saying is true, it seems to me impossible to deny that the discourse on the Areopagus is an original creation of Paul. On the one hand, to consider the Athenian discourse as a synthesis of two currents, the prophetic and the Stoic,[107] and on the other, to attribute this powerful conception to an obscure and nameless personality, when history attributes it to a personality who was not only capable of making such a synthesis, but who actually represents in history the fusion of Judaism and Hellenism, this is a procedure that seems to me illogical. Nor is it true that the contrast between the discourse at Athens and the letters of Paul is such as to compel us to make a choice between them.[108] The contrast exists only for those who persist in considering Paul to be essentially Jewish in spirit; for one who sees in Paul the presence of influential Hellenistic tendencies there is no contradiction. And for one who recognizes the relations between Stoicism and Orphism, the discourse from the Areopagus corresponds exactly to the essential thinking of Paul.[109]

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[100] Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, pp. 13 ff., especially 19 f.

[101] Plutarch, *De stoic. repug.*, 6 (1034b).

[102] Von Arnim, *op. cit.*, I, 121 f. (Frag. 537).

[103] I Cor. 9:20 f.

[104] Gebhardt, "Die an die Heiden gerichtete Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, VI (1905), 238.

[105] Acts 17:30 f.

[106] Acts 13:26 f.

At any rate we possess only a brief account of the discourse delivered on the Areopagus, which certainly does not reproduce the whole address, and still less the complete series of arguments that Paul had brought forward in his discussion with the Stoics. We may assume that very probably he had expounded also his doctrine of anthropological dualism and the consequent necessity of the soul's liberation from the body through rebirth in Christ. For this doctrine accorded perfectly with the Stoic anthropology which regarded the soul, as did Paul himself, a prisoner of the body, and affirmed the necessity of its liberation.[110] Even in Seneca, just as in Paul, we find the body pictured as a garment which envelops the soul.[111] The Stoic doctrine of the body as a prison or chain, so prevalent in Seneca, was Orphic, as was also the Pauline dualism.

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[107] Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, pp. 125–27.

[108] Norden, *op. cit.*, p. 127; Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur*, 2. Aufl. (Tübingen, 1912), pp. 245 ff.; Wilamowitz in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* (1910), p. 285.

[109] It is certain however, as everyone knows, that Paul could not have made the allusion to the "unknown god." The expression ought to be in the plural, and it can be explained only as a corruption of the text. Paul actually referred to the "unknown gods," and someone has substituted the singular for the plural, following the Gnostic notion of the θεὸς ἄγνωστος (Pfleiderer, *Urchristentum*, 2 Aufl., I, 512; Wendland, *op. cit.*, p. 128; Norden, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 f.). The substitution could not have been made by Paul himself, as some suppose (Harnack, *Apostelgeschichte* [Leipzig, 1908], p. 95), because his hearers would have observed the mistake (Loisy, in *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses*, Nouvelle série, IV [1913], 364).

Thus Orphic conceptions would have prepared the way for the diffusion of Paulinism, and it is just because Paul's message answered to ancient and important Greek beliefs that it was so readily accepted among the Greeks.

For the very same reasons it met immediate opposition among the Jews. The causes of this hostility have been variously stated, but the fact is that no answer appears fully satisfactory. I am of the opinion that they come nearest to the truth who stress the ecstatic, mystic, and magical side of Paulinism.[112] I believe that it is a proper step in advance to see in this excess of ecstasy and magic a confirmation of our thesis. In this event one easily explains the fact that the teaching of Paul, notwithstanding his good intentions, failed in just that area where according to him it *ought* to have succeeded, and triumphed instead among the Greeks.

Another obscure feature of primitive Christianity is its association with the cult of Orpheus. The first Christians were forced to perceive the profound similarity between the two religions, and they thought that Orpheus had been converted from polytheism to monotheism, and had even written treatises in favor of the latter.[113] Also they thought that Orpheus had derived his teaching from his master, Moses.[114] The

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[110] Seneca, *Ep.*, VII, 2 (65); XVI, 2 (502); *Cons. ad Polyb.*, IX, 3, 8.

[111] Seneca, *Ep.*, XIV, 4 (92).

[112] Case, *Evolution of Early Christianity* (Chicago, 1914), pp. 127–28, 144–47.

[113] Justin, *Cohort.*, 36; Theophilus, *Ad Autolyc.*, III, 2.

[114] Clement Alex., *Strom.*, V, 12 (Stählin, I, 79); Justin, *Cohort*, 4; Suidas, *s.v.*

Jew Artapanus identified Moses with Museus, teacher of Orpheus.[115] And Orpheus finally came to have a real cult. Indeed, apparently the images of Orpheus painted in the catacombs may be, not allegorical representations of Christ, as is commonly supposed, but references to Orpheus himself.[116] Also there is a notable plastic monument of Orpheus, of which an example is at Constantinople and a replica at Athens. A sculptured cross on its base seems to indicate a bond between the two religions, and there is a most remarkable relief in Berlin which shows a crucified man and the inscription "Bacchic Orpheus."[117]

VI

From all this evidence it is certain, I believe, that Orphism had enormous importance for the shaping of early Christianity. One may raise questions on points of detail, or may doubt the value of certain data, but it is impossible to deny the thesis as a whole. The origin of the Pauline theology and mysticism is to be sought in Orphism. This is the religion of which Knopf was in search when he said that we should be much wiser if we could know the theology of the Hellenistic circle in which Paul moved.[118] Also it is that for which Wernle[119] was looking when he expressed the hope that in future it would be possible to determine exactly what may be said with certainty about individual mystery religions. Finally, it is what

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[115] Alexander Polyhistor apud Eusebius, *Praep. ev.*, IX, 27, p. 432a; Kern, *Orph. Fragm.*, p. 14, No. 44.

[116] Heussner, *Die altchristliche Orpheusdarstellung* (Leipzig, 1893); Dieterich, *Nekyia*, pp. 229 f. On the representations of Orpheus in the catacombs, see also Saxl, "Frühes Christentum und später Heidentum in ihrem kunstbez. Ausdrucksformen," *Jahrb. für Kunstgeschichte*, II (1923), 81.

[117] ΟΡΦΕΟϹ ΒΑΚΚΙΚΟϹ. Kern, *Orph. Fragm.*, p. 46, No. 150; Eisler, *Orphisch-Dionysische Mysteriengedanken in der christlichen Antike* [Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg, II (1922–23), 2. Teil, p. 339], starting from the observation that the crucifixion does not appear in art before the fifth or sixth century, while this seal belongs to the third century A.D., also thinks that there was a tradition regarding the crucifixion of Orpheus.

[118] Knopf, *Probleme der Paulusforschung* (Tübingen, 1913), p. 34.

[119] Wernle, "Jesus und Paulus," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, XXV (1915), 88.

Wrede[120] intuitively perceived when he expressed the opinion that Paul, before his conversion, already believed in a divine messiah whom he superimposed on Jesus, and that Paul's whole problem consisted in the search for this Christ.

What, then, one may ask, was the part played by Orphism in history? I believe that it may be defined as the mediator between Jewish Christianity and the Greek world. It is easy to persuade one's self that the teaching of Jesus never could have gone out from its Jewish milieu to become diffused in the world—a world that then was Greek—without undergoing profound modifications necessary to render it capable of being understood and accepted by the Greeks. On exactly this issue the very existence of Christianity depended. The possibility of survival lay in the fact that the teaching of Jesus, while it had a local character, also had a universal content. But the historical realization of this universal quality through its effective conquest of the world depended upon the transformation and adaptations that were capable of being effected without destroying its integrity. How far was the new faith able to remain what it was and yet become Greek? And what would be the new program and the new forms that it would have to adopt?

The problem was a grave one, as it is for every religion with a universal urge when it passes from its native setting to another civilization. It is the problem that confronts the Christian missionary wherever he endeavors to carry his gospel to people whose intellect permits them to accept his message only when transformations have been effected which often are veritable syncretisms, or even more radical reinterpretations. The problem of mediating Christianity to the Greeks could not be solved by recourse to Greek state religion, because nothing was more clearly contrary to the spirit of Christianity than Greek paganism. Since the fourth century B.C., through its skepticism and ritualism, it had lost all religious content. Especially was the state religion incapable of understanding Christianity's teaching on communion with God and the experience of unity with him. In Greek religion the divine and the human spheres were thought to be distinct and separate. Man felt God to be far away in a different world from himself. The possibility of communion and identification with the deity was out of the question. On the other hand this possibility lay at the very heart of the Christian religious experience. But mysticism among the Greeks had grown up by the side of the state religion. It began in ancient times as a spontaneous and primitive impulse of the human spirit. Then, in my opinion, it was systematized and refined through the work of a prophet, Orpheus, and thus it assumed the form of a definite religion distinct from that of the state. In its new Orphic form, Greek mysticism continued to take a larger and larger place in Greek society and to exert an influence on its poetry and philosophy. And when the state religion became less well adapted to satisfy the deeper needs of the spirit, the more deeply did Orphism sink its roots into the soul of the Greek. As a result of this development, by the time of Jesus the whole of Greece, consciously or unconsciously, had become impregnated with Orphic ideas. Now these ideas centered precisely in the notion of communion with God and the possibility for man of identification with the divinity. Thus, thanks to Orphism, the Greeks were able to accept the notion that was also essential for the Christian experience.

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[120] Wrede, *Paulus* (Tübingen, 1904), p. 86.

In still another particular Orphism was suited to become the interpreter of the new faith. It could effectively interpret the person of Jesus. In Jewish Christianity, properly speaking, it would have been impossible even to employ the word "Christianity," since in reality it had no Christ. The person of the Master was purely human in content; he was the Messiah, indeed, but this term was understood in a Jewish and anthropomorphic way. To be sure the disciples believed in Jesus as a divinity, but only in a vague and indefinite form. He was a mortal who attained divinity by his elevation from the human to the heavenly sphere. This was a doctrinal conception that did not express in precise form the superhuman characteristics of the Master because Judaism lacked the conception of the god-man who belonged to that intermediate zone, so to speak, where man and God converge in a single being. On the other hand, from ancient times in the figure of the hero, Greek religion had visualized very clearly the notion of the "man–son-of-god." And Orphism in particular possessed an entire theology in which everything that the disciples of Jesus believed with reference to his person found its adequate and precise expression. Thus the Greek myth served as a medium for the interpretation of all that was mysterious and inexpressible in the person of the Master.

Are we to think that the person of the Master suffered degradation when thus reclothed with myth? Any such interpretation would mean a refusal to recognize the value and function of myth. In a certain sense, of course, any inner experience whatsoever loses something in consequence of the mythical expression that fancy gives it; but that is not denying the fact that only by means of myth does our experience become concrete and communicable. Similarly, any artistic intuition necessarily loses something when the painter expresses it in a picture or the poet embodies it in a poem; but by means of the picture or the poem it is passed on to others who can restore it to life again. Also every idea loses something of its force on being expressed in language; but it is none the less true, however, that without language none of our ideas could be perpetuated in history.

Myth, therefore, is as necessary for religious experience, as is the picture or the poem for art, or language for thought. The myth can and ought to be reduced to the simplest form possible, but it cannot be dispensed with, since the divine, the mysterious, the ineffable cannot be expressed except by fantasy, that is, by myth. If it could be adequately expressed rationally it would no longer be ineffable. Therefore the mystery of Christ never could have been given to the world had it not taken on mythical form. And it was this form that Greek civilization was able to provide. This procedure does not at all detract from the sanctity of the Christian mystery, just as truly as the sanctity of an idea is not diminished by the fact that everyone expresses it according to his own ability in his own language.

The new religion, in passing from Judaism to Hellenism, was under the same fundamental necessity that rests upon every religion in making the transition from the civilization in which it originates to one of a different type. It must accept symbols and forms that are not its own. Everyone knows, for example, what profound changes Christianity undergoes when it passes from the mind of the missionary to the mind of the African or the Hindu. It becomes a new species of Christianity, no longer European, but Africo-European or Indo-European. But we do not believe that in this process Christianity is degraded, and still less do we prefer to have missionary activity cease in order to avoid degrading Christianity. We even believe these transformations to be necessary because they permit the African also to be converted.

Not only did Orphism not degrade the Savior's personality by reclothing it with the Orphic type of myth, but thereby it interpreted and defined that personality, making it real and comprehensible in such fashion that without this mythical interpretation it would have remained restricted to the limits of "Jewish Christianity," and would thus have been lost for us today.

On the other hand, it is obvious that it is not the external form, but the essential content, to which value attaches. It is not the material of the picture, but the idea it embodies, that gives it worth. One unskilled in art may use the same colors and the same canvas but express nothing. Similarly, it is not the physical or mechanical fact of language that has significance, but the idea expressed therein. So it is not the myth that is of consequence, but the values it serves to express. Above all else we ought to remember the new content that Christianity introduced into the external forms of Orphism. At this point one may say without hesitation that the essential character of the Orphic Zagreus is immensely different from that of the Pauline Christ. It could not be otherwise, since there was nothing behind the Orphic myth, while behind the Christian myth there was Jesus. For an Orphic who lost faith in the Orphic myth, nothing was left, while for a Christian who loses faith in the Pauline myth there remains the person of Jesus, the prophet, the master, the friend. Exactly for this reason the Pauline myth contain values not to be found in the Orphic myth. In view of that fact it would really be wasting time to stop to prove the enormous superiority of Christianity when compared with the ritualism or magic of the Orphic religion, with its barbaric myth, its complicated and primitive initiations, and its materialistic eschatology.

RELIGION AND ART

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STUDIES of early life have made it clear that preliterate man did not divide and specialize his activities as do modern men. Nor did he have words to express the various interests which are now characterized as religion, business, and art. It is a striking fact that in the Bible and other sacred texts the term religion scarcely appears, although it is the dominant interest. Ceremonials of celebration of great events in the history of a people and of their recurrent experience with the procession of the seasons are the conspicuous facts of religion. In these ceremonials many forms of activity are blended which under later and more highly individualized functions develop into artistic expression. All of the arts are potentially within the ceremonial. The ceremonial ground, located in some secluded spot secure from observation by forbidden eyes, is the forerunner of the inclosed, protected space of architecture. The dress and ornamentation of the participants, worked out in a wealth of symbolism, are prophetic of the garb and insignia of priests and clergymen. The cult-lore, recited or chanted, becomes the sacred literature refined into poetry and the forms of elevated speech. Flaming torches change into chaste and delicate candles and the sweet incense of the altar. The rhythmic beat of drums and tom-toms grows into the strains of organ music. Mimetic dances evolve into solemn processionals and into postures of reverence and petition. Encompassing clouds of witnesses are symbolized by ancestral tablets, statues and pictures of saints and deities. The whole intricate scene, originally acted out in great detail is sublimated into a wealth of symbolism and imaginative dramatization.

The central themes of the ceremonials vary from one people to another under the influence of their habitat and history. The Egyptians developed a great cult of the dead. Successive dynasties reveal by their monuments and tombs the increasing attention and skill lavished upon their mausoleums, the figures of the dead, the statues of servants employed in their occupations for the deceased, the articles of personal adornment, and enormous treasures of household furnishings, royal dress, and magical emblems. This refinement of technique and care of detail indicate the emergence of the various arts. Inlaid work in precious woods and stones and illuminated texts within the series of sarcophagi were also done with infinite care. The temples of Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, and Greece bear witness to the same process working in the materials and interests peculiar to these peoples. When Solomon built his temple in Jerusalem he brought skilled workmen from neighboring cities to adorn it with handiwork to express the genius and faith of the Israelite shepherds now become a nation and a more self-conscious body of worshipers of Jehovah.

The same process goes on in the great religious bodies within Christian history. All of them carry in the heart of their rituals the symbolism of the life and death of their highest deity. They re-enact, as the most sacred feature of their faith, the drama of man's participation in the power and saving grace of Christ. The celebration of the mass, or the Lord's Supper, is the expression of the historic conception and central office of the Christian religion. It puts into action the meaning of the atonement and the recovery of man from the depths of sin to an eternal life of blessedness and peace. Around that focal point are built the cathedrals, the processionals, the music, the altars, and the ministries of priests and prophets. Christian art, as the shrines and galleries of Christian lands testify, creates its pictures, its statues, its vestments, its carvings, its candelabra and crucifixes, with the utmost thought, affection, and skill to embody as effectively as possible the meaning and power of the redemptive work of Christ. Even Protestant churches of the puritan tradition do their utmost with their resources of wealth and culture to enhance those few forms which they cherish. For them the emphasis falls most upon the arts which appeal to the ear and to the imagination: music, oratory, and poetry.

In this process is revealed the nature of religion from the side of its relation to art. When dealt with separately and stated in terms of its characteristic functions, art may be said to be a means of self-expression. It furnishes the means and methods for the fullest and richest expression of man's experience. It employs forms and symbols for putting the immediate and concrete events into settings and perspectives which are idealistic and imaginative. It combines the real and the ideal, the immediate and the remote, the casual and the meaningful. It illuminates the present with the inheritance of the past and with the outreaches of the future. By it the instant and the given are generalized upon the scale of the wished for and the possible. Perceptual experience is magnified by the conceptual. Events are represented with their implications and irradiating consequences. Particular deeds are displayed with their meanings. The thread of a human life which may appear small and tenuous in its prosaic routine and hard sequence of events is revealed as imbedded in a great texture of fabrics and patterns, colored and toned in a wealth of relations. The "Song of the Lark," by Breton, takes a simple peasant girl in the field at sunrise and portrays in her posture and uplifted face her rapt response to this voice of nature. It suggests realms to which her spirit answers with eagerness and wonder. She is then not merely a drudge of the soil, but upon her face glows the evidence that she responds to an ideal life of joy and beauty. She typifies unnumbered peasants regal with a life rich in dreams and shapes which hallow and transform the workaday life of toil and care. And thus not only is she a type of peasant life, but of all human beings. Therefore everyone finds something akin to himself in her listening, wistful face. The picture is also the expression of the artist. By it he has released his own spirit and conveyed the meaning of a common scene in terms of the idealization of an ordinary, familiar situation whose beauty and significance would too easily escape the eye.

Art is just this interpretation of the artist, his enlargement of the meaning and potency of life. He makes natural events vibrant with his own imaginative conception of their ideal portent. But this is not the work of professional artists alone. It is the characteristic achievement of all significant human living. In the degree to which any man puts into his life imaginative construction of thought and feeling he is an artist. This he may do to some extent in any kind of work, in building houses, operating a business, directing organizations, playing games, making scientific experiments, as well as in writing poetry or composing music. Wherever he contributes thought and enrichment of inventive skill to his activity in the pursuit of ends he adds the refinement of art. In this sense all creative, orderly, effective effort has an artistic quality. The subject matter may be found in the humblest enterprises or in the most comprehensive and refined endeavors. Viewed in this way the common distinction between the industrial and the fine arts is resolved into a difference of materials and technique. In both there is the same constructive, idealizing process of reflection and skilful execution. Religion as a practical enterprise, the quest for salvation, exemplifies this kind of activity. It conceives the simplest acts as moving within a larger perspective, and encourages devotion to them in their ideal bearings and significance. It gives a cup of cold water in the name of divinity and cares for the wounded man by the wayside as if he were a cherished neighbor. The plainest and most alien human being is for religion never a means only, but a final and supreme end in himself.

Art is therefore unifying: it orders and harmonizes the diverse and disparate elements of experience into forms and patterns which make them contributory to significant ends. It brings the brute facts of impulse and physical existence within a frame of ideas and projected plans. Because of this, every fragment of a work of art becomes a symbol of the whole and calls for reinstatement within the total structure to which it proclaims itself to belong. Like the arm or torso of a broken statue, it defines and proclaims the lines and proportions of the entire body from which it has been severed. No matter how great the complexity of detail or how numerous the parts, every feature carries the character and quality of the whole. The greatest art is that which reflects in every part the richest and most far-reaching life. Works of art are therefore identified with the whole life of the peoples which produce them and with the entire culture which they achieve. A Greek vase or a Roman lamp carries the marks of the Greek spirit or of the Roman genius. Each expresses the soul of the race from which it sprang. Even within the great diversity of theme and motif which different arts and artists employ there still pervade them all the strange likeness and distinguishing character of specific race and time. The unity which the artist consciously labored to achieve is thus attained within a deeper and encompassing unity of unconscious attitude and trend of life. The satisfaction which a work of art evokes is partly due to its making explicit in more adequate expression this underlying unity. Partly also it is due to the further projection of the mind or spirit of a culture into new forms which add enrichment without destroying the continuity of spirit.

Art is therefore creative as well as reproductive. When it becomes merely repetitious and only multiplies copies of masterpieces it is decadent and stricken with age. Living art continues to extend its themes and to display novel forms. The so-called "classic" types of art content themselves with adherence to traditional forms and make their stand upon correctness of "form." Romantic art, at the other extreme, minimizes the form and stresses fresh impulse and intensity of feeling. Each becomes one-sided and inadequate, and the opposition between them calls for the resolution of the conflict in modes which keep the form flexible under the requirements of fresh insight, but also strengthen the new impulses by shaping them in favorable and sustaining forms. Art, like religion, moves with the general life of society. In an age of settled and stable conditions it emphasizes and elaborates the established and traditional, while in a time of change and aspiring outlook it takes on new rôles and projects prophetic, adventurous ideals. Whether it glorifies the past or turns confidently to the future depends upon the temper of the age or upon the social group or school of thought with which it is allied. The humanistic painting and sculpture of the Renaissance illustrate the embodiment of the novel and forward-looking tendencies as over against the settled and reminiscent products of the medieval period.

Another function of art may be described as the objectification and stabilization of the ideal values reached in the great experiences of individuals and communities. The master-artists are the understanding and articulate souls who portray the insight and emotions of a people in symbols which perpetuate in enduring stone and canvas and drama the great hours of the spirit. In such symbols these values become available for less discerning men and for the renewal of noble sentiment for all who need to be reminded and inspired anew. It is in the works of art that the transient vision and luminous moments of the profoundest minds are caught up and fixed in shapes and tones which endure and continue to radiate inspiring ideals. Through them men find their better selves again and are lifted to the heights of their fairest dreams. In such symbols there is always more than has been made explicit, for it is their very nature to suggest more than they express. The mind dwells upon them with the sense of inexhaustible wealth, of fruitful and fructifying contemplation. Such symbols are alive with stimulating power. The lines and arches of Gothic architecture continue to greet the eye with new invitations to aspiration and assurances of grace and strength. The stone tracery never rests, but continues to evolve new mysteries. Lights and shadows play through it in endless variety. The cathedral itself is the embodiment of the drama which it shelters. Along its floor runs the pattern of the cross. Over the altar glows the light of faith. The arches leap toward heaven, and in the niches stand the guardian, protecting spirits. Even the fantastic gargoyles escaping from the roof signify the evil sprites which have been driven forth and made powerless by a mightier hand. No wonder that a cathedral is a congenial place for man to meditate upon the meaning of his life and upon the riches of his spiritual possessions.

It is no accident that religion has supplied to art so much material and so much inspiration. The casual traveler through the scenes of the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Greece, and Rome cannot fail to note after the lapse of so many centuries that the most enduring monuments in every place are the temples and the shrines of man's faith. They were built with enormous labor and at fabulous cost. The gigantic columns, as at Baalbek, still stand like sentinels about the immense temple areas, witnessing to the mighty effort their builders made to represent in permanent form their religious piety and devotion. The most frequent figures of stone and bronze, in temples, homes, and tombs, are the figures of the gods and of worshipers in processions and at the sacred altars. It is still true that in the galleries of Europe and America religious subjects dominate to a striking extent. If contemporary artists occupy themselves more with nature and other "secular" subjects, it may be said also that their art lacks something of the significance and strength of religious art. Our art, like our idealisms generally, is short-breathed in a transition period where the old systems have lost their appeal and the new have not yet found adequate interpretation either in ideas or in imaginative symbolism. When the larger problems of life and death are undergoing criticism and skeptical uncertainty they do not furnish the same opportunity for artistic representation as when the whole society is bound together in common conceptions and practices. And in America we are yet occupied predominantly with the exploitation of natural resources, with business and engineering, with the immediately practical problems of industry, and with the sciences and politics bound up with this industrial revolution. Our art is therefore highly self-conscious, hesitant, and piecemeal. It does not venture upon the greater themes which are necessary to great epics and dramas, paintings and sculptures. In the great ages of art it was a more natural, and in a sense a less independent, development. The artist worked within the religious atmosphere and his interest was absorbed in the expression of the ideas and the forms set by the spiritual life. He did not think so much of art for art's sake, but was occupied with the more adequate representation of the experiences which the imaginative life of the people sought and enjoyed.

From these various points of view religion and art may be seen to have much in common, religion furnishing themes and the projection of ideals, while art refines and makes vivid, stabilizes and enhances them. Religion seeks for its ceremonials the highest and purest forms available—offerings without blemish—and art is occupied with just this purification and idealization of all the subjects with which it deals. But there are conceptions of both art and religion which put them in sharp contrast. In general such conceptions arise where either one becomes separated from the living stream of experience and takes on the character of an isolated or overdeveloped tendency.

One such contrast springs from the conception of art in terms of its technique, where it is concerned to an extreme degree with its means and forms. This is sometimes what is meant by "art for art's sake." In that conception there is scarcely a place for ideals or ends. It is not interested in "ideals," but only with lines or colors or rhythm or tones. The artist has no "story" or purpose in mind beyond the representation of an impression or a fancy, and the observer is told that he should regard himself as free to make of it what he will or can. Of course religion, being set for the realization of ends, for salvation of some kind, feels that such art is alien and remote. But this tendency of religion to be practical and to achieve results may lead also to an overemphasis on immediate ends, and such emphasis only widens the breach between the two fields. Art then appears to religion like a student of music absorbed in the practice of "exercises" who never produces a melody or weaves the elements of tone and cadence into a whole.

Opposition between these interests often arises from making one historic and the other contemporaneous. Art for some people is only what they see in museums and identify with the life of the Greeks or ancient Japan. Then its subjects are far removed from religion as they know it. There is an inheritance in the traditions of Christianity from the Hebrew taboos against pictorial and plastic art which heightens this antagonism, for the Hebrews observed with strict devotion the injunction not to make to themselves any graven image of god or man. It was to them a safeguard against idolatry, but it became also an inhibition with reference to the production and the use of most of the arts. There was present, too, no doubt, a natural antipathy to the cultivation of anything so characteristic of the gentile world as the arts of sculpture and drama. Christianity has felt the force of this tradition, especially in its puritanic sects. Only a limited development of literature and of music and of architecture has been accepted by this Hebraic-Puritan attitude. And any Christian, belonging to any of the traditional forms of that faith, may feel himself in a merely "worldly" atmosphere the moment he steps into any but the ecclesiastical sections of modern galleries.

On the other hand, thoroughly modern artists may share the widespread impression of many who are trained in the current culture, that religion is at home only in the past and represents a lingering survival of a system which is no longer vital, while to them art seeks its subjects in the life of the present day. Or, if they appreciate the artistic quality of certain religious subjects, they do so, not for the theme or the idealism, but only for the perfection of the artistry. To them such works are just "quaint," a more or less unconsciously patronizing judgment which human beings are apt to pass upon whatever lies outside their own times and customs.

To the religious mind there is something lacking in artistic activity which devotes itself to small, superficial, or limited subjects. Much current poetry is of this character, dealing as it does in a few lines with a single sensuous impression such as the color of a passing cloud. In the effort to avoid all interpretation by remaining within the terms of pure description the artist forfeits the scope and fulness of experience which are necessary to the proper exercise of his gift. At least for religion the refusal to go beyond the given sensations and the passing moment of time deprives experience of all that makes it worthy to be registered or remembered. Religion, at its best, does not ignore the immediately real nor the infinitesimally small, but it sees them in their relations and follows the natural tendency of the mind and imagination to fill out the scene and include the movement of expanding interests.

Art also becomes foreign and antithetic to religion when it calls attention to itself by overemphasis upon its technique or by its effort to produce effects. It is repelling to have a performer betray an undue amount of satisfaction with himself in his rôle. The actor who struts or shouts or moves mincingly in his manner obscures the character he plays unless it is his part to exhibit burlesque or buffoonery. Even then the act becomes more effective under restraint or by the submergence of the technique within the movement of the plot. At times the stage effects overwhelm the theme and draw attention to themselves. This principle is nowhere more important than in the use of art in religious ceremonials. The requirement here is called "sincerity." If a minister gives the impression of acting his part, or of striving for fine phrases, or of introducing devices of elocution, he is that moment shorn of power. At once he stands over against the task he has undertaken and obscures what it is his function to clarify and enhance. The qualities required are naturalness, simplicity, and unalloyed devotion. Consciousness of the arts employed is likely to be as disastrous as those forms of self-consciousness which call attention to the person through awkwardness or confusion. The highest art loses itself in the action for which it is employed, and is so much a part of the whole that it is discerned only with difficulty.

The quality required in genuine art is that quality which is lost when it is commercialized. It is difficult to describe, but it is easy to recognize, for the feeling for his vocation must be such that the artist cannot allow himself to be influenced by the thought of financial reward. When that happens something inimical to real achievement appears, something which threatens the spirit of true workmanship. In this sense true art is thoroughly disinterested. It is absorbed in its representation of experience and in the expression of what the artist beholds. Any other interest than the setting forth of what is seen and felt is a prostitution of power and talent. Just because the artist has had to learn by self-criticism and by much conscious effort to master his materials and his technique, he may have difficulty in forgetting them and merging them in the execution of his task. Unless the artist is first of all and continually an actively experiencing human being he is in danger of becoming artificial and inadequate to employ his gifts in the spirit of genuine art. It is important that the consciousness of art be absorbed and made oblivious of itself in the representation of adequate subjects.

In other words, aesthetic appreciation is at last, not the contemplation of the technique of the artist, but the enjoyment of the subject delineated with such understanding and skill as to make it appealing as a whole. Otherwise, aesthetic demands could be as well satisfied with a poor subject as with a good one. There would be no moral quality necessary for great art. But in reality the contemplation of a noble subject done with insight and feeling renders more satisfaction than an inferior subject treated with the same ability. Undoubtedly shoes may be polished artistically, but that process could scarcely elicit art of the quality and significance which could be wrought into a temple or into the portrait of a hero. In other words, works of art differ as much in terms of their subjects as in the manner of their execution.

Perhaps the best way to indicate the function of art is to state it in terms of the enhancement and ease which it lends to whatever it touches. Whatever gives to the beholder the sense of release and enlargement has for him the aesthetic quality. Whenever a person performs his task with skill and mastery, with energy and pleasure, he is an artist, whether driving a motor car or painting pictures. Any object which conveys to the spectator the impression of grace and ease in its construction and of free adaptation to its use is a beautiful object. Or anything which awakens pleasing associations and symbolizes the charm of delightful companionships or stirs the imagination toward ideal tasks is so far beautiful. A graceful, fleet runner, a swift-moving, circling plane, a ship under full speed, a scientist delicately testing solutions in his laboratory are aesthetic because they express with free co-ordination the skill of the performers and awaken admiration and appreciation in the onlooker.

Undoubtedly much passes for art which is felt to be such because of quite extraneous elements. Antique objects tend to elicit appreciation beyond their importance in the society in which they were produced. It is interesting to see things judged beautiful simply on the ground of being rare or old. Correspondingly, things are often rejected from the sphere of art on the ground of their novelty. Those who are most satisfied with Gothic architecture hesitate to admit that the modern steel sky-scraper is beautiful. Generally, people do not think of any machine as a beautiful object: steam shovel, motor car, linotype, or locomotive engine. But the man who handles any of these is likely to have a very real affection for them and to see in them that release of power and mastery of circumstance which belong to art.

Art is significant to religion in the balance and proportion which it requires. In the pursuit of great causes, such as are involved in religion, there is a tendency to strain and to fanatical narrowness and intensity. The cultivation of these interests with the artist's soul encourages wider perspectives and better-balanced proportions.

CHURCH AND STATE IN MEXICO

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GREAT issues are involved in the so-called "religious question" in Mexico. The present discussion between the Italian government and the Papacy, the question of the wisdom of electing a Catholic to the presidency of the United States, the tendency of other Latin-American countries to follow Mexico's example, recent legislation affecting religious schools in China, are only a few illustrations that the world is rethinking the question of relation of church and state, as it is rethinking other fundamental matters. The bitterness of the struggle in Mexico, which has been transferred also across the border, both North and South, makes it still more difficult for a Protestant to write impartially on a subject which involves the deepest things which divide Catholics and Protestants. The author can only say that he honestly tries to do justice to both the Mexican government and the church in a brief discussion which necessarily omits many important considerations. Doubtless a Roman Catholic student, honestly seeking with like impartiality to survey and interpret the same range of facts, might choose from different sources which would imply different conclusions.

All people who believe in religion and in the pure purposes of the majority of its priests, whatever may be the faults of the minority, cannot help but feel a deep sympathy with the suffering Roman Catholic church in the present deadlock between it and the government. All who believe in the freedom of the church to hold high the banner of the spirit and not suffer the state to lower it for political and nationalistic purposes must also realize that here is a fundamental issue, the outcome of which may have grave consequences for all religions, whichever one may happen to be in a particular majority at a particular time.

The major consideration for North America to have in mind in studying this question is the fundamental difference between the religious situation in their country and in Mexico. The historical study of the question would seem therefore to be the only method by which to present it truthfully.

EARLY SUPERVISION OF CHURCH UNDERTAKEN

In the very beginning of the Colonial era Pope Alexander VI granted to the Spanish crown the oversight and practical control of ecclesiastical affairs, even agreeing that no papal bull or order should be sent to America without first receiving the approval of the Council of the Indies. A concordat between the Holy See and the Crown of Castille on the eleventh of January, 1553, granted the latter the right to appoint all archbishops, bishops, heads of monasteries, and other ecclesiastics who were to serve not only in the kingdoms of Granada but also in the Indies.

Pope Julius II issued a bull in which he declared: "The right of patronage to the churches of the Indies is granted to their majesties Fernando and Juana, according to these terms: 'No metropolitan church, cathedral, ... in the Indies shall be permitted to erect any building without special permission from their majesties.' "

Prescott's *History of the Catholic Kings* treats extensively of this matter. When the episcopacy of Cuenca in Spain was vacant, Pope Sixtus IV appointed his nephew, not a Spaniard, but a Genoese. Isabel, the Catholic queen, refused to accept the nomination. A rupture between the Vatican and Spain was imminent. Queen Isabel recalled her papal legate and invited the Catholic monarchs to a general council to investigate the evils in the church and to study ways of reform. But the Pope apologized and issued a papal bull relinquishing to the Catholic ruler of Spain the right to approve all nominations to ecclesiastical positions in Spain's dominions.

This struggle in Europe, which was little more than a contest between two rival temporal powers, was early transferred to Mexico. It has continued up to the present day. That a dominant Catholic country like Mexico can support the government in its struggle against the church (so surprising to foreigners) is explained in about the same way that is the challenge that the good Catholic Queen Isabel issued to the Pope in the sixteenth century.

CONFLICT BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE BEGAN IN COLONIAL PERIOD

A study of the historical background of the struggle shows how the church came to occupy such a large place in Mexican political and economic life during the three hundred years of the colonial period and the first few decades of independence, not only because of ecclesiastical organization, but because of the education and training of the priests, who held many important political and economic positions.

In 1644 a petition of the Ayuntamiento of Mexico to Philip IV requested him to stop the foundation of religious houses, which held half the property in the country, to suspend ordination, because there were 6,000 unemployed priests, and to suppress feast days because there were at least two a week.

The church attained to such power that it was able to have ecclesiastics appointed as viceroys. The Inquisition was extended to Mexico in 1571 and was not abolished until the early part of the nineteenth century. This was a powerful weapon in the hands of the hierarchy, and was a vital factor in enabling it to amass vast wealth and secure all sorts of special privileges which lasted until nearly the middle of the nineteenth century.

Take for example the fight in 1624 between Archbishop Juan Perez de Serna and the viceroy, the Marquis of Gelves.

The viceroy had taken a decided stand against certain abuses, such as the practice of some men and women of having portraits of their lovers painted with the insignia of saints, the selling of pulque to the Indians, the taking of gifts by the archbishop, and his selling meat from his own house at an exorbitant price. The prelate resented the insult. The fight began and people took sides. Affairs were brought to a crisis by the viceroy setting a guard over Melchor Perez, who, guilty of certain abuses, had fled for refuge to the convent of Santo Domingo. The archbishop ordered the withdrawal of the guard and excommunicated the viceroy. The bishop of Puebla removed the ban of excommunication. The archbishop was then removed by force from the city, which so angered the populace that they threatened the officers of the law and set on fire the government palace.

When the tumult was at its height the archbishop returned, followed by 4,000 men. The bells pealed forth their joy, the churches were reopened, and the viceroy was virtually deposed and forced to flee. The only punishment inflicted on the archbishop by the king was to transfer him to another see.

The Jesuits began to acquire dominance in colonial life quite early, and this afterward became so preponderant that in 1767 Charles III of Spain banished that order from Mexico as from other Spanish colonies. The same monarch, after another thirty years, decreed the seizure of vast properties belonging to various religious orders. In the Napoleonic period the conflict between church and state was acute. Joseph Bonaparte, when placed on the Spanish throne, decreed that the church lands should be completely transferred to state ownership. He also ordered the dissolution of one-third of the convents in Mexico. After 1814, however, when the Bonapartes were defeated, Ferdinand VII was restored to the throne of Spain and the church was given a more privileged position. A little later affairs in Spain were such that the clerical elements in Mexico again feared that a liberal government at Madrid would enforce the provisions of the Bonaparte constitution of 1812. Accordingly, the church supported Iturbide in the independence movement that resulted in the establishment of the short-lived empire, the fundamental law of which provided that "every Mexican has the obligation to profess the religion of his Fatherland."

A study of the laws of the *Indias,* which contained the carefully drawn legal code for the government of the American colonies of Spain, shows numerous laws intended to control the abuses of the clergy, as the Spanish crown looked upon it. The Spanish kings opposed strenuously the exercising of priestly functions by foreigners in their American colonial possessions.[1]

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[1] Among these numerous prohibitions are found the following:

"We command that our viceroys, presidents, and governors do not present any person for an ecclesiastical office who is not a native of Spain, according to the laws of this book, unless he has an order of naturalization given by us [Libro I, Tit. VI, Ley 31].

"That dispatches from the Pope which are not sent through the Council of the Indias be held and not executed [Libro I, Tit. IX, Ley 3].

"The prohibition of foreign ecclesiastics from enjoying benefits and pensions [Libro I, Tit. III, Ley 1].

"Plan for payment of churches being erected [Libro I, Tit. II, Ley 2]: That inventories of church property should be made [Libro I, Tit. II, Ley 20], and the legal forms prescribed to be used by ecclesiastics for property acquired before entering the churches [Libro I, Tit. VII, Ley 39].

"That to the officials of the King be intrusted the collection of tithes [Libro I, Tit. XV, Ley 1].

"That the prelates exile priests judged by the viceroy to be of bad character [Libro I, Tit. XII, Ley 11].

"That prelates may ordain priests from among the Mestizos [Libro I, Tit. VII, Ley 7].

"That archbishops order priests to teach the Spanish language to the Indians [Libro I, Tit. XIII, Ley 5].

"That all Jesuits be banished from Spain and the Indias and their properties confiscated" [*Recop.* Libro I, Tit. XXVI, Ley 3].

Other important royal orders were: Seizure by civil authorities of charity funds, December 6, 1804 *(Ced. del Archivo General de la Nacion);* prohibition that testators should leave their property to their father confessors or to their kinsmen or churches (Dublan y Lozano, *Legislacion Mexicana,* 43); prohibition that pulpit orators expound anything more than evangelical doctrines and correction of vices Dublan y Lozano, *Legislacion Mex.,* 153); circular abolishing the Inquisition (pub-

So great was the wealth of the church in Mexico in the early years of the nineteenth century that the Spanish Crown, after an investigation, declared that the so-called "benevolent funds" of the church amounted to some $45,000,000, nearly all of which were invested in mortgages on the choicest properties in Mexico. Large landholdings were frequently bestowed upon the church. A typical example of the growth of church estates is given in the following extract from a letter written about 1640 by the bishop of Puebla, Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, to Father Horacio Garochi: "In this place . . . . the fathers began with a very moderate and small estate fifty years ago, and now they have fourteen very large ones. Furthermore, the estates of these kingdoms (in the New World) are not like those of Spain, of thirty-five to seventy acres of land, because here they are thirty to sixty square miles."

Against Bishop Palafox the Jesuits sent an armed force because of his denouncing them in a letter written to the Pope January 8, 1641. In that letter he told the Pope:

> I found, and it continues so, Holy Father, that almost all the resources, ready money, and wealth of these Provinces of North America are in the hands of Jesuits, since they are owners of the largest farms; two of their colleges alone today own 300,000 head of sheep without counting other larger cattle. Other religious bodies and Cathedrals own scarcely three sugar mills, while the Jesuits alone own six of the largest and wealthiest and some of these sugar mills, Holy Father, are worth half a million pesos (Mexican dollars) or even more, and there are some worth near a million.
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> There are farms which have an income of more than one hundred thousand pesos; one religious Province of the Jesuits has six of such farms. Besides all this they own farms of wheat and other seeds which are very large here; some have an extension of four or six leagues. The silver mines are very rich and productive. Their wealth and power are increasing with such speed that it will not be long before both ecclesiastics and laymen will be their servants or beggars at the Jesuits' doors. To

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lished in the *Gazeta de Mexico*, August 3, 1820); royal order that property of Inquisition be used for payment of national debt (*Noticioso General de Mexico*, No. 694).

their wealthy possessions, which are already excessive, they add what they earn by trade and negotiation of every kind, even of those which are improper to religious persons. They have meat-markets and slaughter houses; they manufacture a great many products and keep a big trade with China through the Philippine Islands. And with all this wealth and power they secure more and more wealth and power, to the damage of others and the downfall of themselves. They consider themselves so powerful already, Holy Father, that they refuse to respect the rights of others and to obey the public law is considered by them an injury to their own privileges and power.

To defend their privileges they buy false witnesses. The temporal wealth of the Jesuits is such, Holy Father, in the New Spain that we bishops are very much perplexed, and for that reason we appeal to your Holiness. Each Jesuit has an income of at least 2,000 pesos while the other friars have only 150 pesos at the most. The Superior of the College of Puebla, Diego de Moroy, once said when somebody advised him not to do something improper: "Go to the devil! I have 70,000 pesos ready to buy justice and win this case."[2]

Bishop Palafox was only one of the many ecclesiastical authorities that strove to correct the abuses that always develop in a church possessing great riches.

The cathedrals themselves, handed down through the centuries, represented an enormous labor and expenditure. The Cathedral of Mexico, the largest in the Western Hemisphere, cost two million dollars; the Cathedral of Oaxaca, even more. The Cathedral of Puebla necessitated an outlay for construction purposes of a million and a half; that of Aguas Calientes and Chihuahua, over $800,000; Zacatecas, $600,000; Merida and Jalapa, $300,000; San Juan Bautista, $250,000. Numerous church edifices represented an expenditure of more than a quarter of a million dollars.

In citing these facts, it should be said that this article is discussing only the question of relations of the church and the state in Mexico, and not the spiritual work of the church. Amidst many difficulties and temptations the church did many fine pieces of service and often showed great sacrifice:

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[2] *Obras de Palafox*, Tomo I.

> True it is that for two centuries the clergy had many responsibilities other than those relating directly to religious worship and their own support. Until the eighteenth century education was provided practically everywhere in consequence of the initiative of individuals or of religious bodies (representative of society in one of its principal aspects), and it was the Church in Mexico that made available whatever means for education were to be had down to the end of the Colonial period. Thereafter, for half a century, such educational organization as existed in rural communities, and among the Indians, was provided exclusively under Church auspices. All organized charitable work, likewise, was carried on by the Church down to the beginning of the nineteenth century. That she bore, and sought to fulfill, the requirements of these responsibilities the Church in Mexico will unhesitatingly claim; and she can point to a remarkable record in just this connection.[3]

In spite of such service, however, the Spanish Crown, and later the Republican government, saw great danger in the continuous building up by the church of great economic power, protected by the *fueros,* which eliminated taxes and gave other special privileges. The attack by the Spanish government on the institution of mortmain was not directed at the church only, but also at the evil of huge landed estates in general. Army officers and clergy were kindred spirits and saw things with the same eyes. The fact of being a pure-blooded Spaniard was in itself a sort of certificate of aristocracy. The haciendas of the privileged classes became bulwarks of slavery or peonage and of all kinds of reaction. Indians were assigned officially to the owners of these great estates, and there began the combination of the landlord and the foreign priesthood to exploit the peons.

The colonial period, with the enslaving and exploiting of the native by the foreign-directed hierarchy, lasted for three hundred years. It was during that time that most of the wonderful churches which dominate the Mexican landscape were built by forced labor. The great landed estates became the basis of most of Mexico's evils, and lasted up until the revolution began, in 1910, which had their destruction as one of its main objects.

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[3] C. E. McGuire, "The Church and State Conflict in Mexico," *Current History* (July, 1926).

INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT LED BY A PRIEST

It was against this system that Padre Hidalgo led his movement in 1810. He was a native Mexican parish priest. He resented the exploitation of his people and declared independence from Spain three hundred years after Cortes. It helps toward an understanding of the present religious situation to remember that Hidalgo was a Mexican priest who led in the movement for liberty from Spain. Hidalgo himself failed. He was captured, excommunicated by the foreign-directed hierarchy, and shot. Here is an early explanation of the differences between a Mexican parish priest, who saw the needs of his people, who walked among them and helped them, and the foreign hierarchy, who often combined with the landlords to exploit them.

In reality the difference between the European ecclesiastic and the Mexican parish priest was tremendous. There were priests in Indian villages near Mexico City that received no more than \$50–\$75 annually. Yet the income of the archbishop of Mexico has been estimated at \$65,000; the bishop of Puebla, \$55,000; the bishop of Michoacan, \$50,000. Compare with these a cabinet minister's salary, which at that time was \$3,000.[4] The devotion of the humble Mexican priest to his task has always been impressive. As Brantz Meyer wrote in 1844: "Throughout the Republic no persons have been more universally the agents of charity and the ministers of mercy than the rural clergy. The village curas are the advisers, the friends and protectors of their flocks. Upon all occasions they have constituted themselves the defenders of the Indians. They have interposed in all attempts at persecution and whenever the people were menaced with injustice, stood forth the champions of their outraged rights."

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[4] Humbolt, *Essays on New Spain*, I, p. 201.

EARLY INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

Hidalgo represented that appeal of the Mexican priest and people to get away from foreign dominance and give the peon a chance. But he failed. For fifty years following there was a struggle: on the one hand the landed interests and the clericals; on the other, the liberals or anticlericals. Mexican independence was secured in 1821. The constitution of 1824 declared: "The religion of the Mexican nation is and will be perpetually the apostolic Roman Catholic. The nation will protect it by wise and just laws and will prohibit the exercise of any others." By the constitution of August, 26, 1842, privileges of both the ecclesiastics and the military were confirmed as follows:

> Art. 2. The nation professes the Roman Catholic apostolic religion, and will not tolerate the public exercise of any other.
>
> Art. 31. There shall be no other legal privileges than those conceded to the ecclesiastics and the military; but when they accept any duty or employment of a civil character, their causes and persons shall be subject to the authority designated by law.

However, immediately after the establishment of the republic, efforts began to limit clerical privileges. On February 7, 1828, an order was given transferring to the state of Chihuahua the building belonging to the Jesuit college in that state. In that same year the *Desierto de los Carmelitas* was declared the property of San Bartolo, Santa Rosa, and San Bernabé, towns of the federal district. The sale of the *biones de temportalidades* was ordered in 1829. Nevertheless the church seemed increasingly prosperous in spite of such minor confiscations of property. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the church's wealth in Mexico was estimated at 65,000,000 pesos. Following the independence movement its property was variously estimated from 169,000,000 pesos upward.

The liberals resented this great wealth in the hands of the church as they also denounced the army, and an association of these two groups was formed in consequence, attracting also the *hacendados,* private owners of large estates. Thus was the wealth concentrated to oppose the radicals.

The liberals formally opened battle on June 6, 1833, when the minister of justice issued a circular advising the clergy that they were not to deal with political affairs from the pulpit and were to restrict their preaching to the Roman Catholic religion only.[5] The University of Mexico was suppressed, on the ground that it was entirely dominated by the priests who composed its faculty. All other colleges of the nation were made subject to a bureau known as the *Dirección de Instrucción Pública.*

On the twenty-seventh of the same month the congress came to the conclusion that the government should no longer enforce the collection of church tithes. These tithes had considerably decreased in recent years. In the five year period from 1806 to 1810 the income from this source amounted to 10,691,300 pesos, whereas in the five-year period from 1829 to 1833 they brought in only 5,211,628 pesos. The church was very much afraid that even this amount would be seriously decreased if something drastic were not done to block the proposed legislation.[6]

By the laws of December 17, 1833, and April 22, 1834, certain privileges were taken from the church and a more general secularization of church property proposed.

The church replied by recalling its champion, Santa Ana, from retirement, who appeared in Mexico City, proclaimed the abolition of the federal system, dissolved Congress by military force, and promulgated a decree repealing all the enactments passed by Congress against the privileges and power of the church.

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[5] It is interesting to note that this order, as most of the others of the early period, are the ones that are repeated in the present regulations, often supposed to represent new legislation.

[6] The best treatment in English of this period is in Calcott, *The Church and State in Mexico,* chap. iv; see also McBride, *Land Systems of Mexico,* pp. 66–69.

The Archbishop of Mexico hailed this action with satisfaction, saying: "His victorious sword has come to the protection of religion, and through his true Catholicism we have regained the peace, liberty and everlasting power of our Church."[7]

Gomez Farias, the Liberal vice-president, was ordered to leave the country on pain of death, and Santa Ana was given a donation of $240,000 by the hierarchy.

By 1850 the Catholic priests controlled two-thirds of the productive wealth of the country, dominated economic life, and monopolized the great opinion-forming agencies: religion, education, and charity. "So extensively were private properties mortgaged in favor of the church that it is said that there was hardly a big farm in the whole republic which was entirely free from some such encumbrance."

The Bishop of Puebla at one time, arguing against the creation of a bank from the capital owned by the church, said: "The Church is doing this work that a bank would do without expenses; its coffers are banks better backed than those proposed. Here are common sources of prosperity, where the merchant and the farmer secure the necessary funds to save them from failure, and to improve their situation. Why take these funds that are being loaned with such good results to farmers and merchants?"[8]

REFORM MOVEMENT LED BY JUAREZ

The greatest name in Mexico's history is that of Benito Juarez, a pure-blooded Indian. He saw that not only Mexico must have liberty from Spain, but she must have ecclesiastical liberty. He therefore worked for the separating of the church and state, which was proclaimed in the constitution of 1857. Many of the laws which are attracting attention today as though they were new were written in the constitution of

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[7] These matters are treated in various annual *Memoriae del Ministro de Justicia y Negocios Eclesiasticos.*

[8] *Coleccion Eclesiastica*, IV, 62.

1857. The movement that had begun with the expulsion of the Jesuits and the sale of their estates in 1767 was now coming to a head. On July 12, 1859, in a decree of twenty-four articles, it was provided that all property of regular and secular clergy should be confiscated for the benefit of the nation. At the same time all religious fraternities and brotherhoods were suppressed, with a further prohibition against all such organizations for the future. Marriage was made a civil contract; civil judges were given the duty of registering births and deaths and the right to perform marriages. The clergy were denied the right to control cemeteries; and distinctively religious garbs were prohibited outside of churches. Religious toleration was granted for the first time in Mexico. Church schools were to be inspected. On February 2, 1863, the following important additions were made to these provisions:

> Art. 1. All the property that the secular and regular clergy has been managing under various titles, whether in the shape of landed property or in whatever name or form it may have been held, comes under the dominion of the nation.
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> Art. 5. The existent religious orders, regardless of the denomination to which they may belong and of the purpose for which they may have been created, as well as archconfraternities, confraternities and brotherhoods united to the religious communities and the cathedrals or parishes or whatever other churches, are suppressed throughout the republic.

The liberals defended these drastic laws as being necessary for the saving of a Republican form of government. In those days, when the government proclaimed a law displeasing to the all-powerful hierarchy, one of its representatives would come on the street clothed in religious garb and lead a mob of fanatical people in protest against what the government had done and demand that these laws be suppressed. If there were not open bloodshed in the plaza in such a conflict with the liberal elements, at least the government would usually have to surrender its position.

Bancroft puts the situation as follows:

> The clergy systematically opposed the Government, were hostile to religious toleration, freedom of thought and to a free expression of the press; they objected strenuously to equality before the law; they made war against civil marriages and registrations; opposed foreign colonization and public or any other education, unless it was wholly under ecclesiastical control; they demanded every aid and support from the laws and Government, and yet disallowed all subjection or responsibilities to them; they had large pecuniary resources which they used freely to accomplish their end, constantly availing themselves likewise of the low elements of ignorance and superstition. . . . .[9]

The government's answer to these conditions was the constitution in 1857, and sixty years later a re-enactment of the same, with additional provisions to curb the church's temporal power, in 1917.

The church so resented the work of Juarez that it appealed further to its foreign supporters and was instrumental in bringing Maximilian from Austria to establish an empire. But the little Indian with his ragged army of peons defeated this foreign invasion. Juarez died before he was able to put into effect his educational program. He represents the second great effort of Mexico to develop her own life for her own people.

The attitude of the hierarchy to the Juarez program and the strong fight it was prepared to make is stated in the following:

MANDATE OF POPE PIUS IX

> Thus we make known to the faith in Mexico, and to the Catholic universe, that we energetically condemn every decree that the Mexican Government has enacted against the Catholic religion, against the Church, and her sacred ministers and pastors, against her laws, right, and property, and also against the authority of this Holy See. We raise our Pontifical Voice with apostolic freedom before you to condemn, reprove, and declare nil, void, and without any value, the said decrees, and all others which have been enacted by the civil authorities in such contempt of the ecclesiastical authority of this Holy See, and with such injury to the religion, to the sacred pastors, and illustrious men.

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[9] Quoted in "The Church and State Conflict in Mexico," *Current History* (July, 1926).

THE DIAZ RÉGIME

The successor of Juarez was Porfirio Diaz. While he was suspected at first, being opposed both by the hierarchy and the United States, he soon won both parties by his friendship. He winked at the reform laws; monasteries and nunneries began to appear again in Mexico; and the church began to acquire property. He threw the country open to foreign capital, and at the end of his thirty years' rule United States Consul Letcher estimated that North Americans owned over a billion dollars' worth of property, and Europeans some three-quarters of a billion, out of a total national wealth of a little over three billions. About 54,000,000 acres of Mexican land had been transferred by various methods, fair and foul, to foreigners. The Mexicans began to feel that their government was "a mother to foreigners and the stepmother of Mexicans." When they said that, not with flowers, but with cannon, Diaz passed off the stage. In 1911 he gave place to the present régime, represented by Madero, Carranza, Obregon, and Calles, and "Mexico for the Mexicans" became the central theme.

THE PRESENT RÉGIME

The present government claims that in the same way that it is trying to control the foreign landholders and foreign oil operators it is endeavoring to control the foreign-directed ecclesiastical organization. Peculiarly enough, it is doing this, not by an entirely new method, but by an appeal to the old. In giving land to the peon it appeals to a restoration of the old communal lands, *ejidos*, granted to the Indians many years ago. In dealing with the oil question it places petroleum back in the classification it held in the old days, as a part of the subsoil which belonged to the crown or the nation. In the same way it endeavors to deal with the church question by placing the church back under control proposed in pre-republic days and in the constitution of 1857. In other words, the present régime in Mexico takes the position that the same foreigners and privileged classes against which every reform movement in Mexican history has been directed must now finally be put into a place where they can no longer dominate the country and hold back the orderly education and development of the twelve million peons who form three-fourths of the population.

The first gun in the battle between the liberals and clericals, following the retirement of Diaz, was seen in the organization of the Catholic party. According to Luis Cabrera, "with De la Barra's accession to the presidency the Catholic clergy of Mexico believed the moment had arrived to organize themselves for the political struggle, and to that end a political group was formed, under the patronage of the Catholic clergy, made up chiefly of big landowners."

Their first formal declaration of political reforms, dated December 12, 1913, made no mention of church reforms, but on June 11, 1915, in one of the darkest periods of the constitutionalist cause, the policy of the Carranza régime, bidding for the support of all parties, was announced as follows:

> The constitutional laws of Mexico known under the name of Laws of Reform, which establish the separation of the church and the state and which guarantee the individual the right of worship in accordance with his own conscience and without offending public order, shall be strictly observed; therefore, no one shall suffer in his life, freedom and property because of his religious beliefs. Temples shall continue to be the property of the nation according to laws in force, and the Constitutionalist Government shall again cede for the purposes of worship those which may be necessary.

Carranza continued to enforce the reform laws up to the time of the adoption of the new constitution, creating anew the government machinery by which they might be made effective. On August 22, 1916, the following law was issued:

> 1. So long as churches are open to the service of any creed they remain assimilated to properties destined to a public service and subject to the oversight of the Department of Government, so far as concerns the exercise of the creed, and to the Department of Hacienda respecting matters relative to their use, preservation and improvement.

2. The First Chieftancy, through the Department of Government, is the sole authority which can order the closing of churches in order to retire them from religious service and to consolidate their property. Consequently the local and municipal authorities must refrain from making decisions on this matter.

CONSTITUTION OF 1917

Six years after the constitutionalists had begun their struggles against the reactionary régime, they felt ready to work out a new fundamental law, which they did at Querétero, beginning February 5, 1917. The new constitution, which went into effect on May 1, followed largely the Constitution of 1857 in religious matters, but added several provisions. Article III states:

> Instruction is free. That given in public institutions must be secular. Primary instruction, whether higher or lower, given in private instructions shall likewise be secular.
>
> No religious corporation nor minister of any religious creed shall establish or direct schools of primary instruction.
>
> Private primary schools may be established only subject to official supervision.
>
> Private instruction in public institutions shall be gratuitous.[10]

Article V, of the 1917 constitution, regarding "the abridgment, loss, or irrevocable sacrifice of the liberty of man, whether by reason of labor, education, or religious vows," is similar to that adopted in 1857 as far as it concerns the monastic bodies.

Article XIII is practically identical with Article XIII in the constitution of 1857 abolishing the ecclesiastical and military courts.

Article XIV is drawn largely from one section of the reform laws of 1874. It reads:

> Everyone is free to embrace the religion of his choice and to practice all ceremonies, devotions or observances of his respective creed, either in

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[10] Professor John Dewey, who has recently been in Mexico, wrote in *The New Republic* of September 23, 1926: "The fact that the country priests have used their enormous influence over the souls of their parishes to oppose the establishment of

> places of public worship or at home, provided they do not constitute an offense punishable by law.
>
> Every religious act of public worship shall be performed strictly within the places of public worship, which shall be at all times under governmental supervision.

The second portion of the famous Article XVII also consolidates the position of the Mexican nation toward the wealth amassed through centuries of special privileges on the part of the church. It reads as follows:

> The religious institutions known as churches, irrespective of creed, shall in no case have legal capacity to acquire, hold, or administer real property or loans made on such property; all such real property or loans as may be at present held by the said religious institutions, either on their own behalf or through third parties, shall vest in the Nation, and any one shall have the right to denounce property so held. Presumptive proof shall be sufficient to declare the denunciation well founded. Places of public worship are the property of the Nation, as represented by the Federal Government, which shall determine which of them may continue to be devoted to their present purposes. Episcopal residences, rectories, seminaries, orphan asylums, or collegiate establishments of religious institutions, convents, or any other buildings built or designed for the administration, propaganda, or teachings of the tenets of any religious creed shall forthwith vest, as of full right, directly in the Nation, to be used exclusively for the public services of the Federation or of the States, within their respective jurisdictions. All places of public worship which shall later be erected shall be the property of the Nation.
>
> Public and private charitable institutions for the sick and needy, for scientific research, or for the diffusion of knowledge, mutual aid societies or organizations formed for any other lawful purpose shall in no case acquire, hold or administer loans made on real property, unless the mortgage terms do not exceed ten years. In no case shall institutions of this character be under the patronage, direction, administration, charge or supervision of religious corporations or institutions, nor of ministers of any religious creed, or of their dependents, even though either the former or the latter shall not be in active service.

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rural schools has been at least one factor in causing the drastic decree for the laicizing of all primary schools."

The same articles in the constitution of 1857 which provide that the president, vice-president and senators and representatives shall not be ministers of any religious creed are in the constitution of 1917.

Article 130 of the 1917 constitution may be said to be the center around which the present storm in Mexico rages. Its first paragraph restates the first paragraph in Article 123 of the 1857 constitution, which we have referred to as the genesis of all the laws aimed at curtailing the special privileges of the ecclesiastical establishment in Mexico. It reads: "The Federal authorities shall have power to exercise in matters of religious worship and outward ecclesiastical forms such intervention as by law authorized. All other officials shall act as auxiliaries to the Federal authorities." The article then goes on to state that: "The Congress shall not enact any law establishing or forbidding any religion whatsoever. Marriage and all other acts relating to the civil status of individuals shall appertain to the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil authorities."

It states that: "The law recognizes no juridical personality in the religious institutions known as churches. Ministers of religious creeds shall be considered as persons exercising a profession, and shall be directly subject to the laws enacted on the matter."

It sets forth that:

> The State Legislatures shall have the exclusive power of determining the maximum number of ministers of religious creeds, according to the needs of each locality.
>
> Only a Mexican by birth may be a minister of any religious creed, in Mexico.
>
> No ministers of religious creed shall, either in public or private meetings, or in acts of worship or religious propaganda, criticize the fundamental laws of the country, the authorities in particular or the Government in general; they shall have no vote, nor be eligible to office, nor shall they be entitled to assemble for political purposes.

Provisions are made for the procedure to be followed in dedicating new temples of worship for public use, and for the care and maintenance of places of worship, and responsibility is placed on caretakers who, together with the municipal authorities where the church is situated, shall be responsible for the exact performance of all the provisions laid down in this article.

Article 130 also provides that: "Under no condition shall studies carried on in institutions devoted to the professional training of ministers of religious creeds be given credit or granted any other dispensation of privilege which shall have for its purpose the accrediting of the said studies in official institutions."

Penalties are provided for the violation of this law: "No periodical publication which either by reason of its program, its title or merely by its general tendencies, is of a religious character, shall comment upon any political affairs of the nation, nor publish any information regarding the acts of the authorities of the country or of private individuals, in so far as the latter have to do with public affairs." A further provision states: "Every kind of political association whose name shall bear any word or any indication relating to any religious belief is hereby strictly forbidden. No assemblies of any political character shall be held within places of public worship."

Article 130 concludes with the following provision as to the inheriting of wealth by the clergy:

> No minister of any religious creed may inherit, either on his own behalf or by means of a trustee or otherwise, any real property occupied by any association of religious propaganda or religious or charitable purposes. Ministers of religious creeds are incapable legally of inheriting by will from ministers of the same religious creed or from any private individual to whom they are not related by blood within the fourth degree.
>
> All real and personal property pertaining to the clergy or to religious institutions shall be governed, in so far as their acquisition by private parties is concerned, in conformity with Article 27 of this Constitution. [Article 27, it will be remembered, is the article which deals in detail with the legal capacity of the church to acquire, hold, or administer real property.]

Article 130 ends with the sentence: "No trial by jury shall ever be granted for the infraction of any of the preceding provisions."

THE HIERARCHY PROTESTS

The Mexican hierarchy was not long in protesting the new constitution. The papal legate openly violated one of the provisions of the constitution. President Obregon expelled him from the country. When the hierarchy protested against his action, President Obregon addressed to the bishops a letter in which he stated:

> The Catholic religion requires of its ministers that they should nourish and guide the souls of believers. The revolution which has just ended requires that the government born of it should nourish the stomach, the brain, and the soul of each and every Mexican. In this basic conception of the two programs there is not only nothing mutually exclusive, but there should be on the contrary indisputable harmony. I regret very sincerely that certain members of the high Catholic clergy have not sensed the transformation which has occurred in the minds of the people toward a modern outlook in the course of which ineffectively abstract doctrines have day by day lost their influence, while effective social programs have gained strength. To these latter the high Catholic clergy has not only denied its measure of co-operation but has actually opposed their development with systematic obstruction, particularly in those very features which are essentially Christian and the execution of which in no sense conflicts with the doctrine which the church in theory supports. If there has been any failure of harmony it is due chiefly to the divergence between the clergy's theory and practice.
>
> It is certainly regrettable that the lack of sincerity of certain members of the Catholic clergy causes a continuation of this ancient struggle, when the two programs could so well co-operate. If instead of continuing to fight, and thereby inevitably losing ground, they would only work with us with the sole purpose of seeking the welfare of the people!
>
> I therefore call upon you with all the sincerity which characterizes the men of the revolution, and I exhort you for the good of our people that you neither calumniate nor injure the progress of that essentially Christian and humanitarian program which the Government seeks to develop in our country. Its oppressed classes have for many long and bitter years experienced sundry injustices and have missed the spirit of brotherhood and justice which should have prevailed in the directing upper

> classes, who have neglected the noble part of man's mission on earth and instead exerted all their efforts to pile up their material fortunes. I assure you with all sincerity that not only will you not encounter any obstacle in carrying out the tenets of your religion in this country, but that you will have the support and sympathy of every Mexican. We ask only that no systematic and unjustified obstruction be raised against the popular desires which have acquired such strength in the minds of the people that to deny their existence or to oppose their realization would merely reveal the utter ignorance of whoever should attempt either.

The Obregon administration did not pass any regulatory laws providing for the enforcement of the constitution. President Calles, however, seemed to feel the necessity of carrying to a logical conclusion the fundamental reforms relating to divisions of land, foreign holdings of property, and foreign dominance in religion. Laws on all of these subjects, applying the principles of the constitution, were issued in 1926 and 1927 and caused the most strenuous opposition by the landed proprietors and the clergy.

The orders issued by President Calles for the strict enforcement of the religious laws were decreed following an attack on the government, through the press, because of its attitude toward religion. When a leading daily of Mexico City published for the third time such an attack, now signed by Archbishop Mora y del Rio, stating categorically that the church refused to obey the constitution, President Calles accepted the challenge.

One of these declarations, signed by the Archbishop of Mexico, was published in *El Universal* on February 4, 1926, as follows:

> The doctrine of the Church is invariable because it is the true divine revelation. The protests which the Mexican prelates have formed against the Constitution of 1917 in the articles which are opposed to liberty and religious dogmas will be maintained firmly. This protest has not been modified in large because it is derived from the doctrine of the Church. The information which *El Universal* published on January 27 referring to the fact that a campaign will be begun against unjust laws contrary to natural rights is entirely correct. The episcopacy, the priests

and Catholics do not recognize and we will combat Articles III, V, XXVII, and then up to XXX of the present Constitution. We cannot change this attitude or for any reason vary it without being traitors to our faith and to our religion.

President Calles replied that the whole question of the authority of his government was challenged and he must either enforce its authority or admit the supremacy of an ecclesiasticism which had always opposed democratic government in Mexico.

The Minister of the Interior immediately wrote to the Attorney-General asking that he proceed against the Archbishop for proclaiming his purposes not to obey the constitution and for exciting the public to disobey law. On denying the charge, the Archbishop was acquitted. But the conflict increased. On July 2, 1926, the government issued a revised interpretation of the laws regarding the church, requiring the prompt registration of every church, the obedience of the law against foreigners serving as ministers, and the prohibition of primary schools' teaching religion.

The requirement that the churches register brought the whole question to a head. The registration meant the acknowledgment of the government's ownership of the churches and its right to enforce the various provisions of the religious laws. The hierarchy's reply to these orders was a refusal to obey and an order to all the clergy to cease functioning as of August 1, 1926. From that day until this no priest has functioned in the churches. The government insisted, however, that the churches remain open, and so they have.

The government, after taking an inventory of these properties, has insisted that the doors be kept open for the free exercise of religious rights and ceremonies. The hierarchy has forbidden the priests to officiate until the government has changed its policy. As a result, thousands of the faithful enter the churches to pray before the various images and are becoming accustomed to worshiping without the presence of a priest. Everywhere now one finds people worshiping, the service being read by lay readers, very often women, but not from the chancel. The government holds that religious freedom exists since there is no interference with religious rights conforming to law.

Enforcement of the law has evidently been impartial in that all religions have been treated alike. Some foreign priests, who were not amenable to Mexican law, continued in some cases to officiate and were deported. Foreign Protestant ministers have ceased to function ecclesiastically, except those ministering to foreign colonies, which is permitted by the regulatory law. All Mexican Protestant ministers have registered and are continuing their work undisturbed. Some Catholic schools were temporarily closed upon inspection, but most of them have been reopened within the law. The "Schismaticos," the Independent Mexican Catholic church, is seemingly too weak to offer much future.

The Calles government seems to be able to carry out its policies because a large section of the people, although nominally Roman Catholics, are out of sympathy with the church's program.

President Calles has made several statements on the question since the deadlock between the government and the church began, August 1, 1926.[11] One that involves an explanation of the church's program of resistance is the following, published in the *New York Journal* and *El Excelsior* on July 26, 1926:

> In regard to the questionnaire presented by Mr. John Page, correspondent of the Hearst newspapers, and in which he asked me, first, if the manifesto of the so-called National Defense League of Religious Liberty and its project to bring about the paralyzation of the social and economic life of the country is mutinous; secondly, if the project in question can affect in any way the life in Mexico, socially and economically; and,

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[11] *New York World*, February 23, 1926; *New York Times*, August 10, 1926; P. E. Calles, "The Policies of Mexico Today," *Foreign Affairs*, Quarterly Review, V (October, 1926), 1–5.

thirdly, if the government over which I preside can mollify the reforms and additions to the penal code, about which the members of the League have complained, I desire to state:

The judicial authorities will determine whether the sheets recently distributed by the National League for Religious Liberty are of a seditious nature or not, though it can already be said that it is attempted to disturb public order, because the economic crisis which is sought by the League will, if achieved, bring about serious disturbances of public peace. However, the purpose of the Catholic agitators will be a failure, and a substantial evidence of the lack of strength of those people.

The economic life of Mexico is not dependent on the activities of groups who are disgusted with the Revolutionary government of the country. Neither industry nor commerce has ever been dependent on the group of political agitators who have started this ridiculous movement. Besides, the live forces of Mexico have always been developed without being led by those who make use of religion for exhibition purposes or seeking profits. These live forces, in the hands of Catholics, Protestants, or members of any other religious denominations, are not affected by the decisions taken by badly intentioned groups.

President Calles, referring to declarations of Archbishop Mora y del Rio, said:

This cannot be overlooked by the government because it would imply weakness on its part, as it meant a dangerous opportunity to disturb public order. Now what is the government of any country to do, when a social group, religious or otherwise, publicly rejects the fundamental laws of the country, and announces its purpose to fight them, inciting the peoples to repudiate the Constitution? What could my government do but devote its attention to these Constitutional clauses connected with the clergy's protest, and demand a strict obedience of the law? Thus the religious conflict was created. We have had no need to pass new laws, but merely to enforce those already effective since the times of Reform, some fifty years ago, and since 1917, when the present Constitution was enacted. . . . .

Frankly speaking, I believe that rather than the clergy themselves, the ones obstructing the administrative task of the Government are people who agitate, close to the clergy, and disguise themselves, as I have already stated, with a religious cloak to cover their old reactionary tendencies of hatred of the government and the men of the revolution. . . . .

Another very interesting group of actors in this religious conflict is formed by professional political agitators, who, disguised as Catholics,

> organized in the past a National Catholic Party which posed as a great friend of President Madero. But, on the day after Madero's murder, that Party entered into an alliance with Victoriano Huerta.
>
> Next came the National Agricultural Syndicates, organized by so-called ranch owners who succeeded in corrupting several revolutionary leaders in 1923. This they did merely with promises because they were, and still are, incapable of raising the necessary funds to pay those they corrupt. These Syndicates before, during, and after my presidential campaign, have been dreaming of misleading the will of the Mexican people, and today they are co-operating with the League for the Defense of Religious Liberty, receiving a weak support from the Archbishop of Mexico. . . . .
>
> The Archbishop and Bishops who are now giving their approval to the proposed campaign would not like to be held responsible for any possible riots, in which case they will claim that they counselled "an orderly and peaceful action." But they do not dare (as they perhaps desire in view of the danger in which they may find themselves should the campaign succeed) to condemn the movement, fearing that the ignorant Catholics might think that their repudiation was an act of cowardice before the "chivalrous and generous attitude" of the political agitators who are defending the bad Catholicism.

THE CLERGY PETITION THE GOVERNMENT

The Catholic bishops changed the historic attitude of the church which it has sustained all during Mexican history, advocating the necessity of the Roman Catholic church having the support of the nation, in a petition which they sent to President Calles August 16, 1926. After answering the charge that they had rebelled against the laws of the republic and asking that the application of the laws be suspended until they could be reformed, the bishops declared that the crux of the solution was found in "the Most Sincere Independence of the Church and the State." Consequently they petitioned for liberty of conscience, of thought, of worship, of teaching, of association and of the press.[12]

In reply, President Calles admitted the right of petition, but said that he was an unfortunate one to receive such an appeal, since he believed that the present laws were just, and therefore he could not initiate their change before Congress. After explaining that the rebellion of the clergy consisted in their publicly attacking the constitution, he suggested that the petition for changes in the law be made directly to Congress.[13]

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[12] "Datos para la Historia," *Publicaciones de la Secretaria de Education Publica* (Mexico, 1926), Tomo X, No. 15, pp. iii–viii.

Following the advice of President Calles, the prelates petitioned Congress for a revision of the objectionable laws. Congress replied that it had appointed a committee to study the petition, but the conclusion was that any changes would do violence to the principles of the constitutions of 1857 and 1917, and therefore could not be considered.[14]

This was practically the last attempt made by the hierarchy to settle matters. The bitterness that developed was shown in open rebellion, especially in the state of Jalisco, where finally, with the cry "Long live Christ, our King!" atrocities were committed so terrible that the government, claiming that the church authorities were behind such trouble, expelled most of the hierarchy from the country. The great majority are now in the United States, seeking sympathy for their cause. It is hardly likely that they will find reconciliation with the Calles government. Both the presidential candidates recently executed, Generals Serrano and Gomez, had offered to treat the church more liberally. It is generally believed that if General Obregon succeeds to the presidency, which now seems a certainty, he will effect a compromise which no doubt the Catholic leaders, having lost so much, would accept at considerable sacrifice of former positions.

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[13] *Ibid.*

[14] All these documents are published in two recent books of the same title: E. Perez Lugo, *La Cuestión Religosa in Mexico*; Antonio Uroz, *La Cuestión Religosa in Mexico*.

CALVIN'S EFFORTS TOWARD THE CONSOLIDATION OF PROTESTANTISM

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THE sixteenth century witnessed the disruption of the visible Catholic church in the West, and the church history of that period has usually been treated mainly in terms of the process of dismemberment. We have gleefully or ruefully traced the sequence of schism upon schism, and described in our conclusions the organization and life of the territorial churches as completely separate entities content to forego all fellowship with each other. In the interests of truth and proportion, one is justified in seeking to direct attention to that aspect of Reformation history which such a treatment ignores: the sense of need of a wider fellowship, the frustrated hope of a general reconstruction.

The Reformation arose sporadically and developed as a series of outwardly independent movements without guidance from any single controlling mind or central committee. To this the political geography and the many local patriotisms of Europe conduced, no less than the strong individuality of the leaders. The trade of a reformer, too, was an exacting one. He had to be an assiduous scholar and an alert and energetic organizer and director of large, intelligent, and often headstrong groups. Grave events happened rapidly about him, and tasks thrust upon him withheld him from those he projected. It need not surprise us that it was the lot of these men to die with a certain amount of botched work on hand, and with plans largely unfulfilled and tasks unfinished. Perhaps their chief unfinished task, and the one at which they worked with least success, was that of securing a basis of co-operation and intercommunion.

Very early in the conflict the charge was laid against the Protestants by their papal opponents that they had broken Catholic unity and cast themselves out of the visible church. With one voice they repelled the charge. Their uniform argument was that the schism had been caused by Roman apostasy, and that it was Rome that had departed from the Catholic faith and fellowship. From Luther and Melanchthon to Jewel and Hooker the opponents of Rome severally claimed for themselves and their followers the name of Catholic Christians. The *Augsburg Confession* was set forth, as its conclusion states, "that it might be understood that in doctrine and ceremonials among us there is nothing received contrary to Scripture or to the Catholic church."[1] The *Second Helvetic Confession,* almost as significant for the Reformed as the *Augustana* for the Lutheran churches, expresses the hope that its adherents will be held not to be heretics but Catholics and Christians,[2] and teaches an unambiguous doctrine of the unity of the Catholic church to which all particular churches are referable.[3]

By all the reformers, as by their opponents, though with a different set of accompanying presuppositions, the church was thought of as Catholic and visible. It is true that the doctrine of the invisible church is sometimes so emphasized by them as to dim the vision of a true visible and organized church, but that vision was present and potent in the thinking of each one of the leaders. This is true even, for instance, of Knox, who gives least theoretic expression to the conception.[4]

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[1] "Apud nos nihil esse receptum contra Scripturam aut Ecclesiam Catholicam" (the German edition has "gemeiner christlichen Kirchen").

[2] "Speramus nos ab omnibus habendos non pro haereticis sed pro Catholicis et Christianis."

[3] "Et militans in terris ecclesia semper plurimas habuit particulares ecclesias, quae tamen omnes ad unitatem Catholicae ecclesiae referunter" (Cap. xvii).

[4] See, e.g., Knox's answer to Tyrie's charge that the Reformed church of Scotland is "new" and "invisible" (*Works,* ed. Laing, VI, 490 f.).

Diverse and even irreconcilable views about the organization and worship of the Catholic visible church they may have held, but for each of them it was a reality. Where through degeneration the true church had become almost invisible it was their task, by means of teaching, worship, and discipline, to give it visibility again, both as particular churches and as a Catholic church. Were they content then to hold this Catholic conception of the church visible as a pipe dream? To what extent if at all did they seek its realization?

There was in fact a sincere attempt to translate the dream into reality. Less effort was expended in it perhaps than in the controversy with Rome; but in certain quarters at least there was no half-heartedness about the effort.

Of the outstanding leaders with a secure following who took most seriously the duty of conciliation and unification, Melanchthon, Calvin, and Cranmer are specially marked; while Bucer and John à Lasco are prominent among a number of able and earnest secondary reformers, who, having fewer commitments to a special clientèle, consciously endeavored, in many contacts with persons and groups, to further intercommunion.

The age was theological; even political pacts often had a basis of theological agreement or failed to mature for lack of it. Divergences in theology were insuperable obstacles to Christian fellowship; and the tragedy of Protestantism was that its sections were kept apart by disagreements over the interpretation of that sacrament in which fellowship ought supremely to have been realized. The tragedy was poignantly felt at the time, and there are many parallels to the words written by Cranmer to Melanchthon (March 27, 1552): "It is truly a matter for grief that the sacrament of unity is become, through the devil's malice, food for disagreement and as it were the apple of contention."[5] The only conceivable basis of Christian reunion, then, lay in the field of "faith and order," rather than in that of "life and work"; and especially in the field of faith, or its formal expression in doctrine. A doctrinal consensus was recognized to be the primary consideration.

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[5] "Et dolendum sane est, Sacramentum unitatis invidia Diaboli factum esse escam dissidii et veluti μῆλον ἔριδος," (Cranmer, *Remains and Letters*, p. 433). *Corpus Reformatorum*, VII, 971. Cf. Melanchthon's similar expressions in letters to

Of the attempts to reach a Protestant consensus the following will be at once recalled: (1) The *Marburg Colloquy*, 1529; (2) The *Wittenberg Concord,* 1536; (3) The negotiations of the English and the Lutheran theologians, 1535-39; (4) Melanchthon's *Confessio Augustana Variata,* 1540; (5) The *Consensus Tigurinus,* 1549 (to be considered presently); and (6) Cranmer's project for a Protestant Consensus, 1547-1553. Even within the quarter-century from the Marburg Colloquy to the death of Edward VI, the list might of course be extended without including the notable conferences with Romanist theologians; and it might be largely added to by reference to incidents and documents reaching to the period of the Westminster Assembly.

Calvin's aim to promote the formation of an all-Protestant communion, to which our attention is now briefly to be given, obviously constitutes no isolated phenomenon of the age.

The Marburg Colloquy had indicated clearly what was to be Protestantism's "apple of contention." The events connected with Bucer's well-meant and untiring but largely futile efforts to secure agreement cannot be traversed here. By the middle forties, when the Council of Trent was assembling to rehabilitate Romanism, it was evident that Protestantism was tending more and more to disunion. Some years earlier Calvin had come to close acquaintance with the German and Swiss points of view. As he did so, he realized that he stood theologically midway between Wittenberg and Zurich. He

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Cranmer in 1548: *C.R.*, VI, 801, 894. On October 5, 1544, Melanchthon had written to Musculus: "O rem miseram, et omnium lacrymis deplorandam, quod illud ὅσιον σύμβολον τῆς ἀγάπης belli cogitur esse materia seu occasio" (*C.R.*, V, 495).

believed, too, that the two parties in some degree misunderstood each other, and that by conferences they might be reconciled. He was anxious to do justice to the religious significance of the Lord's Supper in the experience of the church, and could not be satisfied with the conception of it as a mere sign, or a mere aid to the memory, factors which entered so largely into, if they did not (as the Lutherans supposed) exhaust, the Zwinglian interpretation. On the other hand, he could not accept the materialistic terms of corporal presence in which the Lutheran position was often stated, nor the literal view of *Hoc est corpus meum* for which Luther contended at Marburg. He supposed, however, that both groups of reformers had been led to extremes by the heat of controversy, and that both had the root of the matter in them, however distorted the upgrowth appeared. In short, he hoped to follow the thesis and antithesis of Luther and Zwingli with a synthesis in which all the values would be comprehended and the disputants reconciled. Not that his doctrine was deliberately shaped as a conciliatory one. It took shape before he realized his calling as a moderator of extremes. He was resolutely determined not to sacrifice truth to peace. But on this matter he felt that no conflict between truth and charity was involved. Kolfaus[6] agrees with Lang that Calvin "united the exegetical clarity of Zwingli with the religious depth and inwardness of Luther." In broad comparison he admired Luther more highly than Zwingli,[7] yet he sincerely revered both. He naturally sought to unite parties which represented elements already fused in his own thinking.

In course of time he became the self-conscious mediator.

[6] *Calvinstudien*, p. 47.

[7] "If the two men are compared," he writes to Farel, February 26, 1540, "you yourself know how much Luther has the preference": "Si inter se comparantur scis ipse quanto intervallo Lutherus excellat" (*C.R.*, XXXIX, 24). Doumergue remarks: "If he put Luther above Zwingli, much more did he put the Zwinglians above the Lutherans. The former had modified, the latter had exaggerated, their master" *Jean Calvin, les hommes et les choses de son temps*, II, 569).

His position on the Lord's Supper in the second edition of the *Institutes* (1539) bears the mark of reflection on the sacramentarian controversy. His *Little Treatise on the Lord's Supper* (1540) is notably irenic in purpose.

> The recent contention [he remarks] is an unhappy business, the devil having stirred it up to impede, nay completely to interrupt the work of the Gospel. . . . . [Luther] said the bread was the body of Christ and . . . . added similitudes which were somewhat harsh and rude; but he was in a manner compelled to do so, for it is difficult to give an explanation of so high a matter without some impropriety of speech. Zwingli and Oecolampadius were intent on removing the [Roman Catholic] idea of the carnal presence. . . . . Engrossed on this point they forgot to show what presence of Jesus Christ ought to be believed in the Supper and what communion of his body and blood is there received. . . . . Luther thought they meant to leave nothing but the bare signs and began to call them heretics. Both parties failed in not having the patience to listen to each other in order to follow the truth without passion. Still they should be reverenced for their holiness, knowledge, and zeal. . . . . God has ended, or silenced, the strife, preparatory to its final settlement. No formulary is yet agreed upon. . . . . But this will be when God will be pleased to assemble in one place those who are to frame it.[8]

Early in his career as a reformer, Calvin had felt the need of a basis of Protestant agreement.[9] In March, 1540, he affirmed, in a letter to Bullinger, his intention constantly to promote the peace of the churches:

> What, my dear Bullinger, should more anxiously occupy us in our letters than to keep up brotherly friendship among us by all possible means. It is important for the whole church that all should keep together to whom the Lord has committed the affairs of his church. It is therefore our duty to cherish a true friendship for all preachers of the word, and to keep the churches at peace with each other. As far as in me lies, I will

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[8] Calvin, *Tracts* (ed. Beveridge), II, 195. Original in *C.R.*, XXXIII, 448 f.

[9] To Megander (Gaspar Grossmann) and his associates at Berne, February, 1537, he urgently voiced the desire for a general synod (*fratrum conventus*) to settle the issues in dispute in Swiss circles (*C.R.*, XXXVIII, 84). He asked Bullinger, February 21, 1538, why there might not take place a "public synod' where individuals might propose anything they thought beneficial to the churches with a view to general agreement (*inter nos concordia*) (*C.R.*, XXXVIII, 154).

> always labor to do so. I wish that something would occur that would give me the opportunity of discussing the whole matter with you face to face.[10]

Calvin consistently abode by this resolution, and never lost hope that the several churches would yet realize that corporate unity which entered into his definition of the Catholic church.[11]

In his relations to Lutheranism Calvin built his hopes upon Melanchthon's *Augustana Variata* of 1540. This edition of the great Lutheran Confession was Melanchthon's boldest move for reconciliation with the South Germans and the Swiss. It appeared a year and a half after Calvin's first personal intercourse with its author at Frankfort in February, 1539, when their enduring friendship was begun. It is, therefore, probable that Calvin's influence should be recognized in the modification of the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper, for which it is remarkable.[12] It was this copy, to Eck's displeasure, that was presented in the negotiations with the Romanists at Worms and Ratisbon. There is no evidence that Luther ever expressly disapproved of the alteration. The *Variata* was warmly and repeatedly approved by Calvin. His later strictures on the Confession were on the original edition, and were mainly on points on which it differed from the revised version. He was in close association with Bucer and

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[10] *C.R.*, XXXIX, 27 f.

[11] "Que veut dire ce mot catholique ou universelle? C'est pour signifier, que comme il n'y a qu'un Chef des fideles: aussi tous doyvent estre unis en un corps. Tellement qu'il n'y a pas plusieurs Eglises, mais une seule, laquelle est espandue par tout le monde (Eph. 4:3; I Cor. 12:12, 27)," *Catechisme de Genève* (*C.R.*, XXXIV, 39).

[12] The Tenth Article, which originally read: "De coena Domini docent quod corpus et sanguis (wahrer Leib und Blut) Christi vere adsint (unter Gestalt des Brods und Weins) et distribuantur vescentibus in coena Domini; et improbant secus docentes," was materially altered to read: "De Coena Domini docent quod cum pane et vino vere exhibeantur corpus et sanguis Christi vescentibus in Coena Domini" (*C.R.*, XXVI, 278, 357, 559). Grisar (*Luther*, English ed., II, 445) thinks Philip of Hesse made the suggestion of this revision to Melanchthon. On the view that the *Variata* was written in 1538 see J. W. Richards, *The Confessional History of the Lutheran Church*, p. 225.

Melanchthon during the period of the conferences of Hagenau, Worms, and Ratisbon (June, 1540—April, 1541). If he differed from them on certain issues of the negotiations with the Romanists in these conferences, he remained conscious of substantial accord with them on the sacramental question.[13]

The significance of the Zurich *Consensus* (1549) can only be seen in relation to the renewed sacramental controversy of the forties. Zwingli's *Exposition of the Christian Faith*, published by Bullinger in 1536, with its consideration for certain unbaptized pagans, had displeased Luther. To his chagrin the Swiss had also published a new German Bible in 1543. He was further annoyed by the discords of the right and left wings of his followers, men like Amsdorf and Westphal opposing the liberalism of Melanchthon. He reopened the battle with his *Short Confession of the Lord's Supper* (September, 1544), which contained an attack upon Zwingli and Oecolampadius that out-Luthered Luther in vehemence. This inexcusable outburst crushed Melanchthon's, but not Calvin's, hopes of peace. Melanchthon wrote Bullinger (August 30, 1544) regretting "this most atrocious book of Luther's." "I cease to hope," he laments, "for the peace of the churches. . . . . Our enemies who defend the idols of the monks, raise their crests, and once more our churches are put asunder, for which I take great sorrow."[14]

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[13] For details, see Doumergue, *Calvin*, II, 580 f., and Calvin's informing letters of the period in *C.R.*, Vol. XXXIX.

[14] "Fortassis priusquam hae meae literae ad te perferentur, accipies atrocissimum Lutheri scriptum, in quo bellum περὶ δείπνου κυριακοῦ instaurat. . . . . Desino igitur sperare Ecclesiarum pacem. Tollent cristas inimici nostri, qui defendunt ἴδωλα monachorum: Ac rursus Ecclesiae nostrae magis distrahentur, qua ex re ingentem capio dolorem" (*C.R.*, V, 475). Melanchthon's correspondence of the period of the incubation and publication of Luther's manifesto is informing. It shows him in a mood of depression and abounds with ejaculatory prayers for the peace of the church. To Bucer (August 28), *ibid.*, p. 474, he writes of the "fierce book in which you and I are beaten black and blue": "atrocem librum . . . . in quo ego et tu sugillamur." As for himself, he is a tranquil bird, and would not unwillingly escape from his house of correction if his troubler should press him hard: "Ego sum tran-

Calvin, though deeply distressed by the renewal of the controversy, found in it an opportunity to seek peace and understanding anew. He now "devoted time and strength to the program of bridging over the chasm between Zwingli and Luther, and by setting aside their particularities to produce a true unity."[15] Though not named in Luther's attack, he felt himself by implication condemned; but his first concern was to calm the indignation of the Zurichers. He declined an imprudent suggestion of Farel which amounted to asking the injured party to seek forgiveness,[16] and wrote to Bullinger a letter of advice that does him credit. "I learn," he says, "that Luther in his insolent petulance attacks us all together." Thus first identifying himself with the victims of the wrong that Luther has done, he asks Bullinger to consider how great a man Luther is, by what extraordinary gifts he is distinguished, and with what energy of soul, perseverance, ability, and success he has continued to overthrow the Kingdom of Antichrist. "I have already often said," Calvin adds, "that were he to call me a devil, I should still continue to venerate him as a distinguished servant of God, who, while excelling in extraordinary virtues, also labors under some great faults."[17]

There is no record that Luther ever called Calvin "a dev-

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quilla avis, nec invitus ex hoc ergastulo discedam si infestus me urgebit." Cf. a letter to Jonas, September 27, *ibid.*, p. 484. At this stage he was much more distressed to see the hope of Protestant union dashed than concerned to reopen the discussions with the Romanists, with whom negotiations were now again mooted in anticipation of the Council of Trent. See his letters to Camerarius and to V. Theodorus, both of August 11. To the latter he writes: "Nunc jussi sumus componere παρασκευὴν futuri conventus. Quid dicam consilii esse nostris? Instituere volunt conciliationes cum Pontificiis, et nostrarum ecclesiarum concordiam non fovent" (*C.R.*, V, 461). To Camerarius: "Odi haec fucosa consilia, et liberari me opto" (*ibid.*, p. 462).

[15] Kolfhaus, *Calvinstudien*, p. 45.

[16] Calvin to Farel, October 10, 1544, *C.R.*, XXXIX, 755.

[17] "Etiam si me diabolum vocaret, me tamen hoc illi honoris habiturum, ut insignem Dei servum agnoscam: qui tamen ut pollet eximiis virtutibus, ita magnis vitiis laboret" (*C.R.*, XXXIX, 774).

il." Doumergue gives the impression indeed that Luther's praise of Calvin's work, in 1539 and subsequently, disposed the latter to think more favorably of the former than he had done previously. Luther had been shown a criticism of himself by Calvin, and had generously remarked: "I hope Calvin will one day think better of us." Calvin, on learning this, wrote to Farel (November 20, 1539), "I am completely vanquished [*fractus*] by such moderation."[18] But Calvin was deeply conscious of his debt to the Saxon reformer. His lasting reverence for Luther is attested by many passages, including his spirited defense of Luther against Pighius on the doctrine of predestination,[19] and the letter he wrote to his "honored father" (January 20, 1545) to ask an opinion on his exhortations to undeclared Protestants of France. Says Calvin here: "Would to God that I could take flight to you, were it but to enjoy a few hours of your conversation. . . . I hope that that which is not given us on earth will soon be granted us in the Kingdom of Heaven. Farewell, man of high renown and faithful servant of Jesus Christ and at all times my most revered father. May the Lord continue to guide you by his Spirit to the end for the common good of his church."[20] Melanchthon, in whose care this letter was sent, wisely or unwisely withheld it from Luther on the ground that "Dr. Martin looks at things with suspicion, and does not wish to have his sentiments . . . . published abroad."[21]

Apparently in January, 1545, to a correspondent who cannot be identified, Calvin wrote to discount the expectation of any results from a possible conference with the Romanists. In case any attempt at this is made, unacceptable demands will be presented on both sides, and the Pope will know how "to throw all into disorder." But as for divisions among the reformed: "In the midst of these hostile preparations, that certain persons should find leisure enough for senseless quarreling with one another looks rather portentous. . . . . We seem to have hired ourselves both hand and tongue to the ungodly that we may afford them sport and pastime by tearing one another to pieces." But with God's aid, "the church will at length surmount these perils." The letter too suggests some difficulties in the way of union that it is easy for us nowadays to overlook. His correspondent has proposed that he should go to Wittenberg. The journey would require twenty days. He has no money; he is in debt and cannot turn to the merchants of Geneva, who, after two years of dearth, are themselves "almost starving." "Add to this what I have already said that the time is unseasonable for consulting Luther because his anger has scarcely settled down from the heat of contention." He has sent a messenger, Claude de Senarclens, with a letter to Melanchthon.

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[18] *C.R.*, XXXVIII, 432. Doumergue, *Calvin*, II, 572 f. G. DeWette, *Luthers Briefe*, V, 411.

[19] "Defensio sanae et orthodoxae doctrinae de servitute et liberatione humani arbitrii adversus calumnias Alberti Pighii, Campensis" (Geneva, 1543), *C.R.*, XXXIV, 225 f.

[20] *C.R.*, XXXX, 8.

[21] *C.R.*, XXXX, 61.

About the time of this correspondence appeared the reply of the Zurichers to Luther's tirade: "A truthful Confession of the Servants of the Church at Zurich as to what they teach especially concerning the Lord's Supper, in answer to the Slanders, Condemnation and Jests of Dr. Martin Luther." Calvin has no praise for this work. On June 28 he wrote Melanchthon: "The Zurichers have the better cause, but their book is jejune and puerile." Again he expresses his admiration with his criticism, of Luther. "From my heart I reverence him, but I am thoroughly ashamed of him." The calamity of the church resulting from Luther's example of tyranny is not to be deplored merely in silence. Melanchthon ought to take the opportunity to declare his own mind. Nevertheless he writes not so much to arouse as to console him.[22]

Luther contributed nothing further to the controversy, but remained unrepentant. It is doubtful, indeed, whether any friend frankly expostulated with him. A few weeks before his death he wrote facetiously to Probst, of Bremen (January 17, 1546): "This one beatitude of the psalm is enough for me, the most unhappy of men: Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the council of the Sacramentarians, nor stood in the way of the Zwinglians, nor sat in the seat of the Zurichers."[23] Luther's however, was a mind of many facets; and some probability attaches to certain anecdotes of a different color, told by Christopher Pezel.[24] Pezel narrates that Luther, before setting out on his last journey, remarked to Melanchthon: "In the matter of the sacraments we have gone much too far" (*viel zu viel gethan*). Melanchthon suggested the preparation of a new statement, that the churches might be united again. "I've often thought of that," said Luther, "but in that case all the doctrine will become doubtful. I will commend the thing to the Lord. You," he added, "do something after my death." Pezel's informant, Hardenberg, vouched for the story with the remark, "This is true, as God is God."[25] Another story of Pezel's is to the effect that Luther, in 1545, praised Calvin's *De Coena Domini* to the bookseller, Moritz Golsch, saying, "I might have intrusted the whole affair of this controversy to him from the beginning. If my opponents had done the like we should soon have been reconciled."[26]

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[22] C.R., XXXX, 98 f.

After the opening of the Council of Trent, Calvin's activity on the cause of Protestant union increased.[27] The death of Luther, and his own growing success in Geneva, placed him clearly in the leadership of the Protestant forces. Melanchthon, surrounded by tumults and depressed by many griefs, proved unable at this stage to contribute in any appreciable degree to the union effort. Bucer had met with a repulse from the Zurichers in the spring of 1538, and, for some time afterwards at least, felt a grievance against Bullinger for his part on that occasion. Calvin advanced evidence that Bullinger had not intended to wound Bucer personally,[28] and sought to restore mutual confidence. But the Zurichers would hardly receive favorably suggestions of union from Bucer. In any case Bucer was now living amid increasing trouble at Strassburg, and, yielding at last to the wishes of his friends and the invitations of Cranmer, he departed to England in May, 1549, never to return.

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[23] DeWette, *Luthers Briefe*, IV, 778.

[24] *Ausführliche wahrhafte und bestandige Erzählung vom Sacramentstreit* (Bremen, 1600), pp. 125 f., cited by Doumergue, II, 572.

[25] Hardenberg was the friend and correspondent of Bucer, à Lasco, and Cranmer; Cranmer regarded him as very influential with Melanchthon (Cranmer, *Remains and Letters*, p. 422).

[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 137; Doumergue, *loc. cit.*

[27] His *Acts of the Council of Trent with the Antidote* appeared in November, 1547 (*C.R.*, XXXV, 365 f.).

Calvin's plan was to make the unification of Geneva and Zurich the first stage in a general agreement. He had maintained occasional correspondence with Bullinger since 1537, and they had become friends. He had always believed that no vital issue divided them and that complete accord could be reached between them. On November 25, 1544, after Luther's attack, he wrote to Bullinger: "If we could only talk together for half a day, we would agree without difficulty, not only concerning the matter itself, but concerning the form of stating it. Meanwhile the present occasion of offense must not hinder us bearing in our hearts brotherly friendship in the Lord."[29]

He now deliberately wooed Bullinger and led him to discuss a formal consensus. In November, 1548, he sent him twenty-four propositions on the Sacraments. Bullinger commented on these with general approval, and Calvin replied.[30] In March, at a Synod in Berne, Calvin presented twenty similar articles.[31] These were not accepted by the Bernese, but he did not lose hope of a later agreement. In May, 1549, on

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[28] Calvin to Farel, February 28, 1540 (*C.R.*, XXXIX, 24).

[29] *C.R.*, XXXIX, 775.

[30] *C.R.*, XXXV, 689 f.

[31] *C.R.*, XXXV, 717 f.

Bullinger's invitation and accompanied by Farel, he made a flying visit to Zurich, and with Bullinger completed the twenty-six articles of the *Consensus*. So far had agreement already been reached that the final shaping of the document required only two hours.[32] Conference was had and agreement secured with the ministers and the civic council. In August a signed copy of the *Consensus* was sent by Bullinger to Calvin.

These articles of agreement,[33] if somewhat repetitious, are unambiguous and full of nervous thought. The sacraments are described (7) as "marks and badges of Christian profession and fellowship or fraternity, to be incitements to gratitude and exercises of faith and a godly life." But beyond this Zwinglian conception (8) "he undoubtedly truly performs inwardly by the Spirit that which the sacraments figure to our eyes and senses; in other words we obtain possession of Christ as the fountain of all blessings." They are effective, however, only for the elect (16–18). "For as he enlightens unto faith none but those whom he has foreordained to life, so by the secret agency of the Spirit he makes the elect receive what the sacraments offer." "The signs are administered alike to reprobate and elect, but the reality reaches the latter only." Those who hold the literal view of the words of institution are "repudiated as preposterous interpreters" (22). The phrases about "eating His flesh" and "drinking His blood" are explained as not involving any "transfusion of substance," but in the sense that "we draw life from the flesh once offered in sacrifice and the blood shed in expiation" (23). The sharply Zwinglian phraseology of some of these clauses, and especially the reference to "preposterous interpreters" (22), strikes the reader at once, and Dorner's remark that Calvin had employed the language of the *Variata*[34] is hardly borne out. Why did Calvin, if he desired to conciliate the Lutherans, accept language which was not adapted to win them? Probably the answer is, as Gieseler seems to suggest, that Calvin and Bullinger had in view as their immediate aim obtaining the assent of Berne, where the majority party was extreme Zwinglian. If so, the object was only partially attained. Berne had taken offense at Calvin's theocratic scheme, by which Geneva had assumed a place of secure independence of her ambitious neighbor; and for many of the Bernese no good thing could come out of Geneva. They objected to the publication of the document, and finally consented to this, giving only verbal, because not unanimous, assent to its contents.[35] The other Swiss Protestant communities gave their adherence to the *Consensus;* and its adoption marked the virtual unification of French and German Swiss Protestantism and prevented all further danger of a split over the Lord's Supper in the reformed churches of Europe.[36]

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[32] Calvin to Myconius, November 26, 1549 (*C.R.*, XLI, 457).

[33] *C.R.*, XXXV, 733 f.

[34] *History of Protestant Theology* (English ed., 1871), I, 410.

It is clear that from the first Calvin hoped to use the *Consensus* in order to accredit, not Geneva, with which the Lutherans had then no controversy, but the German Swiss, to the German Lutherans. "Those who had formed an unworthy opinion of us," he writes, "will see that we proposed nothing but what was good and right. . . . . Those in distant lands who differ from us in opinion will soon we hope offer us the hand."[37] Here he may have had reference to England as well as Germany. But his main design was to elevate the Swiss theology to a plane on which the Germans would feel free to recognize it. How could he have expected so much from the *Consensus*, which nobody could possibly mistake for a Lutheran document? In order to answer this question it is necessary to remember in the first place that the document was an unequivocal assertion on the part of the Swiss that the sacraments were not bare signs, and this was calculated to overcome Lutheran assumptions about the Zwinglians.[38] Again it was clearly Calvin's opinion that the essential, as distinct from the accidental, elements of the Lutheran view were comprised in the doctrine of spiritual presence as forcibly stated and reiterated in the *Consensus,* and that moderate Lutherans would regard the positive sections of the document with no disfavor. It is not to be supposed, either, that he intended to make the *Consensus* a *sine qua non* of negotiation with the Lutherans. Beza, during Calvin's lifetime and with his support, made greater concessions. The *Consensus* would serve, however, to introduce the Zurichers to the Wittenbergers. In point of fact it did serve that purpose. Melanchthon, on reading it, said he had never before understood the Swiss position.[39] Dorner says, "many Germans, especially at Strassburg and Wittenberg, shared Calvin's hope."[40] Never before had there seemed so fair a prospect of Protestant peace and intercommunion. Bucer and à Lasco sent congratulations from England, where the idea of a general consensus of Protestantism was now being canvassed from another angle.

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[35] *C.R.*, XLI, 391 (Ministri Bernenses Turicensibus, anno 1549), and *ibid.*, p. 397 (Calvinus Vireto, September 23, 1549).

[36] Doumergue, *op. cit.*, V, 368, quoting Witz-Oberlin.

[37] Quoted by Henry, *Life and Times of John Calvin* (trans. by Stebbins, 1852), II, 82.

The success of Calvin's project depended on the ascendancy in Germany of the conciliatory wing of the Lutherans. After the Schmalkald wars, however, the strict confessionalists bestirred themselves to oppose the concord. They were reactionaries protesting against the growing liberalism in Lutheran circles. Their movement began, not with an assault upon the *Variata* (which seems not to have been in controversy till 1560),[41] but by a violent attack upon the Tigurine agreement. In this controversy Calvin's most prominent antagonist was Joachim Westphal (1510–74, pastor at Hamburg since 1541). Beginning in 1552 he issued a series of five tracts vigorously denouncing Calvin, Bullinger, à Lasco, Peter Martyr, and the Swiss *Consensus*. Learning that he was canvassing lower Germany for pledges against the doctrine of the *Consensus*, Calvin entered the lists in reply, and issued in 1554 the text of the *Consensus* with an exposition (*Mutual Consent in Regard to the Sacraments*), and in 1556 his *Second Defense of the Sound and Orthodox Faith Concerning the Sacraments, in Answer to the Calumnies of Joachim Westphal*. This was followed in 1557 by a *Final Admonition* to Westphal. In these vigorous pamphlets Calvin sometimes resorted to bitter invective. But they are remarkable for his insistent claim that he has always approved of the *Augustana* as it was presented in the conferences with the Romanists (i.e., the *Variata*), and for a bold appeal to Melanchthon, its "most distinguished author." For the sake of illustration some paragraphs from the *Final Admonition* may here be quoted:

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[38] Henry quotes Planck to the effect that the *Consensus* "accomplished, or at least declared," the union of the Swiss with the Lutheran system, and that by it all doubt as to whether the Swiss recognized the actual presence was completely removed *(ibid.)*.

[39] Henry, *op. cit.*, II, 83, citing Lavater. See, however, *C.R.*, XLII, 417, where he writes Melanchthon (November 29, 1552) that he has been informed that his friend had stricken out a sentence of the *Consensus* on election.

[40] *Op. cit.*, I, 410.

> To free ourselves from the prejudice thus craftily sought to be excited, I appealed, I admit, to the author of the Confession, and I do not repent having done so. What does Westphal do? With his gross barbarism he represents me as making the victory to depend upon Philip's subscribing to us. Let not my readers wait till he himself becomes ashamed of this falsehood; there is too much brass in his brow: let them only judge what such vile talk deserves.
>
> My words are: in regard to the Confession of Augsburg my answer is, that (as it was published at Ratisbon) it does not contain a word contrary to our doctrine. If there is any ambiguity in its meaning, there cannot be a more competent interpreter than its author, to whom, as his

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[41] Gieseler goes so far as to say: "As long as Melanchthon lived the *Variata* was universally and without objection used, even by the most decided opponents of Melanchthon, as Westphal," and notes that it was first called in question at Striegel in 1560 (*Church History*, IV, 433, footnote 33).

due, all pious and learned men will readily pay this honour. To him I boldly appeal; and thus Westphal with his vile garrulity lies prostrate.

Let him extract from these words, if he can, that I made the victory to depend on the subscription of any single man. No less sordid is the vanity which makes him wonder exceedingly that such a stigma was fastened on his master, though, from Philip's answer, he has learned the fact of our agreement more clearly than I ventured to declare it. But what need is there of words? If Joachim wishes once for all to rid himself of all trouble and put an end to the controversy, let him extract one word in his favor from Philip's lips. The means of access are open, and the journey is not so very laborious, to visit one whose consent he boasts so loftily, and with whom he may thus have familiar intercourse. If I shall be found to have used Philip's name rashly, there is no stamp of ignominy to which I am not willing to submit.

The passage which Westphal quotes it is not mine to refute, nor do I regard what, during the first conflict, before the matter was clearly and lucidly explained, the importunity of some may have extorted from one who was then too backward in giving a denial. It were too harsh to lay it down as a law on literary men, that after they have given a specimen of their talent and learning they are never after to go beyond it in the course of their lives. Assuredly, whosoever shall say that Philip has added nothing by the labour of forty years, does great wrong to him individually, and to the whole Church. The only thing I said, and, if need be, a hundred times repeat, is, that in this matter Philip can no more be torn from me than he can from his own bowels. But although fearing the thunder which threatened to burst from violent men (those who know the boisterous blasts of Luther understand what I mean), he did not always speak out so openly as I could have wished, there is no reason why Westphal, while pretending differently, should indirectly charge him with having begun to incline to us only after Luther was dead. For when more than seventeen years ago we conferred together on this point of doctrine, at our first meeting not a syllable required to be changed. Nor should I omit to mention Gaspar Cruciger, who, from his excellent talents and learning, stood next after Philip highest in Luther's estimation, and far beyond all others. He so cordially embraced what Westphal now impugns, that nothing can be imagined more perfectly accordant than our opinions. But if there is still any doubt as to Philip, do I not make a sufficient offer when I wait silent and confident for his answer, assured that it will make manifest the dishonesty which has falsely sheltered itself under the venerable name of that most excellent man.[42]

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[42] Calvin, *Tracts*, II, 355 f. *C.R.*, XXXVII, 148 f.

Melanchthon, who had already suffered from the venom of Westphal's pen,[43] now, as Moeller says, "wrapped himself in silence." But his silence gave assent to Calvin's claim, and the extremists are soon found accusing him of a secret understanding with Calvin. Thus the promising effort for the peace and consolidation of Protestantism issued in the violent Crypto-Calvinist controversy, in which the exclusive party finally triumphed and the possibility of a general agreement was rendered exceedingly remote.

Calvin did not live to learn of the expulsion of the Philippists from Wittenberg or to read the *Formula of Concord,* and he never despaired of the ultimate success of the consensus project. Kolfhaus ascribes his undimmed hope to his sense of unity with Melanchthon.[44] It is to be remembered however, that he always insisted on his essential agreement with Luther. Thus he wrote to Marbach, a Lutheran minister of Strassburg, in 1554:

> If that excellent servant of the Lord and faithful Doctor of the Church, Martin Luther, were still alive, he would not be so severe and implacable as to refuse his ready assent to this Confession, namely, that that is truly afforded us which the sacraments figure, and we are therefore partakers in the Lord's Supper of the body and blood of Christ. How often did he say that he contended for nothing but that it might be clearly understood that the Lord does not mock us with empty signs. . . . . Greatly would it trouble me if a doctrine should now be rejected which I so many years ago taught freely and openly at Strasburg, both in the schools and in the churches.[45]

Doumergue regards the years 1556–58 as the period of Calvin's greatest effort to make "of the two protestantisms one." In his sixth volume he has furnished a full narrative of the conferences of that period. But while Calvin is still seen to be hopeful and active, his figure largely recedes here behind that of his stalwart lieutenant, Beza. It is Beza's hand that shapes

[43] *Historia vituli aurei Aaronis ad nostra tempora accommodata* (1549). Cf. Kawerau, "Westphal," in *Realencyklopädie,* 3d ed., XXI, 186.

[44] *Calvinstudien,* p. 111.

[45] *C.R.,* XLIII, 212 f.

the documents of negotiation, and it is Beza who goes (four times) to confer with the Germans. Nor does it appear that Beza was so much concerned with the high task of forming a Protestant communion as with the pressing and immediate need of securing German protection for the persecuted Huguenots. He prepared a confession (1557) that was decidedly more pro-Lutheran than the Swiss *Consensus*. Calvin fully supported his efforts and tried to secure Bullinger's assent to the formula. But Bullinger was not only hesitant; he was hostile. The Zurich attitude here reminds us of the history of the *Wittenberg Concord*. The unfavorable reception of Beza's compromise in German Switzerland nullified the project.[46]

Near the end of 1560 Calvin tried to renew the union project and sent a memorandum to the Reformed Churches of France, then newly organized on a national basis and since Henry II's death filled with hope of liberty. He now proposed the assembling of "a free and universal council to put an end to the divisions of Christendom."[47] Such a council must be thoroughly representative. It would determine matters of doctrine, "ceremonies," and church government. In order that it should effect the reunion of Christendom (*afin que toute la chrestiente soit reunie*), the participants in it must be prepared to abide by its decisions or be cast off as schismatics from the general body. It does not appear that Calvin expected or would have tolerated any scheme of reunion with the unrepentant papacy. Yet he countenanced the Colloquy of Poissy in 1561, and might have attended it if it had been thought wise to invite him.

At this period Calvin repeatedly besought Melanchthon to take action on behalf of peace and union. In a letter of August 3, 1557, he suggests a conference of pious, upright (*integris*), and moderate men to be held at Strassburg, Tübingen, Heidelberg, or Frankfort, with the consent of the princes. If he is himself regarded as of this class, no necessity whatever will prevent his attendance.[48]

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[46] Baum, *Theodor Beza*, I, 405; Baird, *Theodore Beza*, pp. 90 f; Doumergue, *op. cit.*, VI, 527 f.

[47] *Memoire sur le concile* (*C.R.*, XLVI, 285 f.).

Widely divergent views have been expressed of Calvin's advocacy of unification. The Lutheran, G. Kawerau, approves the remark that Calvin engaged in the conflict with Westphal from "motives of church politics."[49] The Roman Catholic, J. M. V. Audin, while in general representing Calvin as a destructive radical, occasionally, and particularly in the matter of union, regards him as an ecclesiastical politician intent upon molding a vast socio-political organization.[50] On the other hand, some admirers of the reformer have held that his plan had nothing to do with organic union.[51] Neither of these theses can be exclusively maintained in the face of his known principles and practice; yet both preserve aspects of the truth. His work and letters on every page proclaim him a man of religion; he cared for political affairs only as they related themselves to religion. On the other hand, he had a deep concern for church government that must have asserted itself in the development of any plan of union. While it is true that he frequently speaks of the Catholic church as invisible, he never regards it as ideally without visibility or unity. Its invisibility is its misfortune, due to medieval papal oppression. "How unlike, or rather how contrary, is its present perverted government to the ancient government of the Church." The Romanists have "used the name of the Church itself to oppress the Church.[52] The divisions in the church, the "frightful mutilation of Christ's body," caused him profound pain.[53] He wished "to maintain the church universal in its unity, which malignant minds have always been eager to dissever."[54] Having quoted the *Interim* on the marks of the true church, he comments: "The marks which they set down for discerning the church, viz., pure doctrine, the right use of the sacraments, and the holy unity thereon depending, I willingly receive." It is noteworthy that he here records no objection to the strong claims of corporate unity set forth in the *Interim,* but merely proceeds to attack the episcopal-succession doctrine of continuity.[55] It is of the visible church that he is treating when he says, in fullest accord with Thomas Aquinas: "What God has thus joined let not man put asunder. To those to whom he is a father, the church must also be a mother" (*ut, quibus ipse est pater, ecclesia etiam mater sit*).[56]

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[48] *C.R.*, XLIV, 558.

[49] *Realencyclopädie*, XXI, 187.

[50] *Histoire de la vie, des ouvrages, et des doctrines de Jean Calvin* (1850) I, v, viii, 360; II, 383.

[51] See, for example, P. Vollmer, *John Calvin, Preacher, Educator, Statesman* (1909). This writer states (p. 145): "The close connection between church and state in all Protestant countries excluded all ideas of organic or absorptive union." Calvin, he thinks, was far from proposing any governmental unification.

[52] *Tracts*, III, 265. *C.R.*, XXXV, 611. Cf. the *Westminster Confession*, chap. xxv: "The visible church which is also Catholick . . . . the Catholick Church hath been sometimes more sometimes less visible."

Whatever place invisibility had in the church theory of Calvin, practically he exhibited an ecumenical outlook, and combined with a strict conception of doctrine a surprising degree of ecclesiastical liberalism. Hence he not only tolerated but commended the office of archbishop for Poland,[57] regretted Hooper's overstrained Puritan scruples about vestments,[58] and repeatedly urged the avoidance of separation even where concessions in opinion constituted the price of unity.[59]

Troeltsch has acutely remarked: "Following the example of Geneva itself, the center of the strictest doctrinal unity and discipline, Calvin thought he could, by arranging all peripheric peculiarities, weld the various countries and churches into the great body of general Protestantism."[60] Calvin approached the task in a religious spirit and sought to build a Europe-wide religious communion; but his success would probably have involved the erection of a somewhat elastic church polity and, where possible, the employment of the secular power in the service of the church. To this policy Calvin's view of the function of the state committed him. For him the state is to be maintained "in order that a public form of religion may exist among Christians, and humanity be established among men."[61]

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[53] "Nemo enim est, vel modico duntaxat pietatis sensu praeditus, quem non excruciet ac moerore conficiat foeda haec, horrendaque corporis Christi laceratio" (*C.R.*, XXXV, 591).

[54] *Institutio,* IV, 1, 9. *C.R.*, XXX, 754.

[55] *C.R.*, XXXV, 610.

[56] *Inst.*, IV, 1, *C.R.*, XXX, 746. Compare the explicit statements in the Catechism of Geneva (1542) on the unity of the church: "Pas plusieurs, mais une seule" (*C.R.*, XXXIV, 39).

[57] Letter to Sigismund Augustus, December, 1554 (*C.R.*, XLIII, 330).

[58] To Bullinger, March, 1551 (*C.R.*, XLII, 75).

[59] E.g., *Inst.*, IV, 1, 12. *C.R.*, XXX, 756; XXXVII, 36.

Calvin played for high stakes. Had his ardent hopes been fulfilled, Protestantism would have taken the outlines of a church ecumenical and conciliar, in which the unity which was once attained on the monarchical principle of government at the cost of no little repression, under the papacy, would have been succeeded by a general communion under the government of a representative body expressive of the voluntary cohesion of the states, cities, and groups participating. Once established, this Protestant conciliar church of Europe might have chosen to employ the weapon of political coercion and thus have brought upon itself reproach, embarrassment, or ruin. On the other hand, it might conceivably have given expression on a grand scale to Christian fraternity, catholicity, and democracy, reversed the process of dissolution in the church, exhibited to the distracted states of Europe an impressive pattern of spontaneous unity, and rendered the last four centuries of Western history incomparably richer and happier than they have been.

[60] "Calvin and Calvinism," *Hibbert Journal*, VIII (1909), 102.

[61] "Ut inter Christianos publica religionis facies exsistat, inter homines constet humanitas" (*Inst.*, IV, xx, 3; *C.R.*, XXX, 1094).

TRENDS IN THE REDEFINITION OF RELIGION

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THE ENDEAVOR to achieve a more adequate working hypothesis of the nature and meaning of religion as a function of human life, to be employed as an instrument of guidance and analysis, is pertinent to the future development of all the religious sciences. That each religious science or discipline will deal with different types of data and experience and will work from distinctive points of view appears both desirable and inevitable. Yet a large measure of convergence in the understanding of the central nature and function of religion as a planetary phenomenon ought to be capable of realization if thorough objectivity of mental attitude and inclusiveness of data characterize the methodology of the religious scientist.

This article represents an attempt to outline a method for reaching an understanding of the nature of religion which will meet the demands of the criteria entitling it to the term "scientific." The approach developed in this study suggests merely one of various methods that might legitimately be employed.[1] A working definition or understanding of religion should satisfy the criteria enumerated as follows: First, it should take into account all of the facts or data of religion. This means that it should include all the elements—thought-forms, customs, attitudes, and ceremonies—of all religions in the various stages of development. Secondly, the psychological and social forces which give rise to the religious thought-forms and activities, the human needs, wants, motives, purposes, and interests, should be unfolded and analyzed. Further, the distinctive nature and functional significance of the religious phenomena for the individual and group should be clarified. This last criterion would yield the differentia of religious behavior. To meet the demands of these criteria calls for the synthetic employment of the genetic, psychological, social, and historical methods of analyzing and describing the inclusive data of religions.

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[1] For other methods recently formulated, see the following: Aubrey, "The Nature of Religion—A Study in Method of Definition," *Journal of Religion*, V, 187–91; Cole, "What Is Religious Experience," *Journal of Religion*, VI, 472–85.

A second promising method for achieving a tentative working hypothesis of the nature of religion would be an intensive critique of the history of the attempt to discover the nature of religion within the religious sciences. A critical analysis of representative efforts during the past few decades to unfold the nature of religion should indicate the factors making for divergency and limitations in understanding, the present trends in the interpretation of religion, and the possibility of convergence in understanding with the employment of a more adequate methodology.

The method utilized in this study, while primarily following the second procedure, combines essentially the central features of both the methods suggested previously. A critical analysis of the numerous attempts to define the nature of religion demands that all of the data yielded by the genetic, psychological, social, and historical approaches be drawn upon. More specifically stated, our mode of procedure may be summarized as follows: Representative scholars are selected on the basis of the methodological school to which they belong: philological, anthropological, psychological, or historical. The author's understanding of religion is oriented to the sources and range of his data, his psychological point of view, any philosophical presuppositions evidenced, the method of analysis, and any other significant elements in his description of religious behavior. An analysis is then made of the way in which the scholar's method has influenced such factors as the selection of data, the interpretation of materials, and his understanding of religion. A complementary phase of this analysis will indicate the effect of any initial presupposition as to the nature of religion upon the selection and interpretation of data. This critical analysis of the interactionary relationship between *method* and *understanding* may throw light on the cause of diversity in the interpretations of religion. The critique of the author's conception of religion should be essayed in the light of all the facts now made available by any of the religious sciences.

I

It is of the utmost importance to note at the beginning of our survey the understanding of religion which dominated Christian thought at the time of the genesis of the science of religion. Familiar is the story of how the practical life of society had thrown off the effective ecclesiastical control of the thirteenth century, leaving the church as a separate institution with the one chief function of mediating that supernatural regeneration which alone could guarantee salvation. It was inevitable in this situation that religion should become identified with the church and with certain items of belief, supernatural in character, upon which rested the entire function of the church. Religion in Christian thought, even until the present, in the popular mind has tended to mean something to be believed about God and salvation, which is intimately tied up with a particular institution, the church. Failure to recognize the dominant and persistent character of this traditional view of religion would be to lack appreciation of the immense difficulties which the students of religious science have faced in freeing themselves from the presuppositions of a Christian milieu.

During the middle of the nineteenth century numerous factors contributed to the emergence of a science of religion. The new physical sciences, the empirical and critical philosophy of Bacon, Hume, Kant, Mill, and the French Positivists, the application of the biological evolutionary hypothesis to other fields of scientific study, the activities of trader and explorer in revealing new countries and civilizations, archaeological research, the new method of historical study especially applied to the Scriptures, and the rapid advances of the sciences of philology and anthropolgy are influences which provided a favorable setting and stimulus for a scientific study of religions. The religious history of the race now presenting itself in a broad panoramic sweep exhibited multitudinous and widely diverse thought-forms and customs. Confronted by religions which possessed Scriptures that claimed divine authority, elements which were disconcertingly similar or contradictory to the "essentials" of Christianity, ideas of numerous gods or no gods at all, it was inevitable that open-minded and critical scholars would move in the direction of a transformed and enlarged understanding of the nature of religion.

The most conspicuous exponent of the philological method applied in the field of religion was Max Müller.[2] Language forms as exhibited in sacred scriptures, commentaries, creeds, songs, prayers, proverbs, and curses constituted the chief sources of his materials. Müller's psychological presuppositions are most clearly revealed in his notion that man possesses a "faculty of faith" which apprehends the Infinite independent of all historical religions, just as man has a faculty of speech independent of all the historical forms of language.[3] The basic quality in religion for Müller is "the perception of the Infinite."

The limitations of Müller's method and his conception of religion are too numerous for detailed analysis here. The philological mode of approach, unaided by other sciences, proved utterly incapable of restoring the social milieu in which the vital significance of the religious life could be clearly discerned. The philological bias tended to result in a stress upon ideas or theology as the central fact of religion. Throughout all of Müller's studies the influence of Christian thought may be easily observed. Full emancipation had not yet been achieved.

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[2] *Chips from a German Workship*, Vol. I; *Origin and Growth of Religion; Introduction to the Science of Religion; Natural Religion; Physical Religion; Anthropological Religion.*

[3] *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, pp. 13–16. Müller as a translator of Kant may have been influenced by his philosophy in this notion of faith as a specific mental faculty.

II

Anthropological science has played a major rôle in the history of religious science, although the interest of the anthropologist is not primarily in the field of religion. The names of Spencer, Tylor, Lang, Frazer, Jevons, and Farnell are conspicuous among the early students of the science of religion. Tylor,[4] Lang,[5] and Frazer[6] may be selected as representative of the earlier school of anthropologists. The investigations of these scholars are characterized by the employment of the comparative method for classifying data, and the assumption of a uniform religious evolution. Their studies are confined almost entirely to the religions of primitive groups.

Tylor's celebrated "minimum definition of religion" is "the belief in Spiritual Beings."[7] Lang's view of the nature of religion is not essentially different. It involves the belief in "the existence of an Intelligence or Intelligences not human" and in the possession by man of "an element which may possibly survive the death of the body." The definition of religion formulated by Frazer has received wide attention. For him religion consists of "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and human life ."[8] Of these two elements, theoretical and practical, belief clearly is primary.

Again it is necessary to telescope our critique of the studies of these scholars. The notion of "social evolution" has now been generally abandoned by social scientists. The comparative method came under heavy fire from which it has emerged stripped of its chief assumptions.[9] The social and psychological significance of the forms studied was seriously neglected, resulting in a skeleton picture of religion rather than in a view of a vital organic process. Nor is any generalization as to the nature of religion legitimate on the basis of the facts yielded by a study of primitivity alone. A grave limitation lies in the psychological point of view which seems entirely too intellectualistic in the light of current psychological science. The authors conceive as simple and essentially intellectual what is actually a complex of behavior forms which are directly related to certain interests and values of the religious group. The judgment can hardly be escaped that these scholars started with an understanding of religion which tended to influence both the selection and the interpretation of data. Possessing this primary assumption, the limitations in method did not force a more thorough and penetrating analysis of the facts.

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[4] *Primitive Culture.*

[5] *The Making of Religion.*

[6] *The Golden Bough.*

[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 424.

[8] *Op. cit.*, I, 222–23.

When we come to the newer anthropological school we find a more refined and elaborate methodological procedure.[10] Among the most prominent scholars working with the newer tools of investigation are Boas, Dixon, Goldenweiser, Graebner, Lowie, Marett, Rivers, Sapir, Schmidt, and Wissler. The best representatives for our purpose are Marett,[11] Goldenweiser,[12] and Lowie,[13] because of their significant work in the field of religion. These men reject the evolutionary theory of development, employ the comparative method with caution, draw their materials largely from primitive culture, and emphasize the emotional and impulsive aspects of behavior. Marett, more fully than the others, recognizes the importance of the socio-psychological factors in the analysis of religious behavior.

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[9] For penetrating critiques of the comparative method see: Schleiter, *Religion and Culture*; Haydon, "From Comparative Religion to the History of Religions," *Journal of Religion*, II, 579 ff.

[10] For descriptive statements of the nature, task, and methods of the new anthropology, see: H. E. Barnes (editor) *The New History and Social Studies*, pp. 269-70; *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, pp. 247; Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*.

[11] *The Threshold of Religion*; *Psychology and Folk-Lore*.

[12] *Early Civilization*; "Religion and Society; A Critique of Émile Durkheim's Theory of the Origin and Nature of Religion," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method*, IV, 113-24; "Spirit, Mana, and the Religious Thrill," *ibid.*, XII, 632-40.

[13] *Primitive Religion*.

There is a striking degree of unanimity in the way these anthropologists interpret the nature of religion. They share in common the *mana* theory of religious origins and this provides the motif for their interpretation of all religious phenomena. The *mana* concept grows out of the reaction of primitive man to everything in his environment that is superusual, dangerous, uncanny, awesome, extraordinary, or mysterious. The essence of early religion is the reaction of awe and emotional thrill in response to the mysterious, magic potency manifested in things, persons, and events, together with the effort of man to adjust himself to this potency. The higher religious thought-forms and customs are exfoliations of this *mana* reaction. Marett has been most conspicuous in developing the *mana* or preanimistic theory of origins. The particular nuance in Goldenweiser's analysis of religion lies in his stress on the "religious thrill" which is derived directly from man's contact with certain manifestations of nature. Lowie's main contribution to religious science is the concrete materials he presents. Religion, for him, is essentially the "sense of something transcending the expected or natural, a sense of the Extraordinary, Mysterious, or Supernatural," in a word "supernaturalism."

The limitations of method, psychology, materials, and understanding involved in the studies of the anthropologists will become increasingly evident as our survey continues. There is a distinct gain in the psychological shift from belief to impulsive and emotional action as prior in primitive behavior. The utter impossibility, however, of embracing the multifarious and diverse activities of the religions of man in the frail category of "an emotional reaction to the superusual" is clearly evident in the face of facts yielded by the other religious sciences. Moreover, there is no genuine attempt to discover the relationship of the "religious reaction" to the needs, interests, and processes of the group which have produced it and which give to it the most vital significance.

The outstanding inadequacy suggested by a careful analysis of these studies is in the authors' initial understanding of religion. They start with the hypothesis that religion is some kind of a reaction to the supernatural, select only those materials which cluster around this kind of behavior, and submit them to psychological analysis.[14] The primary presupposition thus seems to be the determining factor in the understanding of religion.

III

Countless are the scholars that have employed the historical method in the study of religions. So wide are the variations in the mode of procedure, the kinds of data utilized, and the psychological approach that to venture even a bare characterization is a precarious undertaking. "No document, no history" has ever been the slogan of the historians. The term "document" is interpreted generously and includes not only literary records, but also superscriptions, archaeological remains, and monuments.[15] A growing effort to orient the document to its total social milieu finds its fullest expression in the work of the "new historians," whose investigations will be considered in a later section of this survey.

A close examination of the studies of such representative scholars as Tiele,[16] Albert Réville,[17] Kellogg,[18] Menzies,[19] Jas-

[14] Cf. Lowie, *op. cit.*, XVII, 4, 71.

[15] For statements of the traditional historical principles and method, see the following: J. Toutain, "L'Histoire des Religions et le Totemisme," in *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, II, 121–31; H. Pinard de la Boullaye, *op. cit.*, p. 390; J. Réville, *op. cit.*, pp. 227, 240.

[16] *Elements of the Science of Religions.*

[17] *Prolegomena of the History of Religions.*

[18] *The Genesis and Growth of Religion.*

[19] *History of Religion.*

trow,[20] Jean Réville,[21] J. Estlin Carpenter,[22] Toy,[23] and Hume[24] yields results which can only be scantily summarized in this article. There is a marked tendency in some cases to stress the sacred scriptures as the main source of materials for the interpretation of the religion of any historic group.[25] The inadequacy of scripture as a primary source for the study of religion is now fully recognized by the modern historian.[26] Although a wide range of data is drawn upon by many of the historians, there is little realization, with one or two exceptions, of the necessity of interpreting the significance of a particular datum or form against the background of its social, political, geographic, and economic setting. The psychological concepts and principles used as tools of analysis were not very fruitful from the standpoint of present psychological science. No longer does the psychologist talk about "a religious faculty," "a religious instinct," "a religious sentiment," "an innate sense of the Infinite," or the "priority of belief" in man's religious behavior. Similarly, the endeavor to root religion in "a feeling of dependence," or any other single feeling or sentiment has failed to find support in the later researches of religious scientists.

Religion, though envisaged and defined differently by each scholar, consists essentially for all in some belief in, or attitude toward, the superhuman or supernatural. From this basal belief, feeling, or instinct, flow the other elements of the religious complex: ceremonial, thought-forms, institutions, ethical ideas and conduct. The influence of traditional Christian philosophical and theological thinking is clearly discerned in a survey of the work of the historians of religion. Greater objectivity, a wider range of data, a more adequate psychology, more refined checks to eliminate bias, and a deeper penetration of the social and functional meaning of the religious forms are all important elements in present historical method.

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[20] *The Study of Religion.*

[21] *Les Phases Successives de L'Histoire des Religions.*

[22] *Comparative Religion.*

[23] *Introduction to the History of Religions.*

[24] *The World's Living Religions.*

[25] Cf. R. E. Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[26] Cf. S. J. Case, "The Historical Study of Religion," *Journal of Religion*, I, 1–17; *The Social Origins of Christianity*, pp. 1–37.

IV

The psychology of religion as a distinct branch of the empirical sciences is an achievement of the twentieth century. Its genesis is marked by the investigations of Hall, Starbuck, James, and Coe, which were indicative of a new spirit and a new method in the study of religious phenomena.[27]

The most significant contribution to the new science in the early period was *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* by William James. His psychological point of view and method are too well known to call for extended elaboration. His inquiry is devoted to the purely individualistic aspects of religion, the "cases" described and analyzed being those which exhibit unusual, extreme, or abnormal forms of behavior. Autobiography and other literary documents furnish the source materials for the study of these mystics, geniuses, and "twice-born" individuals. Religion, formally defined, means "the feelings, acts, and experiences of men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."[28]

Familiar is the story of the breakdown of James's central hypotheses, appealing though they were to many of his contemporaries. Irving King, followed by other psychologists, removed the "subconscious," in which religion was rooted for James, as a special agency of revelation.[29] The work of Baldwin, Cooley, Dewey, Faris, and Mead has reduced the individual of James's psychology to a mere abstraction. The selection for study of "extreme" and "psychopathological" cases brought forth a volley of criticism. The delimitation of his investigation to the religious experience of the individual to the neglect of the social phases of religion inevitably leads to an understanding of religion too partial for a working scientific definition.

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[27] For accounts of the beginnings of the psychology of religion, see: J. B. Pratt, "The Psychology of Religion," *Harvard Theological Review* (1908), pp. 435 ff.; E. L. Schaub, "The Psychology of Religion during the Past Quarter-Century," *Journal of Religion*, VI, 113–34.

[28] W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 41.

[29] I. King, "The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness," *Psychological Review, Monographic Supplement*, 1903; Coe, *Psychology of Religion;* "Religion and the Subconscious," *A.J.T.*, XIII, 337–40.

Stratton's *Psychology of the Religious Life* reveals a decidedly original and unique analysis of religion from the standpoint of materials, method of procedure, and point of view. Biography, confessions, and similar documents are relegated to the position of secondary and supplementary sources of data. The more objective manifestations of the religious life in customs, ceremonies, and other group practices constitute the most fruitful materials for the fullest understanding of religion. The deepest roots of religious experience he discovers in the idealization process which is inherent in the human mind. "The ideal is the picture of what will satisfy in the fullest measure our desires." It is "that which is most deeply satisfying." Religion may be characterized as "man's whole bearing toward whatever seems to him the best or greatest."[30]

The most conspicuous weaknesses in Stratton's approach are threefold: a rather uncritical use of scriptures and other literary documents as primary materials; an overemphasis on the concept of conflict as an organizing and interpreting principle of religious activities; and a failure to breathe vitality into the various religious thought-forms and customs by immersing them in the life-interests and processes of the group. He does approximate the genetic-functional understanding of religious behavior which is developed in a more throughgoing manner by such men as Ames, King, and Coe.

One of the most substantial contributors to the literature of the psychology of religion is Professor J. B. Pratt.[31] Drawing his materials from representative groups, Christian and Oriental, he essays an analysis of the religious processes "which in the last resort are to be found in the individual." Pratt asserts that no particular "brand" of psychology dominates his treatment of religion, but he does display a definite alignment with the "instinct" psychologists in the weight he gives to specific, inherited tendencies which condition man's attitude toward the "Determiner of Destiny." Religion is defined at the beginning of his latest book as "the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies."[32]

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[30] *Psychology of the Religious Life*, pp. 377, 394.

[31] *The Psychology of Religious Belief; The Religious Consciousness.*

Pratt's chief service to religious psychology is to be found in his descriptive analysis of some of the more significant experiences and processes of the religious individual, rather than in any distinctive clarification of the nature and meaning of religion as a human function. The range of his investigation appears to be largely determined by his interpretation of religion as the individual's attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny. Consequently, the genetic, social, developmental, and functional aspects of religion are not given prominence in his study.[33] The application of Professor Pratt's method and interpretation of religion tends to result in a stress on the theological aspects of the religious experience of the individual.

The understanding of religion in the studies of Leuba[34] and Wright,[35] while possessing distinctive features, agree in making *function* and *values* the basic factors in religion and an attitude toward the superhuman the *differentia* of religious behavior. For Leuba religion is "that mode of behavior in the struggle for life in which use is made of powers characterized here as psychic, superhuman, and usually personal."[36]

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[32] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 1.

[33] The individualistic and instinctivistic viewpoint in psychology which is evidenced in Pratt's work has received much criticism and chastening in recent years. See for typical critiques: Ames, "Religion in Terms of Social Consciousness," *J. of R.*, I, 264–70; Bernard, *Instinct*; Carr, *Psychology*, pp. 384 ff.; Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*; Faris, "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?" *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVII, 184–96.

[34] *A Psychological Study of Religion.*

[35] "A Psychological Definition of Religion," *A.J.T.*, XVI, 385–409; "On Certain Aspects of the Religious Sentiment," *J. of R.*, IV, 449–63; *A Student's Philosophy of Religion.*

Probably the most definite attempt to formulate a psychological definition of religion that would satisfy the canons of logical procedure and thus possess the precision requisite for a scientific discipline is that of Professor W. K. Wright. After stating the prerequisites for a scientifically valid definition of religion, he formulates the following one: "Religion is the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon the agency."[37] The *genus* of religion is the endeavor to secure socially recognized values, the *differentia* is found in the nature of the agency evoked in the process.

In finding the *genus* of religion in the realm of values Wright has the agreement of all religious scientists who seek a functional description of religious behavior. The validity of his differentia, however, is open to question. A few of the factors which make questionable its scientific tenability may be briefly enumerated. The investigations of Ames, Coe, Durkheim, and King provide much evidence for the hypothesis that religious processes, purposes, and reactions precede any notion of extra-human powers to be controlled in the interests of the group. Genetically, the idea of extra-human powers seems to be the result, rather than the cause, of the characteristically religious process.[38] Furthermore, the ever changing conception of the superhuman agencies makes precarious its selection as the central element in religion. The main defect of the definition is that it probably fails to take into account all of the facts. There are numerous "specific" religious activities that are not believed to evoke any extra-human agency. It is notable that salvation for the early Buddhists was an achievement of man himself, that current Jainism is non-theistic, that the "fundamentals" of Hindu religion concern social customs and habits,[39] and that Confucianism has been social and human in its emphasis.[40] Even in contemporary Christianity there are many "specific acts" of individuals and groups that are not intended to secure the help of any extra-human power. The efforts of the church to banish poverty, to achieve a humanized industrial order, to make prohibition effective, and to eliminate war from the world must all be labeled as non-religious according to this formula. There is a rapidly growing realization that many religious values are to be won by human effort, techniques, and enterprises.[41] A new analysis of the facts seems to be necessary in the interests of a scientific method for discovering the nature of religion.

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[36] *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

[37] *A.J.T.*, XVI, 393.

[38] See especially Coe, *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 60 ff.

V

The point of view and method of a functional, social psychology employed in a thoroughgoing way has proved conspicuously fruitful in the analysis of religious experience and in unfolding its meaning on the level of its deepest significance. Similarly, the evolutionary concept coupled with a socio-historical method have contributed greatly in clarifying our understanding of religion.

The studies of King,[42] Ames,[43] and Coe,[44] while carrying distinct differences in emphasis, share in a large measure a common genetic, social, developmental, and functional method of approach. Experiences are conceived in terms of activities or processes in specific situations in which ends, values, or purposes are always involved.[45] Professor Coe's functionalism is blended with "self-psychology," the central doctrine of which assumes that the conscious self is the basal fact of psychological science.[46] All of these scholars see clearly the necessity of employing the data of history, anthropology, sociology, genetic and social psychology, and history of religions.

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[39] Cf. Das, *Hinduism*; Eno, "Modernism in India," *J. of R.*, V, 239–54.

[40] Miao, "The Value of Confucianism for Religious Education in China," Doctor's thesis, University of Chicago.

[41] Cf. G. B. Smith, "Is Theism Essential to Religion?" *J. of R.*, V, 356–77.

[42] *The Development of Religion.*

[43] *The Psychology of Religious Experience.*

[44] *The Psychology of Religion.*

King finds that the religious attitude in the primitive group is intimately related to the process of valuation. Rites, ceremonies, and thought-forms achieve religious significance because they gather round those interests and needs which are most crucial in the life of the entire group. The fundamental factor in religion, therefore, is the attitude of valuation. Professor Ames's analysis of the origin and nature of religion parallels rather closely that of King. Certain activities which are directly related to the most vital interests of the group acquire that intensity and sense of worth which constitute them as religious because they are participated in by every member of the group with keen emotional reactions. Genetically and historically, "the religious consciousness may be identified with the consciousness of the greater values of life." The values of religion are always some other kind of values also, social, political, economic, or aesthetic. An unpublished definition of religion formulated by Ames avoids the term "consciousness," which has bothered some of his critics. "Religion is the pursuit on the part of the community, or the individual member of the community, of what are thought to be the highest social values."

Professor Coe dismisses as unfruitful all attempts to define religion in terms of a certain content of belief, or element of feeling. Ideas are always sustained by something that makes them interesting and important. "Religious feelings themselves must be understood by references to the situations in which they arise and the part they play in the total adjustment process." The process in which religious ideas and customs are developed must be the characteristically religious thing per se. "It is because a religious interest is already present that men achieve a notion of religiously superior powers." The differentia of religion, then, cannot be found in any content of belief, ceremonial technique, or the kind of agency evoked, but in the religious values, interests, and purposes which produce and make significant these elements. The chief thing in religion when viewed functionally seems to be "the progressive discovery and reorganization of values."[47]

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[45] The main principles of functional psychology are excellently summarized by Ames, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 ff.

[46] For a statement of the principles of "self-psychology" and for bibliography, see J. Moore, *The Foundations of Psychology*, pp. 68 ff.

The twentieth century has witnessed marked developments also in the field of historical science. Social ideas, forms, and institutions are being described in the light of their origin, function, and development in a socio-natural environment. Since the new historiography is still in its infancy, its results, particularly in the religious realm, are largely potential rather than achieved. The implications of the social historical method for the study of religions have been excellently formulated[48] and their fruitfulness amply demonstrated by Professor Case.[49] The unit of history shifts from the document to the contemporary social order, from thought-forms and ceremonial to the social process from which they emerge. "From the point of view of historical study, life in relation to surroundings is the primal stuff out of which religions evolve.[50] The vital interests of specific people and the means available for the satisfaction of these needs are the factors which determine and constitute the religion of the group. To interrogate the complex factors of the environment in order to discover the genetic forces which shape religion the assistance of various sciences is demanded. Sociology, anthropology, psychology, archeology, and general history must all be called upon in reconstructing the religious life of any particular group. To understand the functional significance of religious behavior an adequate psychological analysis of human needs, motives, and interests is indispensable. Important implications for the understanding of religion flow from these emphases of the new historian.

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[47] *Op. cit.*, p. 65. For the most extended critique of the work of the functionalists, see E. L. Schaub, "Functional Interpretations of Religion: A Critique," *Philosophical Essays in Honor of J. E. Creighton,* pp. 328–56; cf. also E. S. Brightman, "What Constitutes a Scientific Interpretation of Religion," *J. of R.*, VI, 250–58.

Other functional interpretations of religion include: Artman, "What Can Religious Education Do with Human Nature?" *Religious Education* (April, 1925), p. 78; Aubrey, *op. cit.*, p. 46; Cole, *op. cit.*, pp. 472–85; Edwards, *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 65, 71–72; Faris, "What Constitutes a Scientific Interpretation of Religion?" *J. of R.*, VI, 237, 240–42; Trout, "The Development of the Religious Attitudes," Doctor's thesis, University of Chicago, p. 46.

[48] "The Historical Study of Religion," *J. of R.*, I, 1 ff.

[49] *The Evolution of Early Christianity; The Social Origins of Christianity; Jesus: A New Biography.*

Religion, for Case, represents man's endeavor to secure a satisfactory life for the individual or group in contact with the various worlds of reality. Professor J. M. P. Smith finds the bases of the religion of the Hebrews in the social and natural setting which defined their needs and problems.[51] A recent Doctor's thesis which employs the social historical method in making a descriptive analysis of Hindu religion shows clearly that India has always understood religion to be the entire practical, social complex of life-interests and activities.[52] "It is not without significance," the author states, "that India had no special word for religion in her scriptural language. That life-quest and guidance was covered by the word *dharma*, referring to the social laws and duties which constitute religion for India."[53] Professor George Moore expresses the universal motive of religion in the phrase: "life, more full, a fuller, richer, more satisfying life."[54]

"The co-operative quest for a completely satisfying life" is the central meaning of religion as a function of life for Professor Haydon.[55] Religions are as many as the human groups that have developed a complex of customs, thought-forms, and ceremonies that embody and mediate those values and satisfactions which constitute the most worthful life. Three elements or phases are always involved in this shared quest of socially approved values: a theological or ideological element which results from man's endeavor to adjust himself to the natural environing world; the practical technique of ritual, custom, ceremony, and institutional activity which develops as means of controlling the environment in order that the crucial needs of life may be satisfied; the ideal of what constitutes the most worthful or satisfactory life. All these elements of theology, technique of control, and the idea of the good life "have changed continuously owing to increased knowledge of the nature of the universe, more effective practical control, and an ever higher ideal of social spiritual values."[56] The differentia of religion cannot be found in any of these changing elements, but in the shared quest of socially approved values and satisfactions.

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[50] Case, *Journal of Religion, op. cit.*, p. 9.

[51] *The Prophet and His Problems; The Prophet and His Times.*

[52] Eno, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

[54] *The Birth and Growth of Religion*, p. 7.

VI

This critical, synoptic survey of the quest of the religious sciences for an understanding of the nature of religion leads to several tentative conclusions. Emancipation from theological and supernatural-centered conceptions of religion has been difficult, yet gradual. Presuppositions of a particular religion in a particular social milieu have been constantly "rationalized" as the fundamentals of all religions. The limitations in method have been another conspicuous factor in the slow movement toward a thoroughly descriptive and scientific understanding of religious behavior. The most satisfactory estimate of the relative rôle of the two factors, method and understanding, is to view them in an interactionary relationship. More objective and more trustworthy scientific procedure dealing with a more inclusive range of data and employing a more adequate psychology has brought a larger understanding of religion. The enlarged understanding of religion, in turn, has contributed to the development of a more reliable and fruitful method of investigation. Resulting from this circular or interactionary process has come the gradual clarification of the deeper meaning of religious phenomena and a more dependable scientific methodology.

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[55] See the following articles by Professor Haydon for a description of method in the religious sciences and for his descriptive interpretation of religion: "From Comparative Religion to the History of Religions," *J. of R.*, II, 579 ff.; "What Constitutes a Scientific Interpretation of Religion," *J. of R.*, VI, 243–49; "Religion: A Co-operative Quest of the Good Life," *American Review*, I, 88 ff.; "The Definition of Religion: A Symposium," *J. of R.*, VII, 125–35.

[56] *J. of R.*, VI, 40.

The critique of the progress of five decades in the definition of religion, with materials presented in a cumulative fashion from all the religious sciences, reveals a strong tendency toward convergence on the basis of a functional understanding of religion. The facts yielded by genetic, psychological, and socio-historical studies support the tentative hypothesis that religion is a complex of ideas, attitudes, habits, customs, and practices developed by a group as it adjusts itself to its total environment, social and natural, in the endeavor to achieve those values and satisfactions which are considered most worthful. The values may be sought in this world or in a world beyond, but even the other-worldly aspirations have their genesis and significance in the pursuit of the ideally satisfying life. This seems to be the meaning of religion as a function of human life when viewed in its universal sweep through the ages. Perhaps the most important present task of the philosophy of religion is the development of the implications of the scientific understanding of religion for the ideal and program of religion and religious education in the light of the new needs, new problems, new knowledge, and new possibilities of the modern world.

BARTH'S RELIGIOUS CRITICISM OF RELIGION[1]

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RELIGION is essentially the relationship between man and God, i.e., it is a subject-object relationship, in which the object, belonging to a world beyond the immediate grasp of the human mind, can never be conceived with realistic assurance. Theology as the rational expression of the religious experience is always in danger of violating the inner character of religion. In its tendency toward assertion it is constantly speaking in affirmative terms of what intellectually can hardly be affirmed. This consciousness of the limitation of theological assertion was, at least in Protestantism, greatly deepened by Kant's epistemology. Only two ways were left open to meet the demand for religious expression and for the theological substantiation of this expression:

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[1] The following literature is recommended: Karl Barth, *Der Römerbrief*, 5. Aufl. (München, 1926); *Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie* (Gesammelte Vorträge), 2 Aufl. (München, 1925); *Die Auferstehung der Toten*, 2. Aufl. (München, 1925); "Sechzehn Antworten und Offener Brief an A. v. Harnack," *Die Christliche Welt* (1923); Bernhard Dörries, *Der nahe und der ferne Gott* (Gotha, 1927); Th. L. Haitjema, *Karl Barth's Kritische Theologie* (Wageningen, 1926); Willy Lüttge, *Dialektische Theologie* (Tübingen, 1925); Emanuel Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal* (Göttingen, 1922), pp. 155 ff.; Wilhelm Kolfhaus, *Die Botschaft des Karl Barth* (1927); Walter Künneth, *Die Lehre von der Sünde, dargestellt an dem Verhältnis Kierkegaards zur neuesten Theologie* (Gütersloh, 1927); Hans Wilh. Schmidt, *Zeit und Ewigkeit, die letzten Voraussetzungen der dialektischen Theologie* (Gütersloh, 1927); Max Strauch, *Die Theologie Karl Barths* (München, 1926); Paul Althaus, *Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie*, I, 4; Torsten Bohlin, *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (1926), pp. 163–98, 268–79; Horst Stephan, *ibid.* (1925), pp. 159–215, 278–85; Georg Wünsch, *ibid.* (1923–24), pp. 327–52, 444–48; Gust, Krueger, *Harvard Theological Review* (1926); G. G. Kullmann, *Anglican Theological Review*, X (1927), pp. 116–34; H. R. Mackintosh, *Expository Times*, XXXVI (1924–25), pp. 73–75; J. W. McConnachie, *Hibbert Journal*, XXV (1927), pp. 385–400; P. Scherding, *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuse*, VI (1926), pp. 336–49. A complete study of the "theology of crisis" should also include the works of Friedrich Gogarten, Eduard Thurneysen, and especially Emil Brunner. Since their point of view is slightly different from Barth's, and since they discuss more specific problems of theology, history, and philosophy, they have not been considered in the present article. In reviewing the recent developments in German theology one should also give attention to the important philosopher of religion, Paul Tillich.

1. The anthropocentric representation. This involves the abandonment of the divine world as such and the concentration upon the description of the inner world of the pious soul, *auf die Beschreibung frommer Gemütszustände*. The religious subject is the theme of theology.[2] Schleiermacher is the first to choose this way.

2. Indirect assertion. The essence of the divine world cannot possibly be described, but it can be indicated. In view of the inadequacy of language, one must turn to the suggestive, foreshadowing paradoxes of Kierkegaard. Here the religious object is the theme of theology.[3]

It is evident where Barth's contribution finds its theologico-historical place. He puts himself very decidedly near Kierkegaard and he protests in sharpest terms against the Schleiermacher type of theology. He even goes so far as to question the sincerity of the religious experience of Schleiermacher.[4] His and his companions' protest against the subjective and anthropocentric type of theology, their protest against all schools which in their theological endeavor to formulate religious experiences rely upon psychology and history, is even sharper than their criticism of the positive, dogmatic type of theology. They suspect that such a theology has betrayed its own theme in substituting for the object of religion the subjective human functions and experiences.

They oppose a type of religiosity which, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, found expression particularly in the German literary movement of Romanticism. This Romanticism, in its protest against the wooden rationalism and morality of the Enlightenment, was characterized by a retirement from all that is objective into the subjectivity of feelings and sentiments, in order to attain the consciousness of a unity with the universe, with the innermost heart of all being. Such a consciousness is close to mysticism. On this basis the movement also favored pantheism, because the latter seemed to establish a harmonious unity of all world-contrasts. This thought of integration led to a religious evaluation of history as a process of evolution, of organic growth.[5]

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[2] Cf. F. Kattenbusch, *Die deutsche Theologie seit Scheiermacher*, 4. Aufl. (Giessen, 1924), pp. 18 ff.

[3] Cf. Martin Dibelius, *Geschichtliche und übergeschichtliche Religion im Christentum* (Göttingen, 1926), p. 87.

[4] Cf. *Zwischen den Zeiten* (München, 1927), Heft 4.

Schleiermacher is regarded as the theological representative of Romanticism. In his inclination to identify profound inwardness with divine life, in his positive religious evaluation of history, in the course of which salvation evolves gradually, he is seen as the father of the theology which reached its climax in Ernst Troeltsch.

Dissatisfied with Romanticism, Barth and his friends insist on a recovery of the true religious attitude of the Reformation. They fight passionately for a world-view which is based upon a sincere recognition of the irreconcilability of all the world-contrasts, and therefore also upon a clear distinction between man and God. In true religion, they maintain, God can never be identified with anything human, not even with purest inwardness. Everything human, history and civilization included, is always outside of God.

The tremendous impression of Barth's writings is doubtless mainly due to this criticism of the religiosity of modern theology. The problem which is the center of theological discussion in Germany today may, therefore, be thus formulated: Does an anthropocentric theology do justice to the essential character of religion, especially to its object, which we call God? And in what way is a theocentric theology able to do so?

Barth, however, does not offer a purely theological discussion of this problem. His books are distinctly different from the well-known work of Schaeder,[6] who attempted to answer the same question in an academic manner. Barth's concern is not so much theologically scientific as religious.[7]

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[5] Cf. E. Brunner, *Reformation und Romantik* (München, 1925).

His words are inspired by an impassioned fervor and by pious enthusiasm. One cannot avoid being affected by their appeal. An understanding of Barth's attitude is impossible without an estimation of his religious experience.

In nearly all the numerous reviews of Barth's so-called "theology of the crisis," the importance of his own religiousness has been overlooked. Seemingly, both the friends and the critics of Barth have been frightened by his severe criticism of the religion *Erlebnis* as a merely subjective, man-glorifying feature of the soul. It cannot be denied, however, that the sentiment which underlies Barth's eloquent passages is the result of a certain religious experience itself.

Its core and central point is this: Our life as such is perplexing; its limitations, its finiteness, its constant relativity, its ups and downs from pain to joy, its unassuredness of a supreme good, in fact, its continuous standing face to face with radical evil, its narrowness inclose us within a wall which we cannot surmount, but which throws us always back into the restlessness and into the sufferings of life. We are bound to be creatures, and we suffer from our creaturehood in unspeakable pain. We can never live as if we were the masters of our fate. We are given over to the unceasing movement of force and matter, of growing up and pining away, of organization and decomposition, of desire to live and the necessity of dying. The desire to live, steadily inspired by the animalistic instinct which the Greek called Eros, is always broken by the sheer reality of death. The genius and even the prophet are awaiting the same fate as the microbe.[8] How can such a life be immediate, real, eternal? The world is unredeemed. Man and his universe are nothing but a riddle, a question.[9]

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[6] E. Schaeder, *Theozentrische Theologie* (Leipzig, 1914–15).

[7] Cf. E. Neubauer, "Die Theologie der Krisis und des Wortes," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (1926), pp. 5 ff.

[8] *Römerbrief*, p. 292.

But if everything in this world is perishable, there must be something eternal. There must be beyond this life something that cannot possibly be reached by man. Death must have life as its parallel, and time, eternity.[10] Otherwise life would be unendurable. Our finiteness urges us to seek a non-relative, absolute dissolution which surpasses all our thinking. For even our thinking is always relative, never rid of the spell of death.[11]

Here, according to Barth, religion is born. "Der Sinn der Religion ist der Tod."[12] Death is the law of this world. It is the negation and the annihilation, the destroyer and the destruction, the creaturehood and the naturalness, the indissoluble contrast to, and the inalienable mark of, life, the sum of all terrors, evils, oppressions, and puzzles of our existence.[13] The only thing of which human beings are sure is death. When this final possibility becomes acute in man's mind, all relative harmlessness and naïvete and all inner calm vanish away. Then there is no longer room for harmony with one's self or even with the universe. The abyss and an extreme horror take their place.[14] All this means that religion cannot be recommended to man; for it is a disaster. It overcomes certain men with a fatal necessity. It is the disaster of which every human being suffers openly or secretly. It is the horrible power that drives John the Baptist into the desert, that shapes the physiognomy of men like Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Calvin.[15]

The death line separates what is possible for man from what is possible for God. It separates time from eternity. *Finitum non est capax infiniti*. Never do they join or fulfil each other. God stands at the opposite pole from man. An infinitely qualitative difference separates them. This God is never identical with all we call God, with what we experience, revere, and adore as God. He is the absolute "Stop" to all human restlessness and the absolute "Forward" to all human rest. He is the "Yes" in our "No," and the "No" in our "Yes." He is the first and the last, pure limit and pure origin. As such he is the unknown, never a something in our well-known midst.[16] All that is, disqualifies itself before him as not being, reveals itself as being estranged from God's perfect life.[17]

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[9] *Wort Gottes*, p. 165.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

[11] *Römerbrief*, p. 286.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

It is evident that this religious experience, the vitality and seriousness of which cannot be denied, asserts God only indirectly. It is also clear that as soon as an assertion is made it is rationalized. Is it not arbitrary philosophizing to call that which limits our finiteness God? Or to identify God with eternity in contrast to time? Is it not in the context of Barth's thoughts an arbitrary philosophical conclusion to speak of God as of the origin (*Ursprung*), to say that something limited must also have "a yonder" to its limitedness, and that this "yonder" is prior to all existence, *das Ungegebene,* to which everything in this aeon stands in an inexplorable transcendental relation, whereof one can speak only in dialectical, but never in affirmative, terms? This neo-Kantian concept of God as the pure beginning or origin[18] is totally foreign to the religious fervor in which Barth speaks of man's limitedness.

However, there can be no question that the experience of the perishing creaturehood of all life must lead to the perception of a cause of all this limitation. But that is just a thought which Barth never would allow to be conceived. He never would say that eternity *causes* time. Eternity *limits* time. Each belongs to a totally different sphere.

It is therefore impossible that God, identified with eternity, can enter the plane of man, or that man, by his own effort, can reach God or come to know him. Indeed, God is the totally other, the unknown, the remote. All man can be sure of in regard to this God is that he does not know him. Pure and superior stands God, neither beside nor above (supernatural), but beyond all conditioned and conditioning power.[19] God is unconditioned. All deities that need somebody, namely man, to adore them or to know them are not divine, they are human dreams and idols.[20] Sin,[21] for Barth, is therefore man's taking himself for God. It is the deification of man or such a demonstration of God, by which man wants to justify himself.[22] Hence Barth's severe criticism of the religious *Erlebnis*. In so far as it is content, possession, or fruition of God, it represents the shameless anticipation of what could possibly be verified only by the unknown God. Wherever the unqualified distance between God and man and the one who limits him is overlooked, fetichism arises. God is, then, experienced in man's spiritual and material formations, i.e., family, nation, state, church, etc. That is idolatry. Man can never be the *creator creatoris*. He can only testify to God.[23] The mystical experience of union with God is rendered impossible.[24] It involves the fundamental sin: *Eritis sicut deus*. There can be no gradual transition, no ascension, no evolution to God. All experiences of grace and mercy are still in the "here," and no bridges lead into the "beyond" of God.[25] God can never be a psychological or historical value.

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[16] *Ibid.,* p. 315. [17] *Ibid.,* p. 147. [18] *Ibid.,* p. 315.

This is the basis for Barth's criticism of all religion. He admits that religion represents the highest achievement of humanity, but religion can never overcome humanity or renew it, not even the early Christian religion or that of Isaiah or of the Reformers.[26] The most one can say positively of religion is that it contains something holy, because it points from man to God.[27] It is the human possibility of receiving an impression of God. But any claim to absoluteness, to transcendence, or to immediacy that may be raised in defense of religion is nul.[28]

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[21] Cf. Walter Künneth, *Die Lehre von der Sünde* (Gütersloh, 1927).

[22] *Römerbrief*, p. 169.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 222.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 259.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

The same criticism has to be extended to the church. If the church gathers together those who speak and hear God's word it is undoubtedly engaged in a good enterprise. None the less, such an enterprise is a totally human, perishable, and sinful one, for God's word spoken by human mouths and heard by human ears is no longer God's word.[29] The church represents the vain attempt to render the impossible possible. Such a criticism includes the Catholic and orthodox Protestant churches as well as the modernistic church associations. But modern Protestantism in its religio-cultural endeavors has more than all the other groups betrayed God. Its only theme is the deification of man.

So far the Christian character of the "theology of the crisis" has not yet been apparent. Barth wants to be characteristically Christian. One of the most important tasks of the present study must be to determine the relation of these fundamental thoughts to Christian religion and tradition.

Before such an effort can be made, however, we must speak of Barth's relationship to his time. It is frequently said that this revolt against modern theology, against the *Kulturtheologie*, is mainly due to German post-war pessimism, that it is a reflection of the cultural crisis in post-war Germany. Such an explanation is not altogether correct. Barth is a Swiss. Being a Calvinist, he has been under the influence of men like Kutter and the Blumhardts, and last but not least, Overbeck and Kierkegaard, to whom he evidently owes the most. The first edition of his epoch-making commentary on the Epistle to the Romans was finished in 1918. Post-war pessimism is not the only psychological basis of his theology. His protest (he is a pupil of Herrmann) is rather the expression of an inner dissatisfaction with a purely subjective, humanistic type of theology. It is the product of his insight into the religious weakness of modernism. It was his distress in his task as a minister that led Barth to his discoveries and to his viewpoint.[30] He felt the tremendous difficulty of speaking to modern man of God, of the God of the Bible. In a lecture before ministers he urges his audience to hear in all his words the question: What does preaching mean? Not, How does one do it? but How *can* one do it?[31] In line with the reformers, he considers the word of God as expressed in the Bible to be the basis of all preaching. As he struggled to understand the Bible and its religious application to his time, it was Paul who revealed to him first what he calls the characteristic attitude of the biblical man: "Ein plötzliches Stillgestelltsein und ein steiles Aufwärtsblicken und angespanntes Lauschen."[32] He threw away the "scientific pathos" for the struggle against "rigid orthodoxy" and "dead-letter belief." No fruitful discussion about the Bible, he contends, is possible so long as one confines attention to its human, historico-psychological character. The strange context of these human documents, the remarkable cause which concerned the writers of these sources, is the biblical *object*.[33] This object demands also all our attention, in spite of the tremendous progress of modern science and technique.[34] Thus, Barth discovered the "biblical line," which he says, is by no means identical with the bible-book.[35] It is found in the attitude of the biblical men: "God has drawn the attention of these people unto him. He demands their full obedience; He does not want to be used. He will not serve; he will rule. He wants to drive and to use only himself. He does not want to give satisfaction to anything, but to himself. He desires not to be a 'yonder' besides a 'here'. He will not be 'a something alongside another,' but the totally other, the totality of all merely relative otherness. This is the point of the

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[28] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

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[30] *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

[31] *Wort Gottes*, p. 113.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

Bible."[36] The biblical men do not testify to the glory and splendor, but to the limitations, of humanity.[37] The Old Testament prophets reveal always the divinely first behind the humanly last.[38] The meaning of the Kingdom of God as proclaimed by Jesus, Paul, and the Apocalypse is *consummatio mundi*, the annulment of all merely existent things.[39]

One has to find the "word" in the words; one must look through the historical forms into the spirit of the Bible.[40] For the cause, the object of the Bible, is the same as ours. Barth maintains that, like Calvin, one must enter a dialogue with the biblical text, after having conscientiously understood what it says, until the wall between the centuries has become transparent, until the conversation between document and reader is totally concentrated upon the object.[41] He claims that his interpretation of Paul's letter to the Romans is the result of the application of such a method. He blames the professional exegetes for having overlooked this most important part of their task.

A combination of Kierkegaard's and Calvin's point of view is, therefore, the characteristic feature of Barth's *Römerbrief*.

His system of thought may now be more fully analyzed and described. How can the experience of the unknown God be applied to the Bible? How can the theology of the paradox be unfolded on a biblical basis?

Barth claims that the content of the Epistle to the Romans is the revelation of the *Deus absconditus*. God, the remote God, has revealed himself. Man has not come to know him by his own efforts. God alone has willed to make himself known to man as he is. This revelation of God is the only possible way of connecting the two poles of the great contrast of God and man and of eternity and time. God must do it. Were man to attempt to make this revelation his own, he would draw eternity into time; he would adore a non-God. Man cannot claim to know the remote God even after he has revealed himself. For God remains always the only free, royal, sovereign, unconditioned, groundless Lord. Only as such can he be venerated as God.[42] He affirms himself in negating us as we are and the world as it is. He manifests himself to us in creating the distance between him and us. He shows us mercy in bringing us under his judgment.[43] Whosoever dares to take the horrible curse of the divine "No" upon himself will, if this "No" is felt in its extreme radicalism, perceive in the "No" the divine "Yes." God's judgment in the radical negation of everything created is also his justification and his salvation.[44] The love of God has its beginnings in the fear of God;[45] and a love thus rooted is the only possible love of God that man can feel. To die of God means to live in him. Death bears life.

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[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 84 f.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[40] *Römerbrief*, p. v.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. xi.

In certain respects this is only a pointed repetition of the experience of all religious individuals: God will reveal himself to the truly unselfish soul. We are reminded of the mystics and of the reformers and their doctrine of justification. Calvin especially stands in the background of such theology. Indeed, Barth finds room for the main parts of Calvin's doctrine: God's majesty and glory, his predestination; they all rise again in the impassioned words of one who regards himself as a prophetic reformer in modern days.

At one point, however, Barth differs greatly from the reformers. Both Calvin and Luther stressed the certitude of salvation. Justification meant to them the assurance of God's grace in spite of sinfulness, by the mere apprehension of God's love in faith. Barth cannot give such an assurance. The hope of standing under God's "Yes" is only a perspective, the direction of the narrow path in this world. It means walking on the edge; it means that it is possible to take the next smallest step only in a *desperatio fiducialis*, in faithful despair,[46] in expectation of a *futurum aeternum* which man as man shall never attain, which he can only divine in the experience of the complete annihilation of his being as such.

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[42] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

For Barth also this can only be perceived in faith. This faith, however, is never identical with piety, even of the purest and finest type. It is rather the respect for the divine incognito, the love of God that is conscious of the qualitative difference between God and man. It is the horrified "Stop" before God.[47] To have faith means to be silent, to adore in ignorance, to know that death alone can be a simile of the Kingdom of God.[48] There is nothing human in faith; it is the principal invalidation of all human experience, knowledge, and action. Nothing human is left that would be more than a hollow space (Hohlraum), more than emptiness, privation, and hinting potentiality. It has no value in itself; it cannot be something either before God or before man.[49] It is the attitude which makes us bend our necks under the crisis which arises out of the recognition of the general situation that exists between God and man, the crisis which consists of man's inability to perceive God, the unapproachable.[50] Even faith is conceived of as being absolutely negative. It is the most negative stage of receptivity. It is therefore also that state which permits man to see himself as God would see him, as a being limited in the extreme. But the limiting one enters here also. He limits in order to reveal himself as the unknown. Judgment and salvation, annihilation and edification, are always together; the crisis is always the turning-point, the "Yes" is always in the "No." In this concept, faith is totally deprived of its historical significance. It furnishes the most striking example of how Barth applies his own experience to Christian tradition.

Even the doctrine of original sin finds its place in this new system of theology, and it is given an entirely new interpretation. Here, as in all his expositions, Barth claims to interpret the true tendency of Paul. Not that the dogma of original sin as developed by the Western church, he says, would have appeared to Paul as a conclusive hypothesis; the tradition about this doctrine represents one of the many historico-psychological adulterations of Paul's opinions. Barth considers original sin, which entered the world in Adam, as the timeless, transcendental disposition of man. It is the super-temporal fall of all men out of their unity with God.[51] Such an interpretation of the ancient dogma provides Barth with the opportunity of explaining why man can never participate in God's life otherwise than by shrinking from him in horror and despair. Barth is even so much of a Calvinist that he describes this transcendental fall of man as the result of the divine predestination.[52]

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[46] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 351.

Rejection and election are coincidental, however, for ultimate fear of God is the beginning of love of God; death is the birth of life. In Barth's Christology these ideas become most clear. His christological concepts illuminate all hitherto obscure points of his system. They provide the great illustration of its tendency and its intention. It is in Jesus Christ that two planes intersect each other, one plane forming the well-known world of man and of time, the other one, which cuts the first one, being the world of the Father, the world of original creation and of final redemption.[53] Here has God revealed himself, not in glory, not in beauty, not in perfect harmony, but by tearing open a gaping abyss, by creating a most vigorous and efficacious scandal.[54] For Jesus, the bearer of the highest possibilities of man, the greatest religious hero, the wise teacher, the prophet, the performer of miracles in the name of God, he, the man who reveals most purely and sincerely time full of memories of eternity, who represents humanity full of expressive divinity[55]—this Jesus of Nazareth, the Messiah, is at the end of his career a purely negative figure.[56] The absolute scandal of his death on the cross brings about the most radical annulment of all values of life. It is the revelation of absolute otherness of God, the disclosure of the last possibilities of divine wrath, the unrolling of the question of God in its sharpest and in its inescapable sense.[57]

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[51] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 150.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

But the crucifixion was followed by the resurrection. Like the reformers, Barth thinks of the two together, saying that in God's most manifest judgment upon man lies immanifestly also his mercy. The resurrection signifies the "Yes" of God. The risen Christ completes the revelation. He gives assurance of the *futurum aeternum,* but never positively or firmly for man! For the resurrection is no historical event among the facts of this life. It is rather *the* unhistorical event, surrounding *all* events as their limitation, leaving the manifestation of the unknown God as such unrevealed, *hinting* only at the transcendent mercy of God. No continuity can exist between the historical facts of the story of the resurrection (i.e., the empty grave and the visions of I Corinthians, chapter 15) and the resurrection itself. For should the resurrection be in any sense a fact of our history or of time, it would also belong in the plane of the up and down of life and death.[58] Exactly like Athanasius, who had to assert against the Arians that only a full God could assure man of his immortality, does Barth conclude that nothing within time or history can assure man of God's eternity.

Here it is completely disclosed that like the resurrection itself, the salvation of man can never be achieved in time, neither in the present nor in the past nor in the future. It belongs in the super-temporal, super-historical, transcendent world of God. It can only be hinted at. In the resurrection, the new world, the world of God's original creation, touches the universe of our life as the tangent touches the circle. Such, according to Barth, is our only hope. It is really *desperatio fiducialis.*

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[56] *Ibid.,* p. 72.

[57] *Ibid.,* p. 139.

[58] *Ibid.,* p. 184.

In a critical review of Barth's theology one needs first of all to try to appreciate his fundamental point of view. It is very evident that the historical criticism of religion has been emphasized at the expense of justice to the irrational elements of religion, especially to those connected with the idea of God. Furthermore, the humanization of religion has too often related religion to non-religious attitudes and functions of mind, depriving it of its essential character. Modern theology has doubtless, to a great extent, surrendered the "other-worldliness" of religion to a certain secularization of the content of the religious experience. One will therefore hardly hesitate to pay close attention to the *corrective* Barth desires to supply. In his earlier years Barth did not intend to construct a new theology. He merely wanted to supply a new point of view, which would not necessarily be in contrast to the view of any particular theological school.[59] However, he now proposes in correction of certain definite theological methods an approach of his own. In setting aside the dogmatic way because it expresses the contents of revelation in too direct and concrete a fashion, lacking the reserve due to the transcendent majesty of God, and in criticizing the critical or negative way because its final conclusion is a negation in which one cannot speak of God at all, he proposes the dialectic way. "It presupposes the "Yea" of the dogmatic and the "Nay" of the critical, and finds truth to lie in between."[60]

This approach, we may well remember, is not entirely new. The most outstanding religious geniuses of the Christian church have employed it to express their religious experiences.

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[59] In the meantime, he has begun to construct a theological system of his own. The first volume of his *Dogmatik* (*Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes* [München, 1927]) is just off the press. Since it appeared after this article was finished, it will be reviewed in another essay.

[60] *Wort Gottes*, p. 156. Cf. F. McConnachie, "The Teaching of Karl Barth," *Hibbert Journal*, XXV, No. 3, p. 387.

Paul, Augustine, Luther, liked to speak in paradoxes. That is why Barth feels an affinity to them. Furthermore the so-called "mystics" have written numerous passages which could be incorporated into Barth's presentation without being foreign to his viewpoint. They have always been sharply opposed to a firm and concrete formulation of what God is.[61] One can even find much similarity between Barth and Rudolph Otto, whose religion is definitely mystical. Otto was the first to introduce into modern theological terminology the concept of God as the *ganz Andere,* the totally other. To speak in terms of Otto, Barth has, however, put all the emphasis in the *mysterium tremendum,* leaving out the *mysterium fascinosum.* In this respect Barth could never be called a mystic. But some striking parallels between Barth's religiousness and mysticism offer an opportunity to evaluate the "theology of crisis."

The mystics speak of the unknown God, before whom every being is naught. Like Barth, they claim to experience God in a "faith" that is totally passive. Is not Barth's description of faith as *Hohlraum* very similar to all the mystical terms of religious receptivity as emptiness (*Ledigkeit*), silence, inward stillness (*innere Gelassenheit*), nothingness, etc.?

The main difference between him and men like Tauler and Eckhart lies in his hesitation to propose, after the experience of passivity, a courageous attainment of God, a union of the unselfish human self with the divine. Only a constant stubborn recollection of his rational, philosophical concept, *finitum non capax infiniti,* prevents him from attaining, like the mystics, to communion with God.[62]

Doubtless Barth expresses the view which Hocking[63] formulates in the following words: "If it may be said that God in religious attainment touches and satisfies the spirit, his dealings are not overt and visional, nor verbally expressible without transformation and risk of error." One is almost inclined to say that Barth, in fear of falling into this error, fails to reach the full religious attainment of God at all. At this point—attainment of God—we touch the weak spot in the "theology of crisis."

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[61] Tersteegen: "Ein begriffener Gott ist kein Gott." Cf. especially G. Heinzelmann, *Glaube und Mystik* (Tübingen, 1927), p. 63 ff.; W. Weber, *Glaube und Mystik* (Gütersloh, 1927), p. 42.

[62] Cf. H. W. Schmidt, *Zeit und Ewigkeit* (Gütersloh, 1927), *passim.*

[63] W. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (New Haven, 1912), p. 54.

To bring it out more clearly, let us compare Barth with Hocking, who seems to have a profound understanding of the religious attitude and hardly overlooks a characteristic religious trait.

Does not Hocking stand on the same ground with Barth when he says: "We have outgrown the days when we make the citizen great by making the government small; we shall outgrow the days when we make man great by making God small and useful" (p. 328)? Does not Hocking think with Barth when he points out: "We have heard much in recent years of the advantages of the immanent God; and I have nothing to say in doubt of these advantages. They are the modern form of the more omnipresent and polytheistic aspect of religion. But they are fatal advantages if they lose from sight that other direction of progress, notable from the earliest, the retreat from God. Religion may be too romantic, too much interested in what is not here, but beyond somewhere in the ineffable; yet religion, if it lives chiefly in the next things, will turn out to be no religion at all. In proportion as the religious horizon is drawn close, the garment of religious experience becomes trivial" (p. 327). Hocking has, like Barth, a very clear impression of the "intangible nature of religious objects" (p. 56), and he realizes that predicates of God are nearly as false as true, always in need of being balanced by a predicate of an opposite and contrasting name. "As an object in the world of objects," he says, "God is next to nothing" (p. 323).

Thus Hocking must favor to a certain extent the dialectical antitheses and paradoxes of Barth. He himself likes to speak of the ultimate otherness and of the unknowable character of God. But nevertheless for him this God can be experienced. Here he goes beyond Barth. Hocking offers the religiously necessary corrections of Barth when he writes: "God appears as a being in whom opposite traits are strangely united; but the nature of the center in which such oppositions agree or are neutralized is not picturable—is known, if at all, to immediate experience" (p. 323). Or: "We need not fear that God will be thrust out of consciousness by this effort to assign him ultimate otherness, for God thinking cannot well expel God from thought" (p. 327). Barth should notice this truth. It becomes definitely clear in another quotation from Hocking: "The explanation of the religious paradox seems to be this: That the effort to think God must first differentiate God from all other objects. But *we* also are in a different world from that of any of our world objects; something in us is foreign and transcendent to all that we view. There could be no absolute rapprochement between the heart of this alien-within-the-world which we call self and its God, unless that God were also in some way alien to that same realm" (p. 329).

Barth's fundamental mistake and error is the elimination of the religious subject. The religious subject attains in its experience the transcendence of God. It is taken out of and raised above the world and its relativity to such a degree that it participates in the absoluteness of God. In worship, the religious subject as the alone flees to the alone. In worship the transcendence of God becomes immanent—in the religious subject. It is a very important observation that prayer has evidently no room in Barth's theology. In worship, conceived of as the essential religious attitude, the dialectical separation of time and eternity is overcome.

This conclusion brings us back to our former statement about the incompleteness of Barth's mysticism. Barth himself seems to know that worship is always communion with

God. He even affirms its positive value by describing it as a recollection of the unity with God out of which man has transcendentally fallen; but he declares that this unity can never be regained because time can never become eternity. This conclusion is not in accordance with the norm of religion. For it is in religious experience that the infinite enters the finite. Man possesses an organ which lets him share eternity. Barth calls it faith, conceiving it as "Hohlraum"; i.e., utmost detachment from all timely objects. He does not, however, take the important further step which the religious experience itself demands, namely, the unfolding of the positive relationship between man and God. We reject the rational-philosophical principle of Barth that time and eternity stand in an unbridgeable contrast to each other. His criticism of religion is overdone. We accept Barth's criticism of mysticism as that form of religion which cannot endure the contrast between God and man, and takes possession of the absolute in an identification of subject and object.[64] We accept the warning of Barth that God is the totally other, beyond the outreach of man. But we are in line with the most profound Christian tradition in expressing our belief that man is able to enter into communion with God. Barth overlooks and harshly destroys the true essence of religion. Mysticism may be criticized for its too immediate and too direct anticipation of the inner quality of the universe. But there is another way of apprehending the unconditioned meaning of the conditioned world. It is the heart of the religion of Jesus—which Protestantism claims to have rediscovered—that man, in daring trust that there is an eternal meaning of life, will confirm himself as one who participates in the eternal meaning of things. The value of such an attitude is tremendously increased if it is thought out in personal terms. In such a way worship *is* attainment of God. There *is* in religion a certitude of salvation.[65]

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[64] Cf. G. Heinzelmann, *Glaube und Mystik*, pp. 63 ff.

[65] Cf. E. Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal* (Göttingen, 1922), p. 165.

After such a general criticism of Barth's theology we have now to review critically some of his specific theological opinions. Reference has been made to the influence of certain philosophical concepts upon the formulation of his point of view. Our attention is again drawn to them when we try to understand the identification of God, the totally other, with what Barth, evidently under the influence of Platonism and neo-Kantianism, calls *Ursprung,* origin. We shall not introduce here a philosophical argument, but simply observe that this philosophical idea is (by Barth) related to the religio-theological one of creation. Philosophically speaking, it is quite intelligible that the origin of all things can be deduced only *via negationis,* but theologically speaking it is inconceivable that the creator should negate his creation. Nor does the creature, conscious of its state of being created, deny and annihilate itself in face of the creator. In employing these terms of Christian tradition, Barth has been led by the rationalization of his religious principle to empty them of their positive religious content.

For, to follow his argument through, the creator can never be identified with eternity if eternity is the negation of time. And if time is but the negation of eternity, having no reality for God, human history is of no significance and value for God—Barth says so, indeed—but therewith it is proved that human life as such is utterly meaningless. According to Barth, life as such is indeed of no value to God; its only meaning is death. The idea of creation, however, puts an emphasis upon a positive, meaningful relationship between God and man.

Every attitude toward God has to prove its value in the resulting behavior of man toward the world, i.e., religion is essentially linked to morality. From Barth's point of view, curiously enough, such a conclusion is impossible. The true religion, the herald of which he pretends to be, issues in no direct ethical results. Barth says expressly that it cannot be the business of a man who has accepted his point of view, to replace the customary altogether too positive ethics either by a negative ethics or by an attempt, through revolution, to regain the lost innocence of paradise. It is his office, he says, to recognize that death includes the death of the wisdom of our lives, to be completely clear about the fact that man is always wrong, and therefore to make the action of the body (*Betrieb des Leibes*) die in full action, without making it stop or cease or turning it into another direction.[66] Before God, life is nothing positive. Before him the humanly greatest and the lowest, the best and the worst, the noblest action and the most evil one, are not different. They represent only different aspects of the same problematical quality (*Problematik*) of life under the spell of which every human being stands. The need to sleep and the need to pray are merely different grades of man's brokenness and limitedness. *Sub specie aeternitatis* they must be negated, the one and the other.

Such an ethical attitude means nothing else but that the world and life, as they are, are to be treated indifferently. Such a morality is the logical outcome of Barth's religiosity. It must lead to agnosticism and scepticism. It involves a radicalism which is almost the same as that of Bernard Shaw.

It is very obvious that such a position is, from the point of view of tradition, distinctly un-Christian, and moreover totally unbiblical. And yet Barth claims to have given an adequate interpretation of Paul. Here we touch the point at which the severest criticism of Barth must emerge: His use of the Bible is completely arbitrary and unobjective. His religious experience, which led him to depreciate the value of history, has blinded him also in regard to the historical character of the Bible. There can be no objection to Barth's use of the Bible for the purpose of illustrating his own religious "discoveries." But one must strongly object to his claim that he interprets the Bible accurately, and that therefore his theology is bound anew to the authoritative word of God. We are grateful to Barth for having raised with such fervor the problem of authority for our belief, and for confronting us so vividly with the question whether the Biblė can still be that authority. He himself regards the Bible as a historical document of the Jewish and Hellenistic period of the world's history, but he maintains that he has rediscovered in these writings the inner word, which he sees particularly manifested in Jesus Christ (but, of course, in Jesus Christ as he sees him!). Why does he not make the same use of some other religious documents? Why use the Bible? By rendering his theology supposedly biblical, he has made it in no way Christian or authoritative. In fact, by disregarding the importance and value of history, he merely makes the principles of our religion more perplexing than ever. His use of theologico-religious terms as they are to be found in the Bible or in Christian tradition is unhistorical and altogether subjective. By no means can he claim to have returned to biblicism. To demand a return to the exegetical methods of the reformers is ridiculous, simply because our presuppositions are totally different from theirs.

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[66] *Römerbrief*, p. 277.

All these criticisms, it seems, are vital. They render an acceptance of Barth's point of view impossible. But a theologian cannot ignore the call to pay more attention than has lately been given to the true object of true religion—if that is still possible.

BOOK REVIEWS

A NEW RENDERING OF ARISTOTLE'S *PROBLEMATA*

The *Problemata*, though not a genuine work of Aristotle, is nevertheless included in the Aristotelian corpus and therefore is properly given a place in the great Oxford translation.[1] It occupies the whole of the seventh volume, and it is interesting to observe that the last eight volumes, IV–XI, are now complete, and that only a few titles in volumes I–III still remain to be published. The *Problemata* itself is a monument of Peripatetic observation and curiosity, and though the theories advanced rest only too often on obsolete scientific doctrines, it remains an admirable object lesson in just that inquisitiveness which is essential to the scientific temperament at its best and is only too often lacking in the men who are most industrious in the business of science.

The translation is made from the Teubner text of Ruelle-Knoellinger-Klek, but the translator so often adopts different readings that it is only fair to say that he has established his own text. He takes occasion, besides, to correct many misprints in the Teubner text. The changes are almost invariably departures from the manuscript tradition and are introduced in order to bring meaning into passages which are left scarcely intelligible in the Teubner text. In many cases the reading adopted is suggested by the Latin version of Theodore Gaza.

Numerous footnotes not only record the textual changes, but also supply a brief commentary and many valuable allusions to the works of Aristotle and other authors. An index contains references to matters in the body of the text, but unfortunately not to the notes.

The translation itself is readable and the difficulties of the Greek are generally smoothed out; but sometimes some of the crabbed nature of the original appears also in the English, as, for example, in the following instances: "why is it that all such animals as do not fly shed their winter coats, except the pig" (893a3); "why does horse take pleasure in and desire horse" (896b10); "is it for the same reason as that for which the old are wiser than the young?" (910a27); "why do men take greater pleasure in listening to those who are singing such music as they already know than music which they do not know" (918a2)—"they" refers to the listeners; "now the earth was salty, but not hot owing to the abundance of water flowing into it" (937b15).

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[1] *The Works of Aristotle*, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross. Vol. VII, *Problemata*. By E. S. Forster. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1927. Pages 858–967. $5.00.

An examination of Books XVIII, XXIX, and XXX suggests the following remarks. In 916b32, *αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν μαρτύρων ῥᾴδιοι πίστεις*, "proofs supported by witnesses are easily obtained," should rather be "evidence supplied by witnesses is a form of proof readily accepted." In 916b37, *ἡδονῆς γὰρ στοχαστική ἐστι* is not quite "for their aim is pleasure," but "the aim of their arts is pleasure." In 951a12 the manuscripts have *ἢ διότι ἀσθενέστερον, ὥστε ἐλάττω ἀδικεῖ*; Forster accepts the emendation *μείζω* for *ἐλάττω*, and translates: "it is because she is weaker and so he commits a greater injustice;" *ἐλάττω*, however, may be kept, with the more satisfactory sense, "and so does less wrong herself." In 191a32, *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις ἴδοι. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς φόβοις ὄντες οπλλὰ παραλιμπάνουσιν ὧν αὐτοὺς ἔδει εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι* is translated "and, indeed, that defendants are at a disadvantage is shown by the fact that when men are in a state of alarm they omit much of what they ought to have said or done"; it is rather "and, indeed, this further point is obvious: when men are in a state of alarm, etc." In 952b15, *αἱ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ εὐταξίαι* is not quite "public orderliness," but rather "orderly behavior in public." In 953b3, *προϊόντας δὲ πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ἰταμούς* is probably not "when they proceed to action, reckless," but "as they continue to drink, reckless in action." In 953b15 "a man who is drinking is induced to kiss those whom, owing to their appearance or age, no sober person would kiss" (*προάγεται ὁ πίνων καὶ τῷ στόματι φιλεῖν, οὓς νήφων οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φιλήσειεν ἢ διὰ τὸ εἶδος ἢ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν*) should be "those whom no sober person would kiss, either for their beauty or their youth." In 954b1, *φρονιμώτεροι* is not "cleverer," but "more sane." In 955a33, "like wine mingling in a stronger or weaker form in the body" (*ὥσπερ ὁ οἶνος πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων κεραννύμενος τῷ σώματι*) should be rather "like wine mingling in a greater or smaller quantity in the body." In 955b32, *παραγίνεται* is translated "is of assistance to us," but it seems to have the same meaning which it has three lines below, simply "comes to us."

These differences of opinion, which are modestly put forward by the reviewer, are not surprising in the case of a book which is so true to its own title and offers so many "problems" of interpretation.

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THE HEBREW HERITAGE IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION

The present publication,[1] issued as a companion volume of the *Legacy of Greece* and the *Legacy of Rome,* gives a vivid picture of the influence exercised by Judaism upon Western civilization. Planned some years ago by the late Israel Abrahams, it appears now under the editorship of Drs. Bevan and Singer, with the participation of many prominent Jewish and Christian scholars. Abrahams' spirit, however, is still alive in the whole publication, and more than once his utterances are quoted by the various contributors. Published in a fine external shape, the volume contains also a large number of well-made illustrations. These and the very instructive although short explanations, written mostly by Dr. Singer, add interest to the text. Furthermore, the general reader is considerably helped by a glossary containing the less usual technical expressions, as well as by the very good index.

From the very beginning the editors had to face a fundamental difficulty. While ancient Greece and Rome (notwithstanding all the perorations of the Fascisti) are dead nowadays, so that their contribution may be regarded as a legacy in the ordinary meaning of the word, the Jewish people is undoubtedly alive. This momentous difference is fully recognized by the authors of the Prologue and Epilogue, and also by Professor Isaacs, who calls his contribution a gift *inter vivos*. This difficulty necessarily makes itself felt in all parts of the volume. While some of the contributors, as Smith, Burkitt, Herford, Selbie, and Meillet, speak chiefly about Judaism in the sense of the Jewish religion of the first and second temples, the other contributors turn their attention rather to the continuity of Jewish spiritual life in the ages of dispersion.

Partly out of this discrepancy comes also a certain uneveness in the method of presentation. Some contributors give short sketches on a topic which would deserve fuller treatment, while others investigate their subject more thoroughly, sometimes supplying a real contribution to scientific research. Some furnish a short but very instructive bibliography; others do not. But these are difficulties which can hardly be overcome in any publication based upon a collaboration of so many independent scholars.

The series starts, after a short "Prologue" by A. D. Lindsay, with G. A. Smith's essay on "The Hebrew Genius as Exhibited in the Old Testament" (pp. 1–28), which gives a clear survey of a problem so long and so passionately discussed. Edwyn R. Bevan's "Hellenistic Judaism"

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[1] *The Legacy of Israel*. Ed. by Edwyn R. Bevan and Charles Singer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927. xxxix+551 pages. $4.00.

(pp. 29–67) is an admirable short study of this complicated topic; it contains many new ideas and interesting angles of approach. It is, however, surprising that Josephus, who certainly belongs to Hellenistic Judaism and has exercised a large influence on the Western World, should hardly be mentioned more than incidentally. F. C. Burkitt has to deal in his sketch on "The Debt of Christianity to Judaism" (pp. 69–96) with such obvious problems that he is rather induced to stress the points in which such an indebtedness did not occur than those which prove the affirmative. Still more is this true of R. T. Herford's paper on "The Influence of Judaism upon Jews in the Period from Hillel to Mendelssohn" (pp. 97–128). The choice of such a subject in general seems to us unpromising, however meritorious may be the treatment of details. A fine investigation, despite its brevity, is that of A. Guillaume on "The Influence of Judaism on Islam" (pp. 129–72). Although an independent work, this supplements and corrects effectively the somewhat one-sided recent publication of R. Bell entitled "The Origin of Islam in Its Christian Environment" (London, 1926). In two elaborate papers Ch. Singer (assisted in the first by Mrs. Singer) deals with "The Jewish Factor in Medieval Thought" (pp. 173–282) and with "Hebrew Scholarship in the Middle Ages among Latin Christians" (pp. 283–314) in a brief but thorough manner. The subject which had previously been treated chiefly in scattered monographs of Steinschneider, Guedemann, Guttmann, and others, and has been known by English readers almost exclusively from a few chapters in Jacobs' *Jewish Contributions to Civilization,* is presented here in an adequate way. In some important details it introduces new ideas into the discussion. It is true that to our feeling Dr. Singer does not discriminate enough between Islamitic and Jewish philosophies. Instead of Avicenna and Averroes, we would prefer to hear of Saadya, Jehudah Halevi, and Ibn Daud. These two essays, treating almost exclusively historical problems, are very well supplemented by L. Roth's "Jewish Thought in the Modern World" (pp. 433–72). Even in the first rather historical part of his paper Dr. Roth writes more about philosophical ideas than about literary history. Besides this he tries to explain the share of Judaism in the philosophy of the more recent part. It cannot be denied that in such a subject a uniform agreement can hardly be reached. Particularly in his identification of the biblical with the medieval Jewish thought the author seems to us to overlook the deep historical changes which took place in the meantime. Incidentally, we may remark that such an original thinker as Nahman Krochmal should have been at least mentioned in this connection. G. H. Box's "Hebrew Studies in the Reformation Period and After" (pp. 315–75), and W. B. Selbie's "The Influence of the Old Testament on Puritanism" (pp. 407–32), although not containing much new matter, are a welcome part of the total. We feel it rather as a disadvantage that both quote too many passages from secondary sources. N. Isaacs (the only American contributor to the volume) writes "The Influence of Judaism on Western Law" (pp. 377–406), an excellent sketch on this difficult topic. It is in the very nature of such a treatise that it should be found in some details rather questionable. Not only does it appear to us that the author has underestimated the element of Roman law contained in both Western and Jewish jurisprudence, but also many a detail may be explained differently. Thus we think, to quote only one example, that the influence of Jewish law upon the juridical development of the mercantile companies (p. 400) is anythink but certain. Was not the medieval Jewish community as such a result rather than a cause of the general tendency toward corporate organization in the Middle Ages? In comparison with this last paper A. Meillet's "Influence of the Hebrew Bible on European Languages" (pp. 473–81) presents only a small beginning which needs further enlargement. Lady Magnus, in her sketch "The Legacy in Modern Literature" (pp. 483–505) closes the series of highly interesting papers on the influence of Israel's past upon the present. There is only one more essay, namely, C. G. Montefiore's "Epilogue" (pp. 507–22), which tries to supplement the previous investigations into the past legacy of Israel by a short forecast of the possible future contributions of Judaism to the culture of mankind. Dr. Montefiore represents only one wing within the liberal Judaism, the national section of the latter being hardly mentioned. The ideology of national Judaism in general in all its variations could not find full justice in such a brief although rather impartial summary (pp. 512f). The attitude of orthodox Judaism is not considered at all. It may also be remarked that possible contributions of Judaism toward the world's peace and toward the solution of other social problems are neither mentioned here nor to any extent in the other sections of the book.

Taken as a whole, the volume is to be welcomed and warmly recommended both to the scholar and to the general reader.

S. Baron

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RELIGIOUS VALUE OF THE APOSTLES' CREED

Dr. McFayden, who is professor of History in Washington University, has written a "popular" book in the best sense of that term.[1] He describes the history of the Apostles' Creed, outlines and explains the genesis of the ideas underlying it (e. g., the scientific and religious presuppositions of primitive Christianity, derived from Judaism), and points out clearly the movements of thought and beliefs that drew forth the various formulas embodied in the Creed (e. g., Gnosticism). The author's views are based upon sound and thorough historical research, and he is familiar with the modern literature of the subject. Where he disagrees with other historians he has reasons of his own for doing so. On some matters of detail one questions certain of his statements: e. g., the translation of *Pneuma* in John 3:8; the complete absence of apocalyptic from Hellenistic Jewish literature; the essential worldliness of the Sadducees (p. 83); the interpretation of Jesus' messianic consciousness (p. 96); but the general tenor of the exposition and the clear presentation of the background are quite praiseworthy.

The author views the Old Roman Symbol as a kind of "Fundamentalist" document (p. 213), with an enlightened Fundamentalism which was of real value to the church. It repudiated the Hellenistic idea of God (though *παντοκράτωρ* seems to connote a Hellenistic circle of ideas!) and bound the church to "the original, Jewish form of Christianity." The importance of the Creed today and its relations with modern science are the subject of the two final chapters. Instead of merely stating facts, or advancing any theories whatsoever, the Creed stands for those "practical postulates" underlying the Christian life which are essentially the same today as in the first century. Since "there is little likelihood that these postulates will ever cease to [be] effective and necessary" (p. 293), the continuance of the Creed is not only valuable, but assured. "Time will decide the fate of the Creed aright. But the hearts of some of us yearn for its retention; for its recitation brings us into contact with the faith of Christianity's Golden Age" (p. 300). For all its limitations and misinterpretations, and perhaps even misuses, there are many Christians today who share the author's feeling and are loath to give up one of the few surviving symbols of universal, catholic, historical Christianity.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

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[1] *Understanding the Apostles' Creed.* By Donald McFayden. New York: Macmillan, 1927. xvi+318 pages. $2.60.

PETER'S RESIDENCE IN ROME

The first edition of this book, which was published in 1915 and which was widely discussed in historical and archaeological circles during the following years,[1] contained several inaccuracies in the discussion of the archaeological evidence.[2] These were due mostly to the fact that the peculiar circumstances of the war time prevented Professor Lietzmann from making a detailed survey of the new excavations in the Basilica of St. Sebastian. Moreover those excavations were still in their first stage, and a great deal of important material has since come to light. This second edition contains, therefore, many additions, including a fuller discussion of the archaeological problem and a long appendix in which Dr. Arnim von Gerkan, of the German Archaeological Institut of Rome, gives in detail the history and description of the findings in the various excavations undertaken in St. Sebastian during the last twelve years.

These findings have strengthened the theory already stated by the author in the first edition, that the *dies natalis apostolorum* commemorated by the Roman church on the twenty-ninth of June is but the commemoration of the translation of the relics of Peter and Paul to the crypt *ad catacumbas* in the year 258. The liturgical and archaeological evidence would thus confirm the unbroken tradition that Peter was put to death in Rome and that there his tomb stands under the mighty dome of Michelangelo. The analysis of the liturgical sources and of their implications covers the first nine chapters of the book. The fragmentary and often contradictory bits of information found in the calendar of Philocalus, the ancient pontifical lists, the Roman Sacramentaries, the Canon of the Mass, and in the ancient martyrologies are submitted by the author to a painstaking and exhaustive critical analysis. Professor Lietzmann, carrying further the researches of other liturgiologists on this point, has found a guiding thread that enables him to formulate out of the maze of obscure statements a plausible theory about the origin of the various commemorations of the two apostles which in course of time found their way into the ancient liturgical calendar of the Roman church.

The old commemoration of the *Cathedra Petri* on February 18 was certainly of Roman origin, but the other commemoration on January 18 was of Gallical origin and only later adopted in Rome. Neither of them commemorate the *dies natalis* of the apostles or throw any light on the question of their tombs. June 29, which in the calendar purports to be the commemoration of the martyrdom of Peter and Paul, is not the real historical date of the event, but only a conventional date chosen under peculiar circumstances. The real date of the martyrdom seems to have been unknown in Rome itself about the middle of the third century when a translation of their relics from the original tombs to the site *ad catacumbas* on the Appian Way took place; June 29 is the date of this translation. This leads to the discussion of the archaeological problem.

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[1] *Petrus und Paulus in Rom. Liturgische und archaeologische Studien.* By Hans Lietzmann. Zweite neubearbeitete Auflage mit 13 Tafeln. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1927. viii+315 pages. M. 17.

[2] See the article of the present writer, "The Tombs of Peter and Paul *ad Catacumbas*," *Harvard Theological Review* (January, 1921), and bibliography on pp. 87 ff. Also Lietzmann's reply, "The Tomb of the Apostles *ad Catacumbas*, the same review, April, 1923.

There is no use denying that the affirmative conclusion about an actual translation of the bodies of the apostles to the Appian catacombs (as set forth by the discoverer and first illustrator of the triclia under the pavement of St. Sebastian, Dr. P. Styger) has found great favor with both archaeologians and historians.[3] Nevertheless there are still several competent scholars who maintain a skeptical attitude toward such a conclusion even after the extensive excavations and the new findings in the underground of St. Sebastian. It is fair to say that these findings have not brought to light the decisive evidence sought for by the archaeologians. The mystery still lingers over the central question of the exact place within the catacombs where the bodies were supposed to have been hidden. Only a positive identification of such a place will override all the objections raised against the assumed translation of the relics about the middle of the third century.[4]

The main evidence in favor of the translation still hangs upon the interpretation of the inscription of Damasus and of the *graffiti* found in the *triclia*, especially those mentioning the *refrigeria*. The present writer is ready to admit, against his own previous contention, that the phrase

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[3] The new findings at St. Sebastian are fully described by O. Marucchi in the *Nuovo Bullettino d'Archeologia cristiana* from 1922 on, and in the *Rivista d'Archeologia cristiana*, which has superseded the *Bullettino*. Among the many publications on this problem which have appeared after 1921 we notice: J. P. Kirsch, "Das neuendeckte Denkmal der Apostel Petrus und Paulus in Catacumbas," *Römische Quartalschrift*, 1922; K. Erbes, "Die geschichtlichen Verhältniss der Apostelgräber," *Rom. Zeitschrift f. Kirchengeschichte*, 1924; besides articles by the regretted historian Duchesne and the regretted archaeologian Grossi-Gondi, and by Styger, Marucchi, etc.

[4] In opposition to Professor Marucchi's conclusions, who has strongly advocated that the place where the bodies were hidden is to be identified with the stuccoed spot in the deepest gallery of the catacomb, Professor Lietzmann is in favor of the crypt of St. Sebastian or a place close to it, according to the indications found in several medieval and ecclesiastical documents.

hic habitasse of the Damasian inscription is rightly interpreted "here were buried," but the only conclusion which we can legitimately deduce from such evidence is that in the late fourth century the tradition was already in existence that the bodies of the apostles were once located *ad catacumbas*. Was this tradition based on historical facts? Or was it one of the many legendary formations of which the fourth century was so exceedingly rich? The fact is that of the supposed translation of the bodies *ad catacumbas* and of the assumed return of them to their original resting-places there is no trace in the whole Christian literature of the times, both historical and liturgical, and no other archaeological evidence but this one of doubtful interpretation which is based on the findings of St. Sebastian. Professor Lietzmann believes that the Christian sources are not so silent as we think, and quotes the *Martyrologium Hieronymianum*, which records for the twelfth of December an *inventio corporis sancti Pauli apostoli*, and for the twenty-fifth of January a *translatio Pauli apostoli*, which later, under New Testament influence, became the feast of the Conversion of St. Paul. This evidence would be valuable only if we knew the sources from which the *Hieronymianum* derived its information in this peculiar case. The *Hieronymianum*, such as we possess, is later than the Damasian inscription which, according to Professor Lietzmann himself, might be considered the source of the legends already current in the fifth century that Christians from the Orient went to Rome, and having stolen the relics of Peter and Paul, were miraculously stopped at a few miles from the city. Is it not reasonable to suppose that the commemoration of the *Hieronymianum* has the same origin?

The evidence of the *graffiti* found in the *triclia* and in the deepest gallery is assumed to prove that the tradition of the translation was much older than the times of Damasus and can be assigned to the late third century, and so to be near enough to the event to acquire a high degree of reliability. This conclusion is based on two assumptions: (1) that the *graffiti* belong to the second half of the third century; (2) that the mention of the *refrigeria* suggest necessarily a funerary memorial to the apostles. As for the first point, there is no convincing reason, either paleographical or historical, for assigning the *graffiti* to the third rather than to the fourth century. On the contrary, the fact that the *triclia* was destroyed either in Liberius' or in Damasus' times when the Basilica Apostolorum was built, and also the fact that according to the explicit testimony of Augustine banquets in honor of the martyrs on their commemoration day became common only after the peace of the church, seems to suggest that the *Graffiti* of St. Sebastian belong to the fourth century and probably to the last years of the existence of the *triclia*. As for the second point, there is no evidence that the *refrigeria* mentioned in the *graffiti* imply necessarily a funerary memorial and that they have a funerary character and significance. All the learned studies published lately on this point have failed to bring conviction. In reviewing them Father Delehaye could well write: "We must not exaggerate the implications of the refrigerium, and we must not forget that though it is true that the cult of the martyrs in its first manifestations borrowed much from the cult of the dead, it is also no less true that very soon it assumed the character of a joyful celebration discarding those manifestations of sorrow which were suggested by the customary piety towards the dead" (*Analecta Boll.* [October, 1927], p. 302).

It is safe to admit that the archaeological evidence up to the present day has not solved the problem. The liturgical evidence by which Professor Lietzmann reaches his conclusion that the commemoration of June 29 was established on the occurrence of the assumed translation of the bodies *ad catacumbas* would be unimpeachable and conclusive if it were arrived at independently from the archaeological evidence. But such is not the case. It is only through the exclusion of other plausible motives for the establishment of such a commemoration that Professor Lietzmann is led to accept the theory of the translation *ad catacumbas.* In other words the positive evidence in favor of this theory is only the evidence supplied by the Damasian inscription and by the *graffiti.*

But apart from this question of the translation of relics of the apostles to the Appian Way, Professor Lietzmann's book is the most complete and exhaustive treatment of all the available evidence concerning Peter's presence in Rome at the last period of his life, of his death during the early persecution, and of his tomb *ad vaticanum.* This problem seems to have been satisfactorily solved in the affirmative, and no revision of the existing evidence is likely to radically modify such a solution.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY G. LA PIANA

NEW TESTAMENT STUDIES

The borrowing of ideas and even of words from one writing to another is often discussed by New Testament scholars. Professor Goodspeed's new collection of papers[1] calls attention to more extensive causal links in the early Christian literature. He believes the publication of Acts with its portrait of Paul led to the collecting of Paul's letters. The collection required an introduction, which was supplied by the collector, who wrote Ephesians for this purpose. The example of this collection led the author of the Apocalypse of John to begin with a series of letters to churches. In fact, all the later letters in the canon and in the Apostolic Fathers are affected by the Pauline corpus. The Pauline letters, introduced by an encyclical and treated as encyclicals, led to the writing of new encyclical letters and of new groups of letters (Pastorals, Ignatius). Paul's letters had influence only when they became part of a collection, and that influence includes both the epistolary form of individual tracts and the idea of a group of letters. The early influence of New Testament writings forms a somewhat neglected field of study. This volume reveals and partly corrects that neglect.

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[1] *New Solutions of New Testament Problems.* By E. J. Goodspeed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. xi+127 pages. $2.00.

Some minor suggestions of the book are also of interest. For example, it is conjectured that Philemon was really the letter to Laodicea mentioned in Colossians, and that it was in the original Pauline corpus as a letter to that church. First Clement is read in a new light if, with Goodspeed, we regard it as written in response to the challenge addressed to the Roman church in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The book includes some papers on Acts, its origin and date, and an attempt at reconstructing the lost ending of Mark. These do not claim to be so original, nor are they printed here for the first time. Especially important is the well-considered answer to Torrey's theory of an Aramaic source for Acts, chapters 1–15, an answer based not so much on the diction as on the substance of Acts and on general considerations of the improbabilities of an Aramaic author and public of the kind that Torrey's hypothesis involves.

The volume is unnecessarily repetitious, but it is simple, clear, and unpretentious. Within the limits it sets itself it fully deserves the claim of novelty which its title conveys.

HENRY J. CADBURY

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

FRANCISCAN MYSTICISM

This valuable study of St. Bonaventure[1] describes with illuminating detail the spiritual environment, life, and work of the Seraphic Doctor. The author holds that despite the contrast between the legislative and scholastic mind of Bonaventure and the spontaneity of Francis, it is to Francis that Bonaventure owes his type of spirituality. In the spirit of the founder of his order he frequently expresses such sentiments as *curiosus devotionem non habet*. Even his monasticizing legislation as minister-general of the Franciscans was "an attempt to save what could be saved of the Franciscan ideal" in times of distress.

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[1] *Franciscan Mysticism: A Critical Examination of the Mystical Theology of the Seraphic Doctor with Special Reference to the Sources of His Doctrines.* By Dunston Dobbins. New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1927. 207 pages. $1.25.

Addressing himself to the mysticism of Bonaventure, our author finds it a little disappointing that his language is so objective as to conceal his personal experience of religion. But to him church, dogmas, and ordinances exist for one end: "the arousing of divine love and the desire of attaining to mystic communion with God." Apart from that end all knowledge is vain: *Nolo te congnoscere nisi ut te diligam*. Chapters ii, iii, and iv study respectively the three stages in the mystic way or ladder of perfection—purgation, illumination, union—as these are set forth in Bonaventure's treatises. His scheme of the mystical life is expounded in comparison with the views of other systematizers of mysticism, and here the author shows a considerable range of knowledge in the general field. Anselm and Bernhard helped to give shape to Bonaventure's thought regarding illumination, but the personal experience of the imitation of Christ in Francis was still more determinative. His conception of the church, developed under the guidance of St. Paul, is that of a fellowship of those who embrace the cross and "co-operate with our Lord as members of his mystical body."

Chapter vi discusses, not without some repetition, the literary sources of Bonaventure's mysticism and gives a balanced appreciation of its value. An additional short chapter of "Conclusions" conveniently summarizes the author's judgments on the principles, sources, and characteristics of the great Franciscan's mystical teaching. This teaching is commended as being free from "debased supernaturalism," Quietism, and Pantheism, and as being Christocentric and optimistic. In short, the mysticism of the Seraphic Doctor is "nothing more than the dedication of life to the service of God, making for the best interests not only of the individual mystic but also of the whole community of men." It is of no little interest to find a modern Capuchin discovering in the work of a medieval minister-general of the Franciscans a type of piety which has had frequent expression in Protestantism. For Bonaventure it presupposes asceticism (p. 10), but this is essentially a process of "cleansing the mind" and attaining to peace (pp. 59, 65).

Father Dobbins insists (chap. v) that despite the intellectual demands in some of Bonaventure's writings, he stoutly maintained the possibility of the highest mystical attainment even for the unlearned layman. "All, independently both of special vocation and of special intellectual endowments, may attain with equal ease to the fulness of the Christian life." The example of St. Francis, even to the receiving of the stigmata, may be followed by all (p. 135). This principle appears almost as far-reaching as Luther's doctrine of justification. The fact that it was held by many mystics without producing a general anti-sacerdotal reform movement lends force to the contention that it was something else than Luther's religious discovery that made the Reformation.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

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TRADITIONAL RELIGION IN A SCIENTIFIC WORLD

If one wants to be up to date in the discussion of religion today he must take account of science. To be considered unscientific is almost worse than to be regarded as heretical. Nothing could speak more eloquently of the influence of modern science than the many attempts of writers on religious subjects to bring what they say under its beneficent protection, or at least to show that there is no conflict between what science has to say and what the theologian wants to say. At the same time most of these writers on religion are not really conscious of dependence on a carefully defined scientific method for their religious beliefs. These are taken over from the religious tradition in which they live. Their procedure, therefore, consists in adapting what has been received from tradition so as to avoid any open clash with science. Three recent books illustrate this way of dealing with the problem.[1]

Dr. Windle's book breathes the spirit of an open-minded Catholic. He has a cordial attitude toward science, and would not for a moment undertake to hinder the free exercise of the scientist's gifts. But the reader is conscious on every page that the author is not at all dependent on science for his beliefs. These he takes from the church. Secure in the confidence that the church has the truth, he is more concerned to refute statements which reflect on the reputation of the church than he is to state precisely what science is doing. He admits that individuals who speak for the church are not infallible; indeed, an official congregation of the church may be wrong in its pronouncements, as was the case in the condemnation of Galileo. But back of the fallible statements of the interpreters of church doctrine is the infallible church. It is very slow and careful in coming to dogmatic decisions. "But when a dogma is once defined it stays put," while a science is never able to be sure that its doctrines are final. The confessed ignorance of science in many realms leaves the church free to interpret those realms with sovereign authority. Where science does have definite information, a Catholic simply makes such adjustments of church doctrines as will avoid a direct clash. The evolutionary hypothesis may be maintained so long as it is also held that God, as defined by Catholic theology, is the creative force in the evolutionary process. In short, the author of this volume lives in the theological world defined by his church, feeling perfectly sure that final truth will always be found eventually in the church. He frankly recognizes the findings of science, but these are entirely secondary. They are to be adjusted to the teaching of the church, rather than to be made the basis of a philosophy of life.

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[1] *The Catholic Church and Its Reactions with Science*. By Bertram C. A. Windle. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 152 pages. $1.00.

The Creator Spirit. By Charles E. Raven. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927. xv+310 pages. $2.50.

Reality in Religion. By Gilbert T. Rowe. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1927. 320 pages. $1.75.

Canon Raven has written an unusually thoughtful book. It contains two series of lectures, the Hulsean lectures at Cambridge, and the William Belden Noble Lectures at Harvard. The title, *The Creator Spirit*, indicates the fundamentally theological interest of the author; but the main content of the book is written in admirably scientific spirit. Canon Raven was for some time devoted to a study of certain problems of biology, and has a wealth of first-hand knowledge concerning this realm. Moreover, he has kept up with the investigations in this field to a degree quite unusual in a clergyman. It is a delight to follow his lucid and carefully accurate interpretations of recent developments in biological science. One feels that here his confidence in valid opinions depends entirely on the use of scientific method.

But his main concern is "to show that the work of the Holy Spirit is to be traced in the creative as well as the inspirational energies of the Godhead; that creation, incarnation, and inspiration reveal the same eternal values; that biology and psychology bear witness to love rather than to will" (p. vii). This undertaking means that the power back of the processes which science finds in the world is to be identified with the God defined in a theology which took its rise before the advent of modern science. In the attempts at this identification the reader is frequently shot from one intellectual climate into another with bewildering suddenness. It is somewhat startling to find the author seeking to clear up a biological difficulty by analyzing the phrases of the Chalcedonian Christology. Apparently for him this Christology is dealing with a fact as objective as the carefully observed behavior of birds, which he has just examined.

As a result of his interpretation of biology he accepts Mr. Lloyd Morgan's theory of the "unrestricted concomitance" of mind and physical organism, and thus finds throughout nature a spiritual element which in man reaches a level where direct intuition of the spiritual power back of and in nature is possible. There are some fine observations on the impressions made upon man by nature. Abundant room is found for mystic emotional reactions as well as for the orderliness with which science is concerned. Chapter iv is a remarkably well-disciplined attempt to ask honestly what we have a right to say concerning the character of the power responsible for the kind of world in which we actually live. But when the author passes from the realm of specific scientific inquiry to the larger task of synthesis he undertakes to show that the sciences, when rightly interpreted, furnish a ground for the conception of God derived from ecclesiastical tradition. At the same time his evolutionary philosophy is more logically to be classed with naturalism than with the supernaturalism from which his theology is derived. The present reviewer was unable to feel the same vitality in the sections presenting an apologetic for predetermined theological conclusions as in the very rewarding survey of biology, and in the good, though less authoritative, discussion of psychology.

Dr. Rowe's Quillian Lectures, entitled *Reality in Religion,* deal with a theme which is coming more and more to the front. There has been recently so much sentimental discussion of religion, and so much superficial apologetic attempting to reassure timid souls, that tough-minded individuals are beginning to ask whether religion is either willing or able to face facts in the relentless fashion demanded by the scientific spirit. Dr. Rowe has undertaken to present religion as a reality worthy of serious scientific consideration. He has been much influenced in his attempt, as he himself acknowledges, by Dr. James W. Lee and Professor Douglas C. Macintosh, and he quotes pertinent passages from these men at great length and with great frequency. Professor Wieman and Canon Streeter to a lesser extent are called into service.

The lectures should be judged against the background of the somewhat rigid traditionalism which still prevails in the South. Thus judged they constitute an admirable and tactfully stated plea for the open-minded spirit in religious inquiry. It is made perfectly plain that in an age which is demanding critical testing of everything, religion cannot retain the confidence of men unless it invites the same kind of critical inquiry. The burden of the book is devoted to a plea for this attitude.

But if the reader has already taken all this for granted he is likely to desire a somewhat more precise application of the principle than is to be found in this volume. "Science" is discussed in very general terms. Moreover, there is too frequently an attempt to reiterate conventional beliefs with the assertion that they are validated by "science" or by "scientific method." For example:

> Though the Bible is an ancient book which came into existence long before the birth of modern science, it follows the scientific method in that its great doctrines are based upon experience (p. 180).
>
> Religion with Jesus was wholly scientific. There was nothing fictitious, mechanical, or artificial in his teaching or conduct (p. 154).
>
> Religion has always been in a measure scientific. Every great expression of faith or system of worship grew out of the experience of somebody (p. 146).

In these statements (which are rather typical) the word "scientific" is loosely taken to mean an appeal to experience. The fact is entirely overlooked that whenever a science undertakes its investigations it inevitably revises ordinary common-sense inferences from "experience." Science means a critical examination of supposed facts based on a carefully devised method of measuring and testing. This quality of science (which is all that makes it science at all) is almost entirely left out of sight in the book. In consequence the author can cite religious beliefs which the "experience" of traditionally trained persons affirms to be real, and by showing that these come from "experience" make the claim that they are "scientifically" established. Indeed, the last chapter in the book indicates that confidence is really placed in a deposit of faith rather than in the application of scientific method; for here the endeavor is made to establish "Finality in Religion." Is the sense of reality to rest on "final" revelation? Or on trust in carefully defined methods of discovering reality? The reader of this book will not have this question answered.

Gerald Birney Smith

University of Chicago

POPULARIZING CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

The layman is in the limelight. He has become the focal point of the light that emanates from the theological schools. Time was when the minister stood between the seminary and the pew. He was the middleman who purveyed the results of scientific research to the people. In his ministry of teaching he sought to popularize and disseminate the discoveries made by the academic world of theology. Professors immured in the sacred precincts of learning were thought to have gathered so much dust that they could not attract attention. They had become so used to speaking in tongues that their theological jargon was unintelligible to the uninitiated.

But nowadays the theological professor speaks and writes directly to the men and women of the churches. And I must say he writes with considerable effectiveness. There was Dr. Bosworth's *What It Means To Be a Christian*. There is Dr. W. A. Brown's *Beliefs that Matter*. *The Principles of Christian Living*, by Dr. G. B. Smith, is another. And there is the book under discussion by the professor of systematic theology in Drew Theological Seminary.[1] None of these books is the hasty product of an amateur reporting a subject with more zeal and pertness at his command than knowledge and judgment. They are produced by experts. If the theological schools are to keep their departmental classifications abreast of the times they will shortly need to consider the propriety of including the department of systematics under that of practical theology.

What book shall a minister recommend to the perplexed individual who wants both to straighten out his own thinking and to know what are the current constructive statements that have emerged from the confusing processes of theological reconstruction? What textbooks are available for those study groups which it is the ambition of the minister to promote?

Dr. Lewis' manual is admirably designed for these purposes. It is provided with a series of questions for review and of pertinent research topics. Were I intending to introduce the book to an adult study group I should first pique their curiosity and arouse interest by quoting to them from this appendix. And I should rather expect to find the group as it proceeded in its study turning more and more to the ministerial leader for further elucidation of the topics under discussion.

Dr. Lewis believes that "a scientific theology is a friend of religion." He recognizes the twofold nature of humanity's search for God: partly as an explanation of the world; partly as an answer to profound moral needs of security, refreshment, reinforcement, and companionship. In his treatment of the several significant Christian beliefs he begins with God, following the traditional order of arrangement of subject matter, rather than beginning with man, with his needs and experiences, and concluding with God as the supreme climax and fulfilment. There is no specific study of the place of the Bible in the life of the Christian, though the author indirectly and repeatedly emphasizes the contribution the Bible as currently interpreted makes to Christian thinking.

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[1] *A Manual of Christian Beliefs*. By Edwin Lewis. New York: Scribner's, 1927. 152 pages. $1.50.

Dr. Lewis does not write for that large group of younger people brought up in Christian homes and churches who yet are totally and innocently ignorant of the Christian point of view. The latter do not need readjustment of untenable views. They have no convictions to adjust. They need a winsome introduction to Christian thinking that presupposes nothing. Dr. Lewis has written his manual for people already familiar with Christianity who are anxious to reformulate their thinking.

The book will be hailed as adding impetus in a non-technical way to the growing theological renaissance of our time.

A. C. McGiffert, Jr.

Chicago Theological Seminary

THE CHURCH IN THE CHANGING CITY[1]

H. Paul Douglass, in his *Church in the Changing City,* adds a fourth volume to the notable series of scientific studies of the city church which have been produced under his direction by the Institute of Social and Religious Research. When one wants accurate data and careful interpretation with regard to the church as a factor in the complex, rapidly expanding, and swiftly evolving life of the American city his most valuable resource is this series of church and community surveys. This present book was written in response to the specific request from many city pastors and church executives, "Show us what the other man is doing in cases possibly analogous to ours and let us draw our own conclusions" (p. xiv). And this Dr. Douglass has faithfully endeavored to do by producing sixteen fairly exhaustive case studies of as many big city churches which exhibit a wide variety of adaptations to the changing city. These studies are especially significant since practically all of these churches "are standing where many churches have fallen or are all but prostrate" (p. ix). The varying and sometimes even conflicting terms in which these churches have defined their tasks, and the methods which they have developed to achieve their objectives, are instructive to all who are interested in the problem of the church in an urban environment. In presenting these studies a definite effort was made to avoid passing "moral judgments" upon the programs of the churches investigated; no attempt was made to devise objective criteria by which to test them; rather, the intention is "to allow each church to be judged in the light of its acknowledged objectives" (p. v).

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[1] *The Church in the Changing City.* By H. Paul Douglass. New York: Doran, 1927. 453 pages. $4.00.

Out of the large number of churches with which the staff of Institute of Social and Religious Research had become acquainted in the course of their many investigations sixteen were selected as typical of the varying solutions which a city church might find to its problem of adaptation. These were arranged for presentation in what was felt to be "a significant sequence," namely, from that of a church with a fairly conventional program up through an ascending scale of ever increasing variety and extensiveness until the final church studied "is obviously more than a church" (p. 40). Indeed, the name "institute" is added to that of church in order to indicate the sweep of the program carried on.

Undoubtedly the greatest value of the book will be found by ecclesiastical strategists in the intimate and accurate picture given of the variety of adaptations effected by these churches. And it is an engrossing picture. One church solves its problem by breaking away from a rapidly deteriorating environment and relocating in a more desirable site. Another, finding itself located at the strategic centre of the city's life, appeals to the "downtown minded" and achieves a significant place by its "earnest and large-minded advocacy and interpretation of civic and social problems" (p. xix). One of the most interesting and adventurous experiments studied is that of the Methodist Episcopal City Parish, Los Angeles, in which a single expert administration handles as a unit six endangered churches, first, to conserve them institutionally, and second, to make them more serviceable. Among other churches studied one finds Grace Community Methodist Episcopal Church, Denver, definitely allied with the cause of Labor; Fourth Presbyterian Church, Chicago, combining ministries to both its Gold Coast and underprivileged communities; and Olivet Institute (Presbyterian), Chicago, with its broad seven-day-a-week settlement type of program. Careful study of all these varied cases will well repay anyone who has any responsibility for directing the work of a city church.

The book raises some questions, however. First, the primary concern of this inquiry seems to be to discover those adaptations which have greatest survival value for threatened ecclesiastical institutions. This is, of course, important. But is it not even more important to discover to what extent these churches are actually enriching the lives of their members and adherents and also meeting the needs of their communities? It is highly desirable that some technique should be developed by which the actual potency of the church might be measured. Very little scientific study has been attempted along this line. Second, this study seems to make evident a very general lack of clear thinking on the part of church leaders as to the essential function of the church. Even these churches which have attained success frequently have done so by the method of trial and error, rather than on the basis of careful thought. Some have, indeed, shown profound insight as to the responsibilities which a church ought to accept; but more often they simply have been fortunate in the devices which they have tried out. It can hardly be said that they have undertaken this or that form of service because it was seen to be a logical expression of the church's function. Is it not desirable that there shall be a great deal more very definite thinking by those responsible for directing the church enterprise as to the central task of this institution? It is hard to see how a church can intelligently project a program until it has clearly defined its objectives. Third, Dr. Douglass' scale for measuring the adaptation of city churches, devised in his *1,000 City Churches,* is rather plainly in evidence as the background of his thinking in all this discussion. Indeed, the sequence already referred to in which these churches are arranged for presentation, as he says, "inevitably implies a hypothesis as to the relation between environmental pressure and institutional development in the group of churches concerned" (p. xv). Dr. Douglass' thesis is that under pressure of urban needs churches have developed increasing and varying forms of activity, and the adaptation of the church to the city can be measured, therefore, in terms of the number and range of the activities in which it engages. To the present reviewer this series of case studies seems to indicate that no such scale of measurement is of much value. It oversimplifies the problem. This scale takes no cognizance of the efficiency with which these activities are carried on; of the actual need for such services in a given community; of the possible duplication of such services by other institutions; nor of their relevancy to the essential task of the church. Adaptation, these studies would seem to indicate, must be measured in terms of definite objectives, on the one hand, and of particular neighborhoods with all their complex organization on the other. The effort to find a scale by which to measure the "urban" adaptation of churches does not seem to promise great success.

An appendix containing methodological notes describing the processes used in this investigation adds to the value of the volume. Altogether it would be hard to overestimate the importance of this book to the city pastor or church executive.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

[The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length]

RELIGIONS IN GENERAL

DREYFUS, HIPPOLYTE. *L'Oeuvre de Bahāoullāh.* Tome Troisième: *Le Livre de la Certitude (Kitābou'l Iqān).* Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1928. xii+191 pages. Fr. 18.

After letting it rest for some time, Hippolyte Dreyfus resumes in this volume the publication of the works of the founder of Bahaism in a French translation. The present book is one of the earlier works, a sort of open letter in reply to the questions of an uncle, how his nephew could presume to call himself prophet, Mahdi, etc., by whose return the day of judgment would be ushered in.

HARTMANN, RICHARD. *Die Krisis des Islam* (Morgenland. Darstellungen aus Geschichte und Kultur des Ostens. Heft. 15). Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1928. 37 pages. M.1.50.

Having given in Heft 11 of the same series a rapid survey of the world of Islam from its beginnings to the present (see this *Journal,* Vol. VIII [January, 1928] 156), Richard Hartmann here presents a masterful, brief, and popular sketch of Islam's attempt to meet and remedy the recognized inferiority of its civilization over against that of Europe. Along with the relatively well-known reform movements of India and Egypt, the Turkish movement or movements are for the first time adequately presented in a popular treatise. The one Islamic territory that seems to be unduly slighted is Persia. For the rest the sketch is admirably clear and well balanced.

PIEPER, MAX. *Die Ägyptische Literatur.* Handbücher der Kunst- und Literaturgeschichte des Orients. Wildpark-Potsdam, Germany: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1927. 102 pages. M. 10.

This treatment of Egyptian literature is part of a larger undertaking bearing the title *Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft,* edited by Oskar Walzel.

PUGLISI, MARIO. *La Preghiera.* Torino, Italy: Fratelli Bocca, 1928. 368 pages. L. 28.

An extensive critical, historical, and interpretative study on the subject of prayer. The volume consists of four parts. The first surveys the present status of the study, more particularly from the philosophical point of view, and discusses both the question of methodology and the universality of the phenomenon. Part II is a descriptive exposition of prayer in the light of its history and forms as practiced by individuals or connected with institutions. The third part deals with the meanings and values that have been associated with prayer, and Part IV is on prayer in relation to the religious consciousness of today. The author is familiar with the wide range of literature on his subject in various languages; his attitude is thoroughly scientific in that he views the phenomenon with strict objectivity, yet he is able to appreciate the significance which prayer has had for different sorts of religious persons; and he regards its meaning for today as falling more especially in the area of moral values and ideals.

HEBREW LITERATURE AND RELIGION

BATTENHOUSE, HENRY MARTIN. *The Bible Unlocked.* New York: Century, 1928. xiv+553 pages. $3.50.

The author, who is professor of biblical literature and religion at Pennsylvania State College, has had in mind the needs of the college student and general public, for whom he offers guidance in the whole field of biblical study, including both the Old and the New Testament. The book is written from the moderately critical point of view.

GUNKEL, HERMANN. *What Remains of the Old Testament and Other Essays.* Translated by A. K. Dallas. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 187 pages. $1.50.

These five papers by Professor Gunkel have appeared in various places and at different times during some twenty years in Germany. The separate studies are quite independent of one another, although each has its interest. The titles are "What Is Left of the Old Testament?" "Literary History," "The Religion of the Psalms," "The Close of Micah," and "Jacob." Professor Moffatt writes a prefatory note in which he remarks that Gunkel's "introduction to an English audience is long overdue," but some readers may recall with pleasure Gunkel's *Legends of Genesis* in English translation years ago, and they will be glad for more from the same source.

MALTER, HENRY (editor). *The Treatise Ta'anit of the Babylonian Talmud.* Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1928. xlvii+243 pages.

A tractate of the Babylonian Talmud in a new critical edition of the original text, with an English translation and brief notes. This is the first volume in a projected series making accessible to English readers standard Jewish classics in addition to the Old Testament scriptures.

TORREY, CHARLES CUTLER. *The Second Isaiah: A New Interpretation.* New York: Scribner's, 1928. xii+477 pages. $5.00.

The author finds Isaiah, chapters 34, 35, 40–66, to have been, not a product of the Hebrews' experience in the exilic period, but the work of a religious idealist in Palestine about the year 400 B.C. References to Cyrus and the return from Babylonia, now seen in this part of Isaiah by most critical scholars, are regarded as later interpolations which have resulted in failure heretofore to understand the true character and religious significance of this ancient prophet who is primarily an exponent of a timeless spiritual religion for all mankind rather than a political deliverance for Israel. "What he heralds is the triumph of pure religion, meaning just those few things which the prophet Micah and the apostle James declared to be the essentials. He knew well that only this, nothing more or less, could make common ground for all men."

NEW TESTAMENT

CASE, SHIRLEY JACKSON (editor). *Studies in Early Christianity.* New York: Century, 1928. ix+467 pages. $4.50.

This volume of essays is presented to Frank Chamberlain Porter and Benjamin Wisner Bacon by nineteen different writers among their friends and fellow-teachers in America and Europe. The subjects of the various papers are so selected and arranged as to constitute a critical survey of just those problems that are today attracting chief attention among scholars in the field of Christian beginnings.

EASTON, BURTON SCOTT. *The Gospel Before the Gospels.* New York: Scribner's, 1928. 170 pages. $1.75.

A critical appraisal of recent studies on the origins of the Synoptic Gospels.

GILBERT, GEORGE HOLLEY. *Greek Thought in the New Testament.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. 216 pages. $1.75.

The author states his aim to be the disentanglement of the gospel of Jesus from the Hellenizing influences that have impressed themselves upon the New Testament literature. The treatment is critical, but emphasizes ideas rather than vital interests and activities in the history of Christianity's contact with the gentile world.

GRUBER, L. FRANKLIN. *The First English New Testament and Luther.* Burlington, Iowa: Lutheran Literary Board, 1928. 128 pages. $1.25.

A vigorous contention for the dependence of Tyndale upon Luther's version of the New Testament, and a generous glorification of the German reformer.

HINDS, ARTHUR (compiler). *The Complete Sayings of Jesus.* Williamsburg, Massachusetts: D. H. Pierpont & Co., 1927. 280 pages.

HUCK, ALBERT. *Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien. Anhang die Johannesparallelen.* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1928. xlv+247 pages.

This seventh edition is essentially a reprint of the sixth (1922), with some slight changes in the textual apparatus, of this widely used harmony of the first three gospels.

LEVISON, N. *Passiontide.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner's, 1928. xi+180 pages. $2.00.

This volume is a series of Passion Week studies representing close investigation and an independent point of view. The Jewish affinities of the author permit the introduction of much lore relating to Jewish background, a feature adding considerably to the value of the book. There are many interesting speculations, although unfortunately these are sometimes offered without adequate research to place them within the realm of probability. Too, the author's use of his New Testament sources, together with his own religious viewpoint, is too traditional to realize the promise suggested by the better features of his work. The studies are much less popular than is usual with those for Passion Week. On the whole, an interesting and a valuable book.

MICHAELIS, WILHELM. *Täufer, Jesus, Urgemeinde. Die Predigt vom Reiche Gottes vor und nach Pfingsten. Neutestamentliche Forschungen II, 3.* Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1928. 142 pages. M. 4.50.

Assuming that the coming of the Kingdom of God, taken in the apocalyptic sense, was the message of John the Baptist, and that Jesus interpreted his mission to be the Messiah of this Kingdom, the author seeks to ascertain the significance of this preaching in the history of the early church and also its relation to moderns. Between Jesus and the early community lay Easter and Pentecost, and the author thinks that the preaching of Jesus about the Kingdom ought to get its significance for us through the medium of these two later incidents. In other words, the gospel of Jesus is not enough; we need also the gospel about Jesus.

NORWOOD, ROBERT. *The Heresy of Antioch.* New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. xx+303 pages. $2.00.

Under this enigmatical title the rector of St. Bartholomew's Church in New York gives us a charmingly written account of the career and religion of Paul. Problems of literary and historical criticism are almost completely kept out of sight, while interest centers on the mystical aspects of Paul's religion, particularly his sense of relation to Christ. The author states his interest thus: "The book is written out of the conviction that Paul is our greatest convert to Christ and, for that reason, speaks with a higher authority than the Gospels."

ROBINSON, BENJAMIN W. *The Life of Paul.* "Handbooks of Ethics and Religion." Revised ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. xiii+268 pages. $2.00.

This useful textbook for elementary study of the life and teachings of Paul now appears in a second edition. The changes consist in revision of the references for supplementary reading, and the addition of a new chapter on "Paul's Religion."

STEAD, F. HERBERT. *The Deed and the Doom of Jesus.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner's, 1927. 73 pages. $0.60.

A study of the atonement, the contribution being the use of the analogy of the law of habit; the death of Jesus constituted the break-up of racial habits, with the emerging opportunity of a proper reorganization.

WARD, J. W. G. *His Last Week. An Imaginary Narrative of Thomas, the Doubter.* New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. viii+205 pages. $1.75.

A piece of religious fiction portraying the experience of Thomas as he passed from his state of doubt into one of confidence in the risen Jesus.

WILSON, THOMAS. *St. Paul and Paganism.* The Gunning Lectures, 1926. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner's, 1927. vii+285 pages. $3.75.

A rather conservative estimate of the influence of his gentile environment upon the apostle Paul.

WOODMAN, CHARLES M. *Intimacy with Jesus.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. 182 pages. $1.75.

An attempt to obtain inspirational value out of mystical meditation upon the person of Jesus Christ and an avoidance of all problems of gospel criticism. All four gospels are treated as equally authoritative in so far as they furnish texts of the type needed, while other elements of the tradition, like the apocalypticism of Mark, virtually drop out of sight. Perhaps one ought not to judge the book by the standards of historical criticism, since manifestly its primary purpose is edification.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

ADAMS, HENRY. *The Tendency of History.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. 175 pages. $1.50.

The reading public will do well to observe that this volume is simply a reprint of a part of *The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma,* that appeared nine years ago. But the new volume is a distinct unit and is of interest to all students of historical methodology.

BATIFFOL, PIERRE. *Saint Gregoire le Grand.* Paris: Lecoffre, 1928. 233 pages.

A new volume by a distinguished Roman Catholic scholar in the series Les Saintes.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance.* Studien der Bibliothek Warburg herausgegeben von Fritz Saxl. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1927. v+458 pages. M.24.

An exposition of the thought of Cusanus, Ficino, Bovillus, and other Renaissance philosophers, but primarily concerned with the first-named. Chapters are: "Nicholas Cusanus," "Cusanus and Italy," "Freedom and Necessity in the Philosophy of the Renaissance," "The Subject-Object Problem in the Philosophy of the Renaissance." Nearly half the volume is occupied with the text of Cusanus' *De Mente* and that of Bovillus, *De Sapiente,* by J. Ritter and R. Klibansky, respectively. Of the former a German translation by H. Cassirer is also given.

FLEMING, J. R. *A History of the Church in Scotland, 1843–74.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner's, 1927. x+276 pages. $3.50.

An intimate presentation of the principles and personages of Scottish religious life from the Disruption to the abolition of Patronage, with special attention to the development of the Free Church.

HAAS, JOHN A. W. *The Problem of the Christian State.* Boston: Stratford, 1928. ix+199 pages. $2.00.

A brief survey of the principal historical conceptions of a Christian state, ending with a "positive proposal" which involves a high conception of the state, and an attempt to distinguish its functions from those of the church. The author hopes by this volume "to stimulate anew the interest in a great and living question to which we give too little thought in our country." On the whole a well-balanced and useful book for beginners in the subject.

HOFFMANN, DOM ALEXIUS. *Liturgical Dictionary.* Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1928. 186 pages. $2.25.

This is a very useful little book for every student of church history. The compiler has endeavored, and with manifest success, to supply a much-needed handy lexicon explanatory of the terms used in the liturgical books of the Catholic church. It contains upward of seven thousand words gathered from the official and unofficial Latin liturgical books. Many of these terms are not found in the classical dictionaries, or not with the meanings attached to them in the liturgical sources. It is claimed that this is the only book containing all the proper names of the Roman Breviary. It is certainly a most useful volume.

JUNGKLAUS, DR. ERNST. *Die Gemeinde Hippolyts.* Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1928. viii+150 pages. M.10.

The so-called "Canons of Hippolytus" are here subjected to a very thorough critical examination. A brief statement about Hippolytus' attitude toward the church is followed by chapters on the history of critical study regarding the origins of the canons, the organization of the community which they reflect, the worship of the community, and the more ordinary activities of the society. The author concludes that Hippolytus, in organizing his separatist church, did not provide it with a new organization, but on the whole was only a compiler. The one new feature introduced by him was the institution of the subdiaconate.

KITTEL, HELMUTH. *Oliver Cromwell. Seine Religion und Seine Sendung.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1928. ix+262 pages.

Cromwell is here sympathetically treated as a religious personality. His religion is largely traditional; but his "mission" is of an original character, though essentially the product of his God-idea and not of any psychic peculiarities. Many aspects of his thought and work are examined, and numerous well-chosen quotations employed.

LAUN, JUSTUS FERDINAND. *Die Konferenz von Lausanne. (Für die Einheit der Kirche).* Heft 2. Gotha: Klotz, 1928. 75 pages. M.2.40.

A sympathetic German view of the Lausanne Conference.

SCHLUMBERGER, GUSTAVE. *Byzance et Croisades.* Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1927. 367 pages. Fr. 60.

The great orientalist publisher, Geuthner, republishes in this excellent volume various essays and articles of the famous Byzantinist Schlumberger, which were either out of print or were for one reason or another difficult of access to the ordinary student. The first is Schlumberger's masterful sketch of the riot which removed the vile Michael V Calaphates from the throne, April 21, 1042, originally published in *Révue des Deux Mondes* (September 15, 1904). The similarity of the Constantinople of Byzantine and that of Ottoman times is striking. The second is on "The Tomb of a Byzantine Imperatrix at Valencia in Spain," from *Révue des Deux Mondes* (March 15, 1902). A great deal of late Byzantine history is enmeshed in the tragic fate of Constance Anne, illegitimate daughter of the great Hohenstaufen Frédéric II. This is followed by a monograph on the well-known journey of Manuel Paleologos to Paris and London in the days when Ottoman glory was in the ascendant, to be checked for a few years at least by Tamerlane in 1402 (from the same journal, December 15, 1915). A trip through the Abruzzi and Apulia (May 3-17, 1914) gives us an admirable variety of views and ideas in the company of the master mind of medieval history (from the same journal, February 1, 1916). A vivid account of the final fall of St. Jean d'Acre into the hands of the Moslems at the end of the Crusades is taken from the same journal, July 15, 1913. Following this a fine presentation of the major facts in the life of the heroic Jean de Chateaumorand, a few of whose many journeys cross the path of Manuel Paleologos, mentioned before, forms the one sketch in the book which has not been published previously. A popular article on the curious ten-year occupation of Jerusalem by Frédéric II of Hohenstaufen, taken from the *Révue hebdomadaire* for January 19, 1918, closes the admirable volume.

SOPER, EDMUND DAVISON. *Lausanne: The Will to Understand.* New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. xiv+156 pages. $1.50.

An informing description of the Lausanne Conference, noting the unities discovered and the differences which emerged in the deliberations. Intimate pen portraits of the principal participants add greatly to the value of the book. The writer is optimistic of the union movement, though deeply aware of the obstacles that beset it. There is a misstatement on page 11 about the origin of the Lambeth Quadrilateral.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND ETHICS

BALLARD, FRANK. *Twentieth-Century Christianity.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner's, 1927. x+319 pages. $2.50.

An attractively written survey of Christianity at the present time. While it furnishes considerable reliable information concerning the various Christian bodies, this information is made to serve an apologetic purpose. The author is very sure that "true" Christianity is the moderately liberal adaptation of traditional Christianity which he himself favors. He therefore presents various features as "perversions" or as "approximations" of genuine Christianity. The volume as a whole is a sensible and high-minded defense of respectable liberalism.

BAUER, WILHELM. *Das "Erlebnis" und das Christentum.* Gotha: Klotz, 1928. viii+104 pages. M.2.50.

Essays for practical edification in which current problems are discussed in the light of pertinent teachings from the New Testament, with the purpose of steadying present-day aspirations and ideals.

CARR, H. WILDON. *The Unique Status of Man.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. 216 pages. $1.75.

A series of lectures given in the University of Southern California. Taking the problem of human freedom, the lecturer traces the main phases of its interpretation through the history of philosophy, concluding with his own solution given in his theory of monads and interpreted in terms of Bergsonian evolution.

CHARLES, R. H. *Divorce and the Roman Doctrine of Nullity.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner's, 1927. ix+100 pages. $0.60.

A scathing indictment of the casuistry involved in the Roman Catholic doctrine of marriage. The bulk of the volume is devoted to an argument to show that Mark's account of Jesus' teaching concerning divorce is incorrect. Matthew deliberately corrected the Markan misrepresentation. The Roman church is declared to have been led into its false position because it regards Mark's statement as authentic.

GILKEY, CHARLES W. *Present-Day Dilemmas in Religion.* Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1928. xi+180 pages. $1.50.

The Cole Lectures delivered in 1927. Having in mind the prevalent tendency to discuss religious problems in terms of two mutually exclusive positions, the lecturer attempted to show that this method of analysis inevitably obscures important phases of religious experience. In alluring literary style and with an abundance of pertinent references and citations, Dr. Gilkey has sympathetically pointed out real issues as contrasted with superficial ones. The outcome is a wholesome presentation of a truly catholic religious faith in contrast to sectarian and provincial contentions. Theology is almost entirely thrust into the background, and vital religious experiences are allowed to speak at first hand.

RITSCHL, OTTO. *Theologische Briefe an Martin Rade.* Gotha: Klotz, 1928. viii+132 pages. M.3.60.

A very interesting series of letters in which the author takes up various points in Rade's recently published treatise embodying his lectures on *Glaubenslehre,* and raises critical questions. In addition to the letters, the volume contains an essay indicating the value of the Lutheran confessions of faith for present-day religious life.

RUST, HANS. *Kant und das Erbe des Protestantismus.* Gotha: Klotz, 1928. viii+123 pages. M.3.60.

A thorough study of Kant's religious ideas in relation to the religious thinking of his time. The author finds that whereas orthodox Protestantism is based on Paulinism, Kant was attracted by the ideals of Jesus. Philosophical idealism has followed this preference of Kant. The author feels that this appeal to Jesus is more truly Christian than the Paulinism of the Reformation. He pleads for a place for Kant as one who brought Protestantism to a truly evangelical position.

STEGMANN, REV. BASIL AUGUSTINE, D.S.B. *Christ the Man from Heaven.* Washington: Catholic University of America, 1927. 104 pages.

An anonymous Catholic affirmed in a recent number of the *Atlantic Monthly:* "Every book on religion or related topics written by Catholics must be submitted to the diocesan bishop for approval. True research is therefore impossible with the Catholic author. . . . . He knows before he begins his studies the deductions he will have to make to be orthodox. This is particularly true in the sphere of scriptural study. The student of this subject walks on particularly thin ice." Father Stegmann's monograph on *Christ, the Man from Heaven* is a perfect illustration. The book bears the *Nihil Obstat* of the Censor and the *Imprimatur* of the Archbishop. This guarantees the orthodoxy and the scientific uselessness of the volume. The conclusion, to which the author had arrived before he began his studies, is that the Pauline "man from Heaven" was a unique item of Christian revelation "to which nothing in pre-Christian religious thought can furnish an analogy."

STRAUS, H. CERF. *Reason and Religion.* Boston: Stratford, 1928. ii+56 pages. $1.00.

A brief exposition of personalism (called by the author "personal realism") as the philosophy which solves all the problems of religious thinking.

STREETER, BURNETT H., CHILCOTT, CATHERINE M., MACMURRAY, JOHN, AND RUSSELL, ALEXANDER S. *Adventure. The Faith of Science and the Science of Faith.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. ix+247 pages. $2.00.

This volume is a sequel to the much-discussed *Reality* published by Canon Streeter last year. Here, however, four members of the significant group which meets regularly for serious discussion make their contributions. The discussions are intended to correlate science and religion by recognizing that both rest upon faith.

Science is an adventure of man in quest of more knowledge. Religion is defined as the adventure of God in the incarnation. There is a fine chapter on adventuring in the moral realm. The main emphasis of the book is laid on the speculative adventuring necessary in order to bring the idea of the incarnation into correlation with the world of an adventuring science.

TURNER, J. E. *The Nature of Deity.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. 248 pages. $3.50.

This volume is described as a sequel to the author's former book, *Personality and Reality*. He there argued that the existence of a Supreme Self in the universe can be established on the basis of the information furnished by modern science. He here examines in detail the characteristics of this Supreme Self, having constantly in mind the facts disclosed by modern science and their interpretation under the theory of emergent evolution. The familiar concepts of theism are discussed and defined under the guidance of these considerations.

PREACHING AND WORSHIP

BARBER, ARTHUR. *The Everyday Philosophy of Jesus.* Boston: Gorham Press, 1927. 132 pages.

A volume of homiletic addresses in which the attempt is made to state in the simplest terms the gist of the religion of Jesus. The style is fresh, and it is easy to feel the author's earnestness in his effort to meet contemporary ethical problems.

STEWART, GEORGE. *The Resurrection in Our Street.* New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. viii+124 pages. $1.35.

Twelve short sermons relating to the Christian belief in a risen Jesus as it affects life today. The book is not an apologetic for the doctrine of immortality, but is rather a spiritual evaluation of that belief in the lives of men in modern times.

SUTER, JOHN WALLACE (compiler). *Devotional Offices for General Use.* New York: Century, 1928. 118 pages. $1.00.

Dr. Suter has aimed "to place in the hands of Christian people forms of services which can be used on many occasions in church, parish houses, school, home, cottage, or camp." With care and fine feeling he has selected brief devotional services from *A New Prayer Book* (Oxford University Press) and from various other larger collections of liturgical offices. The result is a volume valuable to everyone who may be called upon to conduct public or semipublic worship services.

WILLIAMS, MARK WAYNE. *The Master Song and Other Addresses.* New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 139 pages. $1.50.

A series of seventeen stimulating religious addresses on a wide range of subjects published under the title of the first sermon in the group.

MISCELLANEOUS

Abstracts of Theses. The University of Chicago. Humanistic Series, Vol. I (1922–23). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925. xi+525 pages. $3.00.

This volume includes abstracts of thirteen theses in the Divinity School in the departments of Old and New Testament, Systematic Theology, Church History, Practical Theology, and Sociology.

ARONSON, MOSES JUDAH. *La philosophie morale de Josiah Royce. Essai sur l' idealisme social aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique.* Paris: Felix Alcan, 1927. ix+185 pages. Fr.25.

An interpretation of Royce's philosophy of loyalty as a typical expression of American idealism. More than half of the volume is devoted to a brief statement of the historical attempts on the part of the Colonists and the makers of the Constitution to secure social co-operation without sacrificing individual freedom. Channing, Lincoln, Emerson, and Walt Whitman are then taken as prophets of the ideals for which Royce found philosophical expression. Only fifty pages are devoted to Royce himself (Walt Whitman receives thirty-six pages). The author's primary interest is in his own social theory.

BROOKS, RACHEL. *Our International House (The Religion of an American Town).* Sayville, New York: Sayville Press, 1927. 63 pages. $0.60.

A sociological study conducted in the village of Sayville, New York.

WOOFTER, T. J., JR. *Negro Problems in Cities.* New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928. 284 pages. $2.50.

An impartial and sympathetic study of Negro neighborhoods, housing, schools, and recreation in sixteen American cities—seven in the North and nine in the South.

Cambridge University Press

Five Centuries of Religion. By G. G. COULTON, M.A. Vol. I. St. Bernard, His Predecessors and Successors, 1000-1200 A.D. With 24 plates. Demy 8vo. $12.00. Vol. II. The Friars and the Dead Weight of Tradition, 1200-1400 A.D. With 7 plates and 8 text-figures. Demy 8vo. $12.50. (*Studies in Medieval Life and Thought.*)

The Life of Bishop Wilfrid by Eddius Stephanus. Text, with Translations and Notes by BERTRAM COLGRAVE. Demy 8vo. $5.00.

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THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

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I

WE ARE constantly reminded that spirituality is no prerogative of natural science. It is generally taken for granted that, wherever the consideration of the spiritual life does belong, it is not a department of natural history. Naturalists as a rule acquiesce in this and are quite content to leave that which is spiritual to those whose special province it is.

From these assumptions there has grown up, not unnaturally, a tradition that scientific culture not only contributes nothing to the spiritual life, but tends actually to abort it. From all sides and for generations past humanists have voiced the complaint that science has no place for values and that the mechanistic science of our age is blighting the finer fruits of the spirit.

This is a serious indictment of scientific culture, and in view of the rapid diffusion of scientific methods into new fields of human activity the current trends are viewed with alarm by many of our most thoughtful spiritual leaders. One by one the domains of human experience formerly regarded as most intimate and sacred have been invaded by the prying curiosity of scientifically minded inquirers. When the soul was chloroformed by psychology it was feared that the spiritual life would suffer euthanasia with it.

Yet nothing of the sort seems to have happened. Some of the most radically mechanistic psychologists of our acquaintance give all indications of a highly refined spirituality. In music, art, public service, altruism, devotion to duty they measure up with the most idealistic of our humanists. And indeed the charge that scientific training impairs spiritual values in general is contrary to the evidence, as a survey of the careers of our most eminent scientific investigators abundantly proves. These men show spiritual qualities of the highest order.

The recent invasion of the spiritual realm by biologists is not a mere impertinent and vulgar curiosity. There are forces here which seem to influence conduct, and any conduct is a biological event. If we define the spiritual life broadly, as psychologists generally do, to include the whole of our conscious experience as introspectively known, then we must either say the spiritual experience as such is an epiphenomenon which does not influence conduct—a conclusion which is repugnant to most people, including many mechanistic biologists—or else we must search for the mechanism by which a spiritual event can move matter against resistance, that is, do the bodily work manifested in consciously directed behavior.

Natural events do not happen uncaused. Such a thing would be by definition unnatural; for the system of nature as envisaged by natural science is the orderly flow of events, all of which are bound together in a unitary web of causal sequences. This is a mechanistic order because, again by definition, all natural events take place in accordance with laws or uniformities so that under like conditions like results follow, the same as with our artificial machines.

This orderliness of nature makes it possible to standardize our machines and their products and to systematize our knowledge of nature so that in common life we can adjust more efficiently to things as they are and as we expect them to be in the future. By the scientific method we extend this experience of nature and our systematization of it. This gives better prediction of events and better control of events. This control is possible only as we learn the laws of natural causal sequences. This seems to be as true of human nature as of inorganic nature.

Now, when a man tells his small son that it is better to tell the truth than to lie and follows this teaching up with appropriate methods until the boy has developed habits of veracity, a change has been effected in the conduct of the child, in what he does with his body, and he has also developed a moral or spiritual trait which we call honesty. Both of these events—the physical and the spiritual—seem to be results of a complex of causes, one component of which resides in the moral character of the parent, again a spiritual trait.

This apparent causal sequence is validated by the common experience of the race as far back as the memory of man goes, and indeed our whole practice of family and public education is based upon it. I see no escape from it either on grounds of common sense and common experience or in the light of the most rigid scientific analysis of the facts in the case. It can be evaded only by ignoring the troublesome factors or by some process of dialectic that runs counter to the evidence actually before us. If the spiritual ideal of the father were different, the training would be different and the child would be different—he might be trained to be a thief.

In this situation there are obviously some biological events —the physical conduct of parent and child—and some other events, both causal and consequential, which are usually classed as spiritual phenomena—the purpose of the father to train the child in honesty and the actual development by the child of habits of veracity and of ideals of honor.

These seem to be the simple facts. The situation is a mixture of biological events and spiritual values. What is the relation between them? Spiritual forces influence the child's conduct; they may even influence the form of bodily growth, as illustrated by an ideal to become a scoutmaster resulting in systematic exercise and further growth of muscles in weight and power. And, on the other hand, bodily structure influences spiritual development, as illustrated by the case of a child who after an attack of encephalitis is left mentally defective and further moral training is impossible. An injury to the brain affects the spiritual life.

The traditional way of adjusting to this complex problem is very simple. The spiritual life is detached from the natural life—logically, not actually, of course—and moralists work with spiritual forces while naturalists work with natural forces. So we have spiritual systems of metaphysics and theology running parallel with mechanistic systems of nature, the two being perfectly insulated from each other, but only logically, not biologically.

This procedure seems to give very satisfying results so long as the questions are carefully held aloft in the domain of abstractions and not allowed to touch the ground of factual evidence. But the moment one attempts to apply either of these systems of abstractions in a concrete case of human behavior insurmountable difficulties appear. When the spiritists and humanists undertake actually to influence conduct they must use the physical instruments of mortal bodies and the physical apparatus of culture—books, schools, and the like—and here their spiritual systems somehow must enmesh with the mechanisms of nature. And when biologists extend their mechanistic science into the realm of human behavior their traditional formulations of mechanism break down completely and sometimes disastrously.

Perhaps the spiritists and the humanists are quite content to let the matter rest here, an unsolved and maybe an insoluble problem. But that is not the temper of modern science. An unsolved problem is a challenge. Questions of this sort are the vital breath of science. And the naturalist cannot rest content with a logically perfect solution in terms of postulates which are abstractions. This may give him a useful working hypothesis, a place to begin an inquiry; but his final abstraction—a law of nature—must rest on actual concrete experiences as data in an orderly and unitary system of interrelated causal sequences.

This is the dilemma of the human biologist. The simple tradition which postulates a natural mechanistic order and a spiritual order with its own system of non-mechanistic laws breaks down in practice. The spiritist has no explanation of the technique by which spiritual experience affects bodily conduct; and the mechanist is left with a great mass of apparently uncaused physical action on his hands—something with which he as a naturalist can do nothing at all by the scientific method and which is nevertheless a real datum of his experience with natural phenomena.

Perhaps the trouble lies in our traditional postulates. The antiquity and sacredness of a tradition are not reliable evidences of its truth, as has been demonstrated a great many times from the days of Copernicus and Galileo until now. Even the axioms of Euclid are at present under fire.

Have we the courage and the judicial temper to question our traditional postulates and definitions of mechanism and of spirit, to examine them critically in the light of the actual experience of today and, so far as possible, uninfluenced by the current theological, metaphysical, and scientific dogmas which have been transmitted to us by our elders? Let us try it.

II

Perhaps it will help us to arrive at some common ground for discussion if the writer indulges in a little autobiographical reminiscence. Spiritual experience is, we all agree, a very intimate personal matter; that is why it is so inaccessible to scientific treatment; and this is my justification for these personalities.

My father was a Baptist minister in our northwest frontier, not learned in the traditions of the schools, but endowed with rare good sense and as fine spirituality as you will ever find. He was greatly beloved of his parishioners and he reared his children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord according to the traditions of his Vermont ancestry.

When the three boys grew up and for some inscrutable reason devoted themselves to natural science, their father readjusted his own thinking with sympathetic understanding of their problems. Among my early recollections are conversations between my father and my brother, ten years older, about the teachings of Darwin and Huxley, then sweeping this country with devastating effect upon many hallowed traditions. Later I read these books myself, and, like both of my older brothers, after much intellectual struggle and many moral crises arrived at some sort of working adjustment between my scientific beliefs and my spiritual values. The result was that when in due course I became professor of biology in a small Baptist college I was able to keep the peace with my environment and at the same time, I trust, to help some of my students over hard places in their own spiritual development.

Things were going smoothly enough outside. I was teaching evolution to the Freshmen and Sophomores and the president of the college was teaching evidences of Christianity to these same students as Seniors from a text (his own) in which this doctrine was vigorously attacked; and there was, so far as I know, never a trace of friction about it.

But things were not going so comfortably inside. I was trying to live in two unrelated worlds at once, a Dr. Jekyll–Mr. Hyde sort of existence that (as I have since learned) Mr. Dewey says is impossible. I think Dewey is right; for in the case of any thoughtful person one of the dual personalities is sure to dominate the other to the detriment of both, or else the conflict products a "complex" which wrecks the personality beyond repair, with the terminal stage perhaps in a madhouse.

Some sort of a readjustment was imperative; and since the day's work was teaching and research in biology, the canons of natural science could not be given up without damage to both an academic career and a personality already molded in conformity with scientific standards of loyalty to experience.

The dilemma is peculiarly aggravated in this case by the fact that for thirty-five years now I have devoted myself to the study of the mechanisms of the brain and how they work, and here the question of the relation of the human brain to human consciousness cannot be evaded.

The expedient of the radical behaviorists, who leave consciousness out of the reckoning altogether, is all right for their program—the development of an objective psychology. This is a very useful thing to do, and it has already contributed much to our knowledge of human nature. But it stops short of the problem in which we are here interested, the relation between spiritual experience, which is a real phenomenon, and the mechanisms of conduct.

These are the considerations which led to a re-examination of the postulates and definitions upon which our traditional dualistic concepts of mechanism and spirit are based, an examination conducted on strictly scientific lines, using only data of experience, and all of the available data, and searching for causal relationships among the phenomena. The causes recognized must be natural causes, which means that every event included in the survey must be the consequence of some previous natural events and the cause (or part of the causal complex) leading to some subsequent events. This is the scientific method.

It is no part of the naturalist's job (at present) to explain the origin of nature. That may come later; but so far we have to take nature as we find it, a going concern, and we try to learn what it is made out of and how it works. Nor is it the naturalist's duty to explain the metaphysics of causation. In natural science a causal relationship is a uniformly observed relationship, and it is nothing more. There is no implication of necessity, of predetermination, or of foreordination. The implication here is contingency—nothing happens unless something else happens, and under identical conditions the same thing always happens.

This we call determinism. It is not predeterminism, for we have no scientific evidence that immutable laws of nature were enacted by somebody or something at the beginning and have necessitated a foreordained sequence of events. These laws are *our* laws, our formulations *ex post facto* of what we have observed to happen; and the laws of change (of growth and evolution) are the most important of them all. We read these laws backward and they give no basis for prediction except in so far as conditions do not change or as we are able to deduce the laws of change.

This orderliness of natural processes, as already mentioned, is the law in accordance with which artificial machines work and give us standardized products. All natural machines —solar systems, rivers, trade winds—work in accordance with the same law, and this is why we call natural processes mechanistic.

This is my creed as a naturalist. It is founded on experience with nature. Now how does spiritual experience articulate with this mechanistic view of the world?

III

As a naturalist I prefer to begin the present survey in the field where I feel most at home. Let us, then, first inquire, What is mechanism?

This we have already outlined. Machines make things in accordance with natural laws of cause and effect. Their structures, activities, and products are standardized. They do not make something out of nothing. The materials and energies which they use all come from outside the mechanism and the products turned out are delivered again to the surrounding environment. A part of the energy received and often a part of the raw material are employed in the process of manufacture ("wasted" from the efficiency engineer's standpoint); the rest comes out with the product. Taking everything into account, the equations of materials and energies received and delivered exactly balance. We know (or can find out) where everything concerned with the process of manufacture comes from and where it goes to. No machine needs a disembodied spirit to run it or tell it what to do.

As long as conditions remain uniform a uniform product is delivered. This is what we want most of our machines to do, but some machines are especially designed to deliver a different product every time. An adding machine will always give the same answer to a particular problem, but ordinarily we set a different problem every time and get a different answer. It is a lawful procedure in both cases.

Some machines participate in their own manufacture. A dictaphone may be so geared that, having taken a record on a cylinder, the mechanism is automatically reversed and the spoken words are delivered. The record made by the machine during dictation becomes a part of the mechanism of speech reproduction.

These characteristics of man-made machines are all found in natural machines also, because both operate in accordance with the same natural laws. A river system is a mechanism constantly engaged in making new products—sandbars, deltas, etc. It makes itself during the process. Ultimately it wears itself out and is scrapped like any other machine. When its drainage basin is degraded by erosion to sea-level the river is no more. The laws of river origin, maturity, senescence, and decay are well known to physiographers.

There is a widespread popular impression that the output of a machine is "the passive product of external force," to quote the words of a well-known philosopher. Nothing could be farther from the truth. When a machine makes something it does it actively. The materials and energy employed come from the outside, and the business of the machine is so to direct and transform this energy that material and energy will be delivered in different form. The product would not be made except for the work of the machine, and the nature of the product depends on the structure of the machine and the conditions under which it is operating. It is an active process throughout, and the machine does work that would not be done if it were not in operation. This holds for all artificial and all natural machines.

Every living body of plant or animal and every human body is a machine in the sense just described. The task of the science of physiology is the investigation of these mechanisms, how they work, the sources of their materials and energies, the output, and the relations of all of these things to the processes of inorganic nature. This task is far advanced, though much work remains before it is completed.

All biology is mechanistic biology. Most working biologists, whatever their philosophy, accept this as the fundamental postulate of their science. It is based on the sum of their experience with animate nature and it fits that experience. The wider the experience the better it fits. The few biologists who attempt to incorporate within this science non-mechanistic vital forces, entelechies, or other similar spiritual agencies have thereby contributed nothing to an understanding of vital processes, but on the other hand they have closed the door to further investigation of these fields by the scientific methods of observation and experiment. The appeal to these mystical agencies is always at the borders of our factual knowledge, and as knowledge is enlarged one by one the phenomena for which non-mechanistic explanations are sought are taking their places in the ordered ranks of functions produced by known mechanisms.

All of the characteristics of lower organisms commonly listed as unique and non-mechanistic are seen to have analogies in inorganic nature, though usually in simpler form. The apparent purposefulness of animal behavior—its adaptiveness, in biological terms—is paralleled by many natural mechanisms like rivers. The organization, whatever it is, is constantly adjusting to the changing environment within which it works. Sensitivity, conductivity, integration of behavior, reflex, selective or discriminative reaction (so-called physiological choice), memory, even associative memory in its objective manifestation (that is, conditioning of reflexes or modification of behavior by personal experience)—these and all the rest are known to occur in recognizable form in dead mechanisms. So many of the phenomena commonly appealed to by mystical vitalists have been adequately explored experimentally and found to be strictly mechanistic and related in cause and effect sequence with inorganic phenomena that the inference is justifiable that all of them are until the contrary is proved.

These vital mechanisms are not identical with inorganic mechanisms, and the products of their action are very different. The attempt so often made to reduce vital phenomena to "nothing but" physico-chemical process has always failed and it probably always will. The vital mechanisms are unique. Otherwise they would not behave in so characteristic a fashion. But so is every inorganic mechanism unique. It delivers its own kind of product. That is why we invent new machines, to make something that we want and cannot get otherwise. But the laws of all of these diverse mechanisms are related in a unitary natural system without interference by any agencies external to the system.

This is the present status of natural science. It is all mechanistic. The entire natural cosmos is a machine. That is why it is a cosmos, not chaos. Natural events have natural causes. Any other events—if such there be—are by definition unnatural, and natural science has no technique for dealing with them.

This involves an enlargement of the popular ideas about machines, but no change in our basic concepts of what mechanism is. Machines of different construction do different things and deliver different products, and the same machine may deliver different products under different working conditions. The only way to know how a particular natural machine works and what products it delivers is to find out by observation and experiment.

The most puzzling problems of mechanistic science at present are at the two extremes where our factual knowledge is most meager: the field of infra-atomic physics and the field of physiological psychology. In the former field the theories of the behavior of electrons and quanta of energy and of relativity have already passed far beyond the formulations of classical mechanics. Some physicists, accordingly, are inclined to appeal to non-mechanistic categories here; others decide that it is better to enlarge and rectify our notions of mechanics to include the newly discovered phenomena. This last procedure will be justified if it proves in the end that the recently discovered properties of matter and energy are related with those of atomic and molecular aggregates in orderly ways capable of quantitative statement. Time and further research will reveal whether this is really the case. So far it seems probable.

In the field of physiological psychology we are still farther from a solution of our problems or even a satisfactory formulation of them. The writer, as already explained, is interested in the spiritual life and its cultivation, in himself and others; and he also as a neurologist has a professional interest in the relations of this life to his career as a bipedal primate with a cerebral cortex which is structurally the most complicated single piece of mechanism known in our natural cosmos.

IV

We have outlined the growth of the mechanistic idea in natural science and its enlargement to include a mechanistic biology. In so far as we can predict and control the course of events in inorganic nature and in animal behavior our success rests on our understanding of the laws of the mechanisms involved. This control is already very considerable. That is why this is characterized as a mechanistic age. On the organic side the control of farm crops and animals gives us scientific agriculture. Even new breeds of wheat and milch cows can be created by application of known laws of heredity and selection. Human life is no exception. We now know how to go about it to breed new races of men, and it can be done any time enough of us want to.

But the spiritual life is left outside this scheme of progress. Science perhaps can give us better tools with which to work; but if spiritual forces are non-mechanistic, science can help us not at all in the development of those spiritual powers which employ these tools; and if spiritual culture does not keep pace with material progress the result may be disaster. Because a man whose spiritual values remain at the level of barbarism, when supplied with high explosives and other efficient mechanisms of destruction, becomes merely a more competent and dangerous barbarian. Science is sometimes accused of aiding and abetting this crime against civilization.

Now, is that quite fair to science? If the spiritists have no technique for meeting the emergency, why blame their failure on science, which by their own postulate is outside the pale of spiritual realities? Really, scientific investigators are not as cold-blooded as they are sometimes pictured. They have their own spiritual values, and some of them are primarily concerned with problems of human welfare. Let us look at these spiritual values again from the biologist's angle.

The traditional postulate is that spiritual experiences are non-mechanistic. Why? Apparently because everybody says so. But this does not square with our biological experience. We have no experience at all of any conscious act apart from bodily organs that do bodily work. A very slight obstruction of the nutritive functions of these organs results in immediate loss of all consciousness—coma. Various intoxications and infections that disturb bodily processes produce similar changes in conscious processes.

And so we might go on piling up evidence that the spiritual life is real life in the biological sense; that all mental activity is bodily activity; that thinking and loving and hating and willing and imagining, that faith, hope, and charity and all our other spiritual powers are functions of bodily organs in the ordinary biological sense. That evidence cannot be marshaled here, for that would require a large book, and much of it is very technical and recondite. There is plenty of it.

An unprejudiced survey of the data leads to the conclusion that spiritual experiences, all of our conscious acts, are bodily functions in just the same sense that muscular movements are. We know what the organs are in both cases, and where they are, and something of how they work. Muscular movement is a simpler function and we know more of the actual mechanisms employed than we do for emotion and thinking; but we do not know all about it, or as much as we would like and hope for, in either case. The advances in our knowledge during the last ten years have been prodigious. Few people realize how much we actually know about the structure of the brain and how it works.

We do not know exactly how a muscle contracts or how a brain thinks, but we know that these organs do perform these functions as surely as we know anything in biology, and the scientific evidence is as complete and as convincing in one case as in the other. A hundred years ago as little was known about how a magnet attracts iron as about how a brain thinks, and both were regarded as magical by most people. We do not yet know exactly how a magnet works, but by common consent this machine has been divorced from magic. That has not yet happened for the brain, but probably it will in due time.

We conclude, then, that the spiritual life is real life, a genuine vital process in the biological sense, something that we do with our bodies. We can now understand why it is so tremendously important a causal factor in human behavior, why it is the greatest creative force in the world.

All machines make things. This is natural creation. The product may be a knitted sock, a river delta, a litter of pups, a magnetic field, or an act of volition. There are natural causes and natural results for all of these. The products delivered by the human thinking machine are the most powerful forces that have ever operated in the history of our planet. They have changed the face of nature, harnessed for man's use forces of wind, water, natural fuels, and electricity, built up social, political, and moral systems that have created civilization. This is no mean output for a machine. It is just because the process is mechanistic that it works practically within and upon the natural environment where we live and of which we are parts.

V

This is where the biologist comes out of the labyrinth—a radically mechanistic biology and a radically mechanistic psychology. What have we gained and what have we lost?

Well, we have gained a practicable approach to the study of human nature—all of it—by scientific methods. By further revision and enlargement of our idea of mechanism to include machines whose products embrace conscious acts (and all conscious experiences are acts) we have brought together objective psychology and introspective psychology and converged their very diverse technical procedures upon the problems of human experience and conduct. We have enlarged the scope of human biology to include all that mankind does and experiences—a thoroughgoing renaissance of human biology by the substitution of law for magic. We have opened up a natural technique for the further control of human conduct, personal development, and social evolution leading to better bodies, better minds, better morals.

On the last point, control of natural forces by man does not involve the violation or abrogation of any laws of nature. We merely adjust our own procedures to these laws as we find them. So we make water run uphill by using a force pump which opposes a stronger force against gravity. Our hope of more effective control of human conduct and social evolution similarly lies in our ability to learn the laws of human nature and sociology. This we must do before we can adjust to them intelligently. And this is not an idle dream. We have proved its efficiency by doing it. We can do it better if we try hard enough.

Now, what have we lost? We have surely lost any hope that we may have cherished of being able to do anything to human nature, or with it, by magic. So far as we work within the realm embraced by our experience up to date we can hope for results only by the use of such natural materials and forces as are available. And we can get results only in conformity with natural laws. These we must discover before we can adjust to them efficiently. We cannot expect to do muscular work without a bodily organ, nor mental work without a bodily organ. We cannot claim any power to initiate behavior, by voluntary effort or otherwise, apart from natural causes. We cannot make something out of nothing.

The preceding remarks must be read in the light of the limitations of our inquiry. We are here considering the natural history of the spiritual life, and we can go no farther than the scientific method will take us. What may lie in the supernatural realm is beyond our scope. We can neither affirm nor deny about that.

Then, again, we have no unrestricted freedom to do as we like about anything, to choose to which laws of nature we shall conform our conduct. People who seriously try to exercise that kind of freedom do not last long unless we catch them at it promptly and restrain them in the asylum.[1]

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[1] The problems of human freedom obviously present the greatest difficulties in a mechanistic analysis of human nature. But they are not insuperable if only we are willing to forego the divine powers of performing miracles, as I have endeavored

This is only a part of the balance sheet. Everyone must complete it for himself and evaluate it for himself. From the biological angle it is tolerably satisfactory. Practically it works out very well. We have mechanisms for the control of the development of spiritual powers comparable with those everywhere recognized for the development of muscular powers.

In training a child for muscular skill, say writing or violin playing, we are training his body. Learning these arts is a process of bodily growth. It can go no faster or farther than the bodily organs can be changed. The same thing is true when we train his memory, will power, and self-control. He acquires these spiritual powers as fast as he grows the organs that perform the functions. We know what the organs involved are in both kinds of learning. It is the child who must do the growing in both cases; we can only provide more favorable conditions. But we can do this, and this is what our systems of family and public education do.

The child can grow in stature and muscular strength without giving any conscious attention to it. But he cannot develop honesty, self-control, or any other spiritual power in this way because it is the conscious functions that he is exercising, and the growth of their organs in these directions will not go on unconsciously.

Limitations of space forbid further elaboration of the practical applications of this kind of human biology. There is no department of the spiritual life that is not illuminated, clari-

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to show in a paper entitled "Biological Determinism and Human Freedom," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXVII (1926), 36–52. There is a natural freedom involving no miraculous powers which is supremely valuable to us and which satisfies every practical behavioristic and spiritual requirement. Some critics of this paper and of the more popular booklet, *Fatalism or Freedom* (New York, 1926), complain that the treatment is metaphysically unsatisfactory. That is not surprising. There was no expectation of solving any metaphysical problems, but only to go as far as the method of natural science can take us. It is no task for a biologist to try to square his data with metaphysical systems.

fied, and ameliorated by the recognition of this organic union with the rest of the vital process.

VI

Have we dimmed the luster of our spiritual values by mechanizing them? Let me ask another question. Are the landscape painter's aesthetic appreciations impaired by knowledge of the laws of perspective and the chemistry of pigments? No, these are the tools of his trade. So are his brains and his ductless glands. It will not hurt him to know as much about how brains work as he does about mixing pigments.

Will the moralist and the religious teacher gain or lose by learning more about the tools of his trade—the technique of education, of sociology, of psychology, and the physical apparatus employed in all of these? He has gained something in efficiency of control of his material. Has he lost anything? Not unless he has deliberately and unnecessarily thrown it away. Why should spiritual values be impaired by knowledge of the technique and apparatus employed in the cultivation of these values any more than agricultural values are?

Let it be emphasized again that no attempt is made here to trespass on the fields of metaphysics or theology, but only to carry a biological survey as far as it can safely go with biological methods. If our survey carries us over some traditional boundaries and supplies some landmarks that may be of use in the further culture of these non-biological fields, that of course is a satisfaction. What these non-biological disciplines may be able to do with data and methods that do not at present fall within the scope of natural science is no concern of the naturalist.

This biological analysis is not materialism, idealism, realism, or any other of the current metaphysical solutions of the great riddles of the universe. It may be consistent with any one of these, or none of them; for it has taken us to no ultimates, no absolutes, no universals. It is an attempt to analyze our verifiable experience up to date and to stop well within the limits set by the scientific method. What lies beyond is left wholly unexplored. We do not know ultimately what matter is, nor energy, nor mind. We know scientifically only some relations among these things.

Faith may go far beyond knowledge, often with very beneficial results. On our thesis an act of faith, like an act of creative imagination, is a natural function of a natural body. But its mechanism and its consequences cannot as yet be given adequate mechanistic formulation. Very good. We are fortunately able to exercise these powers in advance of our knowledge of the details of the mechanisms employed. So art, metaphysics, and religion still supplement science, just as they supplemented common experience before the natural sciences were born. Their frontiers are always in advance of verifiable factual knowledge, and they give us appreciations, hopes, and aspirations that transcend anything that science can offer. For this we give thanks and take courage.

But science is always pressing close behind and assaying the values that faith gropes for. Some of them are found to be counterfeit. Other values are greatly enhanced. Faith founded on knowledge and reaching beyond knowledge is basic in all human endeavor—commerce, science, religion. But a faith which contemns knowledge or ignores it is the root of superstition and a bar to progress in any direction.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE CHINESE LABORATORY: WILL IT STAND THE TEST?

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THE RADICAL attack against religion is directed mainly at Christianity because that is well organized and aggressive; moreover, it is subsidized by societies in foreign lands. These countries are usually referred to as "The Powers." The Russian claim that Christian missions are allied with "imperialism" seems therefore to be well founded.

But while this article will deal almost entirely with Christianity in China, it must be borne in mind that the radicals in the Kuomintang are against all religion. They press their claims against Buddhism, Confucianism, and Mohammedanism. Religion, so they say, is mostly superstition and has been used from time immemorial by those in authority as "a dope" to keep the common people quiet and in subjection.

In addition to all the old philosophical arguments, they try to show how hopelessly out of date religion is when compared with modern science. In this connection they discuss miracle and prayer and seek to prove that men today need only science and that no man who knows science is religious.

In all this they confuse religion with superstition, and the organization of religion with the life of religion. For example, in Christianity they confuse un-Christian ecclesiasticism with the simple religion of Jesus. The brilliant Dr. Hu Hsih did that in his short and stimulating article in the *Forum* for July, 1927. Of course there are many very strong arguments against religion, especially against the old orthodox, unscientific creeds and rituals. If religion is to survive in China, or elsewhere, for educated men, these arguments must be met and in many cases religious statements formulated afresh.

The following paragraph from Tang Leang-li's recent book is a good example of what Christians will have to face. Tang and others like him know the West and its weak points. They must be answered with like acumen:

> Young China is determined to end the dominion of the Christian missionary over her spiritual life. For the missionary, as a rule, regards a Christianity, that is decaying or has become obsolete in the West among all thinking persons, clergy as well as laity, a Christianity that is morally defective, intellectually absurd and historically untrue, as a suitable religion for an awakened China, which is no nation of savages. The enlightened West has surrendered her faith in the Joshua sun miracle and the Virgin birth of Jesus; young China refuses to be fed by an inferior philosophy, impractical ethics, witless superstition and old-world myths, which are passed on by the bulk of the missionaries in China as divine revelation and historical truth.

Accordingly all who see what is at stake realize that one of the great intellectual battles of the ages is now on in China. That battle will be keen, exciting, and well fought, for the Chinese are probably the most tolerant people in religion in the whole world. No one is scorned there because of his religious belief or because of his lack of it. It is perfectly respectable in China to be an atheist. The religious battle will therefore not be bitter, but it will often be brilliant. I think dogmatic fundamentalists will be forgotten in the early skirmishes; so far as the Chinese are concerned, I judge they are already out of it; only Christian liberals can stay in to the finish.

Millions of Americans are vitally interested in this religious aspect of the Chinese revolution because of the great amount of money which has been given by Americans to Christian missions. At the close of 1926 there were in the neighborhood of 7,000 Protestant and 1,500 Catholic missionaries in China. The American Protestants were spending altogether about $10,000,000 a year and had more than $80,000,000 invested in colleges, churches, and hospitals. The total Chinese

Protestant community was 780,000 and the Roman Catholics had a membership of 1,970,000. It is no wonder that such a widespread revolution as the present should see this tremendous movement and single it out for attack.

The radicals have been especially bitter against Christianity because of its political affiliations. It has been, so they claim, the instrument of oppression and imperialism. It is allied with gunboats and capitalism. In a pamphlet, *The Anti-Christian Movement*, the article on "Evangelism and Imperialism" alleges that Western governments have been using missionaries as forerunners of their colonization policy. Missionaries opened the way and political control followed. "History proves that Spain, France, England, Germany, and other Powers have secured their colonies and special rights in Africa, the Near East, and Far East by using evangelism as the opening wedge for imperialism."

In the case of China the unequal treaties and toleration clauses and indemnities are also cited as evidence that missions are in alliance with Western governments. It is this handle which the Russians have grasped in their effort to control the situation. Dr. Henry T. Hodgkin, of Shanghai and London, one of the secretaries of the National Christian Council, brings this out in a letter of March 2, 1927:

> It is this element which brings the really serious threat to the Christian Church. This element is opposed to religion of all kinds and particularly to the Christian religion on the ground of its supposed association with imperialism. In most cases the serious incidents which have been so widely reported are due to action by this Left Wing, sometimes with the connivance but not infrequently against the wishes of the moderate elements. There is a real danger that this element may force the pace both in regard to the economic situation and in regard to international relationships.
>
> Chinese with whom I have to do seem to me to give far too little weight to this danger. They speak as if it would be a comparatively easy thing to shed the Russian elements and the Chinese extremists when once the country is united. I cannot myself share this optimism. Moreover it seems to me that Christian leaders who are willing to accept help which

> is of so dangerous and even of so evil a character in order to achieve an end that is in itself desirable are making a tragic mistake.

That he was right, recent events have made clear.

In the first place it must be noted, in connection with the religious revolution so far as Christianity is concerned, that it is not merely a matter for the foreign missionaries. There is a Chinese Christian church which has developed during the past hundred years. It has become self-conscious and able leaders have emerged only during the past decade, but it is now the most significant fact to be reckoned with in relation to Christianity in China. That is true of both Catholic and Protestant. Six Chinese Roman Catholic bishops were consecrated at Rome October 28, 1926.

Dr. Frank Rawlinson, editor of the *Chinese Recorder*, familiar with every phase of the Christian movement in China, has this to say of the Protestant church:

> Its roots have struck deep down into Chinese life, even though numerically it is still weak. The greatest promise for its future is found in the vital way the Chinese mind and heart is responding to its implications. It has in large measure become China-centric. The immediate need is to complete this process. It is indigenous to the extent that Chinese Christians are beginning to direct it. It is coming to grips with the Chinese mind and religious genius.

This church has several severe problems to face: one is the anti-Christian attack; another is the organization of a church really Chinese; another is the relation of this church and its leaders to the missionaries in China and the mission boards in America and Europe. It must cut the leading-strings and govern itself. Only so can it be rid of one of the most bitter attacks hurled at it, namely, that it is a foreign institution. "Only as the church can become as truly Chinese in China as it is English in England, German in Germany, and American in America, can it overcome the handicap of appearing to be a foreign institution," says Bishop L. H. Roots, of Hankow, one of the greatest Americans who ever went to China.

The real problem as a Christian leader sees it is well expressed by Dr. Cheng Ching-yi, general secretary of the National Christian Council of China, in a letter to the writer dated May 31, 1927:

> Chinese Christians are being placed in a very delicate position. On the one hand, they must be loyal to their religious convictions, and on the other, they are also true lovers of their fatherland. It is not easy to be clearly understood by the people in the country of these facts, especially because so many are linking Christianity with the foreigners who are not looked upon by good many people with friendly eyes at the present time. It seems that the principles of Jesus Christ are not difficult to accept in China, but since the Christian religion comes by way of the West, it is now being involved in the outcry of "imperialism" and "capitalism," two slogans that have found their way all over China. Christianity is very much like a good thing in a bad place.

One enormous difficulty is that while there have been efforts by the missionaries during the past ten years to transfer authority to the Chinese, they have not succeeded. The missionaries, for the most part, have held on—in many cases actually not knowing how to let go. The result is that able and loyal as many of the Chinese Christians are, they do not feel that the Chinese church is theirs; it still "belongs" to the missionaries. Even such an outstanding man as T. Z. Koo, one of the national secretaries of the Y.M.C.A. in China, recently in the United States on an important errand, said in Shanghai March 27 at a conference on Chinese and missionary administration: "The Christian church in China is an institution in which we Chinese Christians do not feel a sense of proprietorship. For instance, I was trained in the Anglican church, but I do not feel that the Anglican church is mine."

Not many missionaries have any feeling of resentment because the Chinese are taking a larger place. They do not feel that there is a revolt against missionaries as such, though undeniably that is true in a number of cases. I think Rev. Z. T. Kang, pastor of a big Methodist church in Shanghai, stated it fairly at the conference just referred to: "There are two ways of looking at the situation. First, as a spiritual revolt in which the Chinese church is grasping for power. This is not a true estimate of the situation. Second, as a sign of life and growth in the Chinese church. Chinese Christians feel they must do something but do not yet know what. It is a time of hope because a time of co-operation. We must build the Chinese church together."

Chinese leaders, for the most part, view the situation with a broader vision than do the missionaries. The missionaries are intensely interested in the denominations and in the colleges into which they have put their lives. The Chinese point of view is well illustrated by some further remarks by Mr. Koo:

> There are three points around which my thinking on the question of devolution revolves:
>
> 1. Are we willing, whether missionaries or Chinese, to take what we have in personnel and organization and make a beginning with that to build a Chinese Church? For example, if I may be permitted to use the Y.M.C.A. as an illustration, when we start a new work we take the best group available as a board of directors and start with that. We do not wait ten years until we get the sort of men we want but begin with what we have, and gradually things begin to happen. We are trying too much to judge this question of transfer by Western standards of efficiency. You say if we attempt to start with only what we have our institutions will be in danger. There is likely to be less efficiency, waste, etc. Hence the Chinese hesitate to undertake these new responsibilities. We will simply have to take the risk to accept mistakes, waste, loss—it is an inevitable part of the process. With all our Western efficiency we have not been able to save our institutions from the present crisis. Had we not better lose some in experimenting to find a better method?
>
> 2. Denominationalism: I do not say that denominations must go, but I do not stand for them. They are a real problem in meeting the situation. I wish we could take a few large cities and use the city as a unit rather than the mission, making the experiment of working together to face the whole situation. If we will try to face this problem with all it involves in men and money, then I will believe that you are really sincere in saying that you have no interest in perpetuating your own missions.
>
> 3. Or again we may take certain parts of the work as units, and

think in terms of the whole nation or of a whole branch of the work. For instance, take education. The large universities are too big for the Chinese to think of taking them over now. Why not relate all the educational work of the Church in one program. Study where to bury and where to build up. Could we not make the problem of support much easier? Why not sell off part of the large property of some institutions and endow the remainder, or another institution, so that the work may be carried on efficiently? This will not be possible until we can look at the whole Christian educational work as one problem.

So far as the missionary personally is concerned he faces three questions: first, the problem of his relation to the Chinese church; second, his attitude toward the new nationalism; and third, the matter of his relation to his government and its military policy in China. Most of the younger group have already taken a very liberal attitude in all of these matters and have been of great help to the Chinese leaders. Many men like Barnett, of the Y.M.C.A., and Leighton Stuart, of Yenching University, have accomplished more through pure friendship and understanding during the past three years than they accomplished in thirteen years before.

On the other hand, there are men, like Bishop Graves, of Shanghai, who by their arrogant attitude have exhibited the very spirit of imperialism which is anathema to every red-blooded patriot, whether in the church or out of it. They emphasize the chaos in China and fail to see the magnificent creative spirit that moves over the whole land. Bishop Graves gave out an interview which was published by the *New York Times* on June 2, 1927, which well illustrates what I am saying: "There is nothing to compare with the schools and colleges which the missions have slowly and laboriously built up with efforts extending over half a century. Yet we are asked to hand these over to the Chinese before they have proved themselves capable of establishing and managing any stable system of their own."

In like vein for two and a half columns he insults the Chinese patriots and discounts the great movements of which some of his leading laymen are a part. Other missionaries have given out interviews as bad or worse. Men who talk in public like that have a certain inner scorn, an attitude of mind which the Chinese with whom they associate are quick to catch, and to resent. Miss Ting, general secretary of the Y.W.C.A. in China, meant just such missionaries as well as governments when she said last May, "For every person in China who shouts for a revision of the treaties there are one hundred who see that all we need is a new attitude on the part of the foreigners."

This new attitude is shown in a brilliant way by Bishop Roots, the Episcopal head of the Hankow diocese, in his article in the *China Christian Yearbook* for 1926. He recalls a conference of Christians, Chinese and foreign, called early in 1926, when it was fully agreed that, although missionaries of the highest spiritual and intellectual qualities were more than ever needed in China, they would have to be willing loyally to serve under Chinese administrators, to accept responsibility for such tasks, and only for such tasks, as the Chinese church might assign. They must yield positions of responsibility to Chinese even more rapidly than the Chinese ask for them.

Dr. E. H. Hume, long president of Yale-in-China, has defined the new missionary and his task in a recent article:

> I feel, as I look ahead, that the missionary of the coming days will be less and less one who seeks merely to engage in visible activities. He will do less medical work and less educational work than hitherto. Many of these earlier and important functions will be taken over by Chinese bodies, religious and otherwise. He will find his largest service in the field of spiritual interpretation, as counselor, spiritual guide, co-operating in all things—a servant and auxiliary of the Chinese Christian worker.
>
> As the possibility of international strain in the Pacific area increases, there is a pressing need that within the Christian movement there shall be found a great rallying point of international fellowship and co-operation, of genuine spiritual understanding. Here lies the great opportunity for Christian missions in China in the days ahead.

The new attitude that must prevail is also well stated by Bishop Grose, of Peking, in a recent article in the *Chinese Recorder:*

> Unquestionably the Christian movement in China faces today a great crisis. The crisis arises not from the desperateness of the situation, but from the magnitude of the opportunity. The future of Christianity in the Orient for a hundred years to come will be determined largely by what Western churches and nations do in the next five years. With the rapid unifying of China in a true nationalism, with the progress of the mass education movement, with the raising up of well-trained Christian leaders, with the growing determination of Chinese Christians to build up a self-supporting and self-perpetuating church, and with the more intelligent hearing of the Gospel, stimulated by the anti-Christian movement, it is only nine o'clock in the morning for the cause of Christ in China.

I do not believe anyone has stated this whole complex situation more clearly than it was put by Dr. D. W. Lyon at a meeting in Shanghai in April, 1927:

> First, we must learn to enter more intimately than ever into the life of the Chinese church. We must test our daily efficiency by the degree to which we have been able to have intimate fellowship with our Chinese friends and associates. We must be willing to pay whatever price is necessary to secure this relationship of intimacy. It will cost us much time which according to our former standards of efficiency may seem to be wasted. It will mean transferring our attention from organization to individuals. It will involve placing a larger emphasis than ever before on purely personal relationships. I sincerely believe that our largest usefulness will come along the path of unobtrusive and unselfish friendship.
>
> Secondly, we shall need clearly to keep in mind as our ultimate objective the discovery and development of the leadership which the Chinese church needs.
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> Thirdly, we as missionaries will need to function less, to use the parlance of business life, in the rôle of salesmen and more in the rôle of experimenters.
>
> Fourthly, we need ever to remind ourselves that after all our primary function is to show forth the spirit of Christ. We may be asked to render service along lines in which we had not considered ourselves particularly qualified. We may even be asked to do things which are distasteful to us. After all the fruitage of our lives will depend not so much

on what activities employ our time as on the spirit in which we live and do our work.

The main trouble with the conservative group of missionaries is that they do not grasp the fact that something truly magnificent has been born in China. They seem to think that China of 1927 is the same place as the China of 1900, or even 1917. They are utterly mistaken, as I hope to show. Dr. Wakefield, of Boone College in Wuchang, in an interview published as late as July 24, said, "There is no nationalism in China in the sense that we know it. . . . . Patriotism is almost unknown. Chinese students seldom volunteer for the fighting line." True, they are not quite so foolishly ready to die as Western youths, but thousands have gone into the army in spite of their philosophy that reason is a more civilized policy than war. Hundreds have been shot down in parades before official *yamens*, and thousands are freely giving their services as teachers, lecturers, and writers. There is such a thing as Chinese patriotism; and there is, and will henceforth be, no place for the missionary who is unable to perceive it.

Another question that will not down is that of the relation of the missionary to his home government. Heretofore he has had special protection under the treaties and the "toleration clauses." Gunboats and marines have followed him, and when he or his property suffered, his government has exacted indemnities from the Chinese government. Many churches, hospitals, and schools have been built with these indemnities. But it is this alliance with imperialism that has been one of the chief points of attack by the anti-Christian movement. The leaders of that movement have argued that people who come preaching a gospel of peace, of love, and of universal brotherhood should not depend on battleships and machine guns for protection. It is becoming more evident with every passing week that missionaries who insist on protection can be of no use in China. Professor John Dewey put it in a telling phrase three years ago: "You cannot shoot Jesus to China on a cannon ball."

It is refreshing to know that missionaries, as well as philosophers, sensed that situation long ago, and that a group in North China signed and sent the following to the Department of State in Washington in 1924:

> The undersigned, American missionaries, are in China as messengers of the Gospel of Brotherhood and Peace. Our task is to lead men and women into a new life in Christ which promotes brotherhood and takes away all occasion of wars. We therefore express our earnest desire that no form of military pressure, especially no foreign military force, be exerted to protect us or our property; and that in the event of our capture by lawless persons or our death at their hands, no money be paid for our release, no punitive expeditions be sent out, and no indemnity be exacted.

Dr. Frank Rawlinson, editor of the *Chinese Recorder,* one of the most ample-minded of the missionaries, made this statement on April 8, 1927: "I am inclined to think that when Christian work is resumed and missionaries understand anew their place therein, it will have to be on a basis in which the actual equality of China is recognized in diplomatic conventions, and that the missionary enterprise will have to be definitely dissociated from gunboat policies."

But what is a missionary to do when the government insists on its duty to protect its citizens? The answer seems to be to go right along about one's business when possible and when far enough away from gunboats. In the fall of 1926 the American consul at Chungking did all he could to urge all missionaries to leave Chengtu. Many did leave, but about a dozen remained in spite of a shower of letters and telegrams. They are still there with a handful of Britishers doing a splendid piece of international service by their friendly calls and by the unusual work they are doing in carrying on the West China Union University and the Canadian Hospital.

It seems to have been definitely settled through the events and discussions of these past months that an American consul, at least, has no authority to order an American citizen out of a place of danger; he can only advise and exhort. So having exhorted his nationals, the consul at Chungking departed, taking the last gunboat with him.

In places where a missionary cannot escape the protection of armed forces and there is any likelihood that his presence may cause complications, it seems to me his clear duty to withdraw and thus avoid any suspicion of conniving with military forces. Mr. J. J. Cornelius (of Lucknow) makes that clear in his article in the *Atlantic Monthly* for April, 1927. He quotes an illuminating paragraph from Professor Edward Thompson, of Oxford, who was for many years an official in India:

> If the churches wish to draw into their communion the non-Christian races of the world, they must shed a lot that seems to make for efficiency. They had the chance of a thousand years in the War; it was lost—and everyone knows that it was lost—largely because of the very powerful recognition which the state then gave them. And now? There was a time when the missionaries were often the only channel of protest against injustice. That channel is largely blocked today. From being a heroic and lonely enterprise, foreign missions have become praised and petted by imperialisms that are both better and astuter than those that went before them. The races to which the British and American missionaries are sent might wonder, with some justification, whether the John R. Mott era has been a blessing or a curse to them. The mission field will always have its heroes. But missionary "leaders" are now trusted and encouraged at foreign offices and colonial offices and "missionary statesmanship" is a phrase that religious leaders delight in. The work of foreign missionaries has deserved all the recognition now accorded, and a thousand fold more. But a gilded collar is a poor thing to take in exchange for the greatest liberty in the whole world.

There next comes the question, "What is the real attitude of the Chinese to the missionaries? Are the masses of the people hostile or not?" Dr. C. Y. Cheng, general secretary of the National Christian Council, for many years one of the most prominent Christians in China, made the following statement in Shanghai in April, 1927:

> Some of the outstanding missionary achievements are monumental witnesses in China which cannot possibly be gainsaid or denied: the introduction to the Chinese people of the world's Savior and Friend; the enlightenment of the ignorant; the uplift of the oppressed; the healing of the sick; the education of the young; the improvement of social conditions; the cultivation of cultural intercourse; in a hundred and one ways China has been served and helped by the missionary body which is the best friend of the Chinese people. It is true that the missionary has not yet reached his ideal, for the ideal is high; but the measure of success attained is sufficient to indicate a future of great usefulness.

Sanford C. C. Chen, general secretary of the China Christian Educational Association, made an even stronger statement:

> I am thoroughly convinced that never before in the whole history of the Christian movement in China have we needed more of the help and work of the missionaries than at the present time. China is entering a new age, the age of selection. She wants to select what is the best of the West, and at the same time preserve what is best in the East. . . . . We need more missionaries at the present time than ever before. The missionary will have a very much bigger place, and be expected to do a greater work in the future than in the past.

In many places ultra-radicals have tried to stir up the populace against the missionaries and have failed in practically every case. There was an anti-foreign boycott in Chengtu in November, 1926. It was very stern and severe. No merchants would sell to foreigners. The servants all left; even a wet nurse left the baby she was feeding. Even so, during all those days the neighbors and friends of the missionaries called on them daily. Sometimes there was a constant stream of callers. They said, "We are so sorry about this boycott. We know that you are not responsible for gunboats and unequal treaties. We know you are our friends. We have come to assure you that we are also your friends." On these visits they often smuggled in, under their long gowns, articles of food to help them until the markets should open again. One gentleman not quite bold enough—or perhaps not agile enough—sent a fish by mail to one of his missionary friends. There are many stories, in connection with the Nanking affair, of how both Christian and non-Christian Chinese risked their lives to save the foreigners. The radicals found it entirely impossible to arouse the populace against the missionaries or the business men or consuls.

Mr. Edward Munson, Y.M.C.A. secretary, writing from Foochow, April 30, 1927, tells a most illuminating story:

> Last evening I was at dinner with a small group of leading officials of the nationalist party, who are directing affairs in Fukien province. This included the chairman and the leading commissioners in the new committee government. It also included the educational, communications and military secretaries. It was a dinner given by these officials to welcome Dr. and Mrs. Diffendorfer, of the Methodist Board of Foreign Missions, to Foochow. The expressions of gratitude toward America for her example and assistance, pointing out the similarity in principle between the American constitution and the principles of the Nationalist party, assurances of favor and protection for the Christian institutions and foreign missionaries—these were constantly on the lips of these young leaders who are making China's new history. What a contrast to gunboats, barbed-wire entanglements, and war psychology!

There is still a large place for the missionary, but he will play a very different rôle from that which he played in the past. His task will be different; his outlook must be different; his training will perforce be different. Dr. Henry T. Hodgkin, an English Friend, secretary of the National Christian Council, one of the greatest men who ever went to China, said it this way in a recent letter to the author:

> Those who are ready to meet the new situation and adapt themselves to it, who are absolutely loyal to the conception of Chinese leadership, have patience, sympathy, and the spirit of service, who will take time to make friends, who are prepared to stand aside and see things done in ways they cannot wholly approve rather than rush in and take over control themselves—such missionaries are needed more than ever today.

As Bishop Grose says, the task is not that of converting pagans; it is the infinitely greater work of Christianizing all social contacts, East and West. The missionary must be an expert in the incomparable work of bettering international and race relations. He is to help the races and the nations all around the world to attain a common culture, and in the process to help the different peoples to appreciate the great gifts that all have to contribute to this richer civilization.

One phase of that total problem was well expressed by Professor Daniel J. Fleming at the Honolulu conference in July, 1927. He believes that "we must seek an ethical standard for all religions." It is in ethics and in culture that the world can unite, rather than in creeds, and the missionary must henceforth promote peace, brotherhood, and the unity of the world.

After all, Christianity is a way of life rather than a creed or an organization. It is treading the true way, in a right relationship with the whole world. For men and women, from whatever country, whose chief object is leading men and nations to discover this new way of life there will be a place in China.

CRANMER'S PROJECT FOR A REFORMED CONSENSUS

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CRANMER stands in history as the most typical and influential, if not the most admired, of Tudor churchmen. The story of his public career is to a great degree the story of the English Reformation; and the ideas and principles which find expression in his words and acts are essentially those which underlie Tudor Anglicanism as a whole. While his admirers of later days have been mainly of the low-church party, his influence has been strongly felt by high churchmen who have repudiated his leadership. The fact that Laud was numbered among the Erastians is not unconnected with Cranmer's awe of kings; nor is it fantastic to suppose that Pusey's *Eirenicon* was rendered possible by the ecumenical range of Cranmer's churchmanship and his insistence upon the note of catholicity.

On one side of his nature Cranmer was a Hamlet for whom the native hue of resolution was sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought. Amid pressing crises he could pause to appreciate variant opinions, with results that disqualified him for that aggressive leadership possible only to prompt natures like those of Luther, Calvin, and Knox. An element of hesitancy and indecision, quite distinct from both timidity and prudence, entered into all his actions—a feature prophetic of the temper and policies of his church in later times. Cranmer's lack of driving power, his relative unconcern for the triumph of his own views and plans, exposed him to that reverse of events in which he obtained the higher success of martyrdom. It was not Wittenberg or Geneva or Edinburgh, where downright policies were pursued, that saw a great reformer perish in the flames, but English Oxford, in the land of illogic and compromise. Or should we rather say, the land in which men are more intent on playing the game than on winning it? The Israel of which he was the Moses has like him exhibited more moderation than zeal, more breadth of view than depth of conviction, and has often been content with temporizing measures. But there is a kind of greatness in the spirit of the Anglican communion of which these qualities are the natural accompaniment and, we might say, the condition. Its catholicity, comprehensiveness, and variety of spontaneous religious expression have been made possible by the very elasticity and indeterminateness which are found exemplified in the psychology of its chief reformer.

But while too deliberative for a man of affairs, Cranmer, on the other hand, was not lacking in natural vigor. He was unique among the major reformers in the possession of a robust physique, and was accustomed from youth "to ride rough horses; so that when he was bishop he feared not to ride the roughest horses that came into his stables, which he would do very comely."[1] There is more than a dash of the knight-errant in the composition of his character. His assault upon Roman teaching is as vigorous, if not so violent, as Luther's; and he fearlessly maintained his ground until temporarily overcome by the mental torture of his imprisonment and the conflict of loyalties between truth and his queen. He had, moreover, a mind extraordinarily fertile of fresh projects. Not even the responsibilities of office sapped his genius of this quality. From his proposal to Henry that the universities be consulted on the annulment of the royal marriage to the revision of the canon law and the project of a Protestant consensus, Cranmer was habitually surprising his contemporaries with constructive suggestions of real significance.

[1] Strype, *Memorials of Thomas Cranmer* (London, 1853), I, 2. The reader familiar with Tudor literature will recall a famous sentence of Sir Thomas Eliot: "The most honorable exercise in mine opinion . . . . is to ride surely and clene on a great horse and a roughe" (*The Book Called the Governour* [1531], I, xvii).

The relations of Cranmer with the persons and groups of the Continental Reformation have never been adequately investigated, but his attitudes in general to the reforming parties are not in doubt. Cranmer was six years younger than Luther and twenty years older than Calvin. His awakening came with the reading of Erasmus and Lefèvre, which he began in 1511, when he was twenty-two. During the next dozen years he was a diligent student of Scripture and theology, "seldom reading without pen in hand," and keeping copious notes which were to serve him well in later days. Luther's books began to be read in England in 1520, and Cranmer was in touch with the Cambridge group among whom they were most influential. Toward Lutheranism his attitude was, however, that of an independent inquirer. "Considering what great controversy was in matters of religion . . . . he bent himself to try out the truth herein."[2] By 1525 he began praying that the pope's power might be abolished in England;[3] and when the royal marriage issue arose he denied the pope's dispensing power, and hence the validity of the marriage of Henry and Katherine. His prominence in the King's matrimonial business led to his promotion to the dangerous and uncoveted post of Archbishop of Canterbury on the eve of Henry's most decisive acts affecting the church.

In 1532, during his visit to Germany in Henry's cause, his relations with Lutheranism became more intimate. At Nürnberg he had conferences with John Frederick, Elector of Saxony, and spent much time in the home and company of the reformer, Andrew Osiander. The egotism of Osiander repelled the fine-mannered Calvin and the sensitive Melanchthon; Cranmer, on the other hand, formed with him a lasting friendship, took the Nürnberg reformer's niece as his second wife, and maintained occasional correspondence with him for twenty years thereafter.[4] It has been suggested by Jacobs that the preparation at this time by Brentz, Osiander, and others of the Brandenburg-Nürnberg *Kirchenordnung* directed Cranmer's attention to the need of a common order of worship.[5] It was apparently in this period too that he first made the valuable acquaintance of Bucer, who was to become the mutual friend, as Osiander was the common opponent, of Melanchthon and Calvin.

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[2] Strype, *loc. cit.*

[3] Smyth, *Cranmer and the Reformation under Edward VI*, p. 32.

[4] Strype, *op. cit.*, I, 15.

The negotiations of 1535–39 between the Lutheran and the English theologians brought Cranmer again into intimate contact with the Germans. There is nothing to show, however, that he played a decisive part in these negotiations. His plea for decent housing for the German delegates in London in 1538 indicates his good will toward them and his distress at the discourtesy by which Henry shabbily indicated his intention to make of the whole incident nothing more than a byplay of his opportunist foreign policy. It is doubtful how far he approved the formula reached by the theologians. Even if, as seems probable, he at that time retained much of the Roman doctrine of the sacrament, he might, like the Romanist delegates at Regensburg in 1541, have admitted the undoubtedly Lutheran phraseology of this formula in a sense different from that in which it was understood by the Lutherans.[6]

Certain aspects of Cranmer's doctrinal position and ecclesiastical outlook deserve brief notice at the outset on account of their relation to his interest in the consensus project. In the first place, about eight years after the Lutheran-English negotiations he was led to a view of the sacrament virtually identical with the reformed interpretation. It is the contention of Mr. C. H. Smyth's recent volume on Cranmer that he is to be credited with an intellectual consistency that has hitherto in general been denied him. Smyth stoutly maintains that in his view of the Lord's Supper Cranmer was never either a Lutheran or a Zwinglian. Instead he held, after he had discarded transubstantiation, the residue of the Roman doctrine of the real presence till 1546, when he moved to an opinion identical with that which Bucer had earlier reached by another path. In respect to his view of the sacrament, Cranmer owed his conversion to Ridley, who had arrived at the same position through a study of Ratramnus.[7]

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[5] H. E. Jacobs, *The Lutheran Movement in England,* p. 48.

[6] For a narrative of these negotiations see Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 f. The confession prepared by the theologians is contained in the Parker Society *Remains and Letters of Cranmer*, pp. 472 f. (App. XIII, "A Book Containing Divers Articles *de unitate Dei,*" etc.).

While the ambiguities and inconsistencies of this ninth-century monk of Corbie made it possible for both the principal sixteenth-century parties to claim him, his position gave peculiar encouragement to those reformers who favored the view which came to be known as the Reformed, in distinction from the Lutheran. He was indeed one of the few medieval authors in whom they could find aid and comfort. It helped to establish their own catholicity that they could claim as a comrade one who had run the gauntlet of discussion and inquisition for seven centuries and survived uncondemned. The English reformers made frequent use of his teaching on the Eucharist, the principal elements of which were identical with those which made up the doctrine of Zwingli, of Bucer, and of Calvin. Foxe notes the decisive influence of "Bertram"[8] upon Ridley, and the latter's conferences with Cranmer over the work.[9] The language of Foxe here suggests that Cranmer had anticipated Ridley in the new opinion; but Cranmer himself, and his intimate acquaintance, Sir John Cheke, both make it clear that the reverse is true.[10] Cranmer's own references to Ratramnus are expressions of warm approval.[11]

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[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 50 f.

[8] From the twelfth century Ratramnus was occasionally called Bertram, and he was constantly referred to under this name in the sixteenth century. A. Naegle, *Ratramnus und die heilige Eucharistie* (Wien, 1903), pp. 4 f.

[9] *Acts and Monuments* (ed. Townshend), VII, 409. At his trial Ridley advised the commissioner, Dr. Brooks, to read Bertram. *Ibid.*, p. 544. The *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini* of Ratramnus had been published by Johannes Prael at Cologne in 1532 with the doubly erroneous ascription: *Bertrami presbyteri ad Carolum Magnum Imperatorem*. Leo Jud, that distinguished translator as well as prominent reformer of Zürich, at once produced a German version to which Bullinger contributed an introduction. Numerous editions and translations followed. An English version by William Hugh appeared in 1548: *The Book of Bertram the Priest concerning the Body and Blood of Christ on the Sacrament*. Although favorably mentioned by Trithemius (*Catalogus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum*, 1494), by John Fisher, bishop of Rochester, against Oecolampadius (1527), and by Richard Smith in de-

But Cranmer also repeatedly asserts his own agreement with Bucer, as well as with Peter Martyr and the Swiss. Gardiner had employed against him Bucer's similitude of the sun and the sunbeams. Cranmer convincingly shows this to be in accord with his own teaching.[12] In another passage he remarks: "In the place by you alleged he [Bucer] dissenteth in nothing from Oecolampadius and Zwinglius."[13] As Gardiner had labored to show evidences of discord among the opponents of Rome, Cranmer constantly suggests their essential concord—a concord which he was already seeking to bring to formal expression. This attitude extends to the Lutherans as

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fense of the mass (1546), the work was in 1559 put on the Index on the supposition that it was a Protestant forgery. Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, CXXI, cols. 104 f.; *Realencyklopädie* (3d ed.), 16, 467; Harnack, *History of Dogma,* V, 381 f.; Parker Society, Works of Bishop Ridley, p. 159, footnote 3; p. 206; Naegle, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 f.

[10] The date of Cranmer's conversion by Ridley, as stated by Cheke, was 1546. Parker Society, *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters,* p. 218, footnote 5. Smyth assumes, with probability, that Cheke was the editor of the Latin edition of Cranmer's *Defence, op. cit.*, p. 60.

[11] In reply to Gardiner, who had referred to Bertram in a list of those who had previously taught an erroneous doctrine of the Eucharist and had failed of acceptance, Cranmer responds: "And as for Bertram he did nothing else but at the request of King Charles, set out the true doctrine of the holy catholic church, from Christ unto his time, concerning the sacrament." *Answer to a Sophistical Cavillation, etc.* (1550). Parker Society, *Writings and Disputations of Thomas Cranmer,* p. 14; cf. 13, 172, 196. Against Richard Smith, who, unfortunately for his cause, had approved Ratramnus, Cranmer quotes a sample of "Bertram's doctrine" to show that it is in full agreement with his own (*ibid.*, p. 78). Cranmer found in it that insistence upon the spiritual and memorial aspects which he now strongly favored. Cf. the concluding chapters of the treatise in Migne, *P.L.* CXXI, 170, especially the phrases "*in figuram sive memoriam,*" "*spiritualis est esca et spiritualis potus,*" and the citation of John 6:64, similarly used by Zwingli and Oecolampadius at Marburg, 1529. B. Kidd, *Documents of the Continental Reformation,* No. 109, p. 248.

[12] *Writings and Disputations,* 19, 90. Bucer has not, he notes, taught the error that the substance of the sun is here present on the earth, to which his opponent's doctrine would be analogous.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

well as to Bucer and the Swiss. He was anxious to maintain an open road between Wittenberg and Canterbury.[14] Yet he was in closer accord with the Reformed; and when he wrote his *Defensio Verae et Catholicae Doctrinae de Sacramentis* (1550), this accord was complete.[15] Smyth can hardly be confuted when he says that Cranmer never was a Lutheran. The statement that he never was a Zwinglian is apparently based on a misconception of Zwinglianism.[16]

A second point of importance to note in approaching a consideration of Cranmer's project is that in his view of the Catholic church he was a conciliarist. This statement calls for a brief exposition. Intensely English though he was, Cranmer had no thought of severing the English from the universal church. It is true that his Erastianism limited his conciliarism; but both principles were employed in his resistance to the papal claims. Burnet's summary of a since lost manuscript of a long speech made by Cranmer after the legislation of November–December, 1534, on the subject of church councils, is of interest here.[17] It should be remembered that at this period, as Cranmer was aware, Paul III had just come to the papal throne pledged to call a general council. It is not surprising then that Cranmer, supporting the cause of the new "Supreme Head of the Church of England," should seek to guard against any recognition of the authority of a council held under the pope's control. On the one hand he cites Gerson's *De auferibilitate Papae,* and the decrees of Constance, on the superiority of the council to the pope; while on the other he affirms that "the power of councils does not extend to princes. . . . . The standard of the council's definition should be only taken from the scriptures, and not from men's tradition."

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[14] *Writings and Disputations*, pp. 20 f.; pp. 179 f.

[15] See especially lib. III, cap. xi, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 f.

[16] Cranmer's doctrine differed from that of Luther, as did that of Bucer and Calvin. Smyth thinks (66) he finds a variation from the doctrine of Bucer; but Cranmer himself explicitly denies the variation alleged by Smyth, *Writings and Disputations*, p. 225. The phrases in which Smyth also finds (70) "a vigorous repudiation of Zwinglianism" are no less Zwinglian than the fifteenth article signed by Zwingli at Marburg or the eighth chapter of Zwingli's *Confession* presented to Charles V at Augsburg. The error here is shared by many writers. It is that of beginning with the assumption that Bucer and Zwingli were representatives of two irreconcilable types of Reformed doctrine. Smyth ignores the common influence upon them of Cornelius Henrix Hoen and Hinne Rode, disciples of Wessel Gansfort, an influence that was determinative for both. Wessel was largely in agreement with Ratramnus and Wyclif, although apparently independent of both. Hoen and Rode developed Wessel's interpretation and gave Zwingli his "*est=significat*" argument. Both Bucer and Zwingli held much more than what is suggested by that argument alone. The difference between them, like that between Calvin and Bullinger, was a matter of emphasis, not of substance. Hyma remarks that "Rode was more of a 'Calvinist' in 1520 than Calvin was in 1535 before he met Bucer." All these reformers were in essential agreement. A. Hyma, *The Christian Renaissance*, pp. 218 f., 286; "Hoen's Letter on the Eucharist and Its Influence upon Carlstadt, Bucer, and Zwingli," in *Princeton Theological Review* (January, 1926), p. 124 f.; E. W. Miller and J. W. Scudder, *Wessel Gansfort, His Life and Writings*, I, 145, 164, 187, 203, II, 38, 317 f. (the last citation is a translation of Hardenberg's *Life of Wessel of Groningen*); C. Ullmann, *Reformers before the Reformation*, II, 510 f.; G. Anrich, *Martin Bucer*, p. 47; O. Ritschl, *Dogmengesh. des Protestantismus*, III, 87. For a nearly parallel view in Wyclif, see his *De Eucharistia*, p. 116, and the present writer's article, "Some Emphases in Wyclif's Teaching," *Journal of Religion*, VII (1927), p. 457. Zwingli cites "Wyclif and the Waldenses" for *est=significat, C.R.*, XC, 795.

In 1536 Cranmer signed, and probably framed, *the judgment of Convocation concerning General Councils.* This official document of Convocation emphatically approves general councils, when properly representative, in the following terms:

> As concerning general councils, like as all (taught by long experience) so perfectly know, there never was, ne is, any thing devised, invented, nor instituted by our forefathers more expedient, or more necessary to the establishment of our faith, for the extirpation of heresies and an abolishing of sects and schisms, and finally for the reducing of Christ's people unto one perfect unity and concord in his religion, than by the having of general councils, so that the same be lawfully had, and congregated in *Spiritu Sancto,* and be also conform and agreeable, as well concerning the surety and indifferency of the places, as all other points requisite and necessary to the same unto that wholesome and godly institution and usage for which they were at first devised and used in the primitive church.

Christian princes, he continues, should provide that they be not perverted to wicked ends; considering (1) "who hath authority to call a general council"; (2) whether the causes alleged for a council are adequate; (3) who ought to be the judges in a council; (4) the order of procedure in the council; and (5) "what doctrines are to be allowed or defended." No general council should be called by the pope or any one prince without the express consent of "the residue of Christian princes."[18]

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[17] Burnet, *History of the Reformation* (ed. Pocock), I, 285 f.; *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters,* pp. 76 f.

This is obviously designed to exclude both a merely papal and a merely imperial council, or one called by agreement only of the emperor and the pope. About the same time, presumably in reference to the proposed council at Mantua, Cranmer, with twelve other bishops and clergy, signed an "Opinion" in which it is explained that conditions are changed since the Roman emperors, by virtue of their general rule, authoritatively called councils of the whole church: "Yet now, forasmuch that the Empire of Rome and the monarchy of the same hath no such general dominion, but many princes have absolute power in their own realms, and an whole and entire monarchy, no one prince may by his authority call any general council." One prince may propose it, but it is to be assembled on the free consent of all.[19]

In the course of Cranmer's trial, and on the occasion of his degradation in February, 1556, he presented a carefully worded appeal from the authority of the pope to that of "a free general council." He here asserts that: "It is openly enough confessed, that a holy general council, lawfully gathered together in the Holy Ghost, and representing the holy Catholic Church, is above the pope, especially in matters concerning faith; that he cannot make decrees that men shall not appeal from him to a general council. . . . ." and states in the essential clause: "Therefore I do challenge and appeal in these writings from the pope . . . . as well for myself as for every one that cleaveth to me or will hereafter be on my side, unto a free general council, that shall hereafter lawful be, and in a sure place to which place I or a proctor, deputed by me, may freely and with safety come."[20] For Cranmer then, the General Council was not infallible; but within the limits set by the standards of Scripture and the inalienable rights of temporal sovereigns, it was authoritative. Since for him the Roman papacy had deserted the true church, and that church was now to be sought in the still uncemented sections of Protestantism, he would seek to secure the assembling of a conference of Protestant leaders who would prepare a basis of union for the groups they represented and thus effect the consolidation of Protestantism.

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[18] Burnet, *op. cit.*, I, 284 f.; *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters*, pp. 463 f.

[19] *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters*, p. 467. Cf. the "Protestation of the King, Council, and Clergy, 1537, against the Council of Mantua," quoted by Jenkyns, *Remains of Thomas Cranmer*, I, x, footnote u.

At what date the idea emerged as a distinct plan in Cranmer's mind it is impossible to say. Its genesis may have owed something to Melanchthon, who in 1535, just when he was regretfully declining the invitations of Francis I and Henry VIII to undertake unification missions to their respective kingdoms,[21] wrote a laudatory letter to Cranmer in which he remarked that if there were bishops like him elsewhere there would be no difficulty in establishing general concord and reform.[22] Melanchthon had already begun to exhibit that inclination toward the Reformed teaching on the sacrament which was later to cost him the loss of much Lutheran support.[23] Whether it was these words of Melanchthon's that led Cranmer to realize the possibilities of his position for instituting a unification conference or not, it was apparently to Melanchthon that he first turned for foreign co-operation in the project. More than twelve years had since passed. The English-Lutheran negotiations had broken down. The Council of Trent had held its first series of sessions. Luther had died, and the first Schmalkald War had left the German Protestants in a weak and distressful state. The death of Henry VIII and the succession of Edward VI, at the end of January, 1547, had given Cranmer once more his freedom of action as archbishop. Within the first eight months of Edward's reign Cranmer began to prepare the way for his consensus project. It appears from the correspondence of à Lasco that both he and Melanchthon were invited to England before October 11, 1547. On that date à Lasco wrote from Emden to Albert Hardenberg of Bremen that he was sending a messenger with a letter to Melanchthon "in regard to the call to England."[24] On October 26 Melanchthon, in a letter to Nicholas Medler, noted the receipt of letters by which he was called into England.[25] This is our first intimation that Melanchthon had become informed of the proposal. It was not, apparently, till January, 1548, that he wrote Cranmer in reply. This letter, hastily written while messengers waited, consists of vague commendations of the proposal. He himself had "always desired that a summary of necessary doctrine should be publicly set forth." He warns against ambiguities that would prove occasions of dispute to posterity.[26] On January 20, in a letter to Camerarius, he alludes to the offers of hospitality which he has received from Denmark and England; he prefers to remain where he is.[27] On May 1, possibly in response to a further communication, he wrote more at length to Cranmer, but was still disappointingly indefinite as to his own participation. Once more he emphasizes the importance of reaching unambiguous terms in the proposed consensus. The confession to be drawn up, will, he expects, not differ greatly from the *Augustana;* but some additional articles should be included for the sake of clearness. "In the church it is better to call a spade a spade than to cast ambiguous utterances before posterity as the apple of discord is said in fables to have been offered to the goddesses seated at the feast." In one sentence he seems to hope to be present. "I will gladly listen to other learned men and declare my opinion in turn . . . . as is fitting in a conference of pious men."[28] But he says nothing of the prospect of the journey, and gives no indication of a definite decision to go.

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[20] H. Jenkyns, *Remains of Thomas Cranmer,* IV, 121 f.; *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters,* pp. 224 f.; Foxe, *Acts and Monuments,* VIII, 73. Jenkyns remarks (p. 121) that Cranmer probably received help from a lawyer in drawing up this appeal.

[21] G. Ellinger, *Philipp Melanchthon, ein Lebenshild,* pp. 315 f.

[22] *Non difficulter et concordia orbis terrarum constitui et sanari ecclesia posset. Corpus Reformatorum,* II, 93.

[23] J. W. Richard indicates Melanchthon's response to a work of Oecolampadius (1530), which convinced him that many ancient fathers held the figurative interpretation. *Philipp Melanchthon,* pp. 242 f.

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[24] *Nuntium mittimus Witebergam ad Philippum aut ubi is sit, scribimusque ad illum de vocatione in Angliam de qua hodie ad te scripsi.* Kuyper, *Johannis à Lasco Opera*, II, 61; Jenkyns, *Remains of Thomas Cranmer*, I, 329. It is barely possible that à Lasco does not mean to suggest that Melanchthon shares the invitation.

[25] *Hic tabellarius literas mihi attulit, quibus in Angliam vocor. C.R.*, VI, 715.

[26] Ne reliqui posteris ambiguitates tanquam *μῆλον ἔριδος*. *C.R.*, VI, 801.

[27] Since the word "principes" in the text is doubtful, the passage may or may not mean that Cranmer's invitation has been followed by one in the King's name. *C.R.*, VI, 790–91.

Cranmer pressed the invitation, writing at least four letters in series to Melanchthon, and seeking to influence him also through mutual friends. On July 4, 1548, he wrote to à Lasco: "I am now sending a third letter to Melanchthon, in which I exhort him to come to us." He had already at least once invited à Lasco himself, and the latter had indicated his intention to come, but had been prevented through some unexpected business. He now urges à Lasco to come and to direct all his care and planning to the one end of securing Melanchthon's presence.[29] À Lasco himself did his utmost to further Cranmer's wish. What we may suppose to have been the second of Cranmer's letters to Melanchthon over the matter had been sent in care of à Lasco, who intrusted it to Aepinus for delivery. À Lasco now wrote Hardenberg on July 28 asking him to inquire of Melanchthon whether he had received this letter, and to request a reply. On August 4 à Lasco received Cranmer's letter of July 4, and understood from it that no reply had come from Melanchthon. He immediately wrote to Melanchthon, expressing doubt about the delivery of the former letter, inclosing a copy of Cranmer's letter to himself, and laying the matter upon Melanchthon's conscience.[30] This letter indicates that the writer had himself written Melanchthon in "April or May," and recalls the fact that he had written Hardenberg, as just noted.[31]

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[28] *Ibid.,* col. 894.

[29] *Ut omnem curam cogitationemque tuam in hoc unice convertas, ut Philippum nostrum plane nostrum facias. Miscellaneous Writings and Letters,* p. 421.

In order to strengthen his plea with Melanchthon, Cranmer seems to have induced a number of leading men to write to him. On May 26, 1548, Melanchthon informed Camerarius, *Ego in Angliam multorum et praecipuorum literis vocor. Sed nondum ex Germania discedam.* He hopes the English will move wisely in the beginning of so great a change. He has lovingly warned them, he says, to set forth after grave deliberation a pious confession, lest they later become divided into sects.[32] Apparently he was thinking of Cranmer's proposal as primarily an English concern. Two months after this letter Cranmer was seeking the good offices of Hardenberg to persuade Melanchthon. On July 28, 1548, he wrote what is only incidentally an invitation to the Bremen pastor himself and primarily a request to him to join in the appeal to Melanchthon. He explains that he has called to his side "many pious and learned men," some of whom have already arrived: of Melanchthon, however, he has "no certain intelligence." "For which cause we most earnestly entreat of you, if by any means you can accomplish it, that you will endeavor to induce him to take the journey hither." Ample assurances are given of personal safety, of traveling expenses, and of the greatness of the opportunity—one much greater, he observes, than that which drew Melanchthon to Cologne in 1543.[33] There is no indication of Hardenberg's response.

Still unsuccessful, Cranmer wrote a fourth letter to Melanchthon on February 10, 1549. Here he prays God, who has "rescued our Island from the waves" of trouble which churches elsewhere are suffering, that he will gather a perpetual church, not only there, but in other nations. "For many pious and learned men have come over to us, some from Italy and some from Germany, and we are daily expecting other." Will not Melanchthon consent to adorn their society with his presence? "I am well aware," he adds, "that you have often desired that pious and wise men taking counsel together and comparing their judgments, should set forth with the weight of their authority some work that would embrace the chief matters of ecclesiastical doctrine, and transmit the truth uncorrupted to posterity," and he warns Melanchthon against inconsistency, and against resisting the manifest calling of God.

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[30] *Nescio qua conscientia vocationem hanc negligere possis.*

[31] *C.R.*, II, 92–95; Kuyper, *Johannis à Lasco Opera*, II, 618–19. The Parker Society editor, Dr. Cox (*Miscellaneous Writings and Letters*, p. 421, note 7), mistakenly supposes that the letter of à Lasco to Hardenberg had reference to the *tertia epistola* of Cranmer; the letter of August 4 shows that à Lasco had not learned of the *tertia epistola* when he wrote.

[32] *C.R.*, VI, 918.

[33] *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters*, p. 422.

The letter was to be delivered in person by à Lasco, who had resided with the writer "on intimate terms for some months past.[34] About a year later a fresh invitation was dispatched, receipt of which Melanchthon notes laconically in a letter to Camerarius, April 15, 1550.[35] There is no specific evidence that Cranmer was the author of this invitation, though that is not unlikely.

As for Melanchthon, so far as records show, he met with silence the whole bombardment of invitation. His letter to Cranmer of March 1, 1549, is not a reply to Cranmer's letter of three weeks earlier, and contains no reference to the proposal. It is clear, of course, that the correspondence between Cranmer and Melanchthon is not completely preserved. Two, at least, of Cranmer's letters are lost; and it is possible that some communication from Melanchthon was sent between the dubious acceptance of May 1, 1548, and the irrelevant but friendly letter of March 1, 1549. Nevertheless everything goes to show that Melanchthon finally "did not choose" to join the conference in person.

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[34] *Op. cit.*, p. 425. A number of authorities have been searched in vain for information as to whether à Lasco met Melanchthon during his continental visit of this period; we have no record of the delivery of the letter.

[35] *Ego rursus in Angliam vocor. C.R.*, VII, 573.

Meanwhile Bucer had also been invited to England. On September 3, 1548, he writes to Cranmer describing the troubles that have fallen upon Strassburg: "Wherefore," he says, "we are daily expecting the termination of our ministry. And as we would prefer to undergo any suffering rather than dwell in the tents of Kedar, how very acceptably does your reverend fatherhood offer yourself to our relief."[36] Cranmer now (October 2) sent Bucer a further urgent and cordial invitation. The letter contains a suggestion, though no clear indication, of the plan for a consensus. "You will not," he assures Bucer, "be of less benefit to the universal church of God while you are with us than if you retain your former position. . . . . We will make it manifest that nothing will be more gratifying or delightful to us than the presence of Bucer."[37] Bucer, however, stuck to his now dangerous post for half a year more. On December 23 he thanked Cranmer for having "called us from death to life," but did not indicate a decision.[38] On the following day he wrote Peter Martyr, now at Canterbury, suggesting that the invitation might be extended to three of his colleagues. Of these, Paul Fagius (whose son was already in school at Canterbury) was also invited, and on March 24 Peter Alexander wrote on Cranmer's behalf urging them to come at once. They had already been dismissed by the Senate on March 1.[39] They arrived in England some days before April 26, 1549, when they wrote a joint letter to the ministers at Strassburg.[40]

It was apparently due to Melanchthon's non-participation that the plan was halted. Cranmer evidently felt that Melanchthon was the key man, without whose co-operation no general consensus could be arrived at. The scholars at his side were men of a different class. For the most part they were men who lacked any continental influence, or had lost it, and could not speak for imposing groups. Capable and moderate men they might be, but to proceed with them alone would be to present a consensus of exiles, not of representatives. Indeed, Cranmer seems not to have opened any serious discussion of the matter with them. His invitations to Bucer contain no explicit reference to the subject. If he discussed the matter with Bucer while they were together at Lambeth, Bucer's published correspondence does not reflect such conference. Neither Bucer's letters to Calvin in 1549, when he had occasion to refer to the *Consensus Tigurinus*,[41] nor Calvin's letters to him and to Somerset[42] contain any references to the matter. None of the brilliant company of foreign divines in England seems to have been initiated into the plan. The talents of the visitors were employed in teaching, in ministering to foreign congregations in England, and on the English Prayer Book. Yet all effort did not cease on account of Melanchthon's lack of response.

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[36] *Original Letters*, II, 532.

[37] *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters*, pp. 423 f.

[38] *Original Letters*, II, 533.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 538. Cf. Strype, *Memorials of Cranmer*, I, 283; Smyth, *op. cit.*, pp. 157 f.

[40] *Original Letters*, II, 544.

While between Cranmer and his invited guests the proposal was left in abeyance, the same project, or one very like it, was being canvassed in Switzerland on behalf of the royal Council. Christopher Mount (or Mont), a talented German who had been in Henry VIII's employ on important missions —he had conveyed an invitation to Melanchthon in 1535[43]— was now posted at Strassburg. His letters to the Council at this period[44] are valuable for their information on the moving

[41] August 14. *C.R.*, XIV, 350–58.

[42] *C.R.*, XIV, 437; XIII, 64 f., 531 f.

[43] "Mont, Christopher," *Dictionary of National Biography*. "Though he could not induce him to come to England, he induced him to abstain from visiting France." (This is of course a misleading explanation of Melanchthon's decision, which was taken in obedience to his prince.)

[44] *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign, 1547–1553; Camden Society*, 2d Series, XXXVII, 110 f.

drama of continental affairs. On June 13, 1549, he sent the information that Zurich and Berne would not join a Swiss-French league and that they would not fight against the English.[45] On October 20 a letter was dispatched to the Senate of Zurich in the name of the boy King cementing good will in these terms: "We cannot but hold you in special affection (*non possumus et nos quoque non vehementer vos amare*), and the more because we have understood from the frequent letters of our faithful and beloved servant, Christopher Mont, both your friendly disposition toward us and ready will to deserve well of us. In addition to which there is a certain mutual agreement (*consensus*) concerning the Christian religion and true piety, which ought to render this our friendship the closer."[46]

A similar letter was sent to Berne, as is evident from the reply of the Bernese Council to King Edward on December 14. From this letter it appears that Mount had conveyed the King's letter in person. Whether from Mount's conversation or from the letter which he conveyed to the Bernese, the latter had become aware that a "council" was projected. "With respect to a future council," they state their determination to continue in their own religious settlement of 1528; they will not however refuse to participate in a "general or national council" if it is held in the spirit of the Lord, its members given safe conduct, and the Scriptures taken as the standard.[47] Dixon, without explanation, connects the activities of Mount in Switzerland with Cranmer's project.[48] The suggestion is supported by the apparent identity of the plan with his own.

With these diplomatic approaches we cannot leave unmentioned the proposal submitted by Dr. Bruno, a Lutheran in the pay of the Council, and indorsed by Cecil in October, 1550. The *Discursus D. Brunonis* was printed by Dixon, in all its

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[45] *Calendar of State Papers, 1547–1553*, p. 38.
[46] *Epistolae Tigurinae*, p. 1.
[47] *Original Letters*, II, 718.
[48] *History of the Church of England*, III, 98.

"brutal Latinity," as a footnote. It crowds the text out of four pages of his *History*.[49] It is framed in anticipation of a renewal of the Council of Trent. It contains an extended list of most serene kings, German princes, counts and cities, and Swiss Evangelical cantons favorable to the Protestant cause, and advocates joint action of them all in sending "some of our bishops" with Bucer, Melanchthon, Brentz, and other leading theologians to the forthcoming meeting of the Council. If they effect nothing at the Council it will be necessary to form a "defensive league" of the Protestant powers. Some negotiations had taken place, in which an unnamed "messenger from the princes of Germany," possibly Bruno himself, had informed Cecil that the princes consulted "desire and propose a mutual conjunction with the King's Majesty, who is raised up by God for the beautifying of the Church of Christ." They further suggest that in case war is declared against either themselves or England the alliance is to be so dissembled as to appear other than religious, while between themselves it is to be understood that they are "one body in Christ." This ambitious but unethical scheme did not get beyond the sanction of Cecil.[50] The Bruno proposal, at least in the advice of the "messenger," recommends à Lasco as special counselor of the government, but bears no evidence of any reference to Cranmer. It is quite possible that Cranmer, now since the fall of Somerset less closely in touch with the Council than formerly, knew nothing of it, and even that à Lasco had not been consulted. If it was not solely the product of Bruno's own scheming, its genesis may with some probability be ascribed to the artful brain of Cecil.

Nothing came of these political maneuvers. But Cranmer's proposal for a meeting to frame a consensus was yet to be vigorously renewed. Somerset was executed January 22, 1552; Northumberland, whom Cranmer consistently opposed, was now in the saddle. Trent had resumed May 1, 1551. The

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[49] *Op. cit.*, III, 345 f.

[50] *Op. cit.*, III, 349–50.

Emperor was seeking to impose the compromise of the *Interim,* and Melanchthon had adopted a modification of it. Maurice of Saxony, who held the balance of power in Germany, had secured the attendance of Protestant representatives at Trent (Autumn 1551), while forming a pact (January 15, 1552) with Henry II which presently made possible a Protestant attack upon the Emperor. Charles was soon defeated in the Second Schmalkald War (April, 1552), and the Truce of Passau (August 2, 1552) prepared the way for the Peace of Augsburg three years later. These events were closely watched in England.[51] While in Germany the turn of the tide against Charles dashed the imperial projects for a Lutheran-Roman reunion, Cranmer apparently felt the time opportune for a resumption of his effort. He may also have felt peculiarly at this time the need of an authoritative general Protestant pronouncement as a stabilizing influence on the English situation. The Hooper incident had been decided in his favor, but it had given expression to a strain of radical puritanism far more extreme than that of Geneva. Northumberland, a shabby adventurer, was simulating Protestant zeal as a cloak for his rapacity. Something might be hoped for from the precocious wisdom and piety of the King; but his tenure of life was precarious.

Cranmer's works of 1550–51 on the Eucharist showed clearly his fundamental agreement with à Lasco and Calvin, and with Bucer, whose death, February 28, 1551, had deeply bereaved many English as well as Continental associates. The *Consensus Tigurinus,* framed by Calvin and Bullinger (1549), was hailed by both Bucer and à Lasco; the latter, with Calvin himself, saw in it the promise of a wider union, and issued an edition of the text in London (1552).[52] Bucer had stated that he believed he would agree with à Lasco if they should confer.[53] The points of difference in theology represented by these leaders and their followers were so slight as to make it seem probable that they would vanish, like those of Calvin and Bullinger, on adequate mutual explanation. Melanchthon, too, it was known, was not far from the Reformed doctrine, especially on its most controverted point of the Eucharist. He had disappointed Cranmer before; would he do so again?

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[51] See the correspondence of Mount, Moryson, and Wotton, *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign, 1547–53.*

[52] Kuyper, *op. cit.*, I, lxv; II, 646, 650; Kruske, *Johannes à Lasco,* p. 79.

Bullinger, as inheriting the leadership of the left wing of the Reformed, desired to see the English Reformation move more rapidly in a Puritan direction. He held Cranmer in some degree of suspicion, and offered him unsolicited advice. On February 24, 1551, he wrote to Cranmer urging him to advise the King against sending delegates to the approaching meeting of the Council of Trent, and interceding on Hooper's behalf. Cranmer's reply to this letter, over a year later (March 20, 1552), marks the resumption of his plan. The Hooper incident was now closed, and Hooper was Cranmer's guest at Lambeth. The advice regarding Trent was also, he explains, superfluous, as the King had never considered the course suggested. But Cranmer had decided to recommend to him the plan of a "synod of most learned and excellent men" to be convoked "in England or elsewhere." The King had indicated his approval of this plan, as being most useful for the Christian commonwealth (*reipublicae Christianae utilissimum*). It is not for us to fail the church of God in a matter so important. He is writing "Dr. Philip" and "Dr. Calvin" on the matter; and he asks Bullinger to "consider how the synod may most conveniently be assembled either in England or elsewhere."[54]

The letter to Calvin is of the same date. He desires a harmony of doctrine in order to unite the churches of God. To this end he has often wished for a meeting of learned and godly men, that, having deliberated together, they might hand down to posterity an authoritative statement. The doctrine of the sacrament especially should be defined, in answer to the decrees of Trent on the subject, thus ending the dissensions over the sacrament of unity by which the church of God has been so grievously injured. He is writing Melanchthon and Bullinger: "I beg," he says, "that you will deliberate among yourselves how this synod may most conveniently be assembled."[55]

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[53] Micronius to Bullinger, August 28, 1550. *Epistolae Tigurinae*, p. 369.

[54] *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters*, p. 430.

To Melanchthon he wrote a week later (March 27). In the early church, he observes, differences were settled by councils of the apostles and elders. Had the differences between reformed groups been so settled, the Emperor would not have made war on them. "It is truly grievous that the sacrament of unity is made by the devil food for disagreement, and, as it were, the apple of contention." He therefore proposes a conference of those who excel in erudition and judgment. If Melanchthon objects that the matter cannot be settled without the aid of princes, Cranmer answers that he has consulted the King, who "places his Kingdom at your disposal," and promises security and assistance. He has written Calvin and Bullinger, exhorting them not to fail in a matter so necessary to the *respublica Christiana*. Melanchthon had recently written him[56] of the Tridentine decrees on the worship of the host; let this diligence of ungodliness be answered by a corresponding zeal in setting forth the doctrine of godliness.[57]

What response did these letters elicit? Calvin replied promptly, in a letter of some length. He laments the license and confusion that prevail, not sparing to single out Cranmer's father-in-law, Osiander, as a trouble-maker. He has learned with joy of the success of the Gospel in England, where Cranmer, he knows, has had a hard battle to fight. "I know," he says, "that your purpose is not confined to England alone, but together with her you take consideration for the whole world. The generous disposition of the most serene King, and his rare piety are deservedly to be admired, since the pious plan of holding such a gathering [*conventu*] is accompanied by his favor; and he offers a meeting place in his Kingdom." The lack of intercourse and of holy communion between Christians is one of the evils of the day. This is chiefly the fault of princes, who consult only their own security. "Thus it comes to pass that the members being scattered, the body of the church lies mangled." As far as he is personally concerned he will not shrink from crossing ten seas for the purpose, if he can be of any service. He would find reason enough for this if it were only to serve England. But since there is proposed a weighty consensus of learned men, properly composed according to the standard of Scripture, by which churches otherwise far separated may be brought to unity, he would adjudge it wicked on his part to decline any labors or annoyances. Nevertheless he hopes that smallness of his capacity *(tenuitatem)* will cause him to be excused. If so, he will perform his part by prayer. He reminds Cranmer that Melanchthon is too far off for ready communication. Bullinger will probably have answered already. "I wish," he adds, "that my ability were equal to the ardour of my zeal. But what I at first declined, I perceive the difficulty of the business compels me to attempt; not that I should merely exhort you but that I should implore you to go forward, until at least something be effected, if all does not turn out as you wish. Farewell, most accomplished leader, sincerely revered by me. May the Lord continue to guide you by his Spirit, and bless your holy labors!"[58]

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[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 431–32.

[56] This letter is not extant.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 434.

This characteristic letter shows Calvin to have been fully sympathetic with Cranmer's proposal, and to have regarded it with moderate hopefulness. His language constitutes a promise to go to England if his services are needed. Perhaps the depreciation of his own abilities may be due to the fact that Cranmer's letter did not convey an explicit personal invitation, but only proposed in a general way the holding of a conference. He may have been a little puzzled or a little piqued by the rather brief and casual way in which Cranmer had opened up so important a project. Cranmer, in his part, undoubtedly desired the presence as well as the approval of his correspondents, and thought to show them respect by presenting only a shadowy plan which they were invited to complete.

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[58] *C.R.*, XLI, 312–14. The editors remark: *Vix dubium esse potest hanc ad finem Aprilis vel initium Maii referendam esse.*

Cranmer, awaiting word from Melanchthon and Bullinger, did not reply till October 4. He was now persuaded that the plan would have to be at least temporarily abandoned. He had had, so far, no word from Melanchthon; Bullinger, he says, has answered that he fears it is vain to discuss a council while Germany is so disturbed by war that neither he nor Melanchthon can leave their churches. Consequently the project must be relinquished either completely or until a more convenient season. "As for us, we are again vigorously engaged in reforming the English Church."[59]

There exists an undated reply of Calvin to this decision to postpone the matter indefinitely. Since a general gathering to set forth our common teaching is excluded, he warmly approves *(vehementer laudo)* the new plan to carry forward the Reformation in England itself. Here Calvin animadverts upon certain defects in the English reform hitherto, and admonishes Cranmer not through negligence to leave the task of reform unfinished.[60]

Melanchthon seems never to have replied to Cranmer's letter of March 27, 1552. Whether at Cranmer's request or not, he was, however, once more invited to England in the following May. On August 10, 1553, he informed Camerarius that he had been called once again to England by royal letters sent the previous May; and that in the meantime the pious King had died.[61]

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[59] *C.R.*, XLI, 370.

[60] Calvin, *Epistolae* (Geneva, 1616), pp. 134–35, quoted by Jenkyns, *Remains of Thomas Cranmer*, I, 347; Beza, *Life of John Calvin*, tr. F. Sibson (Philadelphia, 1836), pp. 298 f.

[61] *C.R.*, VIII, 135.

To what cause are we to attribute the failure of Cranmer's project? Strype, without particularizing, remarks: "The troubles at home and abroad frustrated this excellent purpose."[62] Smyth unhesitatingly lays the blame at Melanchthon's door. Melanchthon, he says, "preferred the ignominy of submitting to the Interim to the inconvenience and possible danger of a journey to London."[63] In this judgment no consideration is given to the question of whether Melanchthon could honorably have absented himself from Germany during the troublous times of the Schmalkald Wars. His alleged "ignominy" was not at any rate the ignominy of ease. He complained to Cranmer[64] of the "miseries" and "tumults" amid which he was placed. To Calvin he wrote October 1, 1552, three days before Cranmer's letter abandoning the project: "I am living as in a wasp's nest." If exile comes, he adds, "I am determined to turn to you."[65] He was, in fact, striving, perhaps mistakenly, for a consensus within Germany; and he regarded that as his first task. Until the internal Lutheran tumults were composed he must have felt that he could not negotiate as a representative. To have gone to England would have been to flee from Germany. It would have been of little advantage to Cranmer's aim for him to have joined the discussions as an *émigré*. Nor should it be forgotten that the treatment accorded by Henry VIII to the Lutheran delegates in England in 1538 had justified considerable hesitancy about attending further conferences there. Melanchthon may have prejudged the conference to failure and felt it a waste of time to take any concern for it. His failure to reply to Cranmer is in that case discourtesy, but it is nothing more.

The assumption that Melanchthon's aloofness was the sole cause of the relinquishment of the project is also open to objection. It is due, *inter alia,* to oversight of the letter of Cranmer of October 4, which mentions Bullinger's advice, with Melanchthon's silence, among "many things" *(multa)* which have led him to postpone action. It is probable, from his language, that he would have renewed the proposal at the first favorable opportunity, as he had already once done after an interval. But he had staked success upon the aid of the young King, on whom now lay the hand of death. The royal invitation to Melanchthon sent two months before Edward's death may indeed represent a renewal of Cranmer's purpose. Before Melanchthon received it, he had learned the news of the King's decease. This is the real terminus. Other factors in the situation might have nullified the effort; the change of sovereigns at once put its success out of the question.

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[62] *Memorials,* II, 159.

[63] Smyth, *op. cit.,* p. 40. On p. 48 he quotes Dalton's *John à Lasco,* tr. Evans, in condemnation of Melanchthon's failure to aid Cranmer "in the most decisive hour."

[64] May 1, 1548, *C.R.,* VI, 894 f.; July 4, 1553, *C.R.,* VIII, 119.

[65] *C.R.,* XIV, 415.

The foregoing brief survey of the documentary history of Cranmer's proposal has afforded the reader little definite indication of the content of the plan. There is no evidence that he ever drew up a *schema* of the projected conference. The evidence for the fact that he had such a plan at all rests upon the correspondence that has just been examined, and from his brief letters it is difficult to guess how far he had shaped in his imagination the details of procedure. We may be sure, indeed, that, whatever outlines the matter had assumed in his own mind, all was left so elastic as to be readily modified at the suggestion of others. In the letter to Bullinger of February 20, 1552, he is not even determined to have the meeting in England, though that is assumed in the letter to Melanchthon of the twenty-seventh. In the letter to Calvin of October 4, 1552, he refers to the project as *consilium meum de conventu doctissimorum et optimorum virorum in Anglia habendo.* Obviously the presumption is that the conference is to meet in England, and the personal interest and favor of the King have been enlisted with that end in view. The phrase just quoted indeed may be taken as containing Cranmer's plan in a nutshell. Possibly it is the entire plan. If he could assemble under protection a meeting of the *doctissimi et optimi* of Protestantism, he was confident that the consensus issue would take care of itself.

Smyth regards the proposal as "an echo of the Conciliar Movement," and adds: "To convene a general council of Protestantism . . . . to discover a formula that would unite all the divergent forces of the Reformation . . . . that was the dominant aim of Cranmer's statesmanship."[66] But the conciliar movement aimed at more than formulas; it aimed to establish a supernational representative form of church government. From evidence presented in previous paragraphs it is clear that Cranmer favored, in broad lines at least, a conciliar government of the church Catholic, the true church which in his mind was now to be sought among those who had severed connection with Rome. We are justified then in supposing that the consensus of the wise and good for which he immediately planned was thought of as initiating some conciliar means of maintaining that intercommunion which dissension over "the sacrament of unity" had prevented. Such traditional phrases in the correspondence we have cited as "the church of God," "the universal church of God," "*respublica Christiana*," may be taken as significant of Cranmer's ideal, which is that of a general reintegration by conciliar means. He must have seen, however, beyond the difficulty of securing the presence in a conference of those qualified, grave obstacles in the way of the erection of a conciliar system. For the accomplishment of this end his plan so far as revealed, was entirely inadequate. For his conception of a general council, as we have seen, was that it required not only the favor of one, but the concurrence of all, Christian princes. Calvin at times attributed the general disunion primarily to the discords of self-seeking princes; and Cranmer was equally aware of the seriousness of this factor. Any insistence upon Cranmer's conception of the valid council would necessitate its indefinite postponement. Cranmer was not, however, the man to insist upon definitions, and he probably hoped, as Calvin did, for the co-operation of enough princes to make possible some steps toward the goal of comprehensive conciliar union.

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[66] Smyth, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

This project of Cranmer was seriously put forward and, although void of visible results, it should not be dismissed as fantastic, but taken seriously as a chapter in the history of the ideals of the Reformation. From Cranmer's point of view in that movement it was reasonable to expect of the proposed conference some useful outcome. If he had succeeded in gathering about him at one discussion table Melanchthon, Calvin, Bullinger, and a select number of the troop of foreign scholars who were his guests in England, the fathers of Trent would have trembled and Protestantism would have taken on new vitality. From all that we know of the temper and opinions of these men, they would hardly have found cause for serious disagreement. They would in all probability have reached a consensus; and a statement put forth on their authority could not have failed to prove of epochal significance.[67]

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[67] Dr. Philip Schaff delivered an address before the General Presbyterian Council at Edinburgh in 1877, entitled *The Consensus of the Reformed Confessions.* It is concerned with the proof of harmony of doctrine among the standards of all the Reformed groups, not with projects of agreement or union. But it opens with an allusion to Cranmer's proposal, in which Dr. Schaff uses the following words: "Cranmer, the moderate and cautious reformer and martyr of the Church of England, the chief framer of its liturgy and Articles of Religion; Melanchthon, the preceptor of Germany, the gentle companion of the heroic Luther, the author of the Augsburg Confession, and the surviving patriarch of the German Reformation; Bullinger, the friend and successor of Zwingli, the teacher and benefactor of the Marian exiles, and the author of the most oecumenical among the Reformed Confessions; Bucer, the indefatigable, though unsuccessful, peace-maker between the Lutherans and Zwinglians, and the mediator between the Anglican and the Continental Reformation; Calvin, the master theologian, commentator, legislator, and disciplinarian, who was then just in the prime of his power, and (in the language of John Knox) at the head of "the most flourishing school of Christ since the days of the apostles"—these representative men, assembled in Lambeth Palace or the Jerusalem Chamber, would have filled an important chapter in church history, and challenged the assent of the Reformed Churches for a common confession of faith that embodied their learning, wisdom, and experience" (*The Consensus of the Reformed Confessions*, p. 2). (There is, of course, no proof that Calvin was consulted till after the death of Bucer.)

THE JEWISH WORLD IN WHICH JESUS LIVED

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IN THE interests of clarity it will be best to begin by defining the expression "the Jewish world." One might, for example, understand these words in a thoroughly objective sense. If this were the viewpoint emphasis would be laid upon the description of the territory of Judah, its extent, location, physical features, and natural resources, upon the population, its composition, racial affinities, social classes, manners, customs, and institutions. It is not here proposed, however, to approach the topic from this angle: first, because that has recently been clearly and adequately done in the fourth chapter of the biography of Jesus written by Professor Shirley Jackson Case, and second, because all that is sought here is a suggestive sketch of a historical background, and this cannot be done in a purely objective fashion. It is proposed, therefore, to include in the term "Jewish world" those subjective or spiritual forces which moved in it, and indeed to lay the emphasis upon them.

I

It is helpful, in approaching this subject, to state certain broad conclusions which may be reached by a study of the general significance of Old Testament history.

1. *The first is that in every great age of their history the people of Israel have found themselves face to face with an insistent and practically significant dilemma which divided them and their leaders into two opposing factions or groups.* It is unnecessary to labor this point. Those who know their Old Testament will recall many examples of it.

To cite a concrete instance, there is the cleavage between Ahab and Elijah. Ahab stood for a policy of adaptation to the world's life. He allied himself first with Tyre and Judah against Damascus. When, later, Assyrian ambition threatened the West, he made an ally of Damascus and effectively checked the Assyrian advance at the battle of Karkar, 854 B.C. Ahab's complaisant religious policy is a direct reflection of the policies he attempted to carry out in the realms of politics and social life. Elijah's opposition to him likewise has a political and social background. His policy was one of independence, of the differentiation of Israel from the world.

This case will suggest many others, e.g., the cleavage between Isaiah and Ahaz. But what has been said will serve to suggest the desired point: that all the way down the scroll of Israel's history there is a vertical line of division which cuts across every sphere of life, in every age, on the question of what the Hebrew attitude to the life of the world should be.

2. *The second conclusion is that the source of this endless division was external and not internal. It was not due to any excessive disposition to pugnacity in the nature of the Hebrew race. But on the contrary it is traceable mainly to the circumstance that these people when they came forth from the nomadic stage of their existence elected, quite without inkling of the inevitable consequences, to settle in the land we call Palestine.*

One has only to glance at a map of the Near East to understand why students of those civilizations refer to the land of the Hebrews as "the Palestinian Bridge." It is the one feasible near-eastern land route between Africa, Asia, and Europe. Here was a natural focal point of external pressure, a spot where forces moving in opposite directions inevitably met, a veritable hotbed of dilemmic possibilities.

The moment the Hebrews gained a footing upon this bridge they began to feel the effects of their new environment. They had thrust themselves, by force, into the center of the world. Like all young and vital races, they were self-conscious and self-confident. But, as they encountered various powerful social and political forces, they began to realize that adjustment to life in that habitat was a complex and difficult matter. The contact of their native independent spirit with these necessities of adjustment placed them on the horns of a dilemma from which they have never yet escaped. If they conformed to the world, which was one alternative, they must contemplate assimilation and loss of identity. If they refused to conform, which was the other alternative, they must place their material existence in grave jeopardy as the price of maintaining an intangible integrity. This perpetual dilemma perpetually divided Israel in every phase of its life.

3. *Thirdly, the point may be made that all of Israel's institutions were shaped by the necessities imposed upon them by this dilemma.* An institution is an instrument of social technique. It is an organization called into being by a social need which, as time passes, adapts itself to changing circumstances until its work is done and it settles into the rigidity of institutional arteriosclerosis.

It was even so with the institutions of Israel. They were called into being by social needs. The monarchy, for example, was the solution conceived by the prophet Samuel to relieve the political pressure exerted by the Philistines. The temple likewise was an institution conceived by David, and founded by Solomon, for the centralization of the control of religious sanctions in social life. And when the Jewish state in Palestine was revived after the exile, the rebuilt temple, through its clergy, became the instrument by which Babylonian Judaism gained control of society because it alone suited the need.

4. *Lastly, it may be suggested that Israel's conception of God is an outgrowth of the nation's age-long effort to find a solution for its great dilemma of relationship to the world at large.* The mobile war-god of Deborah is manifestly differently conceived to the god of Solomon, who dwells in seclusion

within the Holy of Holies. The god of Hosea condemns the blood of Jezreel for which the god of Elisha gave sanction. Whatever we may think of God himself, we cannot doubt that men's ideas of God change from age to age, nor can we readily escape the admission that those changes reflect our changing circumstances.

It is not surprising to find, then, that the Hebrew people were always divided in their conceptions of God, and that behind these differences there are always corresponding differences in institutional technique.

II

In respect of the great dilemma the Jewish world in which Jesus lived was no differently situated than that country had always been. The Jews of his day faced the problem of contact with the outside world in a form more intense than it had ever before been presented.

This foreign influence had three sources.

When the waves of Alexander's world-conquest had subsided they left behind a fertile sediment of Hellenistic life in the lands which they had covered. As they lost political power the Greeks began to gain headway in the world of trade. By the times of Jesus they were the commercial successors of the Phoenicians, and the tenacity with which they held control of certain cities is directly related to their commercial proclivities. Through trade, as well as through kindred tastes, their relationships with Rome were close and mutually profitable. In Palestine Greek cities were independent of Jewish control and were organized into leagues for defense and mutual help.

Life in these cities and the areas dominated by them reflected the Hellenistic spirit, with its love of pleasure, luxury, and the material refinements of life. Greek was the language spoken. Greek customs prevailed. Greek money circulated briskly for the gratification of Greek tastes in food, clothing, and house furnishings. Each of their principal centers had its stadium, public bath, banquet-music hall, and forum. The Greeks knew themselves to be intruders, and unconsciously cultivated that peculiar type of social and economic aggressiveness by which early generations of foreigners seek to preserve their foreignness.

From the point of view of influence on the native population perhaps the greatest contribution the Romans made was the sense of the power of the world which their presence symbolized. Whenever he encountered Roman authority, even in its humblest representative, there stirred in the mind of every thoughtful Jew the consciousness of his people's perennial problem. To conform, or not to conform—these were the alternatives he pondered. And the difficulty of decision was made all the greater through some beneficent effects of Roman rule. The Romans made the roads safe from brigandage, and the seas from piracy. Thus they stimulated world-trade, raised the standard of living, and made life and property more secure. Their systematic and well-organized administration was superior to any that hapless land had ever known before. Roman power daily impressed upon the many the necessity of contact with the outside world, and, upon not a few, the advantage in making that contact friendly.

A third factor which contributed to the foreign assault on Jewish society was that not inconsiderable body of Jews from foreign lands who returned to the homeland either for permanent residence or on pilgrimages to the great national feasts. Josephus may exaggerate in placing the number of those who returned for Passover in the year 66 A.D. at three million. Yet they were undoubtedly numerous enough to make a definite impression on society. The assault of the world's influence through them was subtle and hard to meet. They, too, were Jews. Indeed, in their zeal, generosity, and enthusiasm for Judaism as a cult and as a faith they surpassed their native coreligionists.

And yet every returning Jew was a link with the great outside world and a witness for its social values. In many ways they transformed Judaism. It is known that the Babylonian Rabbi Hillel exercised a very profound liberalizing influence on Jewish life in Palestine. If, then, this foreign-born exponent of the law influenced Judean viewpoints, how much more so would those who knew not the law so well contribute to non-Jewish tendencies!

Thus it is quite clear that in the days of Jesus the Jewish world, whether in the homeland or abroad, was being pressed from many quarters to seek a solution for the old problem of relationship to the world, and that, no matter which alternative they adopted, serious consequences seemed inevitable. Jewish society as a whole, then, ranged itself in two groups, according as men favored one or the other of these alternatives.

III

As a nation or race grows old and sophisticated the social forces within it begin to crystallize into institutions. In these institutions may be found the technique by which different social groups hope to solve the problems which confront society as a whole. Though there were many distinct social groups among the Jews of Jesus' day, only two of them had developed their technique to the stage of important institutionalism.

It is natural to think of the temple as the outstanding institution of Israel. It was the institution in which centered the social machinery of the group which is known as the Sadducees. Let us consider for a moment what kind of a technique they had developed. The temple was a national institution. In it were daily offered the various animal and other sacrifices, oblations, and offerings which were believed to avail for the nation as a whole.

The great annual feasts and fasts of the nation centered in the temple. Space does not permit a description of the ceremonies which gave these occasions significance. The chief feasts were Passover, the Feast of Tabernacles, the Feast of Pentecost, the Feast of Lights; and the chief fast was the Day of Atonement. There is, however, one characteristic which all these occasions had in common. They were destined to draw the people together, to bring them into a geographical center, if only for a few days in each year, or, in other words, to make them think of themselves as a social unit.

The same centralizing tendency is seen in the various taxes and tithes by which the temple was supported. These were specified by law and fortified by religious sanctions. But their chief significance lay in the opportunity they offered for the concentration of the country's wealth for the support of a ruling caste.

Considered as a social institution, then, the temple and all its related observances represent the technique of centralized social control by an arbitrarily distinguished class. This class, in the days of Jesus, was known as the Sadducean party, composed of temple priests and their lay adherents. These latter, as we might expect, were drawn almost entirely from the ruling classes, men of large means, widespread interests, and corresponding social, economic, and political influence.

It is unnecessary here to go into the question of the origin and history of the Sadducees. But this much should be said: that their history shows that in the centuries in which they exercised control of the Jewish community in Palestine their general tendency was toward a policy of accommodation or conformity to the world. Whenever, in other words, the pressure of foreign influence seemed to jeopardize the life of the nation on its material side, they were ready to compromise. Perhaps the most conspicuous example of this is found in the high priests of the Greek period who were ready to Hellenize the nation in order to maintain their control over it. The Sadducees of Jesus' day were no exception. Though they were, in the eyes of the people, a religious party, they aspired to take the place in this non-sovereign state which the king and his nobles had taken in the pre-exilic monarchy. And with this essentially worldly policy their whole philosophy of life coincided.

With the Sadducees, on the extreme right wing, stood a party which in the days of Jesus was not organized as such, but which was even then feeling its way toward institutional self-expression. This party later came to be known as the Zealots. Within a generation of the death of Jesus it had become strong enough to sweep the older groups off their feet and plunge the country into the disastrous war with Rome, which resulted in the destruction of the temple in 70 A.D. This party agreed with the Sadducees in that its members were nationalists. Their only real difference from them lies in the realm of procedure. They wanted to do immediately and by armed resistance what the Sadducees hoped to do gradually by skilful intrigue, namely, re-establish Judea as an independent nation. They, too, belonged on the side of conformity to the world because their standards of value were the standards of the world.

But the most significant institution of Judaism in the days of Jesus was not the temple but the synagogue. If we reflect for a moment upon this institution we shall see how different was its genius to that of the temple. In the first place it was a local institution which tended to build up the community consciousness of the smaller centers of population. It tended, therefore, toward decentralization on the economic and political sides of life. It was emphatically not monarchical in spirit, but aimed rather at the socialization of the material benefits of life.

This is seen in the nature of the service it rendered to the local community. It acted first as a local court for civil and criminal cases. On the Sabbath it was a center of enlightenment, inspiration, and edification for the local people. Through the week the education of the junior grades of children was carried on there. And in many communities schools for higher grades were conducted in close relationship to the synagogue. The synagogue specialized in service to the local community, just as the old local sanctuaries had done in pre-exilic Israel.

And yet there was a tremendous difference. The local sanctuaries were entirely independent of each other, with chaotic results. But the synagogues had a connectional bond. To understand the nature of this bond is to understand another difference between the synagogue and the temple. The temple system based its religious authority on a literal interpretation of the five books of Moses. But the synagogue based its authority on the five books of Moses as interpreted by the scribes, a professional class of religious lawyers and expositors of Scripture, most of whom belonged to the Pharisaic party. The synagogues were under Pharisaic control.

Thus the synagogue was the instrument of the technique which the Pharisees had developed to solve the great question of relation to the outside world. Nor is it hard to see that this technique was one of nonconformity to the world. The Pharisees sent their teachers to every corner of the world, where as many as ten Jewish families could be gathered, to teach their people the distinctive observances, duties, customs, and beliefs that made them Jews no matter where they were. Their system removed resistance to the world from the sphere of politics and economics to the sphere of ethics.

On the side of the synagogue belonged also the monastic communities developed by the group known as the Essenes. They were monkish celibates who lived in rural communities and devoted themselves to the subjugation of the natural human appetites. They were thoroughgoing determinists who exempted nothing at all from the sway of destiny. They believed that God is the author of good only, and that the evil in the world comes from an opposing cosmic force. Consequently their technique was one of avoidance of evil by withdrawal from the world. In their seclusion they schooled themselves to bear such evil as might be destined for them, and studied to wait patiently for some supernatural intervention of God in the natural order, whereby alone salvation might come. Their technique, then, belongs on the side of nonconformity to the world.

As we might expect, these two great types of reaction to the world's life divided the Jewish people into two groups or factions, even though the great mass did not realize what it was all about. The battles fought by these right and left wings were staged in an institution known as the Sanhedrin. It was constituted, under Roman authority, as the highest executive court of the Jews for such matters as the conqueror allowed them to control. It was composed of seventy men drawn from the Sadducean priesthood, the scribal class, and the laity. In the days of Jesus the Sadducees were still in control of this body numerically. But some of the lesser Sadducean priests, some of the middle-class laity, and nearly all of the scribes belonged to the Pharisaic opposition. And this opposition was stronger in point of intellectual power and of social influence than the Sadducees. They aggressively challenged the latter all along the line, even on their control of the temple and their discharge of its priestly functions.

IV

Every institution ultimately develops a philosophy by which it rationalizes itself, or, in other words, justifies its existence. When this philosophy and its corresponding institution are compared they are seen to be interdependent. It is impossible, here, to make such a comparison adequately, but some light may be thrown on the world in which Jesus lived if we consider very briefly three points of intellectual or dogmatic difference between the Sadducees and the Pharisees.

To the first point of disagreement reference has already been made, namely, the authority of the unwritten law. The Sadducees held that the only source of authoritative knowledge of the will of God lay in the five books of Moses. Those books, as everyone knows, concern themselves very largely with the temple, its services and its obligations. It can easily be understood, therefore, why the Sadducees took this position. If their dogma were granted it definitely tied the nation down to the one technique of life of which the Sadducees held the hereditary monopoly.

The Pharisees, on the other hand, insisted that interpretations, extensions, and particular applications of the written law made by qualified scribes were of equal authority with the statutes on which they were based. It is not hard to see why they so insisted. Once grant them their position and the world was theirs. It gave them carte blanche for the justification of any technique they might evolve. It gave them almost unlimited power to adjust their system to circumstances while still retaining it as a system. It enabled them to invent new customs and standards by which to keep their people conscious of their distinction from the gentile world.

Thus it appears that here, as always, dogmatic differences are rooted deep in social life. When they cease to be so rooted they wither and are forgotten. The Sadducees and the Pharisees both wanted the same thing, control of society. Hence their difference on this question of authority.

The two parties clashed again on the question of destiny. The Sadducees insisted on the absolute freedom of the human will, or, in other words, on man's power to shape his own destiny. Nothing is predetermined or foreordained. We attain, in this world, the values to which our skill and knowledge and other resources entitle us. It is not hard to see why they believed this. Their technique was one of adjustment. But such a technique can never be sure of getting anywhere if there is an overruling power which decrees the end, no matter what we do. The Sadducees were opportunists. Given skilful leadership a nation might, they held, aspire to and get whatever it wanted. All things could be influenced by will and skill. Even God himself, their very temple cultus taught, was not immune. Offer him that which he demanded in the way of sacrifices and obligations, and his favor and assistance were assured.

The whole technique of the Pharisees, however, promoted the doctrine that destiny has a place in life. The Pharisees said God's will must be considered in every phase of life. Hence their extension of the written law. But this conception of God's interest in human life implies that he has a purpose for it, and therefore has the power to overrule. Yet the Pharisees were not theological fatalists. They couldn't be. They held that man has the power to control his destiny to this extent that he may decide what his attitude to the divine sovereignty will be. They had to make this concession to human freedom to provide motivation for their legalism. If men had no part in shaping their destiny they would soon find no sense in obeying the law. So the Pharisees taught a social doctrine on this point. Society must co-operate with God in shaping destiny. Here they were the heirs of the prophets, and their technique corresponded exactly to their teaching.

Finally, if we would understand the nature of the values toward which any social group is driving, we must consider what hopes they project into the future for society as a whole. The Sadducee had a very simple hope, which was that Judea might some day regain its sovereignty and achieve, under the leadership of his own order, a social, economic, and political success in the world-order which is now in force. It is not hard to see that the Sadducees were, in spirit, men of the world. A long lease of power and a chain of circumstances which had deprived their country of its secular rulers had conspired to make of them nothing but a ruling caste. Only the overlordship of a foreign power kept their high priest from assuming a crown as well as a miter. The Sadducees had no time for visions of a miraculously transformed world.

But the Pharisees had. They entertained as precious the prophetic promises of a golden age to come. Those promises, as one recalls, vary in their conception of the nature of the golden age. But they all have two features in common: First, they are socially conceived. Salvation for the prophet means a new social order. The individual's hope of salvation lies in living to participate in that order. Secondly, these prophetic visions of a golden age are concretely conceived. They are to be realized on this earth. When the Jews of Jesus' day spoke of a "Kingdom of Heaven" they meant a kingdom inaugurated by the God of heaven on this earth. The Pharisaic doctrine of the resurrection and the judgment was a logical deduction from this faith in the ultimate golden age. If there were no resurrection of the body, how could the righteous dead ever enjoy the promises made to them as well as to their children?

And now one can understand what the Pharisees were trying to do by means of their elaborate system. They were trying to preserve the Jewish people as a distinct social group until their great day of vindication should appear. Unless that were done, even God, on the premises of the Scriptures, could not vindicate himself. Unless that were done, the Jewish race, as a race, could never be vindicated before the Gentiles. This was their solution of the great dilemma. The Jews must preserve their social solidarity, must orient every phase of their life upon the divine center, and must wait until God's power was revealed in the world. The ultimate salvation of the individual depended not merely on keeping himself right with God. It depended even more upon preserving the race in that relationship. The whole institutional technique of the Pharisee was designed to enable the Jew to persist as a Jew, apart from, and in spite of, the world, until the day of his vindication, and in some respects its age-long efficiency deserves to be and is one of the wonders of the world.

Into the world in which moved the various social, political, and spiritual forces which have been touched upon above came Jesus of Nazareth. It was a complex and divided society, intensely introspective and self-opinionated, provided with elaborate organization and abundance of far-sighted, sagacious leadership. It is not the purpose of this article to deal with what he tried to do in that society. But it may serve as a fitting conclusion if he be briefly observed in conflict with these two great social techniques which have been considered.

In Matthew, chapter 21, Mark, chapter 11, and Luke, chapter 20, there is a story about the challenging of Jesus by leaders of the Sadducean group. After Jesus had taught for a time in and around Jerusalem he appeared one day at the temple and began to teach. Immediately he was confronted by Sadducean leaders who asked him, "By what authority doest thou these things? And who gave thee this authority?" The dilemma in which Jesus placed his questioners shows that he knew exactly the vital point in their system. He asked them whence John the Baptist had derived his authority. As the record tells us, they were at a loss to answer. "If we shall say, From heaven, he will say unto us, why, then, did ye not believe him? But if we shall say, From men, we fear the multitude, for all hold John as a prophet." Here the Sadducees appear plainly as a ruling caste, jealous to keep their authority, yet knowing well that the great masses were restive under it, and looking for the free prophetic word of cheer and guidance from a soul directly in touch with God. Jesus, like the Pharisees, questioned that conception of authority which centralized social control in the hands of a small ruling group.

In Matthew, chapter 22, and Luke, chapter 14, there is found some reliable evidence of a grave point of difference between Jesus and the Pharisees. The parable of the king who made a great marriage feast to which he first invited chosen guests is the case in point. Those who had a special right to enjoy the king's fellowship spurned their opportunity. Whereupon the king extended its bounty to include the great rabble. "And those servants went out into the highways, and gathered together all, as many as they found, both good and bad."

It is plain that this parable is directed against the Pharisaic system of social control through the inculcation of an ethical system whose prime aim was to create a separate, distinct society, within the world, yet apart from it. Jesus felt that the Pharisaic system fell down at the point of greatest need. It failed to reach those who needed it most. It was a middle-class, *bourgeois* religion which offered little for those upon whom the heaviest burdens of life rested. Plainly, Jesus wanted to save the world, and not merely to save a highly differentiated group from the world.

Undoubtedly there was a need for the work he wanted to do. The tradition that the common people heard him gladly is readily credible when one understands the institutionalized life of his day and observes the clashing of values in the great organized groups of society. Yet when one thinks upon his fate one can see that no particular social group is responsible for it, but, rather, humanity as a whole. All men are tied up together in the great task of discovering the true technique of life. And even those who profess to believe that Jesus found it often have not the courage to live the life that brought him to his Calvary.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE OF THE SCOTCH-IRISH PRESBYTERIANS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE RESTORATION, 1660-72

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I. BEGINNINGS OF PRESBYTERIANISM IN ULSTER

THE term "Scotch-Irish" is both a misnomer and a misleading expression because it connotes a consanguinity between two peoples that does not exist. A better name would be the Ulster Scotch or the Scotch of Ireland, for there was no miscegenation and affinity of blood such as the hyphenated word implies.[1] If that is not true of the Scotch-Irish today, it was a fact during the period of the Restoration and before, for religious differences, racial hatred, and cultural discrepancies all tended to keep the two groups apart.

A stretch of water scarcely as wide as the Straits of Dover separates the North of Ireland from that part of Scotland nearest the English border. Ease of access invited reciprocity of culture and community of ideals, but such contacts never materialized. On the contrary, the economic and defensive policy of a conqueror nation first stimulated immigration of the Scotch into Ireland. The disintegrated tribal system in Ireland proved a source of chronic disorder and the occasion of frequent military interference on the part of England. Such military intervention meant at times the extermination of large population, and it usually meant the confiscation of considerable areas of Irish territory. A notable instance of this policy was in the early reign of James I, when the king crushed a plot of Tyrone and Tyrconnel in Ulster, forcing the two leaders to leave the country. At the same time James I nipped in the bud another insurrection under O'Dougherty. The defection and defeat of these northern chieftains left a million acres of land in Ulster at the disposal of the king. James now determined to plant Ireland.

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[1] Morrison, *History of Windham*, p. 291; Green, *Scotch-Irish in America*, p. 1.

The plantation of Ireland was a system of colonization really begun under the Tudors but first exploited on a large and successful scale by the Stuarts. In 1594, when the University of Dublin was founded, two of its first elected fellows were Presbyterians from Scotland. Later one of them, Hamilton, proved a man of influence in Ulster. He was for a time the tutor of the noted Bishop Usher, a fact that may account for the decided Presbyterian sympathies of the latter. Elizabeth made several unsuccessful attempts to colonize Ireland. In 1572 she tried to people portions of Down and Antrim with Englishmen, but the undertaking finally had to be abandoned.

James now undertook the plantation of Ireland in a systematic manner. As a means of stabilizing conditions there he determined to colonize the confiscated lands of Ulster with his English and Scottish subjects. There was a threefold object in this procedure: economically, it would improve the land by introducing superior methods of agriculture; politically, it would check insurrection; and religiously, it would disseminate the Anglican reform faith among the native Irish. At the head of the plantation project the king appointed Sir Arthur Chichester, who proved a thorough, able, and businesslike administrator. Chichester arranged for three classes of settlers in the form of undertakers, servitors, and loyal natives. The first class were men who voluntarily engaged in the enterprise; the servitors were ex-civil and ex-military officers; and the loyal natives were men of Irish descent thought worthy of confidence.[2] The land was divided into tracts of 2,000, 1,500, and 1,000 acres.[3] Settlers allowed 2,000 acres were under contract to fortify their allotments within a year with castle and inclosure. They were also obliged to settle upon it forty-eight able-bodied men of either English or Scotch descent. The others were to fortify and colonize their plots in proportion.

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[2] See letter of Davies to Salisbury (1610) in Morley, *Ireland under Elizabeth and James I* (London, 1890), p. 384.

[3] *Ibid.*

Chichester was appointed in 1605, but his plan was not in full swing until 1610. On the whole, Englishmen proved indifferent to the scheme, but Scotsmen took active interest in it from the start. This was due to geographical proximity, agrarian conditions in the Lowlands, and the hardiness and spirit of enterprise of the Scots. Coming across the straits, the latter gradually pushed from the extreme northeastern point of Ulster into all parts open for settlement. "The decayed and desserted cities were now replenished with inhabitants; the lands were gradually cleared of woods; towns were built and incorporated; houses were erected throughout the cultivated country; and in every direction there was ample testimony afforded of the peaceableness and industry of the inhabitants."[4] But this peopling of Ulster did not take place in a day, for the main wave of immigration extended over a quarter of a century. Politically the Ulster-Scotch made no impression on Irish affairs until the reign of Charles I.[5]

The immigrants from Scotland were not the cream of the Lowland population. In fact, contemporary writers give one the opposite impression. Both Adair and Stewart, Presbyterian ministers who labored among them, give a gloomy picture of the moral fiber of these men. But some allowance must be made for the Calvinistic attitude of these preachers.

> From Scotland came many, and from England not a few; yet all of them generally the scum of both nations, who for debt or breaking or fleeing from justice or seeking shelter came hither hoping to be free from fear of man's justice . . . . in a few years there flocked such a multitude of people from Scotland that these northern counties of Down, An-

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[4] Reid, *History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland* (Belfast, 1867), I, 82.

[5] Stewart, "History of the Church of Ireland after the Scots Were Naturalized," found in Adair, *True Narrative,* Appendix.

trim, and Londonderry were in a good measure planted which had been waste before; yet these people were void of godliness and seemed rather to flee from God in this enterprise than to follow their own mercy. . . . .[6] The case of the people throughout the whole country was most lamentable, being drowned in ignorance, security, and sensuality, which was Mr. Blair's great discouragement to settle in these parts.[7]

Mr. Blair seems to have been the first of these staunch Presbyterian ministers that came over from Scotland, appearing before 1625. Under his ministry the ethical and religious status of the people took a turn for the better. With a few followers he prayed for days at a time over the spiritual condition of affairs. For years he carried on a system of family visitation. His zeal, pious life, and preaching attracted attention throughout the North of Ireland. He even gained the good will, respect, and friendship of Bishop Usher. "It would break my heart," said the latter to Blair, "if that successful ministry of the North were interrupted. They think to cause me to stretch forth my hand against you, but all the world shall not make me do so."[8] Nevertheless that work was interrupted. For when Blair undertook to administer the Sacrament, appoint deacons, and exercise discipline, he was restrained by the authorities in spite of the friendliness of Bishop Usher.

One by one ministers came over from Scotland—Livingstone, Stewart, Adair, Dunbar, and others. The work gradually grew and became established. The monthly meetings became so large and so taxed for space that open-air gatherings were held. This proved unwise and dangerous, since it advertised their method of worship just at a time when Archbishop Laud was doing his utmost to establish Anglicanism throughout the British Isles. It resulted in the suspension of the Presbyterian ministers and other forms of persecution carried on to the extent that 140 Presbyterians decided to leave Ireland for New England. They actually started and got halfway across the Atlantic when adverse winds, a leaky vessel, and some superstitious notions about divine providence caused them to return. This was in 1636. It was about the only instance of a mass migration of the Ulster-Scotch to America attempted during this century.

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[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Adair, *A True Narrative of the Rise and Progress of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1622–70* (Belfast, 1866), p. 9.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Another phase of the growth of Presbyterianism in Ulster came with the outbreak of the Puritan revolt in England. In 1642 a Scotch army of 10,000 men was sent into Ireland to crush an insurrection. This parliamentary army established its headquarters at Carrickfergus. It immediately organized itself into presbyteries for the convenience of religious worship, and men like Blair and Hamilton were commissioned as leaders by the General Assembly of Scotland. This was a powerful stimulus for the Scotch of Ulster to establish the Presbyterian system in many parts of the North. The Solemn League and Covenant was also instituted. In June, 1646, the Scottish army was defeated by the Irish, but the defeat failed to affect the status of Presbyterianism in the North of Ireland. It had become too well rooted to be suddenly plucked up.

Such was the beginning of Presbyterianism in Ulster. By the time of the Restoration there were seventy ministers who managed a communion of some 100,000 Scotchmen. The North was organized into five presbyteries and a general synod that met four times a year. This organization kept in close touch with the church in Scotland, to which it was similar in government, discipline, worship, and doctrine. Their numerical strength, ecclesiastical organization, territorial compactness, and tactful leadership made the Scotch-Irish a factor to be reckoned with by the political authorities during the time of the Restoration.

II. THE PETITION TO THE KING

A study of the religious situation in the North of Ireland in the time of the Restoration is interesting for two reasons.

It refutes the popular error of a mass exodus of the Scotch-Irish to America during this period, and it reveals a leadership through passive resistance that led to an early triumph of Presbyterianism in Ulster. Both the methods and the results of the conflict present a diametric contrast to the philosophy of force that dominated the Independents of England during the period of the civil war. The latter group, by its policy of blood and war, succeeded only in bringing on English Dissenters a reaction that netted them in the end the Clarendon Code and the Cabal.

The grounds are meager for assuming an extensive emigration of the Scotch-Irish from Ulster during the time of the Restoration. On the other hand there are some reasons to conclude that their exodus was negligible, if not nil. Certainly the cause of leaving Ireland was not religious, for their ecclesiastical status grew more favorable as time went on. The historian Froude was largely responsible for the migration myth.[9] Certainly American writers of Scotch-Irish history find a difficulty, not in locating the first Scotch-Irish arrival during this period, but in finding any at all.[10] The ones that found their way to America during this time came as scattered individuals, and not in migratory groups.[11]

Patrick Adair was a contemporary Presbyterian minister who lived in Ulster during this crisis. He died in 1694. Adair was a man of affairs, a leader of his party, and a historian of these trying times.[12] Allowing for a partisan point of view which one must expect on various points, his account on the whole seems a very fair one. Certainly there is little room for bias when he pictures the condition of the Nonconformists of the North becoming better and better, and their policy of meeting persecution with passive obedience until persecution ceased. This is how he summed up the situation in the North of Ireland:

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[9] Froude, *The English in Ireland in the Seventeenth Century* (New York, 1888), I, 155.

[10] Patterson, *Presbyterians in Philadelphia*, p. 117; Ford, *Scotch-Irish in America* (Princeton, 1915), p. 171.

[11] The greatest influx of Scotch-Irish into America seems to have been the second decade of the eighteenth century, when over fifty ships arrived from Ireland bearing large numbers of such immigrants. In the course of the century there were a number of similar but smaller migrations.

[12] See note 7, above.

> This mercy [cessation from persecution] came seasonably to this poor church in many ways. It proved the continuation of the ministers liberty—a dash too to the prelates who were more violent, and that by their own Primate of Ireland. It was some evidence and fruit of the king's clemency and favor to the Presbyterian ministers of the North of Ireland, and also an evidence of the moderation of the Lord Lieutenant and that he was no enemy of these ministers. . . . . And all this was the more remarkable that it was in the time when nonconformity both in England and in Scotland was much discountenanced, where meetings called conventicles were most strictly pursued and suppressed. But to observe God's dealings with his poor church in the North of Ireland, the most unlikely to gain favor of this kind, they were not only opposite in their principles and practices to the prelatical way, but strangers in another country—being Scotch—hated and despised by those of the English, who were prelatical. Providence ordered them liberty and quiet when others more deserving, and who had greater grounds for expecting it, were deprived of it. Thus the ministers, with the people, having by the wonderful providence of God an open door given to them, continued in the exercise of their ministry, and their assemblies daily grew, so that within a little while every congregation erected a house for their meeting together, and began to celebrate the Sacrament in their own assemblies.[13]

The several steps by which these ministers secured favor by winning the confidence of both king and local authorities are interesting to work out. They not only pursued a policy of studied passive resistance, but also made active efforts to secure recognition of their loyalty and to maintain the right to be dealt with as a corporate body of believers. They consistently clung together to gain recognition as a legal ecclesiastical organization, and they insistently refused to assent to the established church in matters contrary to their religious scruples. The first step to secure recognition of status was their petition to the king.

[13] Adair, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

The Presbyterians of Ireland did what they could toward the reinstatement of Charles II on the throne by moral, if not physical, support. Like their coreligionists both in England and in Scotland, they had not been in favor of the dissolution of the monarchy in the first place, and they had stubbornly refused to sign the Tender of Engagement renouncing the Stuart dynasty. Charles II, also, before his restoration had led them to believe that Presbyterianism would be given a place in the re-established ecclesiastical system. Their disillusionment came. Charles had been merely playing the act and then threw aside the mask. One contemporary writer put it that the Presbyterians were flattered with hopes till their strength and influence were gradually diminished, "till the bees had lost the sting and became noisy and harmless drones." Back on the throne, Charles II at once restored prelacy and the liturgy, denounced the Covenant, and refused toleration to all dissenters.

The Scotch of Ulster had been hoodwinked by the fact that the Irish convention called in February, 1660, to negotiate concerning a restoration had chosen a Presbyterian as chaplain and appointed another on a committee to investigate religious conditions. All of this committee had favored the Solemn League and Covenant. In the end, however, the real power to settle religion in Ireland did not rest with the convention, but with a commission appointed by the restored king. This commission declared for the established church, voted episcopal bishops' salaries, and made it plain that the episcopal form of church government was to prevail in Ireland. The Irish convention also began to bow to the inevitable, for it dismissed the committee to investigate religion and sent a committee to the king asking him to restore the Anglican church in Ireland.

The Presbyterians of Ulster now found themselves left out in the cold. Moreover, they feared that their interests would be misrepresented to the king by the committee sent from the convention. They now determined to counter the move of the convention by sending a delegation of their own. They called a synod to meet at Ballymena, where they drew up an address and appointed Mr. William Keys, of Belfast, and Mr. William Richardson, of Killileagh, to bear it to the king. In the address they petitioned the king "to settle religion according to the rule of the Reformation against the papacy, prelacy, etc., and according to the Covenant." The delegation left for the royal court in May, 1660, and the nearer they approached their destination the more they were discouraged by their coreligionists in England from carrying out their mission. They were told it would be suicidal to mention the Covenant to the king, or to reflect on prelacy in any way, and none of their sympathizers would undertake to procure for them an audience with the king so long as reference to the Covenant and prelacy remained in the petition. In the end the two delegates were induced to expunge their two most cherished propositions. This really rendered their mission abortive.

Thus, when admitted into the presence of the king, although he "looked with an awful, majestical countenance upon them," yet he gave them words of encouragement and promised them protection in time to come. But their brethren at home were little pleased with the mission. They resented the eradication of the most important points from the petition. They put small faith in promises of the king made in a private audience as little affecting the actions of local authorities far removed from the home government. Yet the mission did not prove wholly fruitless. They had gained the ear and the personal sympathy of the king. The latter had recognized a loyalty in the Ulster-Scotch during the time of the Interregnum, and had made mention of it in the conference. This attitude of the king was to prove the ultimate salvation of the Presbyterians in Ireland, but in the meantime they had to endure fiery trial.

III. MANEUVERS FOR RECOGNITION BEFORE THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Charles II did not hesitate to set up the Episcopacy in Ireland as he did in England and in Scotland, where the Bishops' Wars and the upheaval of the forties had taught grave lessons. In Ireland a religious settlement was fixed immediately after the Restoration. While the Ulster petitioners were still in London (May, 1660) they learned that bishops had been appointed to the various dioceses of Ireland. In 1661 Bramhall, primate of Ireland, issued a proclamation against Papists, Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, and Quakers.

Bramhall had been made not only primate of Ireland but bishop of Armagh. With him five other bishops were chosen to fill the several sees of Ulster, one of the most important of whom was Jeremy Taylor, bishop of Down and Connor. Taylor took a very aggressive part in the persecution of the Ulster Presbyterians, and apparently he was not on all occasions such a saint as his writing about holy living and dying leads one to believe. Referring to Bramhall, Taylor, and the younger Leslie, Adair wrote: "There were not three such bishops in Ireland, the others generally laboring to engage and forbear ministers in their dioceses." Taylor was a man "pretending civility and courteous carriage, but whose principles were contrary to Presbyterianism. . . . . He had sucked in the dregs of Popery, Socinianism, and Arminianism and was at heart an enemy not only to non-conformists but to the orthodox."[14] Bramhall had been bishop of Derry once on a time and was remembered for his unrelenting persecution of dissenters. No good was to be expected of him.

A commission of three justices was appointed by the king for the temporary administration of affairs in Ireland. This royal commission now began to co-operate with the bishops to crush dissenters, to uproot the Presbyterian system, and install the Episcopal form of church government. Long before the notorious Clarendon Code was put into effect in England, orders came in the North of Ireland for the bishops to set up their liturgy, altars, and ecclesiastical courts, and for all Presbyterian meetings to cease. Stung by such high-handed measures and suspecting that their discharge was imminent, the Presbyterian ministers called a synod at Ballymena. Here they agreed to send four delegates to Dublin to expostulate with the secular authorities about the policy of suppression and to remind the royal commission of the promise made by the king. Scarcely had the synod adjourned when a troop of cavalry charged down on the place of meeting only to find an empty house.

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 245.

An account of the conference between the commission at Dublin and the Presbyterian delegation has been left by the Earl of Orrery, one of the three royal commissioners.[15] The delegates protested against prohibition of "unlawful assemblies," and against Presbyterians being classed with papists and fanatics. After a two-day session involving many debates, the royal commission gave its decision in five points as follows: (1) The law was to remain inflexible concerning the form of church government; (2) past offenses against the orders were to be pardoned, but not to be repeated; (3) an indulgence to Presbyterians would mean one to papists, a thing unthinkable; (4) exalting the Covenant was to be regarded as sedition; (5) only conformity to the religious settlement would secure immunity from the penalty of the law. To this decision the delegation replied "that as far as their consciences would permit them they would comply, and what it would not they would patiently suffer. That it was their religion to obey lawful authority (and such they owned his majesty was) either actively or passively. That if any of their own numbers preached sedition they disowned them; and if they had the exercising of their discipline they would severely punish all such."[16]

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[15] Roger, Earl of Orrery, *State Papers*, p. 15; see also Wright, *History of Ireland*, II, 131.

The bishops were now left with a free hand to deal with dissent in their respective dioceses. The first tilt was with Jeremy Taylor. The latter, hearing of the decision of the royal commission, at once summoned the ministers of his diocese to a visitation at Lisnegarvey. The ministers refused to appear before Bishop Taylor as individuals, insisting on corporate action and corporate responsibility. They refused to submit themselves to episcopal regimen and jurisdiction. They protested that this insubordination was limited to ecclesiastical government and modes of worship having nothing to do with loyalty to the king. Taylor requested them to submit the refusal in writing but they were unwilling so to commit themselves. He asked if they believed Presbyterian government to be by divine right (*jure divino*), and they answered in the affirmative. Not having recognized their corporate capacity by insisting that the ministers stood before the visitation as individuals, Taylor was met with refusal in his summons for them to appear the second day, and he charged them with contempt. But when he was convinced that they could not be intimidated, the bishop tried other tactics by offering preferments and other inducements if they would assent to the episcopal régime. He failed to turn them from their purpose by any means. Immediately after this episode, Taylor declared thirty-six churches vacant in his diocese, and the other bishops followed suit in theirs.[17] Thus Presbyterianism as a legal organization was ignored, the ordination of the ministers ipso facto dissolved, and economic support was denied them.

But to make matters worse, the Irish parliament that met in May, 1661, at Dublin proved an altogether reactionary body. Only one member of the Upper House had any sympathy with Presbyterianism. In the Commons a handful of Presbyterians from the North with the few Cromwellians that appeared could wield little power. Archbishop Bramhall was made chairman of the Lords, and Bishop Taylor preached the opening sermon. The Presbyterians were again ignored and discredited. An act was passed for burning the Solemn League and Covenant by the public executioner. The attempt was made even to punish all who had been preaching contrary to the established system. The situation looked dark for the men of the North.

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[16] Wright, *op. cit.*, II, 132.

[17] Sixty-one out of the seventy ministers of Ulster were ejected.

They were not, however, discouraged, but immediately took a third step to gain religious recognition. This was to petition the Parliament as they had the king and the royal commission for toleration and for immunity from the penalties of those laws from which their consciences recoiled. To this end three men, Hart, Hall, and Richardson, representing all the societies of the North, were sent to Dublin. In this petition they protested their conscientious subjection to the laws: "Either actively, wherein they found clearness, or passively, wherein they were of a different persuasion. . . . . They complained of their present usage by the bishops, and pleaded for liberty to preach the Gospel without any impositions to which they could not agree with peace to their consciences."[18]

When they attempted to present the petition they were coldly repulsed, and in spite of courageous persistence they were not received by the Parliament. This took away their hope, temporarily at least, for redress from the local authorities; yet they did not waver in the purpose of an ultimate triumphant resistance to the Episcopacy. They retired to their homes—if fortunate enough to have any—or lived on the charity of sympathizers. They now discouraged in their midst all attempts at direct action and any program that tended to irritate the civil authorities. They discountenanced the field preaching initiated by certain young men recently come from Scotland. They held their own meetings in secret "without noise or arousing the magistrates." They studiously adopted a policy of going slow and quietly, not for fear of deportation, but because they hoped ultimately to triumph by such methods.

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[18] Adair, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

In the meantime the royal commission had been succeeded in the administration of affairs in Ireland by a lord lieutenant, the Duke of Ormond, who arrived in July, 1662. Lord Massareene, their only friend and sympathizer in the Irish House of Lords, now urged that the Presbyterians appeal to the new official. At first they were reluctant to do so; but forced to do something because their enemies were becoming more and more aggressive, they finally sent three of their numbers with a petition to the Duke. It was almost like the petition previously put to the Parliament. This was late in 1662. For three months the delegation remained at Dublin amidst the red tape of court and council, and in the end were given little satisfaction. "After many fair promises the result was that they must live according to the law, and that they might serve God in their own families without gathering multitudes together."[19]

But they had been given a ray of hope, for in the negotiations the Duke of Ormond had made the significant statement that "they were unhappy who first suffered for the king and then suffered under the king, and that he thought it was just that what the king had promised them should be performed."[20] It was this promise of the king that put a check on the action of the suspicious, meddling Duke of Ormond toward the Presbyterians of the North of Ireland.[21]

IV. THE PLOT AND THE MUTINY

In the course of the next few years two serious incidents took place, menacing still more the position of the Ulster

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 268.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *State Papers*, Ireland, 1666, p. 251; 1663–65, p. 162; 1667, 484.

Protestants and bringing a renewal of persecution. The events were the mutiny at Carrickfergus and Blood's Plot. The attitude and action of the Presbyterian ministers under pressure of these circumstances again worked out to their good. Their behavior under these two trials brought them an indulgence in regard to the law against nonconformity. It brought for them also an immunity and a liberty enjoyed at a time when their coreligionists in England and Scotland were rigidly suppressed in the enjoyment of religious freedom.

Blood had been a cavalier in the army of Charles I, and he was also strongly anti-Catholic. Two years following the Restoration he was in Ireland, and by December, 1662, the plot was laid; but it was not executed until the next summer. The leader of this conspiracy was a man of no ordinary ability, of personal attractiveness, and genius for organization. Only the treachery of informers within his own party caused the plan to fail. Blood's landed interests near Dublin, his fear concerning a threatening Catholic reaction, and his promise to establish a religion favorable to the Covenant brought together several isolated groups to his support. He planned to seize the government, save Ireland from a Catholic reaction, and render secure the tenure of certain English landowners in Ireland.

He won over his brother-in-law, Mr. Lecky, who happened to be a Presbyterian minister. The two made a trip into Ulster with the express purpose of inducing the other ministers to support the project. The ministers at Ballybregh, in spite of Blood's protested loyalty to the king, discouraged him from expecting complicity by them in any way whatever. This was also the case at Lagan and Armagh; but eight ministers did join the plot.[22] The latter had no popular following.

Strengthened by the Cromwellian party in Munster, the plot deepened until a few impatient spirits in the movement precipitated matters by attacking the Castle of Dublin in

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[22] Carte, *Life of James, Duke of Ormond* (Oxford, 1851), IV, 135.

May, 1663, causing the plan to fail. Blood escaped, but Lecky and the other principal promoters were taken. The private papers of Blood were found and their reference to promoting the Covenant compromised the Presbyterians. A list of names found among these papers showed clearly just who were implicated in the plot. The documents revealed no complicity of the northern ministers as a whole, yet many of them were arrested and imprisoned. This action was taken on the grounds of pure suspicion and prevention. Thus Ormond, writing to the secretary, Bennett, in June, 1663, said: "It is evident that whilst some unconformably silenced ministers are permitted to live in the North, the people will never be brought to conformity, and will always be dangerous; and it is certain that, though it cannot be judicially proven, they [the ministers] were very active in the contrivance of the last design. I think this is ground enough for ordering them all under arrest."[23] The ministers of Antrim were brought to Carrickfergus, where they were placed under close guard. The ministers of Down were severely dealt with in their castle prison of Carlingsford. Seven of them were isolated in a narrow upstairs room where they would have starved but for the compassion of the attendants of the castle. For two weeks they were without bed, and they were fed only by charity. They knew nothing of the plot or why they were in custody.

With the herding of preachers into prisons came orders for disarming all the people of Ulster. This was another groundless act on the part of the Duke of Ormond, whose suspicions were driving him to wholly needless precautions. Yet the peaceful behavior of the people under this pressure and the attitude of tacit concurrence on the part of the ministers was about to win the Duke's confidence when, about a month after the arrest, in July, the news reached him about the visit of Blood and Lecky to the North just before the plot had been attempted. This again brought pressure to bear upon these ministers for a short time. Two of the three men that had been interviewed by Blood and Lecky were sent to Dublin under strong guard and kept in close confinement. But within six weeks they were again practically at liberty. Yet the Duke of Ormond, not willing to take any chances in regard to peace at the North, now gave all the ministers the choice between deportation or imprisonment in Ireland outside of Ulster.

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[23] *State Papers,* Ireland, 1663, p. 149.

All the leading ministers of Ulster, except two, chose exile. "The generality of the ministers of the North were either banished, imprisoned, or driven into corners upon occasion of a plot they knew nothing of, or wherein upon the narrowest scrutiny nothing could be found against them."[24] But their predicament was short lived. The suspicions of the Duke of Ormond led to a close scrutiny into the affairs of the North of Ireland. This, linked with the conduct of the people under the ordeal of disarming and the attitude of the ministers while in prison convinced Ormond of the loyalty of Ulster to the government at Dublin. The result was the granting of an indulgence which secured immunity for the Presbyterians in case of prosecution for nonconformity. This situation, coupled with the coming of a new primate who was lenient, made the position of the people of the North favorable for a time.[25]

This tranquillity was short lived, for a second event occurred that again set Ormond on guard as to affairs in Ulster. This was the mutiny at Carrickfergus. The matter in itself was trifling, local, and due to the back pay among the soldiers of the garrisons, yet it was magnified into a mountain of insurrection covering the whole country. In May, 1665, the garrison at Carrickfergus broke into mutiny, seized the money of the king's receiver, deposed the governor, and took possession of the town and castle. The mutineers were driven from the town into the castle on the following day by the Earl of Arran, Ormond's son, and on the next day the Duke himself appeared on the scene. Terms were immediately arranged with the leaders and the mutiny ended. Only four companies of soldiers had been involved, and there were in all not more than two hundred mutineers, but the location of the trouble with a number of troublesome complications is what brought Ormond so soon into the North. These complications were the Presbyterian situation in Ulster, an insurrection in Scotland just across the narrows, threatening war between England and France, and a plot revealed in England to rouse Ulster to revolt. "Carrickfergus is inhabited by many Scotch Presbyterians who may foment disorder."[26] "The insurrection in Scotland will no doubt animate all birds of that feather to Ireland."[27] "I shall be as watchful as I can over the North of Ireland, where there are as many disinclined as in the rebellion in Scotland."[28] He accordingly ordered the king's frigates from Dublin to the vicinity of the narrows between Scotland and Ireland. "Moore is now in Munster and is bound for Ulster to incite the Scots to rebellion."[29] Moore was one of the Moore-Ludlow plot hatched in Bristol to arouse Ulster. Ormond feared an invasion by France, whose hereditary ally was Scotland. If this invasion materialized, the loyalty of the North was questioned and Ireland was in grave danger. This accounts for the fear and precautions of the Duke of Ormond during the crisis at Carrickfergus.

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[24] Adair, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 282; *State Papers,* Ireland, 1663–65, 154.

The attitude and behavior of the Presbyterians in this crisis again proved them faithful to the local government. As a result a great change took place. The authorities at last began to realize that what the ministers did they did for conscience' sake, going about their work peaceably and painfully under many disadvantages. The policy of passive resistance triumphed in the end, and the Scotch-Irish of Ulster enjoyed a cessation from religious persecution at a time when the Clarendon Code was in full force in the rest of the British realm. In 1669 presbyteries with some limitations were set up in Ulster and public worship was allowed to be resumed unmolested by the civil authorities.[30] Thus writes Adair, "by 1668 they began in divers places to erect meeting houses, and there they met and performed all the ordinances in a public way. They had their monthly meetings among themselves in convenient private houses in the country, where they began to revive discipline, examining the carriage of one another, and bringing scandalous persons to acknowledge their scandals in some ordinary occasions before the sessions, and in the congregation itself; and in the greater scandals before the presbytery. In these things they did not find opposition present."[31]

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[26] Ormond to Arlington, *State Papers*, Ireland, 1666, p. 115.

[27] Orrery to Ormond, Wright, *op. cit.*, II, 148.

[28] Ormond to Arlington, *State Papers*, Ireland, 1666, p. 225.

[29] Orrery to Ormond, *ibid.*, 1665, p. 662.

A powerful factor that helped to bring tranquillity to the Presbyterians of Ireland was the attitude of the king, Charles II, toward them. He did not forget his promise made to the two delegates bearing the petition of the Ulster ministers. The interests of these men were upon his heart. In 1664 Lord Orrery wrote to Ormond as follows: "I had the honor of a long discourse with the king. . . . . I found him much intent on the settlement of Ireland, and extremely careful of his Protestant subjects."[32] Ormond, apologizing for drastic action in the deportation and imprisonment of the Presbyterian ministers on the occasion of Blood's Plot, "asks the king's pardon if his action is not approved. Would rather resort to such action at the risk of the king's disapproval than to have such fellows stay and plot."[33] Later he hinted that the king did disapprove of the exile.

The crowning act of the king's interest in these ministers, his confidence in, and his appreciation of, their loyalty came in 1672. In an interview with Sir Arthur Forbes the king inquired about the welfare of the Presbyterian ministers, stated that he had heard from time to time how they had suffered, and that he understood they were loyal and patient under persecution. On being assured that this was true, "The king of his own meer motion told Sir Arthur that there was twelve hundred pounds in the settlement revenue of Ireland which had not yet been disposed of, but designed for charitable use, and he knew not how to dispose of it better than by giving it to these ministers." On investigation, only six hundred pounds of this was available, but it was now paid in quarterly instalments to the ministers in the North of Ireland.[34]

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[30] Reid, *op. cit.*, II, 310.

[31] Adair, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

[32] *State Papers*, Ireland, 1664, p. 412.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

V. THE SPIRIT OF THE NORTH

Passive resistance of the Ulster Presbyterians had already been put to the test during the Commonwealth. In the period of the Restoration resistance was religious, while under the Commonwealth it was political. In the one the ministers were opposed to the prelacy but loyal to the government; in the other they were opposed to the Parliament but loyal to the Covenant. The Solemn League and Covenant had been drawn up with no intention of overthrowing the monarchy and revolutionizing the state. The latter movement was the work of Cromwell and the Independents. To the Irish Protestants, Cromwell had scrapped the Covenant in the overthrow of the king and the establishment of the Rump Parliament, and the Independents were a mere sectarian party that had usurped the political power. Cromwell had been a party to the Covenant, and the breach of faith on his part was deeply resented.

The Scotch-Irish thus regarded Charles II as having succeeded to the throne in 1649, prayed for him as their king, and preached this fact in their congregations. For a time they openly declared against Cromwell. Colonel Venables, local military commandant, at first acted toward them with leniency and tact, but he was gradually forced to draw in the reins. He finally insisted that they must cease to speak against the government or leave the country. When the ministers remonstrated and defended their position he arrested many of them and put them in prison. He soon gave them their liberty, however, but reminded them that they were now a conquered people under England and the parliamentary party. They replied that the Parliament was an unlawful one. And as a conquered people, they said, they would not resist the government actively, but they could yield to it only "passive obedience out of necessity."[35] Many were banished, but some that stayed traveled in their parishes disguised as countrymen persuading their people to constancy in faith and "reminded them of their lawful duty to their lawful magistrates, the King and the Parliament, in opposition to the usurpation of the times."[36]

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[34] Reid, *op. cit.*, II, 334.

It is evident from what has just been stated that these Ulster Scotch ministers were no mere religious fanatics, but men of deep and solemn convictions at one time religious and at another time political. They were bent on carrying out these convictions with a minimum of trouble-making and in the spirit of extreme deference to established authority. In their policy of passive resistance they performed the offices of the church as quietly as possible so as not to arouse the ire of the civil powers, who connived at their activities so long as public attention was kept down.

Usually some underlying principle was involved in refusing to conform to any measure or point they opposed. They bitterly antagonized the Clarendon Code, not as a political measure and not only because they abhorred prelacy, but because they had sworn in the Covenant not to recognize the established church. The inviolability of an oath was at stake. At times they showed great cleverness in vindicating a principle. In their bout with Bishop Jeremy Taylor when he refused to recognize them as a corporate group they practically refused to recognize his episcopal authority by failing to appear a second time before him in his visitation.

Nothing illustrates the moral fiber of these men better

[35] Adair, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

[36] *Ibid.*

than the behavior of Lecky after arrest for complicity in Blood's Plot. Family ties had led him into taking the step, but once caught in the meshes of the law, he showed a persistent integrity in what he deemed to be right. The College of Dublin, where he was a fellow, petitioned for his life. It was granted in case he conformed. Rather than compromise himself morally he chose to die. When he was promised a pardon in case he would implicate others who were guilty he also refused to purchase his life by playing false to a confidence. He was finally executed.

Neither the iniquity of the times, the usurpation of the bishops, the tyranny of the church courts, the general maladministration of affairs, nor even the good of the people could induce the other ministers to enter the plot. When Blood and Lecky expostulated about such things and proposed a plan for changing the situation, the ministers as a whole "were amazed at the folly, or knavery, or both, of these so despicable persons." They furthermore demanded that nothing more be uttered in their presence damaging to lawful authority, and said it would be a slander to their profession thus to plot in an unlawful manner in order to shun the trouble that God was sending them.

THE MEANING AND POSSIBILITIES OF *FORMGESCHICHTE*

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THE TERM *Formgeschichte* as applied to the New Testament has been in use for only a few years. Martin Dibelius[1] is responsible for originating the term; Erich Fascher[2] has sketched its history; and I myself have attempted its critical evaluation.[3] At present I shall endeavor to show what it aims to accomplish and to estimate its possibilities.

Since the term has arisen in connection with the critical study of the Gospels, and its application has for the most part been restricted to them, therefore for the sake of clearness it will be best for us to confine our attention to the Gospels, and, indeed, owing to the distinctive character of the Fourth Gospel, we shall give attention chiefly to the Synoptics. During a century and a half the study of the Synoptics, as the first three Gospels were called by Griesbach in 1771, made remarkable progress, and by about the year 1900 a substantial body of conclusions was available.[4] In the field of literary criticism one investigated the mutual relation of the Gospels to one another and to their sources, that is, to the written or the oral tradition which antedated the Synoptics. At the same time, and more especially in dependence upon the results of literary criticism, one investigated the trustworthiness of the contents of the Gospels. This study is known as historical criticism. In both fields of research scholars arrived at widely differing judgments on many points of detail. This result is certainly due in part to the fact that the materials for investigation are not of such a character as to make possible final answers to all of the problems involved. But one must not allow these differences of opinion on matters of detail to blind him to the fact that on the whole there was an astoundingly large measure of agreement in the results that were reached.

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[1] *Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums* (1919).

[2] *Die formgeschichtliche Methode* (1924).

[3] *Das formgeschichtliche Problem des Neuen Testamentes* (1927).

[4] A good survey of the status of the study at that time is given by P. W. Schmiedel in the article "Gospels" in the *Encyclopedia Biblica* (1901).

When today we critically scrutinize the work of these older investigators we are struck by the fact that on the whole they confined their research within very narrow limits and that they almost entirely ignored considerations that today have become for us very important. Particularly does one nowadays ask how the rise of the synoptic tradition in general is to be explained as a product of vital conditions within the primitive community. For it is an assured fact that the Gospels arose within the Christian community, say from about the year 30 to 95.[5] Today we detect with perfect ease evidences of the thinking, the language, and the theology of the community. One has only to read Mark 1:1–4 in order to perceive this fact. These four verses presuppose that the reader will understand, without a word of explanation, the meaning of the conceptions "Gospel of Jesus Christ," "the prophet Isaiah," "baptism of repentance," "forgiveness of sins," and what is meant by making the appearance of John the Baptist a fulfilment of a prophecy of Isaiah. That is, the reader must be familiar with the language and point of view of the community in order to understand the Gospel. It arose in the community and embodied the conceptions, the points of view, and the traditions of the group.

In consequence of this fact one may, on the other hand, derive from the Gospels information about the community—its emphases, its tendencies, and its interests. In 1906 I put forth, in opposition to Wellhausen and Jülicher, the proposition that the Gospel of Mark is an answer to the problems of the community.[6] Only when the Gospel is viewed in this way can one understand the puzzling fact that so much tradition about Jesus has been lost, while on the other hand a large number of traditions, which constitute the content of our Gospels, has been preserved. This paradoxical phenomenon is explained by the situation within the community. Its members expect the early return of Christ in glory. Hence they have scarcely any interest in portraying his earthly life. But the return of Christ is delayed, and more and more they find it necessary to shape their own life in accordance with gospel principles. Therefore they collect the traditions. They were tardy and almost too late in undertaking this task, but yet it may be said that they did their work sufficiently well to furnish a consistent and substantial picture of Jesus. The stories thus preserved are only a portion of the whole of the tradition, but fortunately for us they are a sufficient body of information.

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[5] This is the date of the Gospel of Luke, if acquaintance with Josephus is presupposed for this same author in the Book of Acts.

With the assembling of the tradition went also its transformation. On this point all modern scholars are agreed. It is only the extent of this transformation, not the fact of its occurrence, that remains in dispute. This is the problem that gives rise to the method of research called *Formgeschichte*. It aims to show how it came about that the community was in a position to pass on some of the traditions accurately, and what forces were operating within its life to effect the transformation of other traditions. In this connection the work of Bultmann[7] deserves first mention beside that of Dibelius. Bultmann's is a book of prodigious labor and of permanent significance. But really to understand *Formgeschichte* one must first glance at the method of Old Testament research, particularly as represented by Hermann Gunkel in his study of Genesis,[8] for there is no doubt that his method of research has exerted a decisive influence upon *Formgeschichte* as applied to the New Testament. Genesis 12:1 ff.; 20:1 ff.; and 26:1 ff. narrates three times with variations in detail a story of how a man in a foreign country incurs danger by disowning his wife and how he escapes the danger. Great as may be the variations in names, places, and other items, nevertheless each of the three stories is motivated by the same interest, and one may call each a little novel. Each is a short interesting account of how a man gets into an unusual situation and escapes; and just because it is a story with a *leitmotif,* and because the attention of the reader or hearer is focused much more upon the course of action for its own sake than upon the names and details in the narrative, the incident itself is held to be unhistorical. It is difficult to believe that the same event was repeated three times in such rapid succession. Also the narrator himself prized the story much more for its own sake than for its historical quality. In the field of Old Testament study there is now no hesitation in saying that particular types of narrative may be distinguished simply by their form, as an effective story with a fascinating motive, whether their content is historically real or defective. Thus *Formgeschichte* as a method of research proceeds to ascertain first the literary form of the account, and from this form to deduce conclusions as to its historical character. This procedure includes the aims both of literary and of historical criticism.

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[6] "Das Markusevangelium ist eine Antwort auf Gemeindeprobleme," *Schweizerische Theologische Zeitschrift*, XXIII (1906), 92.

[7] *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition* (1921).

The further question now is whether this method of research may properly be applied to the Gospels. Bultmann and Dibelius answer this question affirmatively, not on dogmatic grounds, but on the basis of purely objective considerations. We shall not present simply an exposition of the arguments of these two scholars; it will be preferable to treat the question directly on the basis of the original sources. Are there in the

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[8] *Genesis übersetzt und erklärt,* 3. Auflage (1910).

Gospels evidences of an interest in the form in which stories are told—the influence of *Formgeschichte?* In support of an affirmative answer we present the following examples:

1. Mark 4:1–8 narrates the parable of the sower. In three instances the seed yields no fruit. In the fourth it yields fruit, thirty fold, sixty fold, and a hundred fold. The story is wonderfully simple, but at the same time very effectively told. Interest increases to the very last word. Matthew narrates the same parable but inverts the numbers, a hundred, sixty, thirty. One has only to imagine narrating the parable, first in one form and then the other, to people who have never heard it before in order to perceive clearly the difference between the two accounts. Mark tells the story well; Matthew tells it badly. It is not difficult to decide which is the original. Usually the sayings and parables of Jesus are so very marked, by complete simplicity through their artistic form and practical value, that one must regard Mark as authentic and Matthew secondary. There is also an additional reason for the secondary character of Matthew. Narratives are not improved by their repetition, and made more perfect in form, but repetition easily results in a measure of carelessness in the form. Anyone can test this fact for himself who hears a story told repeatedly. In conformity to this principle, in Matthew the story appears in a degenerate form. And that such is the fate of tradition becomes especially clear in Luke, where the parable is simply abbreviated.

2. Mark 5:21–43 narrates the healing of the small daughter of Jairus. Mark 5:23 says: "My little daughter is at the point of death." Luke 8:42 says "She was dying"; and Matthew 9:18: "My daughter has just now died." These versions show degeneration in the form of the narrative, and are in fact a result of the tendency to heighten the effect. Jesus' act of healing is magnified if the girl is not only hopelessly sick, but lies a-dying, or, indeed, has just now died. The Gospels contain many such examples which we cannot cite in the present con-

nection. But it is important that we should make two observations. First, the reason for decadence in the form of the story can be perceived; and second, the type from which the process of decadence takes its start is the original and historical form. Later we shall lay especial emphasis upon this latter point.

3. In Mark 2:18–20 the disciples of John and the Pharisees ask Jesus why his disciples do not fast as the others do. In verse 19 Jesus answers them by adducing the messianic picture of the marriage feast. He is the bridegroom. While the bridegroom is present the festal ceremonies do not permit of fasting. Then follows in verse 20 the statement that when the bridegroom is removed then the time will return when one can fast. This verse is inappropriate in the present connection. The questioners do not wish to know how long one is to refrain from fasting, or when the practice is to be resumed, but they ask why the disciples of Jesus are not fasting at the present moment. Therefore verse 20 is to be explained as an insertion. The community in which the custom of fasting was again revived explains its action by citing a saying of Jesus authorizing and permitting his followers to resume the practice of fasting. This is again an example of degeneration in the form of tradition. To a genuine saying of Jesus, that is appropriate to his own situation where he is confronted by the fact that he and his companions do not fast, another saying entirely out of accord with his situation has been added. If verse 20 is taken to be authentic, then Jesus answers his questioners in a manner so entirely inappropriate that they could not possibly understand him. Again we are confronted by the fact that a saying of Jesus is handed down in corrupt form, and, indeed, in all three of the examples we have cited forces were operating in the community to bring about the degeneration of the literary form of the tradition. In the first example the change is due to carelessness which results from greater familiarity with the content of the tradition; in the second example it is due to a disposition to make Jesus' deed of healing seem as extraordi-

nary as possible; and in the third example the alteration is due to the community's attempt to justify its conduct by reference to an alleged saying of Jesus. Illustrations of this sort could be multiplied, and in future they will need to be systematically assembled and elucidated.

We now ask whether even whole sections of tradition, entire pericopes, arose independently as stories due to a *leitmotif*. I believe that even this question must be answered in the affirmative, as the following example will indicate.

Luke 2:41–52 narrates that Jesus, when twelve years of age, slipped away from his parents (verse 43!) and they found him in the temple sitting in the midst of the teachers of the law, listening to them, and asking and answering questions in such a manner that everybody was astounded at his understanding. When dealing with a story of this sort it is well to ask what its purpose is. The answer here cannot be in doubt. The whole paragraph aims to show how Jesus at the age of twelve has already become equal in wisdom, even superior, to the wise men of his day. What the narrator here desires to exhibit is the picture of Jesus the wise man.

When one follows up this *motif*, immediately a large number of parallels appear. Solomon, when visited by the Queen of Sheba, astounds her by his ability to answer all her questions (I Kings 10:3 ff.). Achikar, the wise scribe of Senacherib and Esarhaddon, instructs his sister's son so well that he answers all the King's questions.[9] Daniel is far superior in wisdom to all the other wise men at the court of Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. 1:20). Eleazar and his companions, who were to make the Septuagint, were able to answer all the King's questions "on the spur of the moment" (*Letter of Aristeas*, pp. 187 ff.). In all of these stories we are shown the superior wise man; it is a favorite type of the narrator's art among the Jews.

In the light of these parallels we are now in a position to understand the meaning of the paragraph in Luke 2:40 ff. It sets before us Jesus as the superior wise man. The story has been given its form in accordance with this purpose. We doubt whether this is a correct view of Jesus, whether he wished to be, and was, such a person. We doubt also whether the account is historical, for its purpose is clear and is scarcely convincing. That, however, is not our immediate concern. Rather, here the important thing to note about this story is that with the help of the parallels it is possible to show that a similar story with the same underlying idea has been told of many persons. It is always the case in these narratives that an idea, a specific way of thinking, gives the story its form. In the present instance it is the form itself that establishes the unhistorical character of the story.

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[9] Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C.* (1923), p. 220.

This is exactly the purpose of the method of research called *Formgeschichte*. It seeks, through the investigation of literary forms, to arrive at judgments regarding the historical value of tradition. This fact is perfectly clear in the work of Dibelius as well as in that of Bultmann. The keen ingenuity displayed by Dibelius in working out and demonstrating his idea of the paradigm and the novel will always be admired. The paradigm is a self-consistent, concise section of tradition which does not present a portrait of the persons mentioned but characterizes them only in so far as may be necessary for the action. This action always culminates in a saying of Jesus, and the saying is given added significance by the fact that in one or another way it is emphasized by the setting given it in the story. Examples of such paradigms "with very considerable purity" of form are the healing of the lame man in Mark 2:1 ff., the healing of the withered hand in Mark 3:1 ff., the blessing of the children in Mark 10:13 ff., etc. Dibelius distinguishes between the paradigm and the novel. The novel is a story that goes more into detail because it is inspired by the pure joy of narration. It lacks the motives of edification; one cannot so preach from a novel as to find a text in a saying of Jesus to which it leads, for there is no such saying. "The novel treats of Jesus the thaumaturgist." Illustrative examples from Mark are the storm on the sea (4:35–41), the healing of Jairus' daughter, and the woman with the issue of blood (5:21–43), and the walking on the water (6:45–52), and similar occurrences.

In the classification of the two definite and mutually distinct types of narrative indicated before, Dibelius has undoubtedly succeeded better than any of his predecessors in distinguishing these types from one another and in fixing their characteristics. In this he has rendered a permanent service. But immediately a serious objection arises. What, we ask, becomes of the Gospel of Mark as a whole when by the procedure of Dibelius it is resolved into such units. Not that we have any objection if the entire Gospel is split up into component parts. That is necessary for the attainment of clarity, and we have ourselves undertaken the task in previous years. But the question is whether Dibelius has displayed a sufficient variety of interests to enable him to classify according to their form all the units that emerge with the dissolution of Mark. It is impossible to state explicitly the opinion of Dibelius himself, since he has not yet made his conclusions public, but has restricted himself to the consideration of those sections of the Gospel best suited to demonstrate his hypothesis. But proof of the larger question may properly be demanded. Also it is true that even when one employs other types of literary form, such as exhortation (paränesis) and myth in addition to the paradigm and the novel, a considerable number of Markan parts remains which cannot be fitted into the scheme of Dibelius. What is to be done with these remaining parts of Mark?

Dibelius has placed us all greatly in his debt, not only on account of the specific types of literary form which he has distinguished, but because he has told us very plainly the necessity and the method for judging of their historical trustworthiness. In the first place he is very distinctly of the opinion that a conclusion regarding even the truthworthiness of the tradition about Jesus may be, indeed should be, deduced from the literary form in which it has survived. According to Dibelius, the paradigm is on the whole the most historically reliable, although even in the paradigm words which he never uttered may be placed in the mouth of Jesus. The novel is historically much less dependable. It is in part an expansion of the paradigm. Also it is partly a growth about a nucleus borrowed from Old Testament narratives or from Greek stories. Finally, the narrators sometimes superimpose on Jesus "entirely foreign stories, or at least foreign materials." Mark 5:1–20 may be cited as an example. Dibelius calls this passage the novel "about the demoniac and the swine." But one may certainly question whether this is an appropriate title for the Markan narrative.

It has been noted that for Dibelius the question of literary form and of historical trustworthiness always go together. This is a very important matter. Is it a fact?

When we pointed out before that since Gunkel's work on Genesis appeared students have learned to recognize stories with a *motif* in the Old Testament, we purposely chose an example the trustworthiness of which many persons are disposed to surrender at the very start. The same attitude prevails in the case of stories whose *motif* is the figure of the superior wise man, which one finds in the account about Solomon, Achikar, Eleazar and his companions, Daniel, and Jesus in the temple when twelve years old. Even in the incident about Jesus the trustworthiness of the story is much disputed. But what is the situation with respect to the main body of gospel tradition?

To start with, we take for granted the fact of the life and teaching of Jesus.[10] At present we shall not consider the possibility, suggested by Bultmann in his last book,[11] that Jesus is not really the author of the teaching passed on to us as his in the Gospels. These words in Bultmann's book seem to spring from a purely theoretical consideration which he himself does not take seriously. They are more an expression of "German thoroughness" than a statement of his personal opinion. As we have said before, we take for granted the fact of the life and teaching of Jesus. Further, we assume that the community was interested to derive norms for its practical living from its recollections of Jesus. To be sure, it took up this activity only tardily, because at first it expected the early end of the world, and on that account it had no interest in organizing an earthly society in accordance with the teaching of Jesus. When the community proceeded to seek guidance from recollections regarding Jesus the age of the unwritten gospel began. If a member of the group wished to know how he as a Christian should conduct himself on the Sabbath or in relation to the fast he betook himself to an apostle or to someone else who had been with Jesus and who said: "I recollect that the Lord once said or did so and so." In this way the fading recollections of the eyewitnesses became the common possession of the Christian church. Thus arose the traditions out of which our Gospels were composed. The diversities that appear in our Gospels are to be explained in large part from the fact that the traditions were narrated differently by the eyewitnesses or were understood differently by their hearers who repeated them to others. At the very outset one must assume a tendency in the community to effect a transformation in these traditions. It is possible to point out specific instances of this tendency. This is illustrated in the case of the question about fasting (Mark 2:18–20). The primitive Christian community composed of Jews, living in a Jewish environment and imbued with leanings toward Jewish customs, resumed the practice of fasting. Therefore they added to the genuine sayings of Jesus about fasting a supplement to meet their situation, or rather their inclinations.

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[10] The whole question has been admirably treated in Professor Case's book, *The Historicity of Jesus*, to which I should like to refer for all further information.

[11] *Jesus*, p. 17.

This is the place where the point of view represented by

Formgeschichte must make its contribution to a study of the Gospels.

The question, then, is whether or not the traditions are so elastic as to permit them to be classified simply and unconditionally according to specific forms. Dibelius is compelled to answer this question in the affirmative, for he indeed assumes that there are paradigms, novels, myths, and *paräneses* that must be sharply distinguished purely on the basis of their form. It is true, we have already noted, that by this classification he does not take account of even all the material in Mark alone, but his forms explain only a selection of passages. But in the passages selected, the urge to produce specific forms operates without restraint, at least according to Dibelius.

We, on the other hand, question whether the interest to produce specific literary forms in the handling of tradition did have free play. A pure form is possible only where the narrator is not hampered by tradition. That fact may be easily corroborated by a glance at the novels which the literature of any modern people contains. Novels, "the narration of hitherto unreported occurrences," are pure in form only where the author freely shapes the story according to his own tastes. Novels are not pure in form, but show distorted lines, lack of harmony in details, overlapping of motives, abbreviations, or other derangements where the author uses traditional materials over which he does not possess complete control. A careful analysis of the gospel narratives will everywhere show that these narratives appear in impure forms. Already we have referred to the fact that Dibelius calls the section in Mark 5:1–20 the novel "about the demoniac and the swine." This designation is ingenious, but it is not justified by the content of the passage. This title shifts the emphasis from the point that was of importance for the narrator to an insignificant subordinate feature. Rather, Mark 5:1–20 tells how Jesus heals a demoniac and permits the demon to enter the swine. If one chooses, as Volkmar and Wellhausen have done, but with whom I do not agree, to regard the story as unhistorical, then one may entitle it "how a demoniac is healed and his demon sent into the swine." That repeats what the story itself narrates and the purpose for which it is told. But the designation chosen by Dibelius does not render correctly the sense of the passage. This is not an insignificant matter, for it is a pervasive feature of Dibelius' method. He entitles Mark 7:32–37 "the deaf mute," but it must be called "a deaf mute is healed by Jesus." He entitles Mark 9:14–29 "the epileptic boy," but it must be called "an epileptic boy is healed by Jesus." In other words, Dibelius shifts the stress of the narratives from the point on which the evangelists place it to another which makes the story appear to be a novel. In other words, the emphasis is transformed from the point where the traditional value of the narrative becomes clear, to the point where interest in the novelistic form presses into the foreground. The gospel accounts as they now stand are not at all dominated by the norm of literary forms, as Dibelius argues. They are not so dominated because the interest in literary form always began to operate with a given tradition, and because, as we have shown, where traditional material is subjected to the interest in literary form, this interest cannot operate with full power and freedom since the tradition itself allows such an interest to make itself effective only within very restricted limits.

Two different conclusions are to be drawn. First, the method of study represented by *Formgeschichte* is indeed one which promises some results, and its use is to be heartily commended. We shall be permanently obligated to Dibelius for opening our eyes to this matter, and on account of this great debt I am sorry to have to criticize his work. Second, the method of *Formgeschichte* is not an effective technique for the work of historical criticism. This must always be concerned more with the inner character of a tradition, the possibility of its transformation through the inclinations or adaptations of the community preserving the tradition, and its agreement with other traditions already shown to be genuine and trustworthy.

BOOK REVIEWS

AN EVALUATION OF THE PAST

We have here[1] a loose commentary upon what the world at large has done to one mind—not merely the world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. What this mind has in turn done to the world is written in volumes well known and highly praised by contemporaries. Having surveyed through many fruitful years the ideals of the ancient world and followed through many more scholarly years the motifs of the medieval mind, Henry Osborn Taylor comes at the end of his days to pass judgment upon the whole work of man. "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter," his title seems to say; and, in spite of the complex orientation of his answer, it does not differ greatly from the way the other wise man concluded his synthetic judgment upon life: "Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man." It would, however, take a very religious person indeed not to feel regarding our present author, as so many have felt regarding the Hebrew counterpart, that the rich way they each lived life is more worthy of emulation than any moral lesson they jointly deduce from a retrospect.

It was indeed the diversity of life that staggered both of them and that produced in each of them a simplification at the end. Not that our wise man now under review imitated Solomon in complicating his own life through such generous marital distraction. Though he does cry out near the end of the book, "Blessed be sex," he blesses our monogamous conventions and sets the greatest stead by marital loyalty. Taylor's diversity takes a far more intellectual form than did that of Solomon. Impressed in early years evidently by the then prevailing "faculty" psychology, Taylor returns again and again in these retrospections to the disparity between feeling, intuition, reason, etc. Insistently feeling, however, that these human capabilities are somehow at bottom one, or at least that they point to a oneness, he follows human talent through the fields that seem to have resulted more or less from these separate functions—through science, through philosophy, through religion, through art, through action—to insist in a closing chapter that life is a whole, however unable the commentator confesses himself adequately to synthesize the factors that go to make it up.

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[1] *Human Values and Verities.* By Henry Osborn Taylor. New York: Macmillan, 1928. xi+282 pages.

Postponing for a further moment a consideration of his eventual "validities," the "values" of his title are identified with "human functionings." There is little lust for a discovery of severely objective values; the fruits of activity here and now are sufficient to make life what it is and to give it a rich store of meaning. It is a tribute to our age that a man who has lived beyond the three score years and ten should still emphasize human functions as values and the active life conceived as a whole as the goal of man. Religion apart, this our present author seems consistently to do.

Each of the major functionings of human life has its own validities. Science is an intellectual quest, as also is philosophy with a slightly different approach and interest. Religion springs from feeling, but aspires to verities; and while reason cannot finally certify to the objective validation of religious aspiration, the hope still lingers unashamed, and indeed flowers into faith that an objective validation awaits the good man. The treatment of art, and particularly of poetry, which is emphasized, is more alive and challenging than any other section of the book. One suspects that poetic appreciation has meant more to the author than religious affirmation, though the author seems to think differently. One wonders, indeed, whether the author in another *Zeitgeist* might not have found his nature adequately satisfied by art and action instead of, as here, seeking in vaguer fields for the final fruits of faith.

There is nothing dogmatic about the author's final validities. His convictions are urbane and mellow and tolerant. But also they are usually obscure—not, I think, because they attempt to deal with final things, but because of the predilection for organizing the discussion around faculties and banking issues up with discursive historical reminiscences. Instead of taking the material of life as it comes and calling it the name of the moment, and thus keeping the whole upon some common-sense level, the author has a conceptualistic terminology that makes seem vague to another what may be simple enough to his own mind. He consciously struggles with this problem and attributes the difficulty to the material; but religion apart—where he admits that at times he does not know what he is talking about—the difficulty seems to lie elsewhere than in the material. The narrative is most meaningful and beautiful and forcible where it becomes most concrete. But it moves generally in terms of intellectual history rather than of biographical. The book is in fact not a great biography, even of the inner sort; for it does not succeed in getting extraverted the heart of the material of life. It displays rather the fringe of the author's life in its preoccupation with intellectual imagery. But it is well balanced and hopeful of the civilization that has produced it. Its swing from a reaction against one extreme, wholehearted and exclusive acceptance of science ("neither its field nor its method permits the employment of all the faculties by which men grasp what is true and good for them," p. 120), to another extreme, a hearty acceptance of religious faith ("God's love taken, life is cut off at the source," p. 182), leaves inadequately exploited the great plains of life ("ethics is a stupid science," p. 182). Reflecting upon one generation from the point of view and for the sake of another, I hazard the guess that when men set themselves the task of seeing how little faith (in the sense here connoted) they can get along upon instead of how much faith they can achieve, they may find that life profits more from the easy-going minimum than from the poignantly won maximum.

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MYSTICISM IN INDIA

The mystic experience is receiving an unusual amount of attention in modern religious literature. There was a time when church and theologian merely tolerated the mystic; but that was when the paths to the supernatural world were all open and clear. There was no need to seek proof of the reality of God from any such obscure source. The case is very different today. The guaranties of the past—church, Scripture, innate ideas, the experience of Christ, reason—have all been challenged in their claims as revelators of reality. The intuitive, mystic experience now takes up the rôle of guarantor of the invisible, supersensible realm of God.

Whatever else the mystic experience may be, its essential quality is that it gives a complete assurance of direct union with the ultimate nature of reality. Moreover, it is peculiarly personal, and, to the experiencer, altogether beyond challenge. By its very nature it seems to transcend reason and intellectual analysis. It is beyond description. Ideas have no status in this realm. It is claimed that in the vague aura of the area of mystic illumination the prying eyes of science are blind. The mystic is sure of one thing: that here all veils are lifted and God, or Reality, or It, or the ultimate meaning of Being is experienced in truth and fulness. During the last two decades the students of religion have been investigating or exploiting this claim.

India has held rank in the Western World as the land of mysticism par excellence. A study of the varied embodiments of the mystical experience with their contrasting interpretations and of the phases of the mystic technique in India gives an insight into the nature of mysticism obtainable in no other way. It is especially opportune, therefore, to have the story of the development of mysticism in Hinduism presented by one of her own prominent professors of philosophy. Dr. Dasgupta[1] is interested in sympathetic, historical description. He does not enter into psychological analysis or explanation. Religion for him is "a personal relationship with some divine or transcendent Person to whom we submit or to whom we pray for material advantages or for spiritual or moral enlightenment." He defines mysticism as "a theory, doctrine, or view that considers reason to be incapable of discovering or of realizing the nature of ultimate truth, whatever be the nature of this ultimate truth, but at the same time believes in the certitude of some other means of arriving at it." He then describes the various types of Indian mysticism, more than half of which do not aim at union with a "divine or transcendent Person," but deal with an Ultimate indescribable in terms of personality which seems to leave a large area of mysticism outside of his definition of religion. If he had dealt with the mysticism of the Sankhya, the Jains, and the Realist school, this anomaly would have been accentuated. The difficulty is probably in the definition of religion.

The presentation of the historic stages of the mystic development is simply and beautifully done. It is a masterly handling of an infinitely complex theme. There are shown the sacrificial mysticism which reduced the old gods to automata and invested the sacrificial ritual and the Vedic mantras with cosmic potency; the development of this into meditation sacrifices which had the same effective power; the mysticism of the Upanishads, which leads to the super-conscious experience beyond words or understanding by conceptual thought; the Yoga mysticism, which sought to realize the truth of the Atman, one or many, "pure, contentless consciousness, altogether different from what we understand by idea, knowledge, or thought"; the Buddhist mysticism, which sought to experience the bliss of the Nirvana state, an essenceless state of vacuity, superconscious and yet a state of bliss; the devotional mysticism in its classical and popular forms, which aimed at the identification of the self with the Supreme Lord by *bhakti*.

There is much material here for the student of mysticism, especially in the study of the methods of realization. Dr. Dasgupta is insistent upon the necessity of severe moral living as a preliminary requirement laid down by all the schools. The interpretation of Yoga technique may lead the reader to the author's more detailed work, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion.* The variety of methods is a significant element—*tapas,* the different modes of meditation, and the many forms of *bhakti.* The psychologist has here his task. The truths the mystics report are as varied as their social milieu; the experience is one; the means of attaining to it, many. That there is no revelation of new knowledge is clear. The experience is one of assurance, of joy, of at-homeness in the universe, an experience beyond the routine of the phenomenal world, beyond the senses, beyond mind and reason, beyond the play of ideas. That the mystic should interpret the experience in terms of the thought-forms with which he is familiar is inevitable. The author leaves the explanation to others.

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[1] *Hindu Mysticism.* By S. N. Dasgupta. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1927. xx+168 pages. $2.00.

Perhaps there is no simple explanation. The forms of Yoga technique point to autohypnosis. The *bhakti* technique seems to be a subtle form of sublimation. Perhaps there is still a deeper thing, a physiological return to the unconscious memories of the ages, a kind of naturalistic feel of the unfettered freedom of the dance of life. The mystics themselves cannot explain; they report. While the experience is said to be ineffable, and therefore should remain as impossible of communication as the sheerest agnosticism, it is never so. The mystics always tell; and what they tell is what the mystic experience was not needed to teach—just the doctrine learned by them in the mundane world. When that doctrine is shown to be local, ephemeral, and defective, the report of the mystic is not enough to transform it into eternal truth for others. But if the mystic does not or cannot report we have an emotional agnosticism, and the mystic technique becomes merely a means of intrenching traditional religious dogma.

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EGYPTIAN LITERATURE

A comprehensive popular treatise on ancient Egyptian literature[1] has been written by a capable Egyptologist who is likewise familiar with comparative literature. His chronological treatment in combination with comparisons from corresponding stages of other literatures brings out many fresh viewpoints in the Egyptian field. Most striking throughout are the author's contributions on the side of technique. His interest in the development of literary form overshadows, indeed, his attention to historical and social forces. Though these are duly mentioned, one misses in the discussion of the Tale of the Eloquent Peasant, for example, the struggle for social justice so sympathetically brought out by Breasted. To Dr. Pieper the point of the tale is merely that uncultured people, too, may have the gift of eloquence. In any case, this tale is not among those which reveal the personality that inspired them; and, as is truly said (p. 53), "the awakening of personality produced the great progress in Egyptian literature."

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[1] *Die ägyptische Literatur.* By Max Pieper. Wildpark-Potsdam: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion m. b. H., 1927. 102 pages; 4 plates; illus. M.10.

Analysis of form disproves some opinions earlier held by Erman and other leading scholars. Thus the Tale of the Shipwrecked Sailor, preserved apparently complete, begins abnormally for either a cycle of stories or an independent tale. The author seems justified in his belief that it really is independent. As he suggests, something omitted before the text as we know it, without any change in the latter, would suffice to normalize it. It should be explained how easily such omission might occur. Only one manuscript of this tale is known. If the beginning of the roll from which it was copied were damaged or missing, we know from other documents that the Egyptian scribe was perfectly capable of leaving an unexplained blank.

A Cairo hymn to Amon has in accordance with recent research been dated before the famous Amarna movement. That earlier eighteenth-dynasty hymn, wherein Amon appears as creator of all nature, proves to have furnished a direct background for the thoughts which King Ikhnaton was destined to express so wonderfully. The monotheism revealed in Ikhnaton's hymns to his god Aton, the sun disk, is definitely implied in this preceding conception of Amon-Re. Similar thoughts on God in nature, again with a suggestion of monotheism (the reviewer would prefer to say henotheism), are noted already in the tenth-dynasty Instructions for King Merikere. The idea of a supreme deity, "the great god," may, indeed, be carried back to the Old Kingdom (cf. p. 20), and (contrary to the author) may perhaps be connected even then with moral responsibility.[2]

Lapse of time between writing and printing accounts undoubtedly for omission of references to Gardiner's masterly *Egyptian Grammar* of 1927 (p. 6), to excavations around the step pyramid at Sakkara which have completely changed our ideas of third-dynasty art (pp. 7, 21), and to the excavations at Jebeil (ancient Byblos), which prove how strongly Egyptian influence was intrenched in Syria during the Middle Kingdom (p. 46). The steady progress of Egyptology is evidenced by such inevitable gaps. Students of either literature or religion can only be grateful to Dr. Pieper for his methodical contribution in so many-sided a field as Egyptian literature.

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[2] So Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought*, p. 170. But uncertainty enters because the term "great god" was applied, not only to the deity, but sometimes to Old Kingdom pharaohs, living as well as dead (Erman und Grapow, *Wörterbuch der ägyptischen Sprache*, II, 361).

T. George Allen

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THE HEBREW FAMILY

From time to time treatises on various phases of biblical sociology have appeared, but in most cases the authors have been specialists in only one field, either in sociology alone or in the Bible alone. Very few have been at home in both fields, and of these Professor Cross is one.[1] He writes both as a trained sociologist and a biblical exegete, and his book accordingly carries weight, as many of its kind do not. He has made a real contribution to our understanding of social development by his study of the changing status of the family with the Hebrews, and with his sociological approach he has cleared up certain difficulties in the Old Testament field. His plan has been to begin with the Hebrew family in its earliest form, manifestly the matronymic, and trace its development through the patronymic to the beginning of an improvement of woman's position toward the end of the Old Testament period. The book is well written and makes easy reading. At the end of each chapter is a summary, and the last chapter indicates how the study is pertinent to the question of the family today.

Here and there the author's statements need to be modified, but in only one instance does this at all affect his position. In Deut. 21:17 he follows the ordinary interpretation of the passage that the first-born son was to inherit a double share of his father's estate, but Ehrlich is clearly right in interpreting this as two-thirds. A few other points in no way affecting his thesis may be noted. "Bethuel" may very well mean "daughter of God," but the *u* vowel here is not the old genitive ending (p. 33), Gesenius and the other grammarians to the contrary, for the very good reason that it is not attached to the proper word to be a case ending. It is rather a helping vowel, which is fairly common in Hebrew and quite characteristic of Babylonian. On page 82 Amraphel is identified with

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[1] *The Hebrew Family.* By Earle B. Cross. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. 217 pages. $2.50.

Hammurabi, but this identification has now been quite generally abandoned by modern scholars. Josh. 5:2 (pp. 107f.) is not to be translated "Circumcise again the children of Israel the second time," but "Have another circumcision for the Israelites." In his translations the author has followed the accepted versions, making such corrections as he thought necessary. In a modern book it would have been better if he had made his own translations. On page 63, line 20, a word like "express" has fallen out, and on page 66 the date of the deportation of Israel should be 721 B.C., rather than 723. One other criticism may be noted: the book is too expensive for a volume of its character; but this was doubtless a matter over which the author had no control.

THEOPHILE J. MEEK

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS

No trend in recent Old Testament scholarship has been more truly helpful than the adoption of what might perhaps be called an "objective," in contrast to the older "subjective," view of Hebrew religion, ethics, and history. For centuries the normal interpretation of the Old Testament was as a record of a unique and unparalleled process of divine revelation, wherein the Hebrews were set off from their neighbors by the most definite lines of demarcation. Such occasional glances as the student might cast toward other peoples contemporary with Israel were critical, often contemptuous, usually denunciatory. On the one hand was Jehovah; on the other were the gods of the nations, for whose description no language could be too severe. Here the Chosen People; there the Goyyim, the nations. Within, the light of divine revelation, monotheism, ethics, prophecy; without, the blackness of heathen darkness, polytheism, immorality. The genius and achievements of Israel were regarded as her unique possession, neither derived from nor shared by other peoples round about.

When the day came for a new evaluation of the Old Testament there was the inevitable swing to extreme positions. Israel was denied any creative capacity; she appeared merely as a borrower of religious and ethical ideas, a plagiarist without literary conscience, a medium through whom the marvelous achievements of various great peoples had become conveniently accessible somewhat in advance of the rise of historical criticism. Dr. J. M. Powis Smith, in his story of Old Testament interpretation in the last quarter-century,[1] reminds us of the brilliant but untenable hypotheses of Cheyne, Winckler, Clay, and Delitzsch, which submerged Israel completely in her environment.

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[1] *Journal of Religion*, VI (July, 1926), 403.

The *via media* now being followed by Old Testament scholarship, examining dispassionately data from every available source, is achieving a truer evaluation of this important book. That the Old Testament contains borrowed materials is abundantly proved; but we have today a renewed and clearer vision of that unique spiritual consciousness of Israel which purified and refined those materials till they became marvelously transformed. "We are more sure today than ever before that Israel's life was closely interwoven with that of the surrounding peoples and that they borrowed freely from the neighboring civilizations. Not only Babylon and Egypt, but also the Hittites contributed much to the content of Hebrew thought and life. The scholars of tomorrow will find more Babylonian, and still more Egyptian, goods in the Hebrew market than we have as yet thought of. The merit of Israel was not so much in its power to create things *ex nihilo*, but rather in its wonderful ability to transform and enrich things it received from the hands of other peoples."[2]

The very titles of two recent books[3] express this newer viewpoint of the distinctiveness of Israel within the great Semitic family of nations of which she was so truly a part. The contents of both books, however, illustrate the difficulties awaiting the writer ambitious to compress three millenia of crowded history within a hundred-odd pages of text. He cannot possibly present a fair picture of the great Near Eastern civilizations; he cannot offer data or arguments, but must make unequivocal statements or protect himself by "perhaps" or "probably." If Israel is to have any personality at all in so brief a treatment of world-affairs, it must be through a discussion out of all true proportion to her actual historical significance.

Mr. Blunt's book is companion to another volume of his in the same series entitled *Israel before Christ*, which deals with the social and religious development of Israel. It is a strange arrangement which has thus divorced the "historical" side of Hebrew life from its "social and religious" side. No conclusion of the modern school is of greater importance than that which shows the constant play and interplay between "external relations" and "internal development." From this viewpoint the place for a discussion of Deutero-Isaiah, for example, would have been in the same volume with, and alongside of, the references to Cyrus; but not a mention is made of the great unnamed prophet. Surely this is no true representation of "Israel in World Affairs"? If publishing requirements compel a division of materials, it would be preferable, in the writer's opinion, to make a horizontal division at perhaps the Exile, rather than a vertical division that cuts the most vital cords within Hebrew life. It is also not easy to understand why the Sumerians have been treated in so cavalier a style, with a brief mention that implies grave doubts as to their having left any legacy to their Semitic heirs. There is a real need for a bibliography which might enlighten the reader at occasional points where compression tends to mystify. Such minor defects, however, do not detract seriously from the value of this excellent handbook, which may be confidently recommended to those who wish to locate Israel within the great framework of international affairs which so largely determined her destiny.

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[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 415, 419, 423.

[3] *Israel in World History*. By A. W. F. Blunt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. 127 pages. $1.00.

Israel among the Nations. By Norman H. Baynes. London: Student Christian Movement, 1927. 171 pages + extensive bibliography and notes, etc., 154 pages. 5*s*.

Mr. Baynes does not provide the maps, illustrations, and convenient analytical form which make the book just discussed so attractive; but he furnishes a useful classified bibliography, and especially a lengthy compendium of notes on the questions raised in the text. This method enables him to present a convenient survey of international affairs supplemented by more technical discussions of the many points still at issue. He has succeeded rather well in weaving the phases of national and international life, with the slowly emerging religious and ethical ideas of the Hebrews. In a more attractive physical form, his book might well achieve real usefulness in college survey classes.

In distinct contrast to the two preceding works stands the latest volume by Professor Purinton.[4] His Preface makes clear his objective and methods: "If this book can claim any distinction, it is to be found in what it omits as well as in what it contains. It leaves out long descriptions of ancient wars and the pageantry of royal courts and exalts those factors in Israel's history which made for progress in all the higher realms of human life." From the standpoint of the present reviewer such a treatment can scarcely hope to indicate the true nature of the achievement of Israel. That achievement is intelligible only in the light of the fullest possible knowledge of Hebrew environment. There are references, it is true, to parallel events in the outer world; but they are relatively casual, and rarely succeed in setting Israel in its true political position. Thus on page 106 he says: "This new document (i.e., the Gadd tablet relating to the Fall of Nineveh) reminds us that we may anticipate much new light on ancient history from the inscriptions in Babylonia, Egypt, and Palestine, and that some of this new information will affect our understanding of the Bible." Much useful information, attractively presented, is provided for the student of the "inner development of Israel," but no class should utilize this book without having at hand some supplementary source of information regarding the outer world.

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[4] *The Achievement of Israel.* By Herbert R. Purinton. New York: Scribner's, 1927. viii+218 pages. $1.25.

FRANK GARRETT WARD

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OLD TESTAMENT PAPYRI

The University of Michigan Humanistic Series is further enriched by the publication of studies of two important papyrus texts:[1] the minor prophets in the Freer collection, discussed by Professor Sanders, and the Berlin fragment of Genesis, discussed by Professor Carl Schmidt and Professor Sanders. The volume, uniformly with others of the series, is excellently prepared, the texts published in full, with ample notes. The several facsimiles not only enhance the value of the book for its primary purpose, but, especially in the case of the prophets, afford materials for paleographical study.

Professor Sanders finds the papyrus of the minor prophets to have been a codex, of a date before 270. It is therefore pre-Hexaplaric. The text frequently inclines toward the Hebrew in distinction from many of the manuscripts of the LXX; it is an important supplement to existing textual materials. A careful study of characteristic readings leads Professor Sanders to the conclusion that the text is of a type coming from the upper Nile or the Fayum, closely affiliated with the Achmimic version. It is thought that there is some influence of Aquila and Symmachus in it, but little or none of Theodotion.

The data supplied by this papyrus thus appear to complicate the problems of the textual history of the LXX. Further progress must be in the discovery of manuscript grouping, so that the pre-Hexaplaric manuscripts may be divided into their subclasses, and the LXX text ultimately restored from them.

The Berlin Genesis has been known since 1906, but its publication and thorough study have been delayed by the war and subsequent developments. It is a happy bit of co-operation that it is thus associated with the University of Michigan studies.

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[1] *The Minor Prophets in the Freer Collection and the Berlin Fragment of Genesis.* By Henry A. Sanders and Carl Schmidt. New York: Macmillan, 1927. xiii+436 pages.

This manuscript, cited as 911 in the lists of Rahlfs, is the oldest witness to the LXX text of Genesis. It also was in codex form, written in a very ancient style. As in the case of the papyrus of the minor prophets, there are many various readings which are easiest explained as retranslations or adaptations to the Hebrew. Again, there is exhibited independence of the Hexapla. The textual relations of the manuscript seem to be with certain groupings of minuscles rather than with the uncials, and among the versions with the Armenian, Bohairic, and Ethiopic.

The study of the readings of these manuscripts as reported in the Notes clearly demonstrates the importance of their evidence for the early LXX text. The use which shall be made of the evidence will add to the debt already owing the editors and the series.

D. W. Riddle

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EVOLUTION IN JUDAISM

Successive generations need different religious attitudes or at least different emphases. Although God is changeless and eternal, man is variable and ephemeral. Therefore if a religion lives long enough it will surely change. Its ritual will be modified, and even its doctrines will show radical variations. The religions which have not changed have died.

Although change is inevitable in every long-lived religion, there is hardly an official church which will freely admit that fact. Since religions deal with eternities, they prefer to appear eternal and unchanging. Therefore when history brings the inevitable changes they will either be pushed back into the unconscious, or else they will be tacitly taken for granted. In their conscious and public utterances the historic religions will always describe themselves as *sic semper et ubique*.

Judaism has endured for millenia and has participated in many of the great changes in the religious thought of the world. Yet in spite of all its long development, classical Judaism still utters the words: "Thou shalt not add thereto nor diminish from it," and "God will not alter nor change His Law." Notwithstanding this claim to changelessness, the oral law has existed beside the unvarying written law and has been the vehicle of constant change. It has "added and diminished"; it has suppressed and expanded according to the needs of the generations. But in order to maintain its sense of unity with the past, Judaism has always insisted that all the changes brought about by the oral law were always implied in the written law, so that what occurred was not a real change but merely an amplification of what already was stated in the Torah.

The masters of the oral law, the rabbis, constantly adjusted law to life. Were they conscious of their own daring? If they were conscious of it, were they satisfied with their often far-fetched exegesis whereby a biblical text was stretched to cover a necessary innovation? How could the law be deemed eternal if it had to be modified for each generation? These questions, involving as they do the thought-processes of a nobly creative era, will always be of interest to the student of religion.

Solomon Zuckrow discusses some of the achievements of the rabbis in their efforts to adjust law to life.[1] He deals with the various principles which guided them in their modifications of the law, and gives the best-known examples of such changes. He mentions the laws which they have abrogated and enumerates the prerogatives of the rabbinical courts. The appendix suggests a practical application to modern Jewish orthodox life of the facts dealt with in the book. He calls upon the modern orthodox rabbinate to meet in council and abrogate certain ritual laws the observance of which has become arduous if not almost impossible.

The proofs for the adjustment of Jewish law to Jewish life which the author cites in this book are well known to students of Talmudic literature. Most of them are given in Weiss, *Dor Dor veDorshov*, Vol. II, chap. vii. Yet, although the material is not original, the author gives it clear presentation. It is unfortunate that either the author or the printer was so careless with the references. As they are now given the references are not to be relied upon. The transliteration of the names of some of the Talmudic tractates is also quite careless. Aside from this technical slovenliness, the work is handy and informative, and a useful addition to Talmudic literature in English.

SOLOMON B. FREEHOF

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GOSPEL ORIGINS

Professor Easton, of the General Theological Seminary, gave six lectures on the Bishop Paddock Foundation in his own institution last December which are now issued as a book.[2] Though they deal exclusively with the Synoptic Gospels, they cover in short compass a good deal of ground. Beginning with a review of recent criticism, they continue with a critique of some of the more negative critics, and conclude with a defense of the general accuracy of the Synoptic narratives, sayings, and portrait of Jesus. The book is scarcely for the beginner or untutored layman, nor is its interest confined to the specialist.

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[1] *Adjustment of Law to Life in Rabbinic Literature.* By Solomon Zuckrow. Boston: Stratford, 1928. iv+186 pages. $1.50.

[2] *The Gospel before the Gospels.* By Burton Scott Easton. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928. 170 Pages. $1.75.

The first chapter is a rapid enumeration of works of literary criticism since 1901. This material follows a course familiar to many. The author had shown by his recent commentary on Luke his mastery of this kind of technique.

The second chapter is a summary of the works of the protagonists of form-criticism—Dibelius, Bultmann, and others. Except for some surveys in periodicals this is the first real presentation in English of the new German method.

At this point begins Professor Easton's own analysis and argument. He points out the limits of form-criticism. It can classify and explain the forms in which the material in the gospels has come to us. It can show the variety in the sayings of Jesus and the conventional characteristics of the narratives; it can disclose the probable use of these items in Christian instruction. But it rarely can give a criterion for distinguishing what is accurate from the later traditions of Christianity. Properly form-criticism is not competent to pass judgment on historical values. It cannot with certainty give even the relative age of the forms.

The student of the gospels wishes, however, some not too subjective norm for testing the accuracy of the gospel items. Form-criticism claimed to supply such a standard. And the form-critics freely expressed their judgments. Their method coincided closely with Professor Case's technique of "criticism by social environment." What was capable of explanation as suiting the viewpoint of the later Christians was regarded as unauthentic. Though he does not mention Professor Case's *Jesus* in the study of "the synoptic perspective," Professor Easton, in answering the skeptical radicalism of Bultman, is equally answering the Chicago professor. He points out how very little the Synoptic Gospels reflect, or at least attribute to Jesus, ideas belonging to the earliest church. Its interests, like the Spirit, fulfilment of prophecy, gentile Christianity, are most scantily represented.

The sayings of Jesus may therefore, most of them, be original. Much in the stories of cures is not like later surcharge, but characteristic of the actual faith healing of Jesus. Though Easton admits that legendary motives have been at work here and there in the gospels, he would vindicate as historical many of the miracle stories where other scholars have found myth or alien folklore at work. They are compatible with accurate reports from eyewitnesses. He believes the accounts of Jesus' baptism and temptation were told by Jesus himself to the disciples. And these, with other trustworthy passages, he uses to confirm the tradition that Jesus felt himself to be the Messiah.

The vigorous pages of Easton's argument are most suggestive reading. They are samples of how the facts about Jesus may be tested. He appears to be successful in refuting the radical arguments in detail quite frequently. But he establishes thereby rather the possibility than the certainty of his own more conservative conclusions. As the refutation of the latest of radical critics his book takes on a partially ephemeral character. It is a thankless but useful task. It will further carry forward for many English readers their own grappling with the problems of the historical Jesus. But they must beware of assuming that Easton is right because he has shown his opponents' case to be unproved. There is also subjective bias sometimes in the more conservative viewpoint, no matter how skilful the argument and objective the tone of discussion.

Henry J. Cadbury

Bryn Mawr College

A BIBLICAL STUDY OF THE LIFE OF CHRIST

The past decade has been unusually productive of books dealing with the life of Christ. In English no monumental work has lately appeared, but there have been many briefer discussions dealing not only with the less controversial theme of the teaching of Jesus but pressing on to a solution of the problems concerning his life and person. Writers trained in other fields have given to us their ideas of the personality and career of Jesus in books which are interesting because they represent the earnest convictions of thoughtful men, but which lack the convincing power that belongs to the writings of men thoroughly trained in the historical and literary criticism of the Gospels. At this time the lay student in particular may find guidance for his thought in the new edition of *The Life of Christ*[1] by Drs. Burton and Mathews.

This new edition and revision is the work of Dean Mathews but is carried out along lines contemplated by President Burton before his death. The rearrangement of the material bears witness to a significant advance in Bible study since the first edition appeared in 1901. Where the first edition discussed the four Gospels *pari passu* throughout, the new edition presents in a first part the data of the Synoptic Gospels, and reserves for a second part the Fourth Gospel and its portrayal of the life of Christ, thus distinguishing between "the Christ of history" and "the Christ interpreted by Christian experience." But the book still keeps close to the biblical material and is what its subtitle indicates, "a condensed commentary on the Gospels." Topics for class discussion have been appended to the several chapters. The questions suggested in connection with each chapter seem to be further removed from the type of obvious question often found in lesson quarterlies than in the former edition. New headings have been given to chapters and paragraphs. The format is much more attractive than that of the earlier editions, smacking less of the textbook. But one regrets that the index of topics and index of passages have been omitted.

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[1] *The Life of Christ*. By Ernest DeWitt Burton and Shailer Mathews. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. xx+290 pages. $2.00.

The bulk of the book is made up of a running commentary on the passages cited from the Gospels. There is an abundance of incisive comment, and if it sometimes crosses the line that divides the strictly expository from the homiletical, it may not lessen the value of the book for practical use. Brief introductions on specific sections or phases of the gospel record and explanations of local customs are inserted where they are needed. The treatment of the biblical material assumes and promotes a rational attitude toward the gospel narratives. The relation of the Synoptic Gospels to one another is set forth. Grouping of tradition is recognized in Mark as well as in Matthew. So is the insecurity of chronological order in the Perean section of Luke. Discrepancies in the stories of the resurrection are attributed in part to differences between a Judean tradition and a Galilean tradition. Attention is called to "the tendency of the early church to attribute its beliefs and hopes to Jesus." The four pages (307–10) devoted to an introduction to the Fourth Gospel are a model in clearness and inclusiveness. In the chapters that follow the student faces the question of the original order of the narratives and discourses of John. Thus, while the book is constructive throughout, it makes the student aware of the major problems of gospel criticism. This alone should help one in all his study in this field to distinguish between the essential and the accidental, the certain and the less certain, and should put him on his guard against assertive dogmatism.

There remains in our mind this query: Could not the author have gone farther in the same direction? The divergences in the Synoptic tradition seem to open the way for comment on the gradual heightening of the conception of Jesus which modified in Matthew the story of the voice from Heaven at Jesus' baptism and the report of his reply to the first words of the rich young ruler. A like process of heightening is seen in the stories of Jesus' power to quicken the dead, a power that is instanced in ever more striking form as the written account is removed in time from the event—Jairus' daughter, the son of the widow of Nain, and Lazarus. There is room, too, for more explicit statement of the variety of representation in the gospels concerning the attitude of Jesus toward the Mosaic law, and especially of the doubt that may attach to the correctness of the report in Matthew of the words of Jesus on this subject, or of what is involved in accepting that report as accurate. No question is raised concerning the historicity of the Mission of the Seventy, with its manifest duplication of the Mission of the Twelve and its natural motivation as a separate incident in Luke's universalistic gospel. In addition to the detailed analysis of the resurrection narratives there might well be more explicit suggestions concerning the rise of the resurrection faith and the growth and development of the tradition of the bodily resurrection of Jesus. In this, as in a more adequate treatment of the miraculous element in the gospels, the approach might still be biblical. For in securing consideration of this topic by devout minds the most convincing evidence is not from twentieth-century science but from manifest discrepancies and prepossessions in the gospels.

Dean Mathews' book will appeal most to those who want in a life of Christ, not a rapid survey of the results of professional and expert study of the gospels or a logical discussion of the main topics of significant interest attaching themselves to a consideration of the facts of the career of the historic Jesus, but a guide in a first-hand study of the biblical material which is in everybody's hands. It provides abundant subject matter for a course given to a Bible class in Sunday school or to a class in college. But in college at least it should be supplemented by the reading of another life of Christ which will unify the thought and relate it to other realms of thinking by centering attention on the main problems of historical, literary, and religious interest involved in a thoroughgoing study of the subject.

This new edition groups the material, not, as before, according to the divisions in the Stevens and Burton *Harmony*, but according to *The Student's Gospels*.[2] This small volume presents the Synoptic Gospels in parallel columns in the first part and the Gospel of John in the second part, all in the translation by Professor Goodspeed. By some oversight the last section of the twelfth chapter of John is omitted. For purposes of reference in connection with the Burton and Mathews *Life* it would have been much better to insert the verse numbers in the text. Otherwise this is a good use to make of this excellent translation, for the rewording of the familiar narratives will bring freshness and clearness to the study of the gospels.

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[2] *The Student's Gospels*. Arranged by Shailer Mathews, using *The New Testament, an American Translation*, by Edgar J. Goodspeed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. x+193 pages. $1.00.

John Pitt Deane

Beloit College

STUDIES IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY[1]

No higher tribute of appreciation and respect can be paid a scholar than the readiness of his fellow-laborers to signalize their respect for his work by preparing a volume of essays in his honor. Far more valuable and significant than words of direct praise is such an act. And none more richly deserve this gracious courtesy than do these two scholars who for more than thirty years have labored at Yale for the increase of sound learning: Frank Chamberlin Porter and Benjamin Wisner Bacon.

The volume itself is worthy of those whom it seeks to honor. Eighteen scholars at home and abroad have produced a volume which the publishers are justified in feeling is the most important they have ever brought out in their religious books department. No small part of the credit for the work is due to Professor Case, who has graciously prepared and edited the book. The topics of the essays represent, as the editor rightly remarks, frontier issues in the life of the early church.

In the first paper Professor E. F. Scott sounds a warning against feeling that the historical method answers all questions. Christianity is more than a complex of older ideas. Cicero's gift might be the eloquent rephrasing of borrowed ideas. Not so for Jesus and Paul. The recognition of personality and its significance is fundamental. We can never learn too much of the background; yet this quest ought not to blind our eyes to the landscape itself. After all, regardless of how much light other documents may cast upon vexed problems of Christian beginnings, New Testament problems can be solved only within the New Testament itself.

Professor Lake has briefly and popularly suggested the lines along which further work in textual criticism must proceed. The last twenty years have seen many questions reopened which the epochal work of Westcott and Hort seemed to have closed. Perhaps the two chief problems now needing attention are the origin of the Neutral text and the nature of the Caesarean text. The work of Canon Streeter has aroused interest. A group of scholars at Harvard is now at work, but though the fields are white unto the harvest, the laborers are few. Yet in no field of New Testament research can more fruitful and rewarding work be done.

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[1] *Studies in Early Christianity*. Edited by Shirley Jackson Case. New York: Century, 1928. ix+467 pages. $4.50.

One of the most embarrassing things in work with the New Testament is the discovery that in the developing idiom words and phrases came to be used in ways quite different than a knowledge of classic Greek alone would lead one to expect. The doughty Dr. Meyer might deny, for example, that ἵνα is ever used except to express purpose, but the evidence seems to have been against him. Dr. A. T. Robertson considers the recent claim that it is used to express cause, and is skeptical of such a use in the New Testament, even in Mark 4:12. His paper is really a reply to the French scholar, M. Pernot, who claims it, and who incidentally speaks disparagingly of the work of certain scholars of whom the Louisville linguist is one.

Professor von Dobschütz takes us into one of the byways of church history in his essay, "Von Reinen Wort Gottes und vom Lucas-Prolog." In their zeal to recover the "pure word of God," which for nearly all the reformers save Luther meant the Bible free from all human additions, the prefaces to the individual books, as well as to the Bible, as a whole, fell under suspicion. This had a particularly serious result in the case of the Gospel of Luke, since the differences in language and style between the body of the gospel and the prologue caused the latter to be viewed by many as but another of these prefaces by later hands. This particular problem is further complicated by another preface, the so-called "Monarchian Prologue," which appears in many manuscripts. In a thorough survey of several manuscripts from the Vatican and Casanatensis the author reveals the strange confusion that resulted from this quest for the "pure word of God."

The Gospel of Mark is considered in two papers. Professor Easton discovers a primitive pre-Markan tradition in 2:13–3:6 and 12:13–27, originally a continuous whole, which, although formed for Christian instruction, yet contains a true recollection of certain definite events in the life of Jesus. Professor Carré argues that the Gospel of Mark is to be seen as the result of the interplay of two opposing forces: the popularity of Jesus with the common people and the opposition which this popularity and mode of life produced. Following the introduction (1:1–20) are three sections (1:21–45, 2:1–3:6, and 3:7–8:26) wherein these two opposing elements are developed. The first reveals his popularity and his efforts to avoid it by retreating from the multitudes; the second, the fierce opposition aroused; the third reveals him caught in the interplay of this popularity and opposition and vainly endeavoring to avoid their consequences.

As a result (8:27–16:8) he withdraws from the theater of this war, and, abandoning his public ministry, devotes himself to teaching his chosen twelve.

The strange figure of the Baptist is the subject of papers by Professors Bowen and Parsons. Professor Bowen, after considering the meaning of the two titles, ὁ βαπτίζων and ὁ βαπτιστής, concludes that the former alone describes his activity, the latter signifying his membership in a group more numerous and influential than we have always recognized. But what did John do that entitled him to be called "the baptizer"? Probably we have been wrong in feeling that John did more than to summon his fellows to the purifying ablution and to preside over their performance of this rite. Later, when effusion took the place of immersion, this "baptizer" conveniently did the pouring. Professor Parsons admirably summarizes the difficulties in the gospel picture of the relation between Jesus and his forerunner and concludes that John would not have applauded the process which reduced him to a mere voice. Rather he was the leader of a movement in which Jesus too was a member until, under the spell of a divine imperative, the latter withdrew from all earthly leadership and threw himself under the aegis of God alone.

As Professor Bowen discussed the meaning of one term which has usually been considered self-explanatory, Professor McCown has turned his attention to another, ὁ τέκτων (carpenter). After reviewing the various possibilities of meanings, ranging from carpenter to master-craftsman, even rabbi, he concludes that while the "carpenter's" tasks were numerous, including those which we would ascribe to a cabinet-maker, wood-carver, and even shipwright, yet essentially he was a worker in wood. The comparatively few passages which would imply that he was on occasion a mason or builder are either poetical or else possible of other interpretation.

Following Moffatt's excellent analysis and commentary of Mark 7:21–23 and 10:19, which reflect accurately Jesus' view of sins and his emphasis against unchastity, Professor Windisch has a very important article on Jesus' connection with the Holy Spirit in the Synoptic accounts. In detail he considers the surprisingly few allusions to the Spirit in the records, and on the basis of what seems to him a sound critical procedure, maintains that "a complete elimination of the Spirit-representation from the primary tradition is possible." Yet equally clear is the opposite undercurrent in the narratives themselves. How are we to account for this amazing contradiction? Although in the preliterary form of the narrations the pneumatic element was more pronounced, a tendency arose to suppress it, due partially to a growing repugnance for the emotional nature of the phenomena, partially to a developing Christology which preferred to see Jesus as the Son of God who in his own right knows what he must say and do. As a result, in the present records we have a curious combination of opposite tendencies, the one suppressing, the other reintroducing, the *pneumatic* element. So Jesus must still be regarded as a spirit-worker *(Pneumatiker)*, yet showing such sobriety of speech and conduct as to make Holtzmann's term, *Ekstatiker*, a little misleading. Than this is no more thought-producing paper in the collection.

Professor F. C. Grant considers the vexed question of Jesus' social teaching, and warns that in a democratic age it is easy to interpret Jesus as a social engineer or reformer. Fresh from his more ambitious work in this field, Dr. Grant suggests his method of approach—an analysis of the various documents—and finds that while there is some ground (especially in "L") for the phrase "social gospel," yet primarily Jesus was a religious teacher whose ethic was the ethic of religion, and whose religion was Jewish to the core.

No series of essays would be complete today without mention of the Messianic hope. Professors Torrey and Case discuss the subject from almost opposite angles. For the former it is an essential, if indeed not the most prominent, note in the writings of the late Persian and Greek periods from II Isaiah on, especially in the Psalms, all of which reflect the idealized situation of the future rather than historical situations in the present or the past. On the contrary, Dr. Case, running true to form, maintains that long before the time of Jesus a growing distrust in revolution led to the substitution of eschatology for Messianism. The ultimate popularity of the latter was due to the Christians, who welcomed it cordially and who not only preached it, but read it back into Jesus' words. The latter, however, like his Jewish kinsmen, may well have ignored the figure of the Messiah entirely. This speedy rise of interest may be explained partially, at least, by the embarrassment of Jesus' death, which forced belief, if faith was not to fail utterly, in a future deliverance.

Paul, too, comes in for his share of attention. Professor Hatch seeks to account for the relatively small place forgiveness has in the teaching of Paul, all the more surprising because of its central position in Jewish thought. It was not that Paul minimized sin; indeed, with the Psalmist it might be said of him that "sin was ever before him." The explanation lies in his conception of sin as a personified evil power dwelling in the flesh rather than simply as the transgression of the revealed law of God as it is in the Old Testament. To free the sinner, accordingly, an entirely different transaction is necessary. This is found in Jesus' death on the cross. How Paul conceived this is answerable, if at all, only in the light of his conception of the Christian life. Mystic union with Christ, in which "atmosphere" all the blessings of life result—this is the way peace with God is attained. The same wine, but in new bottles.

In a penetrating study of the Epistle to the Romans Professor Ropes has made a real contribution to the understanding of one phase of the early history. Many scholars have been too prone to see Judaizers cropping up here and there among Paul's opponents. As a matter of fact, they seem to have been so severely trounced in Galatia that they did not venture farther West in view of Paul's enhanced prestige. There is no trace of them in Rome, Corinth, Philippi, nor Colossae. The enemies against whom Paul warns in Romans are the Jews; only as we see this letter as the attempt to strengthen and deepen the existing Christian faith of those to whom Paul is writing—not as a polemic nor a bit of missionary propaganda—can we understand it in its fulness.

Professor Cadbury quite agrees with the author of II Peter in his remark that in our beloved brother's epistles are some things hard to be understood. The best hope for understanding a prismatic personality like Paul is to view different phases of his thinking side by side, instead of to force them into one mold. Professor Cadbury then lists six "concurrent phases" of Paul's thought, the apocalyptic, that of dispensations, of status, of cosmic conflict, ethical, and mystical. Perhaps had the masquerader who strove to appear as Peter read this charming essay he might have found some of his difficulties lessened.

Nothing is new under the sun. At least socialism isn't. Centuries before More sketched his Utopia, dissatisfaction with things as they are had produced the Atlantis of Plato, the Panchaea of Euhemerus, and the magic sun-lit isles of Jambulos. Even Alexander and his heirs failed to stay the growing discontent, since they naturally sided with the possessing classes. Nor did constant wars, with the burden of great military establishments, disappear even under Roman control. Asia Minor simply passed from one Shylock to another. Revolution, exploitation, suffering—these were its fate. Although for a time the dawn of the Empire seemed to presage a new day, slave competition and famine combined to make the life of the free laborer in Asia Minor a hard lot. All this, in the judgment of Dr. Dickey, tended to encourage the apocalyptic mood. It seemed impossible that "this" age would see a betterment. Christianity, however, with its emphasis on "feeding the hungry with good things" and "exalting them of low degree," was sure of a hearing. The tantalizing story of the fabulous grape vines and their produce, to mention but one of Baruch's agricultural phenomena of the future, as told by Irenaeus and Papias, may have been crude, but must have been effective. This type of preaching may well account in a measure for the striking expansion of Christendom in the hard-pushed Asia Minor in the first three centuries of this era.

As the volume opened with a warning, so it closes with one, although in a rather more strident key. Dr. Krüger, of Giessen, after some caustic words for those critics who, to use Harnack's biting phrase, treat the early Christian writings as only filthy rags to be macerated and steeped to make blotting-paper, turns to II Clement. The heads of first one and then another writer who has ventured in the field fall before the pole axe of the doughty German. In fact, it would seem safe to conclude that no one who has ever written on this time was free from presuppositions and prejudices. Harnack, Van den Bergh van Eysinga, di Pauli, Schüssler, Windisch, all save Lightfoot, who escapes unscathed, invite his wrath. His purpose in discussing again this already much discussed writing is to close the discussion. This he proceeds to do. II Clement is a sermon, and all from one pen. It was written from Corinth. So much is clear (to him), though not to all. The date of composition is less certain, although clearly post-apostolic and preceding the days of Catholic Christianity, as is proved by its use of the gospels and epistles and apocryphal literature. Perhaps the most interesting part of the paper is the discussion of the relationship between II Clement and Hermas and Acta Pauli (esp. Acta Pauli et Thecla), and the conclusion that although dependence on either side is not to be seen, yet they all used, although independently, similar material. The essay closes with a defense (against Windisch) of the author of the little tract called forth by the charge of shallowness. He may not have been a brilliant light, but he provided sufficient edification for his hearers to have his sermons joined to canonical scripture in at least some manuscripts.

So runs the book. A brief review—and this one has far overrun its proper limit—must fail to do justice to its subject. It can only serve to invite to the feast.

Morton S. Enslin

Crozer Theological Seminary

A NEW DESCRIPTION OF THE CATACOMBS

Here[1] is a brief but brilliant excursion through the subterranean world of ancient Christian Rome and an eloquent description of the characteristics of the Christian art of the catacombs. The author, however, before taking his reader down to the dark galleries of the venerable cemeteries, does not forget to give a rapid sketch of the constitution of the Christian community of Rome and of its life in that early period of the Roman church. Against this background the author sets his description of the cemeterial art, of its characteristics and symbolism.

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[1] *Die Katakombenwelt. Grundriss, Ursprung und Idee der Kunst in der römischen Christengemeinde.* By Oscar Beyer. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1927. viii+153 pages; 30 plates. M. 9.

It is interesting to remark that the reaction against the excessive emphasis upon the symbolic value of the art of the catacombs is gaining ground among the young archaeologians. The recent and very valuable book of Dr. P. Styger (*Die altchristliche Grabenkunst* [München, 1907]) is a very significant attempt at a new analysis of the various elements of the ancient cemeterial art of the Christians in the light of both the influence of the environment and the necessity of a careful revision of all the symbolic theories to which archaeologists having theological and apologetic prepossessions have indulged so much in the past. In Styger's book, among other significant remarks, appears the following: "It would be very interesting to make a survey of the origin of the ancient Christian art in the light of a more detailed knowledge of the quality of the members of the ancient Christian community of Rome (p. 89)." Not only the origins of Christian art, but also those of the most important ancient ecclesiastical institutions have much to gain by a closer view of the conformation and the organization of the ancient Church of Rome. This precisely was the aim of the present writer in his study, *Foreign Groups in Rome during the First Centuries of the Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927). In a very interesting article by Professor E. Buonaiuti (*Ricerche Religiose* [Rome, November, 1927], pp. 553 ff.) attention is directed to the need of a more intelligent collaboration of archaeologists and historians for a better understanding of the early Christian spirit and of their religious life. "The remarkable findings of these last years in the underground of Rome have presented new problems to our archaeologists, who, confronted with monumental and artistic remains which refuse to be classified with the usual well-known types of the primitive cemeterial art, have been obliged to make bold excursions into the field of ancient Christian literature. We cannot say truthfully that the historians of early Christianity are satisfied either with the method or with the results of those excursions of the archaeologists. It may be that up to the present the historians have not fully availed themselves of the priceless support which the exploration and the interpretation of the monumental remains offer for a more diligent reconstruction of the propagation and organization of the ancient Christian community of Rome; but on the other hand, there is no doubt that many archaeologists, lacking familiarity with the strictly historical method, have made use of historical sources only to twist their meaning and content in order to find in them a confirmation of absurd theories" (p. 553).

HARVARD UNIVERSITY G. LA PIANA

GOETZ PRESENTATION VOLUME

This ample volume[1] contains thirty-two short essays on a wide variety of historical subjects, medieval, Renaissance, and modern. Few of the studies are on topics of first-rate importance, but few, if any, are so microscopic as to be negligible on the part of the average worker in history. About a dozen are contributions to our knowledge of historical Christianity; the remainder constitute a miscellany on secondary phases of the history of art, literature, and learning, with a few studies on the philosophy of history, historiography, and method.

W. Levinson gives, with a historical and philological introduction, the text of a hitherto unprinted sermon of Loup de Ferrières delivered one St. Josse's (Judocus) day, probably during the sixth decade of the ninth century. The sermon bears gallant witness both to righteousness and to Latinity in that barbarous age of the Norse invasions. Philip Funk investigates mysticism in East Prussia in the period of the Prussian Knights, and shows the connection of this strain of piety with the fifteenth-century movement in Bohemia. A. Giesecke's study of *The Course of European Piety* is a general interpretation of the history of Christian devotion. Considerable space is consumed in an explanation of the nature of religion itself, which for the writer consists essentially in a consciousness of connection (*Zusammenhang, Verbindung*) with the eternal. Over against the Paul-Luther-Calvin conception of sin and redemption, Herr Giesecke advocates Jesus' "religion of love and deed" (*Religion der Liebe und der Tat*). Calvin, through his predestinarian doctrine which made it incumbent upon the believer to manifest his election by his acts, reverted, indeed, to a *Religion der Tat;* but it bore more resemblance to the Jewish type of piety than to the religion of Jesus, and was responsible for that renaissance of the Old Testament which finds typical expression in Handel's *Messiah,* with its representation of Christ as Lord of the world. The method of the religion which Jesus taught and lived is not that of mysticism nor that of faith; it needs no externals and employs no speculations; but it lays hold on the eternal "without mediators or means, without forms or formulas," by active response to God's love.

In an essay on *Max Weber als Religionssoziologe,* Joachim Wach presents a well-annotated analysis of the work of the most original student of the sociology of religion. Weber is regarded indeed as (with assistance from Troeltsch and Sombart) the founder of the science. Manfred Stimming compares the political theories of Marsilius of Padua and Nicholas Cusanus. The former is represented as a revolutionary radical, the latter as a conservative reformer. Marsilius gave little attention to the concept of natural law; Cusanus made this the unifying principle of his political thought. For both the people is the supreme lawgiver and elects the ruler, but Cusanus is the less emphatic on this point, insisting that it is determined by nature that the wise shall rule and the simple obey. Marsilius makes a sharp distinction between the sphere of faith and that of human reason, of the spiritual and the temporal, and is content to indicate the earthly source of power. No such contrast is found in Cusanus, for whom all power is from God, though the people is the intermediary, and there is a divine element in a popular election. For him, as for the scholastics, the primary function of the state is to aid in bringing its citizens to salvation. The conciliarism of Marsilius excludes the papal primacy, a solution which would have made Cusanus shudder. The footnotes give the impression that, at least as far as Marsilius is concerned, the writer has relied upon authorities rather than sources. The presentation of Marsilius as a secularist is not new; but it involves leaving out of consideration prominent elements of the *Defensor Pacis*.

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[1] *Kultur- und Universalgeschichte. Walter Goetz, zu seinem 60. Geburtstage dargebracht von Fachgenossen, Freunden, und Schülern.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1927. iv+567 pages. M. 35.

Asking the question "Who is responsible for the rise of political Protestantism?" Johannes Kuhn offers a study of the Diet of Speyer of 1529. He regards the proposition set before the Diet in the name of the Emperor as having been substituted by Ferdinand or his chancellor, with the acquiescence of Charles's agent, Waltkirch, for a genuine proposal of the Emperor's, committed to Waltkirch before the Diet, which admitted the principle of a German council and took a considerate attitude to the Lutheran princes, and which would have given no occasion for the momentous Protest. The crisis was thus brought on by East-Hapsburg as opposed to West-Hapsburg *Politik*. The value of this arresting essay is impaired by the lack of documentation.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE NEW ENGLAND CLERGY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

No period of American history has needed a reinterpretation to this generation more urgently than that of the American Revolution. This is true not alone because we have needed to get behind the legends and myths which have grown up concerning it, but because the older historians failed to realize how complicated were the forces which created it. The process of reappraisement began about twenty-five years ago with a discussion before the American Historical Association on American Colonial History by Professors Charles M. Andrews and Herbert L. Osgood. Since that time students have been at work re-examining sources, exploring by-paths, and opening up new approaches. First came an increased emphasis upon the economic forces, resulting in such studies as Schlesinger's *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution,* and Beard's, *The Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.* More recently an interest in the social and religious aspects of the Revolution is indicated by such titles as Jameson's *The American Revolution considered as a Social Movement,* and Van Tyne's *Religious and Sectarian Forces which Threatened Imperial Unity* (chap. xii, "The Causes of the War of Independence"). Of this latter emphasis Miss Baldwin's volume is not only a good example, but it is a noteworthy contribution.[1]

The most important sources used in this study are the sermons preached by New England clergymen on special occasions, particularly the election sermons. Election sermons began to be preached in Massachusetts as early as 1633, and in Connecticut in 1674. The sermons were given, of course, by the outstanding preachers of the time, but the ideas and theories advanced were discussed and repreached by other preachers throughout the colonies. The election sermons were generally printed either at public or private expense and received a comparatively wide circulation among the political and intellectual leaders. Two hundred and six of these sermons Miss Baldwin lists in her bibliography, all of which are referred to in the text.

The eighteenth-century New England minister is described in the first chapter; the books he read, the sources from which he developed his theories of government, and his power and learning estimated. His theology was legalistic, while his conception of a church was drawn from Old and New Testament precedent, and he believed that a church could not exist except by a "sacred and binding agreement or compact" (chap. ii). Civil government he taught was of divine origin; just governments were founded in compacts and there was a close analogy between religious and civil government (chap. iii). Rulers were strictly limited by law, and great emphasis was laid upon fundamental law and its binding quality (chap. iv). Out of the controversies in Massachusetts, particularly before the Great Awakening, came the first full definition of natural liberty, while the Great Awakening itself, and especially the preaching and influence of Whitfield, was in the direction of increasing tolerance and democracy (chap. v).

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[1] *The New England Clergy and the American Revolution.* By Alice M. Baldwin. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1928. xiii+222 pages. $3.50.

The author shows conclusively that the arguments used against England from 1763 on were not new, but that New Englanders had been made familiar with them through the preaching and discussion of their ministers for at least sixty years. Thus there had been built up a body of constitutional doctrine "closely associated with theology and church polity, and commonly accepted by New Englanders" (p. 168). The ministers also exercised a great influence in constitution making. Any real church must have a compact or covenant; so must the state; natural rights they had defined, and this called for a bill of rights. Thus it was that resistance to England, and finally independence and the new governments, were given a religious sanction by the ministers of New England, of whom the people "had been taught from their cradle to believe could utter nothing but eternal truths" (p. 172).

Miss Baldwin has handled a great mass of new material in a most commendable manner; indeed, this monograph might well serve as a model for historical investigators. Her style is clear, her material logically organized, her points well made. She has written upon a phase of the American Revolution about which there has been considerable speculation in recent years, but about which little was actually known. From every standpoint this study is most commendable.

William Warren Sweet

University of Chicago

FREEDOM, CHRISTIANITY, AND PHILOSOPHY

Although Professor Carr is one of the most prolific writers among contemporary philosophers, and although his metaphysics has obvious affinities with a religious interpretation of experience, it is only recently that his public work has concerned itself explicitly with religion. It would be interesting to know whether, as some critics airily assume (in lieu of logical argument) to be the case with all personalists, his thought has always been, as it were, corrupted by a suppressed religious interest, which now at last reveals its true nature, or whether he has actually achieved his monadism, as he himself asserts, through a study of the results of the empirical sciences.

Be that as it may, his most recent book[1] shows an appreciation of the history of Christian thought which is rather unusual in a philosopher. The problem with which he concerns himself is that of the positive freedom which gives man his unique status. For good or for evil, Professor Carr joins with Hegel, "who, though he has been dead for nearly a hundred years, more than anyone represents the spirit which is animating science and philosophy today" (p. 212) in attributing to Christianity the rise of the idea that the human being is actually free. He goes further and asserts that Christianity is "the vitalizing movement which in substance and in form has determined the direction of modern philosophy" (p. 7). To some minds such assertions would convict philosophy of bias and of error. But Professor Carr is willing to entertain the possibility that the essential ideas of Christianity may be true, and, if convinced by the evidence, to accept without shame a philosophy compatible with the Christian view of man.

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[1] *The Unique Status of Man.* By Herbert Wildon Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 216 pages. $1.75.

The book approaches the problem of freedom historically. It shows some of the stages of theological thought on the subject, draws a masterly contrast between the metaphysical determinism of Spinoza and the libertarianism of Leibniz, traces the rise of empiricism and mechanism, makes much of the principle of relativity as offering a contribution to a theory of freedom in the place it assigns to the observer (p. 153), and finally develops in too compact and sketchy a manner a constructive theory of freedom as implied in living activity.

Large perspectives are opened up by the discussions. The movement of modern thought from the static to the active and from the mechanical to the individual is suggestively portrayed. It is well pointed out that the Achilles heel of the mechanistic view is its psychological theory (p. 136). Professor Carr shows that, despite their theoretical opposition, there is a practical identity of freedom in Spinoza and Leibniz (p. 77). He declares frankly (in opposition to Spencer's biological ethics) that "ethics to me is the problem of free will, and if there is no such thing as freedom there is nothing for ethics to deal with" (p. 129). He suggests that the continuity of biological life in the species "is secured by means of the positive freedom which is exercised by the individuals of the successive generations" (p. 189). Perhaps his most significant contribution is that of the inversion of the problem of freedom; whereas philosophers have usually made necessity fundamental and have tried to find a place for freedom in a deterministic world, Carr would make freedom fundamental and would generate necessity and determinism from it (p. 206).

One misses from the book a sufficiently precise definition of freedom, and one wonders at the confidence with which so much is inferred from the theory of relativity. Yet the book contains valuable insights and emphasizes considerations which many recent thinkers tend to ignore. It merits thoughtful reading.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman

Boston University

ADVENTURE AS RELIGIOUS METHOD

Adventure[1] consists of chapters by four English writers: Burnett H. Streeter, John MacMurray, Alexander Russell, and Catherine M. Chilcott. It is the outcome of a series of conferences between these four and some others.

Russell in the first chapter shows that science is adventurous in its search for knowledge. The three other writers find that creditable living must be on a similar adventurous plane. It is the only way to live morally and religiously if we are to escape the blind drift of unthinking action or slavish conformity to past standards. We must form hypotheses and test them by use until they are disproved or lead on to better hypotheses.

Adventure in morals in the form of deviation from accepted codes must, says Streeter, give reasonable hope of morally valuable results. Whatever results ensue must be observed and recorded. He suggests that in difficult fields of moral reform, such as marriage, legislation should be avowedly temporary and experimental and a commission with full powers of investigation should observe and evaluate results. In respect to religion he says: "The doctrine of the Incarnation is, in effect, the ascription of adventure to God. It asserts an emergence of the Divine on a plane of history which is in one sense final but in another is the inauguration of an era of creative activity which admits of no finality." To be a Christian one must have a share in this adventurous undertaking of God.

MacMurray states that "a faith that glories in its subjectivity glories in its shame." Faith is not knowledge in any form, whether as reason or intuition; but it is a way of acting. "Faith is courage in the face of ignorance and insecurity, the refusal to be beaten by failure." Religion based on such faith he describes: "Religion must claim to be true and there is only one truth. It claims that the supreme and only absolute reality of the universe is a personal God. . . . . It impels us to the acceptance of a hypothesis . . . . that if we are to make religion real we must assume an incarnation of God in human personality; and since no other fulfils the conditions, we must assume incarnation of God in Christ.

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[1] *Adventure*. By Burnett Streeter, John MacMurray, Alexander Russell, and Catherine Chilcott. New York: Macmillan, 1928. ix+247 pages. $2.00.

. . . . Religion becomes for us the life of faith, the ceaseless infinite testing of our hypothesis in all the fields of human activity."

In the closing chapter C. M. Chilcott says that we all with Christ may have an adventurous part in "the redemptive agonies of love," and in this way discover the truth and meaning of the incarnation, atonement, and intercession. Christian truth is a living operative purpose with which we must identify ourselves before we can understand it.

Whether or not the book adds much to the cause of clear thinking in matters of religion, it does make a strong appeal for heroism in the living of our lives upon the highest plane.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

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CONTEMPORARY WINDS OF DOCTRINE

A survey of contemporary periodicals would show an increasing popular interest in religious topics, coupled with an extreme diversity of religious opinion—so extreme that the popular mind is quite bewildered and despairs of finding any rational clue to the maze. In this situation nothing is more needed than a sort of orientation chart, on which the conflicting winds of doctrine shall be clearly indicated and their historic sources explained in terms intelligible to the layman.

Dr. G. B. Smith's new book[1] fulfils this function admirably. Taking the Roman Catholic position as its point of departure, it describes the successive steps by which the modern mind has diverged from this position, passing over by way of classical Protestantism to what is now called Modernism. Then, after an illuminating discussion of the present anti-Modernist reaction among Catholics and conservative Protestants, it goes on to analyze and criticize the chief theological trends which prevail among the Modernists. Schleiermacher's appeal to Christian experience, Ritschl's appeal to Christ, the immanence of God in the natural world, the theology of evolution, the strife between theism and humanism—all these tendencies are delineated in terms of contemporary American thought, with just enough historical background to make the present situation stand out in clear relief. Combined with McGiffert's *Rise of Modern Religious Ideas,* it should give the layman all the guidance he needs through the intricacies of modern religious thought.

But it is not only the layman who will be attracted by this book.

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[1] *Current Christian Thinking.* By Gerald Birney Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. 209 pages. $2.00.

When a veteran critic of modern theology undertakes to summarize the gist of it in a few non-technical chapters his exposition is in itself bound to involve a criticism—as in the chapter on "The Theological Interpretation of the Natural World," wherein Rufus Jones and Dr. Fosdick find themselves embarrassingly bracketed with Mrs. Eddy and Ralph Waldo Trine! And Dr. Smith does not stop with exposition and criticism; in grappling with the controversy between theism and humanism (chap. ix), he states his own position in terms that are bound to lead to much heated discussion. As against the Humanists, he maintains that "cosmic interest is an inescapable aspect of religion"; but he admits that "a theism which seeks to establish such a cosmic solicitude for human welfare as has been attributed to the Christian God has an extremely difficult task." He therefore abandons a "too definite theistic philosophy," too snug and tight for a complex and mysterious world, and casts himself upon "an as yet inadequately defined cosmic support of human values," or in other words, "that aspect of our non-human environment which is found to reinforce and enrich our life" (pp. 163–70).

If one were to attempt to chart Dr. Smith's own position upon a map of contemporary winds of doctrine it would be useful to note that all our contemporary breezes may be regarded as minor deflections or resultants of the two great prevailing winds of nineteenth-century thought, positivism and idealism. Positivism exalts science and is suspicious of philosophy; it makes a religion of social idealism, but refuses to project ethical values into the cosmos, and so goes without theology. Idealism rejects the scientific picture of the cosmos as partial and abstract; it supplements the bare facts of science with aesthetic intuition or dialectical reasoning, and so finds the universe altogether perfect and worshipful. All modern religious thought veers either toward positivism or toward idealism. Dr. Smith, in common with many Chicago thinkers, undoubtedly veers toward positivism. Science to him is always "our modern science"; philosophy stands in contrast with science, and wears the epithet "a priori" (pp. 169, 170). Pure Humanism does not content him; but he departs from it much as Mill and Spencer departed from Comte—in reaching out for some cosmic support for social values, finite like the God of Mill (p. 165), undefined like Spencer's Unknowable. Meanwhile, this theological radicalism is combined, as his last chapter bears witness, with a warm and kindly evangelical piety which gives a definitely Christian flavor to his boldest critical passages.

It would be a mistake to suppose that all contemporary Christian thought is veering toward positivism. Much of it is veering in the opposite direction, toward an aesthetic romanticism reminiscent of Schleiermacher or a rational idealism reminiscent of Hegel. In evidence whereof, I need only submit two books which, oddly enough, came to me for review along with Dr. Smith's. In Dr. Gilkey's book[2] the best traditions of romanticism are continued; in J. E. Turner's,[3] the Hegelian school shows signs of renewed vitality and growth.

By classifying Dr. Gilkey as a romanticist of the best type I mean to imply a compliment. Romanticism has had its wild extremists—its Rousseaus and its Nietzsches—but in its true significance the romantic *Weltanschauung* is the richest, broadest, most comprehensive that ever dawned upon the human mind. As against all narrow and bigoted points of view—the narrow rationalism of the eighteenth century, the narrow moralism of Kant, the narrow emphasis upon science by the positivists and agnostics, the narrow emphasis upon religion by contemporary Fundamentalists—romanticism has forever been saying, in effect, what Dr. Gilkey says: not either . . . . or, but both . . . . and. One finds in Dr. Gilkey's pages, as in his preaching, something of that rich unity-in-complexity that characterizes the life of Goethe, the music of Beethoven, the novels of Victor Hugo, the theology of Schleiermacher and Sabatier, the philosophy of Emerson and Bergson, and the preaching of Fosdick—all undeniable products of the romantic movement. That is to say, it is a beautiful little book, which commands an almost effortless attention and leaves in the mind a mellow flavor of ripe wisdom. Conservatism and liberalism in religion, the ethical emphasis and the mystical emphasis, scientific definition and religious symbolism, personal religion and the social gospel, Occidental transforming of the world and Oriental transcending of it, all are persuasively presented as equally necessary poles of thought.

Ethical theists of the more thoroughgoing sort—men like Harry Ward and Reinhold Niebuhr—will probably not be convinced by Dr. Gilkey. Harmonic synthesis and balanced rhythm are fundamentally aesthetic categories, they will point out. Christianity is not an aesthetic religion, but an ethical religion, they will insist; and they will not be satisfied with the inclusion of the ethical as one moment in a larger synthesis. When ethical categories are really made supreme—as the religion of Jesus and the prophets demands—then life's great moments take on the character of an either . . . . or decision, which broad-minded rationalizing may conceal and befog, but not really elude. A certain dualism in life is inescapable, if we are really ethical, they will say; aesthetic monism is not really Christian, but Greek or Hindu. I do not think Dr. Gilkey need flinch before these objections. He can and does make room for the ethical as the highest element in his synthesis, an element supported and enhanced, not obscured, by the mystical, rational, and aesthetic elements. Our inheritance from Greece and India can, and in this case does, support and enhance our inheritance from Palestine.

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[2] *Present-Day Dilemmas in Religion.* Cole Lectures for 1927. By Charles W. Gilkey. Nashville, Tennessee: Cokesbury Press, 1928. 180 pages. $1.50.

[3] *The Nature of Deity.* By J. E. Turner, New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. 248 pages. $3.50.

For the romanticist, the depths of reality can be plumbed only by feeling, not by thought—which means that the symbolic language of the poet and the mystic is *truer,* in the realm of the ultimate, than the scientist's formulas and the philosopher's abstractions. For the Hegelian, this position is unintelligible; any truth that can be felt can be defined. One may find this contrast between the romantic and Hegelian theories of religious knowledge persisting in present-day thought by comparing Dr. Gilkey's chapter on "Definition and Symbol" with Dr. Turner's chapter on "Emotion and Reason." For Dr. Gilkey, following in the steps of Hocking, Wieman, and Streeter, the realities with which religion deals are "incapable of either exact or adequate definition: to be understood they must be experienced, and to those who have thus personally discovered their characteristic quality and richness from within, symbols which connote that quality and express its 'feel' are the only possible terms of utterance." For Dr. Turner, following in the steps of Hegel, Bradley, and Bosanquet, the existence and nature of Deity is susceptible of exact proof and definition, based upon careful dialectical examination of the implications of known facts.

Dr. Turner's book cannot be dismissed as "just another Hegelian system"; it differs from the usual sort in some very vital respects. For one thing, *mirabile dictu,* it is written in an easily comprehensible style, free from unnecessary metaphysical jargon. Again, it is strong (where Hegel was weak) in its respectful treatment of the results of the natural sciences. Indeed, if any criticism were to be offered in this connection, it would be that Dr. Turner has accepted these results too uncritically, and built upon them too confidently, in a day when the fundamental postulates of science are being sharply questioned. Still again, we must note that Dr. Turner is much more clearly theistic than most Hegelians. Both pantheism and absolute transcendence are explicitly rejected. God has an "environment," but is absolutely dominant over it, both in thought and in action. He is "transcendent of" the natural order, which he controls mechanically, but for desirable ends; he is "transcendant *in*" those qualities which raise man at his best above the natural order—so that a trustworthy concept of Deity may be derived from these human qualities pushed to the point of perfection. Perfection is achievable by man already in the aesthetic realm; we are not overbold, therefore, in attributing all conceivable sorts of perfection to Deity. Here arises the problem of evil, which is solved as well as usual—that is to say, not very well. But this reviewer confesses that, with all the difficulties involved, he is impressed with Dr. Turner's attempt to work out a *definite* concept of God. A God who is to function effectively as the object of worship must (psychologically must) be something more than an "oblong blur."

The winds of doctrine, we conclude, are not blowing steadily today in any one direction. The same great contrasting tendencies which govern nineteenth-century thought are still at work; and it would be premature to announce the demise of any of them. But there is visible a certain convergence of traditionally hostile tendencies, which seems to imply that the period ahead of us is to be a period of philosophic synthesis, somewhat like the early part of the last century.

Walter M. Horton

Oberlin College

CHILDREN AND THE CHURCH

Because of the title,[1] the author's position in Calvary Baptist Church, Washington, D.C., and the increasing interest in means of relating children more closely to the church, this book will attract large attention. In the first part of the book the organization and methods used in his junior church are described, and in the second part are sample outlines of sermons that have been "most satisfying to the writer in seeking to make his message live."

From the standpoint of religious education the book is a disappointment. The most common errors of preachers to children are glaringly apparent. The psychology of boy and girl learning seems entirely ignored.

The central aim of the junior church seems to be to develop a "church consciousness." But the assumption seems to be that this can be done only in a conventional service patterned after the adult morning service. The author admits that the average adult service has no more meaning for the ordinary boys and girls than a service in Greek or Assyrian, but the substitute does not seem a great improvement. The terminology is simpler but the ideas are abstract deductions from adult experience. Hardly an illustration in the outlines is taken from boy or girl life. The children may be "interested," but there is no provision for transfer of the principles from the adult illustrations to concrete places in boy and girl life. The deductions are platitudinous abstractions mostly theologically centered. For instance, the author gives a deduction, "Following Jesus we cannot fail," but there is not a suggestion in the book of anything Jesus ever did that a nine to sixteen-year-old could do or might want to do. The urge is to be good, but no illustration is given of what that means in a boy's or girl's life. The findings of modern psychology would suggest that very few of this junior church group are yet able to analyze the analogies and apply the principles even if the motivation were provided.

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[1] *The Junior Church*. By Homer J. Councilor. New York: Century, 1928. 181 pages. $1.50.

It is unfortunate that the author, who seems to have an attractive personality and a keen imagination, cannot see the wonderful possibilities of developing both a "church consciousness" and a vital religious experience in the growing relationship that a child has with the church through the church school from the time he enters the kindergarten till he graduates into the adult department. If a boy or girl fails to get the values of religion in the graded worship and instruction of the church school and in the personal relation with religious people in that Sunday and week-day program it is very questionable if he will get it in a formal service in which his chief opportunity for participation is in some singing if he likes to sing and in some responsive reading if it calls forth from him any response.

E. J. Chave

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CAN RELIGION REGENERATE WESTERN CIVILIZATION?

Religion, Mr. Niebuhr asserts,[1] is in a badly debilitated condition in modern civilization; the increasing secularization of life is sufficient "to prompt its foes to predict religion's ultimate extinction as a major interest of mankind and to tempt even friendly observers to regard its future with grave apprehension" (p. 3). The area of life which religion controls has been steadily narrowed with the passing of the centuries, and a psychology of defeat grips the forces of religion.

What is the reason for this sickness of faith in our day? There is, in the author's mind, a double reason: "The pure sciences have revealed a world of nature much more impersonal and, seemingly, much less amenable to a divine will and to human needs than had been traditionally assumed; and the applied sciences have created an impersonal civilization in which human relations are so complex, its groups and units so large, its processes so impersonal, the production of things so important, and ethical action so difficult, that personality is both dwarfed and outraged in it" (pp. 5–6). That is to say, modern science, pure and applied, undermines both the metaphysical and ethical foundations essential to the support of religion. And of these the more serious is the undermining of the ethical foundation, for "it is easier to challenge the idea of an impersonal universe than to change the fact of an impersonal civilization" (p. 7). But what the church, and particularly the liberal wing, has been attempting to do is to strengthen the metaphysical rather than the ethical foundation. It has sought to make religion intellectually respectable rather than to make it ethically effective. The great need of modern civilization is to make the ethical and social resources of religion available for the solution of the moral problems of modern society. And this, in the author's opinion, it is signally failing to do.

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[1] *Does Civilization Need Religion?* By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 242 pages. $2.00.

The questions, therefore, which Mr. Niebuhr feels forced to raise, and for which he would find answers are: Does religion have resources adequate for the solution of the social and ethical problems of civilization? If so, how shall they be made available? Mr. Niebuhr devotes a chapter to a discussion of the first question, and reaches the conclusion that "the contribution of religion to the task of an ethical reconstruction of society is its reverence for human personality and its aid in creating the type of personality which deserves reverence" (p. 62). It is in religion's regard for the value of human personality that the needed resources for the ethical reconstruction of civilization are to be found.

The second question, however, is still more difficult, and several chapters go into various aspects of this discussion. The individualism of Protestantism has contributed largely to its social impotency, and the increasing secularization of life has come to limit, in the minds of multitudes, the province within which religion should function. There has been an increasing tendency for modern religion to make itself at home in the world and to enter into intimate relations with civilization. If, however, religion is to have social potency, the tension between religion and life must be maintained. There must be constant criticism of what actually is, and more than a touch of asceticism and otherworldliness in religion if society is to be spiritually regenerated. Religion must share with Jesus his fine scorn of this world's goods and standards; it must transcend the world if it would transform it. But with that attitude must be combined a thorough knowledge of facts and a scientific technique and skill which shall bring under control the natural environment so that it shall serve the purposes of the human spirit. That is, religion's method must be that of science, and its spirit that of Jesus.

Christianity, in Mr. Niebuhr's opinion, of all the world's religions alone has the ethical and social resources necessary to effect the spiritual transformation of civilization. "There are resources in the Christian religion," says the author, "which make it the inevitable basis of any spiritual regeneration of Western civilization. . . . . It is congenial to the energy and activism of the Western people and is yet capable of setting bounds to their expansive desires. It has reduced the eternal conflict between self-assertion and self-denial to a paradox of self-assertion through self-denial and made the cross the symbol of life's highest achievement" (p. 235). "The God of our devotion is veritably revealed most adequately in the most perfect personality we know . . . . and his conflict with the inertia of the concrete and historical world is expressed most vividly in the cross of Christ" (p. 237). Any morally creative world-view, the author maintains, will require that this idea of a potent yet suffering divine ideal, defeated by the world yet gaining its victory in defeat, shall remain basic.

The author has little hope that the church will take the lead in the necessary movement of detachment from the world and of conscious conflict with the civilization in which it functions. It is too deeply implicated in the entire process. But it may become the recruiting ground for such a movement, and the minority which does so detach itself may act as a leaven in the whole lump of the life of the church. Likewise, Mr. Niebuhr expects little of the clergy; in the main it must be a lay movement. Probably the latter opinion will be questioned more than the former. The church, as an institution, is indeed deeply enmeshed in the interests and prejudices of contemporary civilization, and so are many ministers. But the discerning, prophetic, and adventurous spirits are rather more likely to come from among the ministers of religion than from the laity if the record of the past provides any basis for prediction as to the future.

There may be some who will question whether several of Mr. Niebuhr's rather fundamental assumptions are actually true. As a matter of fact, is religion a less potent factor in qualifying the behavior of individuals and social groups in our day than in days that are gone? Or is it merely that the area of ecclesiastical authority has narrowed? Again, does our modern industrial civilization actually disregard personality less than earlier civilizations? It is true that in the building up of our industrial civilization there has been an enormous depersonalization of contacts of all sorts; and yet one can hardly regard as superior to ours a civilization built on slave labor, or one which really regarded as persons only the upper strata of society. One might question also the accuracy of the author's contention that the interpreters of liberal religion are more concerned with making religion intellectually respectable than ethically potent. It is doubtful if a survey of the sermons being preached or the literature coming from the presses would bear out that view.

Does Civilization Need Religion? is a stimulating and disturbing book. A vivid imagination, an earnest and inquiring mind, and a daring and devoutly religious spirit are in evidence on every page. No doubt there will be disagreement with the opinions of the author on many points; but no one will question that he has done a great service in this discussion and study of the social potency of religion in Western civilization.

CHARLES THOMAS HOLMAN

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BOOKS RECEIVED

[The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length]

RELIGIONS IN GENERAL

BERTHOLET, ALFRED. *Buddhismus im Abenland der Gegenwart.* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1928. 40 pages. M. 1.50.

This address, given at a missionary congress at Göttingen in 1927, is an interesting and challenging survey of the way in which Buddhism made its impact upon German philosophy, art, and scientific scholarship. Its influence today is noted in religious sects purely Buddhist and those shaped by Buddhist ideology. The author makes several suggestions to account for the success of Buddhist propaganda in the western world.

BOUDRIOT, WILHELM. *Die altgermanische Religion in der amtlichen kirchlichen Literatur des Abendlandes vom 5 bis 11 Jahrhundert.* Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1928. viii+79 pages.

There have been many approaches to the problem of recovering the folk religions forming the basis for the complex Christianity of Europe which absorbed and suppressed them. The author has done the important work of sifting the official church literature for information covering the pre-Christian religion of Germany. The quoted materials make an imposing and illuminating collection.

CLEMEN, CARL. *Die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte.* Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft M.B.H., 1928. 128 pages.

A critical survey of the manner in which the psychoanalysts deal with the materials of early religions and a none too severe exposition of their monoideism and bias. The work makes a very good synopsis of opinions.

SAUNDERS, KENNETH. *The Gospel for Asia.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. xv+245 pages. $2.50.

In this work the author has made a comparative study of the three great sacred texts, the Bhagavadgita, the Saddharmapundarica and the Fourth Gospel. These three books for him represent the finest flowering of the religious thinking of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity. He notes sympathetically the striking similarity among them. As a way of approaching mutual understanding across the borders of religions this book should help. None better than the author can open the doors to appreciation of other faiths, no one is a better apologist for Christianity. The book is beautifully written and the selected readings at the end of the volume are an additional attraction.

SENART, ÉMILE. *Les Castes dans l'Inde.* Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1927. vii+245 pages. Fr. 40.

This work was first published more than thirty years ago. The present edition by the Musee Guimet is a reprinting of the original work unchanged.

HEBREW LITERATURE AND RELIGION

RAHLFS, ALFRED. *Paul de Lagardes wissenschaftliches Lebenswerk im Rahmen einer Geschichte seines Lebens dargestellt. Mitteilungen des Septuaginta-Unternehmens der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen.* Band 4, Heft 1. Berlin: Weidmann, 1928. Table of contents+97 pages. M. 4.50.

With this initial part of the fourth volume the "Mitteilungen" of the Göttingen Septuagint project sever their connection with the publications of the "Gessellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen." For the rest they remain as before. Their new independence is fitly inaugurated by a sketch of the scientific labors of the originator of the great project, Paul de Lagarde, from the pen of the present director of the project, Alfred Rahlfs. It has become rather the fashion to underrate de Lagarde's contributions to Septuagintal and Semitic studies quite as much as at one time he was overrated. At the University of Chicago the Peshito project, just getting under way, appreciates highly the astonishingly diligent labors and penetrating insight of this outstanding biblical scholar of a past generation and feels keenly the need of supplementing its all too slender stock of de Lagarde's works, especially those which have to do with the Syriac Old Testament.

NEW TESTAMENT

LOHMEYER, ERNST. *Kyrios Jesus. Eine Untersuchung zu Phil. 2:5–11.* Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1928. 89 pages. M. 4.80.

The old problem regarding the derivation of "Lord" as a title for Jesus is here reopened. The traditional opinion of its Septuagint origin, and the more recent view of Bousset and his school that it came into Christianity from the cult-imagery of contemporary mystery religions, are both rejected. On the basis of Phil. 2:5–11, which is taken to be a primitive Christian psalm, the mythological *motif* is discovered to have been the basal idea. The dualism of eschatological thinking provided the imagery for a cosmic figure such as Paul depicts, who first suffers defeat at the hands of the evil one and then rises to a place of triumph. He is "Lord" in the cosmos, not "Lord" over a worshipping community nor a mere replica of the Hebrew "Lord" of Old Testament scripture. As for the origin of this imagery, the author thinks it certainly pre-Pauline and believes it would have been entirely appropriate in connection with primitive Palestinian Christian thinking about the heavenly Son of Man.

WEIDINGER, KARL. *Die Haustafeln. Ein Stück Urchristlicher Paränese.* Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1928. 80 pages. M. 5.25.

This is an attempt to isolate, define, and trace to their source those elements in early Christian teaching that may be styled exhortations pertaining more especially to religion as practiced in the home—the table-talk so to speak of the Christian family. This type of ethical instruction, dealing with conduct in the family circle, is found illustrated in such New Testament passages as Eph. 6:1 ff.; Col. 3:18 ff.; I Peter 2:13 ff.; Titus 2:1–10. Its antecedents are discovered both in Hellenistic Judaism and in the teachings of the Greek moralists. But whether Christianity was indebted mainly to Jews or to Greeks for this type of instruction cannot, the author thinks, be positively determined.

BRÉHIER, ÉMILE. *La Philosophie de Plotin.* Paris: Boivin & Co., 1928. xix+188 pages. Fr. 15.

Professor Bréhier of the Sorbonne had already demonstrated his knowledge of Plotinus in his excellent French rendering of the *Enneades* published a few years ago (Paris: "Les Belles Lettres," 1924–25). The present volume is a series of lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in the winter of 1921–22. Their aim is not a complete exposition of the system of Plotinus, but only an interpretation of his thinking regarding the One, the Intelligence and the Soul, that is, the "intelligible world" as distinct from the "world of sense." Perhaps the most significant contribution made by this book to the study of the subject is to be found in the chapter on the Orientalism of Plotinus and the distinction which is drawn between his type of idealism and that of the classical Platonist. Hindu thought is believed to have exerted a distinct influence upon Plotinus, notwithstanding his own conviction that he was simply an interpreter of a purely Greek heritage. Great as is his debt to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, the quest of the Greek mind was essentially rational while Plotinus sought primarily a mystical experience of union with the divine. It is the desire of the oriental religionist who appeals to a mediator savior to effect the union, which the philosopher strives to accomplish without resort to the mythological imagery of a mediator. Thus the idealism of Plotinus is found to be essentially oriental rather than Greek, and hence the ease with which his followers could come to terms with the popular religions, and one might say also, with Christianity.

DOMBART, B., AND KALB, A. *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Episcopi De Civitate Dei Libro XXII.* Vol. I, Lib. I–XIII. Leipzig: Teubner, 1928. xxxiv+599 pages. M. 10.

This is the first volume, including Books I–XIII, of a new critical edition of the Latin text of Augustine's *City of God* in the handy Teubner series. The type is less easy on the eye than is the more open page of the Hoffmann edition in the *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum* which is now nearly thirty years old. In the meantime critical study upon the text of Augustine has made some progress, the latest results of which are incorporated in the new edition. All students should welcome so excellent and convenient a text available at so moderate a cost.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

BATIFFOL, MGR PIERRE. *Saint Gregoire le Grand.* Paris: Lecoffre, 1928. 233 pages.

This is a new volume in the series "The Saints" that already includes many noteworthy names from Paul to Gregory VII. A book about so conspicuous a figure in history as Gregory the Great written by so distinguished a Catholic scholar as Mgr Pierre Batiffol cannot fail to attract attention. The author's complete familiarity with the sources of information and his admiration for his hero make his pages fascinating reading. To Mommsen's remark that Gregory was "just a small great man," Batiffol replies that Mommsen "was born insolent" and that Gregory, despite his humble birth, was a man of very unusual force and character. On such matters judgments are sure to differ, but no future student of the subject can afford to dismiss this volume as the work of a mere partisan.

BERGENDOFF, CONRAD. *Olavus Petri and the Ecclesiastical Transformation in Sweden, 1521–1552.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. 264 pages. $2.50.

This informing study of the Reformation in Sweden by a Chicago Lutheran minister is the product of adequate research in Swedish, Dutch, and German libraries. Emphasis is laid on the historic rôle of Olavus Petri as the creative personality who, side by side with ecclesiastical changes introduced by Gustavus Vasa for political reasons, "nourished the spirit of the evangelical movement," and gave permanency and religious content to the Reformation.

FAYE, EUGENE DE. *Origène. Sa Vie, Son Oeuvre, Sa Pensée. II.* Paris: Leroux, 1927. iii+248 pages.

Four years ago the first volume of this notable work on Origen appeared. It dealt with the life and writings of Origen, while the present book is concerned with his philosophical environment. A third volume is to follow, devoted to an exposition of his doctrines. But already the main positions of Professor de Faye are available in more popular form, in his *Esquisse de la pensée d'Origène,* composed of eight lectures delivered at Upsala in the year 1925, which were also translated into English the following year under the title *Origen and His Work* (London: Allen and Unwin).

No previous scholar has investigated the intellectual setting of Origen's life with anything like the detail that characterizes this book. Here Origen is set into relation not only with the greater schools of Greek philosophy, but with those syncretistic types of thinking that prevailed in Roman times. Quite properly it is assumed that to understand Origen, one must know not only Platonists and Stoics, but also men of diverse tendencies and feelings like Plutarch, Dion of Prusa, Maximus of Tyre, Lucian, Celsus, Apollonius of Tyana, and Numenius. Thus Origen is to be viewed more especially in relation to the later—one might say the decadent—intellectualism of the Graeco-Roman world and not so exclusively in the light of the philosophy of the classical period as has sometimes been the case. At this point Harnack's interpretation given in the *History of Dogma,* is subjected to some incisive and timely criticisms. Professor de Faye's third volume will be eagerly awaited.

STONE, EDWARD NOBLE. *Translation of Chapters XI–XVI of the Pseudo-Augustinian Sermon Against Jews, Pagans, and Arians, Concerning the Creed, also of Ordo Prophetarum of St. Martial of Limoges.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1928. Pages 195–214.

TARNER, GEORGE EDWARD. *Christianity and the Church Mystical: The Harvest of the World's Redemption.* Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co., 1928. viii+149 pages. 4*s.* 6*d.*

An attempt to accredit Christianity and promote missions by a series of studies on the early church. The book is reactionary, uncritical, and incoherent, and will contribute nothing either to scholarship or to religion.

The Conversations at Malines. New York: Oxford University Press, 1928. 95 pages. $1.50.

Valuable record of this now historic series of discussions. Contains separate reports by the Roman Catholics and Anglicans conferring; the reports, however, have been "read, discussed and amended by both parties acting in collaboration." Both are marked by mutual appreciation and optimism.

Vorträge 1924–25. Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg. Edited by Fritz Saxl. Leipzig: Teubner, 1927. viii+371 pages. M. 18.

Vorträge 1925–26. Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg. Edited by Fritz Saxl. Leipzig: Teubner, 1928. viii+217 pages. M. 12.

For the past half dozen years the Warburg library has issued from time to time several volumes of papers under the general editorship of Fritz Saxl. The two volumes that have recently appeared lend further prestige to this enterprise. The series of essays for 1924–25 contains the usual variety of papers, nine in all, among which several are of especial interest to students of Christianity. Reitzenstein contributes two papers, one on ancient Greek theology and its sources and another on "Plato and Zarathustra." K. L. Schmidt writes on Paul in relation to the ancient world. And H. H. Schraeder has an important essay on Manicheism. The volume for 1925–26 embraces six contributions. That by H. Leitzmann on the rise of the Christian liturgy in the light of the oldest sources, J. Mesnil's "Die Kunstlehre der Frührenaissance im Werke Masaccios," and F. Noack's "Triumph und Triumphbogen" are also extensively illustrated. Each volume is furnished with an excellent index.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND ETHICS

Brown, William Adams. *Beliefs that Matter.* New York: Scribner's, 1928. xiii+333 pages. $2.75.

The discussions in this book are probably exactly what will be welcomed by the many persons who think of religion in terms of the traditional theological schema. It enables the reader to keep on using all the terms prescribed by orthodoxy, while giving to them a reasonable, non-polemic, spiritual value. Readers who are more trenchant in their mental processes will find that some of the beliefs advocated do not "matter" very much for them and that the stretching of terms to include altered meanings does not always conduce to clear thinking. The fine courteous spirit of the discussions and the profound religious feeling which dominates them are what we have learned to expect in everything that Dr. Brown writes.

Fulton, William. *Nature and God.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner's, 1927. xvi+294 pages. $3.25.

The Alexander Robertson Lectures delivered at the University of Glasgow in 1926, revised and expanded into an unusually thoughtful volume. Dr. Fulton undertakes a careful and exhaustive study of the interpretations of Nature given both in the history of philosophy and in current scientific and philosophical discussions. In the light of this study he asks how far the conception of purpose, which is a well-established aspect of our natural human life, can be regarded as integral in the larger Nature which produced human life. A theistic philosophy is thus justified, the emphasis being laid on the share which man may have in the working out of the divine purpose.

GALLOWAY, GEORGE. *Faith and Reason in Religion.* New York: Scribner's, 1928. vii+231 pages. $2.25.

A collection of essays on various problems of religion and theology. The titles are: "Knowledge and Religious Faith"; "The Genesis and Truth of Religious Beliefs"; "Evolution and the Finality of the Christian Religion"; "History and Its Religious Interpretation"; "The Theological Antithesis of Grace and Freedom"; "Bishop Butler as an Apologist"; "The Study of Theology and the Work of the Minister."

KOLBE, MONSIGNOR. *A Catholic View of Holism.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. xiii+103 pages. $1.25.

A good-humored and critically acute discussion of General Smuts' much-discussed book, indicating points wherein his philosophy might be improved if it were supplemented with certain tenets of Catholic philosophy. In general, the Catholic critic looks upon the evolutionary mysticism of Smuts as a partial return to the more wholesome teachings of the great fathers of the Church.

MISSIONS

BAADER, ETHEL M. *Indian Playmates of Navajo Land.* New York: Friendship Press, 1927. 133 pages. $0.75.

This is a course planned for primary children in a week day church school and is intended to give them a sympathetic understanding of children of another race. Two Navajo Indian children, of six and eight years of age, are the center of interest. Good stories are outlined, background material for the leader is provided, and some fine programs and worship services are suggested. Simple religious customs are introduced and a primary child should get help in the formation of religious concepts by sharing the experiences graphically presented in the situations of Indian life. A short but valuable bibliography of books and pictures is included.

SCHWAB, JEWEL HUELSTER. *In the African Bush.* New York: Friendship Press, 1928. viii+130 pages. $0.75.

A course for junior boys and girls, consisting first of interesting stories, folklore, and music of the African people, and second, of sample study hours and worship services of which the above source material is made to form a part.

SHRIVER, WILLIAM P. *What Next in Home Missions?* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1928. viii+232 pages. $1.00.

There was a time when home missions meant catching up with the western frontier. But today organized home missions are faced with a different task, namely, to make the church efficient in facing the challenges of its own community, be that rural or urban. The study group, therefore, is encouraged to center attention upon certain typical situations in American life, and then to ask: How did the community or the church come to be what it is? What is the next step?

WARNER, GERTRUDE C. *Windows into Alaska.* New York: Friendship Press, 1928. 104 pages. $0.75.

This is another series of primary stories and programs based on the vivid experiences of a young American boy, the son of an American missionary, in the far north. The Friendship Press is succeeding well in producing a new type of missionary literature that aims to promote an intelligent understanding of other people and to stimulate desirable Christian racial attitudes. There is no strained moralizing or patronizing but a wholesome and happy relationship with children of other lands. Primary children will get real satisfaction in picturing these scenes and reliving the incidents of happy times that an American boy had among the Eskimo children.

PREACHING AND WORSHIP

MASSON, THOMAS L. *In Tune with the Finite.* New York: Century, 1928. 266 pages. $2.50.

Mr. Masson's *The City of Perfection* finds a companion volume in the present book. In varying moods, but always with sincerity, the author attempts to furnish help to his human comrades as they seek to adjust themselves to this actual world in which we wish to give a good account of ourselves, at least to ourselves. It is full of honest talk, with genial humor well thrown in for spice. Lots of horse sense in the book, which someone has described as stable thinking.

MORGAN, WALTER AMOS. *The Dreams of Youth.* New York: Century, 1928. xiv+246 pages. $2.00.

The "children's sermon" has assumed a large place in the conduct of worship in Protestant churches within the past generation and many volumes of these addresses have been issued. This one, by the minister of the New First Congregational Church of Chicago, is not according to the conventional type. On the whole it is the best collection with which we are acquainted. The note of reality runs through it. Dr. Morgan does not talk down to his juvenile audience. He is never silly. The stories are not far-fetched. The moral is not elaborated when it is already obvious. The literary form is admirable.

RICHARDSON, CAROLINE F. *English Preachers and Preaching, 1640–1670.* New York: Macmillan, 1928. xii+359 pages. $2.50.

This is an interesting study of a significant generation of English preachers. The sources are thoroughly searched. The characters are presented vividly. Their human qualities are revealed with refreshing frankness. The most interesting section is "The Secular Interests of the Clergy." The value of the book is greatly increased by the Bibliography and Index. It is a genuine contribution to the history of preaching.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Children's Prayers. Recorded by their mother. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1928. 173 pages. $1.25.

A mother of three young boys has kept a faithful record of her children's prayers, as they have been freely and naturally expressed in the atmosphere of a warm religious home. The record is of one boy from four years of age till ten, and of the other two from their first utterances until five and six. It is a most interesting and valuable collection for all who are studying the religious development of young children. The book is not critical or analytical but is a careful record of the prayers of one home. We need the publication of similar records by other homes of different religious character. Especially would we welcome prayers that would reflect the attitude of parents who are struggling with the problem of adjusting their religious faith and concepts to their modern and scientific world views.

KUPKY, OSKAR. *The Religious Development of Adolescents.* Translated by William Clark Trow. New York: Macmillan, 1928. vii+138 pages. $1.50.

Professor Kupky has placed his readers under a genuine debt by this significant discussion. He has very well illustrated one of the techniques that need to be pursued in order to arrive at some valid judgment concerning the content and character of adolescent experience. Professor Kupky works under no illusion with reference to the complexity of that experience or the difficulty of arriving at an adequate description of it. It is increasingly clear to the American religious educator that the next step in Religious Education is to arrive, through processes of research and experimentation, at a valid description of the experiences of those undergoing religious education. While Professor Kupky's material is very limited in extent, nevertheless it illustrates in a clear way the technique which needs to be pursued in the further development of such data.

PIPER, DAVID R. *Community Churches.* Chicago: Willet, Clark and Colby, 1928. 160 pages. $1.50.

Here is an attempt in 160 pages to give the facts, to provide an interpretation, and to present a handbook concerning the Community Church movement in the United States. The facts alleged are no doubt accurate, but are not as impressive as the author feels. The interpretation is not convincing; it savors too strongly of special pleading. The handbook will be useful to groups wishing to organize a community church.

SHERIDAN, ALMA STANLEY. *Teaching Intermediates in the Church School.* New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1928. 215 pages. $1.00.

This is a new textbook in the Standard Leadership Training Curriculum, outlined and approved by the International Council of Religious Education. It is well graded for the groups who will be expected to use it, and is most practical in its selection of topics and teaching methods. Modern psychological principles are recognized and the best pedagogical practices are suggested. It is distinctly a textbook for Religious Education and care is taken to provide for Christian motivation in all the processes that are discussed. Teachers of early adolescents will welcome this well-written text.

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